P.L.L. Ramanathan Chettiar and others vs Board of Revenue, by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies, Madras and others

Veeraswami, J.—Though the petitioners were different, their petitions have been heard together, as they turn upon a common point. Both of

them are existing rice mill owners in different villages. The third respondent in each of the petitions applied for and obtained permits for installing

and running new rice mills in the particular villages under the provisions of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1959. The licensing authority

had considered and overruled the objections of the petitions who are existing rice mill owners. The petitioners seek to quash the orders of the

Commissioner of Civil Supplies in both the cases. The ground on which the orders of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies are canvassed is that as

he exercises a quasi-judicial function under S. 5 (4) and (5) of the Act and as the orders passed under that section are quasi-judicial, they are

defective in that they do not contain any reasons. It is argued that because Sub-S. (4) of that section directs the authority to cause a full and

complete investigation to be made in the prescribed manner in respect of certain specified matters before the application for permit is granted, the

orders granting permits must ex facie show that the licensing authority had taken those matters into consideration. I am unable to accept this

contention. The Act is intended to regulate the rice milling industry in the interests of the general public and for that purpose it provides for

appointment of certain licensing officers and lays down the principles on which they could grant permits. The Act also indicates that procedure to

be followed by applicants as well as the authority in applying for and granting licences. The Act contains other provisions relating to revocation,

suspension and amending of licenses, certain restrictions on rice mills and powers to inspect. It may be noticed mat the Act provides for no appeals

against orders made under S. 5, unlike In the case of orders passed under S. 6 or 7. Having regard to these provisions, therefore, it seems to me

that so far as the jurisdiction to grant permits under S. 5 is concerned, it is purely administrative. The mere fact that Sub-S. (4) of S 5 directs the

licensing authority to take into account certain specified matters does not mean that for that reason its jurisdiction is quasi judicial in character. The

jurisdiction under this provision does not involve, as it appears to me, any adjudication on rights. Due to exigencies calling for regulation S. 5

makes provisions in order to effectuate that purpose. It may be that in the course of giving effect to the regulatory provisions, persons, like the

petitioners as existing rice mill owners may indirectly be affected in a certain sense. But that is no justification by itself to hold that the jurisdiction

exercised under S. 5 is quasi-judicial.

Even so, I think, it is desirable that an authority acting under S. 5 briefly at least indicates the reasons for its orders, especially where objections

to grant of permits are made for its consideration. But that is not to say that failure to give such reasons will necessarily affect the validity of such

orders. Where no reasons are given in an order, prima facie, it is liable to be considered to be arbitrary. For that reason it may be necessary to

issue rule nisi and call for the records so that this Court may be satisfied that the power under S. 5 has been justly and reasonably, and not

arbitrarily exercised, more especially when the Act has provided do appeal against such orders.

It is true Rajagopalan, J. in P.K.N. Abdul Mazid Vs. The State of Madras and Others, was of the view that the jurisdiction of the authority

issuing permits under S. 5 was quasi-judicial. But a Division Bench of this Court in Lakshmiammal v. P. V. Vaidyalingam and another (2) was

apparently inclined to take a different, view, when the Court observed:

This Court, on more than one occasion, has pointed out the desirability of administrative bodies performing statutory functions to disclose in their

orders reasons sufficient to show that they have taken into consideration all those matters that the statute obliges them to do. But we do not

consider that a writ should issue in this case for that omission.

Jagadisan, J. in S. S. R. M. A. S. M. S. M. Ramasundara Nadar and Co. Parasakthi Rice Mill v. State of Madras and another W. P. No 644

of 1961 was perhaps inclined to take the same view. A learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venugopata Reddi v. Amara

Venkata Narasimhalu Chetti and another A.I. R. 1962 A. P. 363 held that in granting permission under S. 8 (3) (d) of the Rice Milling Industry

(Regulation) Act, the concerned authority was under no obligation at any stage to act judicially, and that the order made by the authority was

purely an administrative order of a ministerial one, not liable to removal by certiorari.

It seems to me, however, that it is not necessary to express a final opinion in this case as to the character of the jurisdiction of the authority

functioning under S. 5 of the said Act. Apart from the desirability of such authority stating the reasons for its orders, there appears to be no defect

in the orders passed by it. The records sent up to this Court in both the petitions clearly show that investigation was made into the specified matter

and the authority was satisfied that there was enough surplus paddy in the neighborhood to justify the issue of the permits in question. The records

also show that the objections of the petitioners were duly taken into consideration before they were overruled. On that view, these petitions should

fail. On behalf of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies, it was argued that the objectors had no locus standi to bring up these petitions under Art.

226 of the Constitution. But, on the view I have expressed, namely, that the authority as seen from the records was thoroughly satisfied about the

surplus position of the paddy before issuing the permits, the petitions need not be dismissed on that ground.

The petitions are dismissed, but in the circumstances with no costs.