Phekan Singh and Another vs Emperor

Wort, J.—The petitioners were convicted, the first u/s 324 and the second u/s 323, I.P.C.

The only point taken in the argument is that the Courts below admitted evidence of character. The evidence was by a police officer who stated that the first petitioner was under police surveillance. The story of the prosecution was that the two petitioners came to the complainant and complained to him of his making reports to the police and thereupon attacked him. There is no doubt, as it seams to me, that the occurrence took place.

The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Crown justifies the admission of the evidence u/s 7, Evidence Act, which says:

Facts which are the occasion, cause or effect immediately or otherwise of relevant facts or facts in issue, etc.

It is quite clear that the evidence of the complainant when he stated that the accused came and made a complaint to him stating that he had been making complaints to the police was relevant and admissible u/s 7. But when the prosecution go on to corroborate their story, giving support to the prosecution case, by calling a police officer to prove that the accused was under police surveillance it seems to me that; they were acting in direct contravention of Section 54, Evidence Act. The learned Magistrate states that the evidence was admissible u/s 14 and Section 8, but it seems to me that the learned Magistrate completely misunderstands the Evidence Act in this respect. It is true that the motive and even the state of the mind are sometimes relevant questions in issue in a criminal case. The state of the mind as shown by the previous course of criminal conduct may be relevant in cases where the defence is that what has been done was done by a mere accident. But this case does not come within any of those illustrations. It is quite clear that the prosecution brought this evidence to show that the complainant was telling a probable story and that being so the evidence was hopelessly inadmissible. I am not forgetting Section 167, Evidence Act; but evidence of this kind goes to the very root of the administration of criminal justice, and it seems to me more important that justice should be administered strictly by Courts of criminal jurisdiction than that persons involved in an offence of this kind should be punished. It is true that objection to this evidence was not taken in the Court below; but it is the duty of the trial Magistrate or Judge to refuse to admit evidence which is not admissible according to law, and therefore it is his duty to exclude such evidence. The learned Magistrate in his explanation states that he was not influenced by this evidence but although that may be so, it seems to me that it has influenced his consideration of the other evidence in the case.

This is a case which I do not think justifies a rehearing, and therefore the conviction of the petitioners will be set aside.