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Judgment
ORDER
The applicant being aggrieved by termination order, dated 23.03.2018, issued by the 4th respondent has filed the OA to set aside the said order and consequently direct the respondent to confirm the services of the applicant in the post of Lab Assistant w.e.f. 22.08.2015 and grant other relief or reliefs as this Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the circumstance of the case thus render justice.
Brief facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant are as follows: The applicant was working as a Laboratory Technician in the 4th respondent organization. In the year 2013, the applicant received a communication dated 08.07.2013 from the respondent calling her for an interview for the post of Laboratory Technician, pursuant to her sponsorship by the Employment Exchange. Upon completion of the selection process, an offer of appointment was issued to the applicant on 12.08.2013, placing her on probation. Consequently, the applicant was appointed as a Laboratory Technician, and her pay was fixed at Rs. 8,560 + Rs. 2,800 with effect from 21.08.2013. Thereafter, the applicant was transferred to the CGHS, KK Nagar, Chennai, with effect from 10.05.2014, where she continued to work until 13.07.2015. The applicant's performance was assessed periodically, and she was graded as "Average" by the Reviewing Authority. Subsequently, her period of probation was extended, with a further extension being communicated to her vide proceedings dated 05.11.2015. Thereafter, the applicant was awarded a rating of 7 points in the Annual Performance Appraisal Reports (APARs) for the years 2015–2016 and 2016–2017. While the applicant was continuing in service, her juniors, who had been recruited through the Employment Exchange in the year 2015, were regularized in service. However, to the shock and surprise of the applicant, an order of termination dated 23.03.2018 was served upon her, terminating her services without assigning any reason whatsoever and without affording her any opportunity of being heard. Aggrieved, she has come before this Tribunal.
The learned counsel for the applicant contended that the applicant was sponsored by the Employment Exchange, underwent the prescribed selection process, was duly appointed by the competent authority, and continued in service for about 4 years and 7 months. Therefore, her services could not have been terminated without following the due process of law and the procedure prescribed under the relevant CCS (CCA) Rules. The impugned order, having been passed without following the prescribed procedure, is arbitrary, illegal and liable to be set aside.
It was further contended that the respondents failed to consider the applicant's APARs, wherein she was awarded 7 points and her performance was duly assessed. The counsel relied upon OM No. F.44/1/59-Estt.(A) dated 15.04.1959, which requires a decision regarding confirmation or extension of probation to be taken within six to eight weeks after expiry of the initial probationary period and communicated to the employee, along with reasons where probation is extended. The respondents neither furnished reasons for extending the probation nor for terminating the applicant's services, rendering the impugned order unsustainable.
The learned counsel further submitted that the applicant was not afforded any reasonable opportunity of being heard before termination, in violation of the principles of natural justice. Moreover, the terms of the original appointment order contemplated one month's notice for termination of services. The respondents, having failed to comply with the said condition, acted contrary to the terms of appointment, and the impugned termination is therefore liable to be set aside.
Reiance placed upon the additional documents obtained under the RTI Act, the learned counsel submitted that similarly situated candidates sponsored through the Employment Exchange and appointed as Lab Assistants in the years 2013 and 2015 were regularized, whereas the applicant alone was terminated. Such differential treatment is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The denial of regularization and permanent employment, despite the applicant's long and satisfactory service, also gives rise to a legitimate expectation and is contrary to the principles of equity, fairness, good conscience and fair play.
The learned counsel for the applicant relied on the following decisions and prayed for the relief sought in the present OA.
Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal & Others Vs State of West Bengal reported in (2009) 1 SCC 768;
Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Dr M.S. Mudhol & Another Vs S.D. Halegkar & Others reported in (1993) 3 SCC 591;
Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Zamil Ahmed Vs State of Bihar & Others reported in (2016) 12 SCC 342;
Judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of BPCL Vs DAX Mohan, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Mad 3365
Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents, while vehemently opposing the contentions of the applicant, relied upon the reply statement and submitted that, under the Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 1991, possession of a two-year Diploma in Laboratory Technology from a recognized institution is an essential qualification for appointment to the post of Laboratory Technician. It was contended that the applicant, Smt. P. Muthu Kumar Selvi, possessed only a one-year Diploma in Medical Laboratory Technology (MLT) from IPH&H, New Delhi, and therefore did not fulfil the prescribed educational qualification at the time of her appointment. Consequently, her appointment was not in conformity with the applicable Recruitment Rules.
The learned counsel further submitted that, while forwarding the requisition to the Employment Exchange, Chennai, the CGHS authorities had specifically prescribed “two years Diploma in Laboratory Technology from a recognized institution” as the essential qualification in Column 2 of the requisition form dated 11.03.2013. However, the applicant was selected and appointed despite possessing only a one-year Diploma. Thus, the selection and appointment of the applicant were contrary to the prescribed eligibility criteria, and the respondents were justified in terminating her services.
In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Raghuwar Pal Singh, Civil Appeal No.1636 of 2012, decided on 13.03.2018, and submitted that the impugned order of termination is legally sustainable. He accordingly prayed for dismissal of the Original Application.
We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel on either sides, perused the pleadings and the materials available on record. We have also carefully perused the judicial decisions relied on by the respective parties.
In the present Original Application, the applicant was appointed to the post of Laboratory Technician pursuant to the appointment order dated 21.06.2013. It is not in dispute that the applicant was sponsored by the Employment Exchange and was selected and appointed through the prescribed selection process. The applicant had furnished all the relevant particulars at the time of her appointment, and there is no material on record to show that she had suppressed any fact or misrepresented her qualifications before the respondents for securing the appointment.
The principal objection raised by the respondents is that, under the applicable Recruitment Rules, the prescribed educational qualification for the post of Laboratory Technician was a two-year Diploma in Laboratory Technology, whereas the applicant possessed only a one-year Diploma in Medical Laboratory Technology (DMLT) at the time of her appointment. We have carefully considered the documents produced by the learned counsel for the applicant, particularly the information furnished by the respondents under the Right to Information Act vide communication dated 21.11.2019. The information sought and furnished is extracted below:
| Information Sought | Information furnished |
|---|---|
| From 01.01.2013 how may Lab Technician was appointed with one-year DMLT certificate in CGHS | 1 (One) in CGHS Kolkata |
| From 01.01.2013 how may Lab Technician was appointed with one-year DMLT certificate in CGHS | 1 (One) in CGHS Bangalore |
The above information assumes significance, as it demonstrates that candidates possessing a one-year DMLT qualification were appointed as Laboratory Technicians in other regions of the CGHS, notwithstanding the then-existing requirement of a two-year Diploma under the Recruitment Rules. It is further borne out from the records that the respondents subsequently amended the Recruitment Rules by reducing the prescribed qualification from a two-year Diploma to a one-year Diploma.
In these circumstances, the appointment of the applicant, who had disclosed her qualification and was selected and appointed by the competent authority, cannot, in our considered view, be characterized as an illegal appointment. At the highest, the appointment could be regarded as an irregular appointment arising out of an error on the part of the appointing/selection authorities, particularly when the applicant had neither suppressed any material fact nor committed any misrepresentation. Such an irregularity, having occurred at the instance of the authorities and not due to any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the applicant, cannot, after a substantial period of service, be used as a ground to terminate her appointment.
15, We find considerable force in the submission of the learned counsel for the applicant, who placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. M.S. Mudhol v. S.D. Halegkar, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 591. In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering a similar situation, held that where the candidate had disclosed the qualification possessed by him, yet the Selection Committee wrongly selected him, and the competent authority thereafter acquiesced in the appointment and permitted him to continue in service for a considerable period of 12 years, the appointment could not be disturbed at a belated stage on account of the authorities' own error. The relevant portion of the order is extracted below:
“6.Since we find that it was the default on the part of the 2nd respondent, Director of Education in illegally approving the appointment of the first respondent in 1981 although he did not have the requisite academic qualifications as a result of which the 1st respondent has continued to hold the said post for the last 12 years now, it would be inadvisable to disturb him from the said post at this late stage particularly when he was not at fault when his selection was made. There is nothing on record to show that he had at that time projected his qualifications other than what he possessed. If, therefore, in spite of placing all his cards before the selection committee, the selection committee for some reason or the other had thought it fit to choose him for the post and the 2nd respondent had chosen to acquiesce in the appointment, it would be inequities to make him suffer for the same now. Illegality, if any, was committed by the selection committee and the 2nd respondent. They are alone to be blamed for the same.
7.Whatever may be the reasons which were responsible for the non-discovery of the want of qualifications of the 1st respondent for a long time, the fact remains that the Court was moved in the matter after a long lapse of about 9 years. The post of the Principal in a private school though aided, is not of such sensitive public importance that the Court should find itself impelled to interfere with the appointment by a writ of quo warranto even assuming that such a writ is maintainable. This is particularly so when the incumbent has been discharging his functions continuously for over a long period of 9 years when the court was moved and today about 13 years have elapsed. The infraction of the statutory rule regarding the qualifications of the incumbent pointed out in the present case is also not that grave taking into consideration all other relevant facts. In the circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to go into the question as to whether a writ of quo warranto would lie in the present case or not, and further whether mere laches would disentitle the petitioners to such a writ.
8.However, we must make it clear that in the present case the 2nd respondent, Director of Education had committed a clear error of law in approving the academic qualifications of the 1st respondent when he was not so qualified. As pointed out above, the interpretation placed by him and the other respondents on the requisite educational qualifications was not correct and the appointments made on the basis of such misinterpretation are liable to be quashed as being illegal. Let this be noted for future guidance.
9.In the circumstances, we decline to interfere with the appointment of the 1st respondent and dismiss the petition. There will be no order as to costs.”
The principle laid down therein is relevant to the facts of the present case, particularly since the applicant had disclosed her qualification, was sponsored through the Employment Exchange, was selected and appointed by the competent authority, and continued in service for several years without any allegation of fraud or misrepresentation.
Similar issue was considered by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of MD Zamil Ahmed Vs State of Bihar & others, reported in (2016) 12 SCC 342, wherein the court held that there is no justification to terminate the service of applicant and that too when applicant was not responsible for making any false declaration or had suppressed any material fact for securing appointment. The relevant portion of the judgement is extracted below:
“11.Keeping in view the peculiar undisputed facts of the case and having regard to the totality of the circumstances, we are of the considered view that the State was not justified in terminating the appellant's services. In other words, the ground on which the appellant's services were terminated by the State after a period of 15 years of appellant's appointment does not appear to be well founded. This we say for the following reasons:
11.1.Firstly, the appellant and wife of the deceased at the time of seeking compassionate appointment did not conceal any fact and nor filed any false or incorrect document/declaration. On the other hand, both of them disclosed their true family relations and conditions prevailing in the deceased family on affidavit.
11.2.Secondly, the appellant, who is the brother of the deceased, undertook to maintain the family of the deceased in the event of his securing the compassionate appointment and he accordingly also gave such undertaking to the State.
11.3.Thirdly, there was no one in the family of the deceased to claim compassionate appointment except the appellant who, as mentioned above, was the close relative of the deceased, i.e., real younger brother and used to live with the deceased. He was otherwise eligible to claim such appointment being major, educated and only male member in the family.
11.4.Fourthly, the appellant after securing the employment throughout maintained the family of the deceased in all respects for the last more than 15 years and he is continuing to do so.”
Recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that a curable irregularity in the final stage of appointment cannot be a ground to invalidate an entire recruitment process. The Court observed that where the selection process was conducted fairly, vacancies were properly notified, and no fraud or malpractice was involved, minor procedural lapses at the appointment stage should not deprive successful candidates of their rights.
At this juncture, it is apposite to highlight the distinction between irregular and illegal appointments. Recently, a two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Tiwary Vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, reported in 2025 INSC 1000, observed as follows in this regard:
"22.The Division Bench also placed reliance on the procedural deviation from the regular advertisement process, by observing that the internal notice issued by the Chief Engineer did not amount to a proper recruitment notification. While procedural irregularities, if proven to be mala fide or substantially affecting fairness, may vitiate a selection process, in the present case, the selection was conducted through tests and interviews overseen by a selection committee. The entire process culminated in formal appointment letters being issued. As held by this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi (3) and Others (2006) 4 SCC 1, mere technical irregularities in appointment processes and in the absence of evidence of illegality, arbitrariness or fraud cannot be a ground to undo appointments, especially when the appointees are not at fault.
23.The Division Bench appears to have blurred the distinction between irregular and illegal appointments. In Vikas Pratap Singh (supra), this Court held that an appointment made without following every procedural formality may be irregular, but it does not become illegal unless it violates statutory provisions or is made without the existence of a post. This Court observed that if the appointment is to a sanctioned post, made by 31 of 41CWP-24697-2025 and connected cases -32- a competent authority, and not tainted by fraud or deceit, it cannot be labelled illegal merely due to some procedural lapse. The facts of the present case are squarely covered by this reasoning. The posts were sanctioned, the appellants were duly qualified, and the appointments were made by the competent authority after following due process of selection and at worst, any infirmity could only render the appointments irregular, not illegal.In R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. and Others(2006) 6 SCC 430, this Court held that appointments made within sanctioned strength, even if temporary or irregular, do not automatically become illegal unless shown to be in violation of statutory rules. There is no evidence or even a finding that the posts were not available or were created in violation of recruitment rules.
24.It is by now well settled in service jurisprudence that the validity of an individual appointment must be assessed on the basis of the appointee's own merit, eligibility, and conformity to the applicable rules. Courts must resist the tendency to issue blanket invalidations of entire batches of appointments merely on the basis of procedural infirmities that affect only a portion of the appointments. The principles of fairness, proportionality, and individual justice are foundational to administrative law and demand that a case-by-case analysis be undertaken before issuing sweeping orders of cancellation.
25.This Court has in several decisions, including State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh and Others (2009) 5 SCC 65, emphasized that when appointments are found to be irregular, the inquiry must focus on whether such irregularity amounts to illegality, and whether the appointee had any role or knowledge of the deviation. If not, and the appointee was otherwise eligible, qualified, and appointed against a sanctioned vacancy, there is no justification for nullifying such appointment. The present appellants, as evidenced by record, fulfilled all eligibility conditions, were appointed within the sanctioned strength, and underwent the requisite selection process.
26.It is here that the doctrine of severability assumes great significance. The rule is grounded in equity and legal logic: where bad can be separated from good, the good must not perish with the bad. The doctrine, though largely applied in constitutional and statutory interpretation, has gained considerable traction in service jurisprudence where a set of appointments are sought to be invalidated en masse.
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29.The case in hand presents a textbook scenario where the appellants' appointments were lumped together with others without individualized examination. The Enquiry Report itself conceded that appointments of Routine Clerks were within the cadre strength, and there is no dispute that the appellants fulfilled the prescribed qualifications and eligibility norms. There is also no suggestion of mala fides, misrepresentation or procedural breach on their part. At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention, that learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents during the course of hearing fairly submitted that the appointments of the present appellants fell within the sanctioned strength.
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31.The jurisprudence around irregular versus illegal appointments must not be blurred. An irregular appointment is one where procedure is not strictly followed but the appointee is otherwise qualified and the post is sanctioned. An illegal appointment, on the other hand, is void ab initio, such as where the appointee is ineligible or the post does not exist. When appointments are questioned on grounds of irregularity, the inquiry must not end with detecting the infirmity but must proceed further to distinguish those whose appointments are unimpeachable. Justice demands separation, not erasure.”
In light of the above, this Court is of the considered view that the appointment of the applicant requires to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances of the individual case, particularly to determine whether the same suffers from any fundamental illegality or is merely an irregularity attributable to the authorities. In the present case, the applicant was appointed in the year 2013 after being sponsored by the Employment Exchange and continued in service until her termination vide order dated 23.03.2018. The said order of termination was thereafter subjected to challenge before this Court, and pursuant to the interim order passed in the present proceedings, the applicant has continued in service during the pendency of the Original Application. Thus, the applicant had already rendered about four years and seven months of service prior to the impugned termination and has continued thereafter under the protection of the interim order of this Court. In the absence of any allegation of fraud, suppression of material facts or misrepresentation on the part of the applicant, and having regard to the fact that the discrepancy in qualification arose on account of the action or error of the authorities who selected and appointed her, it would be inequitable to sustain the termination solely on the ground of such irregularity, particularly when the Recruitment Rules were subsequently amended to prescribe a one-year Diploma as the requisite qualification.
In Sivanandan C.T. Vs. High Court of Kerala, 2023 INSC 709, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court declined to disturb the appointments of Judicial Officers made by the Kerala High Court on the ground that the appointees had already served for nearly six years and had acquired sufficient experience. The Court observed that unsettling their appointments at such a stage would deprive the State and its citizens of the benefit of experienced Judicial Officers.
In view of the foregoing discussion, our findings recorded hereinabove, and the principles laid down in the judgments referred to supra, we are of the considered view that the impugned order dated 23.03.2018, whereby the services of the applicant were terminated with effect from 24.03.2018, cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, the said order is set aside and quashed. Consequently, the interim order passed by this Tribunal on 27.04.2018, which was confirmed by the Hon’ble High Court in W.P. No.12963/2018 vide order dated 07.06.2018, is made absolute. The respondents are accordingly directed to regularize the services of the applicant in accordance with the applicable rules and extend to her all consequential benefits, including such monetary and service benefits as may be admissible in law. The respondents shall complete the said exercise within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
The Original Application is accordingly allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.