NARAYAN CHAND OSWAL vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandleshwer in Session Trial No.117/1996 dated 31.07.1998 whereby the accused were found guilty under Section 307/34 of IPC and sentenced to 7 years each of rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/- each with default stipulation.

The parties have entered into compromise outside the Court. They have filed applications I.A. No.9466/2016 under Section 320(2) of Cr.P.C. and I.A. No.9467/2016 under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. for permission to compromise before the Court.

The factum of compromise between the parties was verified by Principal Registrar of this Court on 05.12.2016.

Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the offence under section 307/34 of IPC is though non-compoundable can be compounded if this Court permits such compounding of the offence exercising extraordinary power under section 482 Cr.P.C.

Learned counsel for the appellants cited the judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Punjab and Anr., (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54. In this case, Hon''ble Apex Court in para 29 of the judgment laid down the guidelines on which the High Court using the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 and quash the charges framed under noncompoundable offences. Taking the guidelines framed by the Supreme Court under consideration. It is apparent that the present dispute is regarding a business matter. It is their personal dispute and society at large is not affected by the dispute. The Hon''ble Apex Court in para 29.2 laid down two tests stating therein that the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

Regarding Section 307 of IPC, the Apex Court observed in para 29.6 as under :- "Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship."

The incident took place on 10.05.1995 almost 22 years back. As per the allegations, the present appellants inflicted injuries by axe on head of the deceased. There were fracture also corresponding to the injuries. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that there was only single injury. The injured was admitted in the hospital but his condition regularly improved and he was discharged subsequently.

Taking into consideration the nature of injuries sustained and total period for which the injured remained admitted in the hospital, I find that this is a fit case where the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred of this Court may exercise in favour of the appellants. Accordingly, the application is allowed.

The appellants are acquitted from charge under section 307/34 of IPC.

With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is disposed of.