M.P. Electricity Board & Another vs Guneshwar Krishan Manuja

This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of nd conviction passed by the learned 2 Additional Sessions Judge, Shujalpur, District Shajapur in Sessions Trial No.141/2012 dated 30.10.2014 whereby the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant- Bardilal guilty under Section 326 of IPC and sentence him to 2 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/- and appellant- Jasmat guilty under Section 324 of IPC for two counts and sentenced him to 6 months imprisonment each and fine of Rs.500/- each.

Parties filed applications I.A. No.7513/2015 under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and I.A. No.7603/2015 for permission to compromise the matter.

The factum of compromise between the parties was verified by Principal Registrar of this Court on 23.11.2015.

Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the offences are non-compoundable but can be compounded if this Court permits such compounding of the offence exercising extraordinary power under section 482 Cr.P.C.

Learned counsel for the appellants cited the judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Punjab and Anr., (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 5 4. In this case, Hon''ble Apex Court in para 29 of the judgment laid down the guidelines on which the High Court using the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 and quash the charges framed under non- compoundable offences. Taking the guidelines framed by the Supreme Court under consideration. It is apparent that the present dispute is regarding a business matter. It is their personal dispute and society at large is not affected by the dispute. The Hon''ble Apex Court in para 29.2 laid down two tests stating therein that the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

Regarding Section 307 of IPC, the Apex Court observed in para 29.6 as under :-

"Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship."

In the present case, the parties had entered into compromise before the trial Court only. If the application is allowed, there appears to be possibility that they are living in the society peacefully in future. In such circumstances, I find it to be a fit case where using extraordinary jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. the offence may be permitted to be compromise.

After going into aforesaid guidelines into consideration and applying them into the present case, I find that this is a fit case where the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred of this Court may exercise in favour of the appellants. Accordingly, the application is allowed.

The appellant Badrilal @ Badri is acquitted from charge under Section 326 IPC and appellant- Jasmat is acquitted from charge under Section 324 of IPC.

With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is disposed of.