AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Per: Hon’ble Shri Sanjiv Kumar, Member (A)
Applicant has filed the present OA, under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking following reliefs:
“8.1Lord Ships be pleased to admit this petition. And be pleased to issue order quash and setting aside order no. E/308/5/3/43 dated 08.12.2003 passed by AEN BRC as Annexure A/1. And be pleased to direct the respondent to treat the deceased employee on duty and released all the retirement /death benefit with all consequential benefit.
8.2The Order for be call for the record.
8.3Any other relief which the Hon’ble Tribunal deems fit.
8.4Cost of suit be awarded.
Brief facts of the case as stated by the applicant are as under: -
The applicant submits that her husband was working as a Cleaner-Mukadam under Western Railway at Anand. He allegedly remained absent from duty during the period from 28.02.2002 to 31.07.2002 on account of illness, including chronic abdominal pain and anaemia. In support of the medical grounds for his absence, the applicant has relied upon various medical certificates issued during the period from June to July 2002 and subsequent communications concerning his fitness to resume duty.
Despite the medical documents explaining the absence of her husband, the respondents initiated disciplinary proceedings against him by issuing a charge memorandum dated 13.01.2003 alleging unauthorised absence from duty. The applicant contends that the medical circumstances were not properly appreciated and that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted without affording her husband an adequate opportunity to defend himself.
Further, the competent authority vide order dated 08.12.2003, imposed the penalty of ‘removal from service without grant of compassionate allowance’. The applicant alleges that the penalty was disproportionate and that the respondents failed to consider the illness of her husband, the medical certificates produced by him and the length of service rendered by him.
The applicant further states that her husband preferred an appeal dated 25.03.2004 against the penalty order. However, the said appeal was not decided during his lifetime. Her husband subsequently expired on 26.12.2006. The applicant has also relied upon a memorandum dated 21.01.2004 concerning final settlement of dues and contends that the provident fund amount and other admissible dues were not released to the family.
After the death of her husband, the applicant submitted representations dated 12.04.2007 and 30.10.2015 requesting settlement of the outstanding dues and consideration of the family’s financial hardship but the respondents failed to provide the requisite relief despite these representations.
The applicant thereafter approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 18/2016 along with M.A. No. 19/2016 seeking condonation of delay. During those proceedings, the respondents stated that upon verification of their records, no appeal dated 25.03.2004 could be traced. By order dated 05.05.2016, this Tribunal noted that more than 12 years had expired since the penalty order, that the applicant had neither produced any material to show that her husband had filed any appeal nor rebutted the respondents’ stand that no appeal was filed, and that no appeal was pending. It dismissed M.A. No. 19/2016 and rejected the O.A. “both on merit as well as on the ground of the delay and laches” under Section 19(3) read with Section 20(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. On a request for permission to file an appeal with a direction to consider it, the Tribunal declined to make any such observation, but made it clear that the applicant was “at her liberty, if she is advised to do so”. The applicant subsequently submitted a reminder dated 20.06.2016 seeking consideration of the appeal stated to have been filed by her late husband.
3. Submission of learned counsel for the applicant:
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned penalty order dated 08.12.2003 is arbitrary, disproportionate and unsustainable in law, as the respondents failed to appreciate that the absence from duty of the applicant’s husband was attributable to his illness. It is contended that the medical certificates and related documents placed on record were not duly considered before imposing the extreme penalty of removal from service without compassionate allowance.
Learned counsel further submits that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted without affording the deceased employee a reasonable and effective opportunity to defend himself. The inquiry was conducted ex parte and the relevant medical circumstances were not properly taken into consideration. It is argued that the respondents ought to have examined the material available on record before concluding that the absence was unauthorised and warranted removal from service.
Learned counsel for the applicant also submits that the deceased employee had preferred an appeal dated 25.03.2004 against the penalty order, but the same remained undecided during his lifetime. It is contended that the applicant, being the widow of the deceased employee and unfamiliar with the departmental procedures, made repeated efforts to pursue the matter and submitted representations and a reminder to the railway authorities.
Learned counsel further argues that the respondents have failed to release the provident fund amount and other admissible settlement dues of the deceased employee despite representations dated 12.04.2007 and 30.10.2015. It is submitted that the applicant and her family have suffered financial hardship following the death of the employee and that the respondents ought to have considered the matter in accordance with the applicable service rules.
In view of the above submissions, learned counsel for the applicant prays that the impugned penalty order be quashed and set aside and the respondents be directed to grant the admissible consequential benefits, including settlement dues, in accordance with law.
4. Submission of learned counsel for the respondents:
Per contra, respondents have filed their reply and denied the claim of the applicant.
Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the present OA is barred by limitation, as no appeal, as claimed by the applicant, was ever received in the office of the respondents. He contended that, pursuant to the directions issued by this Tribunal, the respondents had duly verified their records, but no appeal preferred either by the deceased employee or by his legal representative was found pending in their office.
Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the present OA is a second round of litigation, as substantially similar contentions and grounds had already been raised and considered by this Tribunal in OA No. 18 of 2016. He drew the attention of the Tribunal to the order dated 05.05.2016, whereby the earlier OA was dismissed both on merits and on the grounds of delay and laches, having regard to the availability of the remedy under the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. The applicant cannot be permitted to reagitate the same issues and grounds in the present proceedings, as doing so would amount to reopening the issues already dealt with by this Tribunal.
It was further contended that, although this Tribunal had observed in its earlier order that the applicant was at liberty to pursue an appropriate remedy, the said observation did not dispense with the requirement of availing the remedy in accordance with law. Learned counsel submitted that, instead of preferring an appeal against the relevant order, the applicant had merely submitted a reminder dated 20.06.2016, which could not be treated as an appeal by the competent authority.
Learned counsel for the respondents also raised the plea of res judicata and submitted that the grounds now raised by the applicant had already formed part of the earlier proceedings in OA No. 18 of 2016, which was dismissed by a reasoned order dated 05.05.2016. Therefore, the applicant is not entitled to reopen the same controversy through the present OA. Hence, the present OA is required to be dismissed.
Applicant has filed rejoinder and reiterated the submissions made in the OA. Applicant submits that she had preferred an appeal on 25.03.2004 against the relevant order, but the respondents failed to decide the same. She further submits that although the earlier OA No. 18/2016 was dismissed on the ground that the respondents denied receipt of the appeal, the Tribunal had granted liberty to the applicant to file an appeal or reminder. Accordingly, the applicant submitted an appeal/reminder dated 20.06.2016, which has also not been decided by the respondents.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
The principal issues that arise for consideration are whether the present OA is barred by limitation, whether it is barred by res judicata in view of the earlier order passed in O.A. No. 18/2016, and whether the applicant has established sufficient grounds for interference with the impugned penalty order dated 08.12.2003.
It is an admitted position that the penalty of removal from service without grant of compassionate allowance was imposed upon the applicant’s husband vide order dated 08.12.2003. The applicant claims that her husband had preferred an appeal dated 25.03.2004 against the said order. However, the respondents have categorically denied receipt of any such appeal and have stated that no appeal could be traced in their official records. In the earlier round, this Tribunal found that the applicant had neither produced any material to show that her husband had filed any appeal nor rebutted the stand of the respondents that no appeal was filed, and that no appeal was pending.
We further observe that the applicant had earlier approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 18/2016, wherein substantially similar grievances relating to the penalty order and the consequential benefits were raised. The said Original Application was rejected by order dated 05.05.2016 both on merit and on the ground of delay and laches, M.A. No. 19/2016 for condonation of delay having been dismissed. Although the Tribunal observed that the applicant was at liberty to file an appeal, if so advised, while expressly declining to direct the respondents to consider it, such liberty cannot be construed as an automatic extension of limitation or as a direction to reopen the disciplinary proceedings without satisfying the requirements of law.
8A. The delay in challenging the penalty order dated 08.12.2003 was the subject of M.A. No. 19/2016 seeking condonation of delay in the earlier round, which this Tribunal dismissed by order dated 05.05.2016, holding the claim to be stale; that order has attained finality. The present O.A., filed in 2018, is again directed against the same penalty order and is beyond the period prescribed under Section 21(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The only subsequent event relied upon, the reminder dated 20.06.2016, being a reminder of an appeal found not to have been established, does not give rise to a fresh cause of action or restart limitation; even reckoned from that date, the O.A. ought to have been filed by about 20.12.2017.
The applicant contends that she submitted an appeal/reminder dated 20.06.2016 in terms of the liberty granted by this Tribunal and that the respondents have failed to decide the same. The liberty in paragraph 9 of the order dated 05.05.2016 was only a liberty to file an appeal, if so advised; the Tribunal expressly declined to direct the respondents to consider any such appeal. That liberty neither condoned the delay nor revived the cause of action, which the Tribunal had found to be stale. Further, the applicant did not file an appeal; the communication dated 20.06.2016 is, on her own showing, a reminder of the appeal dated 25.03.2004, which this Tribunal had already found not to have been established.
We have also considered the applicant’s submissions regarding the illness of her husband, the medical certificates allegedly produced during the relevant period and the alleged procedural irregularities in the disciplinary proceedings. These contentions essentially relate to the validity of the original penalty order and were part of the grievance pursued in the earlier round of litigation. In view of our findings on limitation and res judicata, we do not enter into the merits of the challenge to the penalty order.
As regards the plea of res judicata raised by the respondents, the order dated 05.05.2016 was passed between the same parties, in respect of the same penalty order dated 08.12.2003 and substantially the same reliefs. This Tribunal there found that no appeal was shown to have been filed and none was pending, dismissed M.A. No. 19/2016, and rejected the O.A. both on merit and on the ground of delay and laches. That order was not challenged and has attained finality. The present O.A., founded on the very appeal dated 25.03.2004 which was found not to have been established, seeks to reopen what was finally decided, and is barred by the principle of res judicata.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we find that the applicant has failed to establish sufficient grounds for interference with the impugned order dated 08.12.2003. The challenge to the said order is barred by limitation and by res judicata, and the subsequent submission of a reminder dated 20.06.2016 does not revive the claim or entitle the applicant to the reliefs sought in the present OA.
Accordingly, the OA is dismissed.
No order as to costs.
MA pending if any, also stands disposed of.
