Mulraj Dhir vs Emperor

Rowland, J.—The petitioner Mulraj Dhir has been convicted u/s 287, I.P.C., for negligent conduct with respect to machinery and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 60 and his appeal has been dismissed by the Sessions Judge.

The facts leading up to the prosecution were that a boy Ainul went with a companion taking some wheat to be ground into flour at a mill of which the petitioner is the owner. The petitioner was absent; his servants in charge of the mill began to grind the wheat and the lid and hopper fell from the top of the mill on to the foot of the boy who was sitting on the platform; his foot was broken.

The Magistrate held that the accident was due to something being wrong with the machinery of the mill by which some parts of the machinery were thrown off and fell on the foot of the boy. In face of this he said the machinery cannot have been in order.

Now the Sessions Judge in his judgment said:

It seems cleat that the accident itself was due to the carelessness of the man operating the machinery, who might have been prosecuted if his identity was known. But I do not see how the appellant himself can be convicted u/s 287, I.P.C. on that particular score either as having himself done any negligent act or having negligently emitted to take proper order with his machinery, seeing that the actual falling of the cover was not due to any defect in the mill.

Having regard to this finding the logical conclusion would appear to be that the accused should be acquitted; but the Sessions Judge says that there were other defects discovered by the Inspector. He then refers to the evidence that there was a bamboo fence along the platform; he points out that there was an opening in it to give access and says that the appellant is still liable for failing to take proper steps to fence off the platform and the machinery; the result being that the boy was able to get up on to the platform and was injured which would not have happened had the machinery been properly railed off. I do not think the facts found can amount to criminal negligence on the part of accused. The machinery was fenced, and that should have been sufficient warning to outsiders to keep outside the fencing. To require it to be so-fenced that approach to it should be impossible would be setting up a standard of security beyond what is laid down in the law.

Admittedly the Factory Act is not applicable. The standard which was to be applied was according to Section 287, I.P.C., to take such order with the machinery as was sufficient to guard against any probable danger. The section does not say "any possible danger;" the owner is not required to provide perfect security against every possibility of danger, however remote. As I understand the section ha ought to take reasonable precautions and so much care as is sufficient to guard against such danger as can be expected within the bounds of probability.

In the result I find myself unable to uphold the conviction. It is, therefore, set aside. The fine if paid will be refunded. I note that in the Sessions Court the petitioner offered in any case to compensate the boy to the extent of the compensation awarded by the Magistrate. I hope he will carry out that offer.