Mukat Singh vs Union Of India & Ors.

ORDER

“i.

To issue directions / orders / writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order (rejection appeal) dated 21.12.2011 (A-1) penalty order dated 28.07.2010 (A-2) for imposing dismissal from service with disqualification from further employment in Government service and unfair inquiry report dated 11.06.2010 (A-3).

ii.

To issue directions / order/ writ in the nature of mandamus commanding to respondents to set aside the penalty order dated 28.07.2010 (A-2) including confirming the penalty through order dated 21.12.2011 (A-1) and also to set aside the inquiry report dated 09.06.2010 (A-3).

iii.

To issue directions / orders / writ in the nature of mandamus commanding to respondents to reinstate the applicant forthwith will all pay and allowances and other consequential benefits.

iv.

To consider any other relief which the Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.

v.

To award the cost of the application throughout.”

“7)

The very vesting of such powers of summoning and enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath; requiring discovery and production of documents; receiving evidence on affidavits; requisitioning any public record or document, or copy of such record or document from any office subject to the provisions mentioned therein; issuing commissions for examination of witnesses or documents, as are exercised by a Civil Court while trying a suit, which is a court of first instance, it is evident, that the Tribunal while adjudicating a service dispute is empowered to enter into questions of fact, and decide factual issues based on evidence, as is done by the Civil Court, even though not bound by the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In fact, the Tribunal is a substitute for the Civil Court. Prior to constitution of the Central Administrative Tribunal under the Act, 1985, the remedy was before the Civil Court, and therefore, an alternative forum has been provided under Article 323-A of the Constitution of India. It can take evidence, evaluate it and record findings of fact. The powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the other hand, do not permit such an exercise. The proceedings of the High Court under Article 226 are summary proceedings, whereas the proceedings of the Tribunal, even though they are required to be completed expeditiously, are not the same as the High Court in this sense. The Tribunal has been vested with powers to examine questions of fact, to take evidence and decide factual issues based thereon. This aspect has also been considered by a Seven Judges Bench decision of the Supreme Court of India in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, wherein it has been observed in Paragraph 93 - "We may add that the Tribunal will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted." However, for the benefit of the Tribunal, the entire Paragraph 93 is quoted hereinbelow:-

"93.

Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned."

8)

When we peruse the impugned judgment in the light of what we have discussed hereinabove with regard to the scope of the proceedings before the Tribunal and the powers & jurisdiction vested in it under the Act, 1985, we find that the Tribunal has declined to enter into the factual issues on a misconception, as if it was exercising powers of judicial review as are exercised by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, by way of summary proceedings, wholly oblivious of the legal position as aforesaid. The similarity of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal vis-à-vis the High Court has been clearly discussed and explained by the Supreme Court in Paragraph 93 of its judgment in L. Chandra Kumar (Supra). This does not take away the initial role of the Tribunal to act as a Court / Tribunal of first instance. There are various issues which should have been seen by the Tribunal, especially, the points which we have noticed in our order dated 26.04.2024, quoted hereinabove, but have not been discussed.”

“23.

That takes us to the merits of the respondent’s contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent’s case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent’s grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant’s order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence. -------

27.

Now, in this state of the evidence, how can it be said that respondent even attempted to offer a bribe to Mr. Rajagopalan. Mr. Rajagopalan makes a definite statement that respondent did not offer him a bribe. He merely refers to the fact that respondent took out a paper from his wallet and the said paper appeared to him like a hundred rupee note duble folded. Undoubtedly, Mr. Rajagopalan suspected the respondent’s conduct, and so, made a report immediately. But the suspicion entertained by Mr. Rajagopalan cannot, in law, be treated as evidence against the respondent even though there is no doubt that Mr. Rajagopalan is a straightforward and an honest officer. Though we fully appreciate the anxiety of the appellant to root out corruption from public service, we cannot ignore the fact that in carrying out the said purpose, mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. It may be that the technical rules which govern criminal trials in courts may not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules. We have very carefully considered the evidence led in the present enquiry and borne in mind the plea made by the learned AttorneyGeneral, but we are unable to hold that on the record, there is any evidence which can sustain the finding of the appellant that charge No. 3 has been proved against the respondent. It is in this connection and only incidentally that it may be relevant to add that the U.P.S.C. considered the matter twice and came to the firm decision that the main charge against the respondent had not been established.”

“10.

Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.

11.

In Union of India vs. H.S. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718, it was held:

“….The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases, both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides, but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issued without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney-General's argument that sine no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charged framed against the respondent has been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondents case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him ? In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charges in question is proved against the respondent ? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.

12.

In Moni Shankar v. Union of India and Anr. [(2008) 3 SCC 484], this Court held:

17.

The departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Court exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely - preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.”

13.

In Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. (supra), whereupon both the learned counsel relied upon, this Court held:

“26.

In our opinion the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the High Court did not pose unto themselves the correct question. The matter can be viewed from two angles. Despite limited jurisdiction a civil court, it was entitled to interfere in a case where the report of the Enquiry Officer is based on no evidence. In a suit filed by a delinquent employee in a civil court as also a writ court, in the event the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings are questioned before it should keep in mind the following: (1) the enquiry officer is not permitted to collect any material from outside sources during the conduct of the enquiry. [See State of Assam and Anr. v. Mahendra Kumar Das and Ors. [(1970) 1 SCC 709] (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the procedure is a part of the principles of natural justice [See Khem Chand v. Union of India and Ors. (1958 SCR 1080) and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta (1969) 3 SCC 775]. (3) Exercise of discretionary power involve two elements (i) Objective and (ii) subjective and existence of the exercise of an objective element is a condition precedent for exercise of the subjective element. [See K.L. Tripathi v. State of Bank of India and Ors. (1984) 1 SCC 43]. (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the principles of natural justice which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in action is the basis. [See Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454] (5) The enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed on the basis of a finding which was not the subject matter of the charges is wholly illegal. [See Director (Inspection & quality Control) Export Inspection Council of India and Ors. v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra and Ors. 1987 (2) Cal. LJ 344. (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances. [See Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain (1969) 1 SCR 735, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 10].”

The judgment and decree passed against the respondent therein had attained finality.

In the said suit, the enquiry report in the disciplinary proceeding was considered, the same was held to have been based on no evidence. Appellant therein in the aforementioned situation filed a Writ Petition questioning the validity of the disciplinary proceeding, the same was dismissed. This Court held that when a crucial finding like forgery was arrived at on an evidence which is non est in the eye of the law, the civil court would have jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. This Court emphasized that a finding can be arrived at by the Enquiry Officer if there is some evidence on record. It was furthermore found that the order of the appellate authority suffered from non application of mind. This Court referred to its earlier decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. [(1999) 3 SCC 679] to opine:

“41.

We may not be understood to have laid down a law that in all such circumstances the decision of the civil court or the criminal court would be binding on the disciplinary authorities as this Court in a large number of decisions points point that the same would depend upon other factors as well. See e.g. Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 200 and Manager, Reserve Bank of India Bangalore v. S. Mani and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 100. Each case is, therefore, required to be considered on its own facts.

42.

It is equally well settled that the power of judicial review would not be refused to be exercised by the High Court, although despite it would be lawful to do so. In Manager, Reserve Bank of India Bangalore (supra) this Court observed:

‘39. The findings of the learned Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, are wholly perverse. It apparently posed unto itself wrong questions. It placed onus of proof wrongly upon the appellant. Its decision is based upon irrelevant factors not germane for the purpose of arriving at a correct finding of fact. It has also failed to take into consideration the relevant factors. A case for judicial review, thus, was made out.”

14.

In that case also, the learned single judge proceeded on the basis that the disadvantages of an employer is that such acts are committed in secrecy and in conspiracy with the person affected by the accident, stating:

“….No such finding has been arrived at even in the disciplinary proceedings nor any charge was made out as against the appellant in that behalf. He had no occasion to have his say thereupon. Indisputably, the writ court will bear in mind the distinction between some evidence or no evidence but the question which was required to be posed and necessary should have been as to whether some evidence adduced would lead to the conclusion as regard the guilt of the delinquent officer or not. The evidence adduced on behalf of the management must have nexus with the charges. The Enquiry Officer cannot base his findings on mere hypothesis. Mere ipso dixit on his part cannot be a substitute of evidence.

45.

The findings of the learned Single Judge to the effect that 'it is established with the conscience (sic) of the Court reasonably formulated by an Enquiry Officer then in the eventuality' may not be fully correct inasmuch as the Court while exercising its power of judicial review should also apply its mind as to whether sufficient material had been brought on record to sustain the findings. The conscience of a court may not have much role to play. It is unfortunate that the learned Single Judge did not at all deliberate on the contentions raised by the appellant. Discussion on the materials available on record for the purpose of applying the legal principles was imperative. The Division Bench of the High Court also committed the same error.”

15.

Yet again in M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India & ors. (2006) 5 SCC 88, this Court held:

“….Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.”

16.

Yet again in Jasbir Singh vs. Punjab & Sind Bank & ors. [(2007) 1 SCC 566], this court followed Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. (supra), stating:

“12.

In a case of this nature, therefore, the High Court should have applied its mind to the fact of the matter with reference to the materials brought on records. It failed so to do.”

17.

Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.”

“On a careful perusal of the above findings of the Tribunal in the light of the materials placed before it. we do not think that there is any case for interference, particularly in the absence of full materials made available before us in spite of opportunity given to the appellants. On the facts of this case, we are of the view that the departmental Enquiry conducted in this case is totally unsatisfactory and without observing the minimum required procedure for proving the charge. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in rendering the findings as above and setting aside the order impugned before it.”

“4.

The Tribunal, after hearing the parties and referring to the judgement in K. Prabhakar Hegde Vs. Bank of Baroda : Civil Appeal No.6599 of 2025, came to the conclusion that the procedure as prescribed under Rule 14(18) of the Rules was not followed and, therefore, the enquiry from the stage of interrogation of the charged official/applicant was vitiated and passed the order, as noticed herein before.

8.

Once, the fact of non compliance stands established and law in this regard has been laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Prabhakar Hegde (supra), the plea regarding non compliance of provisions of Rule 14(18) of the Rules being only legal plea could have been raised before the Tribunal for the first time and on account of not raising of the said plea in the appeal as well as revision, cannot and does not debar the respondent from raising the said plea.”

“(9.) IN the present case, the petitioner had requested for defence assistance and named an officer to assist him in the enquriy. This request was neither accepted nor denied. The enquiry however proceeded in the absence of the defence assistant and concluded against the petitioner. The circumstances pleaded by learned counsel for the respondent would not, in the absence of a specific reply, amount to acquiescing to proceed in an enquiry without the defence assistance. The principles of natural justice are too precious to be acquiesced with or compromised on the conduct of delinquent employee who had asked for defence assistance, and then proceeded without his application being rejected, to participate and cooperate with the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer was not justified in saying that the petitioner did not make any request for defence assistance subsequently in the proceedings. We therefore, hold that the petitioner was denied the defence assistant in the disciplinary enquiry putting him to a serious handicap resulting in violations of principles of natural justice.”

“41.

It is further held by the learned Tribunal that the respondent is not entitled to back wages considering his past conduct wherein he performed duty without uniform, non- issuance of ticket after collecting the fare, warned for not giving unpunched ticket to the checking staff.

42.

This Court is of the view that the learned Tribunal has correctly held that that the statement of the passengers were shrouded with discrepancies as the statements of Zile Singh and Subhash did not mention the exact starting point, the destination and the amount which was paid by the passengers and the two names were forthcoming and there was no statement of the group of five people who travelled from Gurgoan to Badhspur.

43.

It is further held that there is another statement given by an another passenger, namely, Mr. Abhey Singh, travelling from Gurgaon to Badshapur, the aforesaid statement lacks authenticity since the number of ticketless passengers do not tally with the names of the passengers and it does not state regarding the starting point of travel and the amount paid by each passenger to the conductor.

44.

This Court is of the opinion that the learned Tribunal has rightly observed that the statement of the passengers were not compatible with the oral testimony of MW-2 Rajbir Singh, in that case the checking team of the petitioner should have tallied the cash.

45.

This Court is of the view that since the petitioner was not able to establish the fact that any misconduct was committed by the respondent hence, the respondent is entitled to be reinstated. Moreover with regard to the backwages, it is held that the respondent workman is not entitled to any backwages due to his past record. Thus, the impugned order dated 3rd May, 2010 does not suffer from any illegality or any error apparent on the face of it.

46.

In light of the same, this Court is of the view that the impugned awards dated 2nd September, 2009 and 3rd May, 2010 passed in I.D 204/08/96 having unique case no. 02402c0002151996 by the learned Presiding Labour Court, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi do not suffer from any illegality and do not warrant any intervention of this Court by way of issuance of writ of certiorari as the petitioner has not been able to make out a case in his favour.”

“(2.) The appellant was proceeded against Departmentally when the Inquiry Officer found him guilty of the charges framed against him and submitted his report dated 17th November, 1992 to the Disciplinary Authority. After issuance of show cause notice to the appellant seeking his reply, the Disciplinary Authority agreed with the Inquiry Officer and dismissed the appellant from service vide Memo dated 12th February, 1993. The order of dismissal was put in issue by the appellant by instituting a civil suit for declaration that the order of dismissal from service was void and illegal and that the appellant was entitled to be reinstated. On 21st August, 1995, the suit was dismissed. The appeal filed by the appellant before the learned District Judge, however, succeeded and on 30th July, 1996, the learned District Judge allowing the appeal declared that since proper procedure had not been followed and the appellant had been denied the facility of a Defence Assistant after his earlier Defence Assistant had ceased to act for him, the order of dismissal was illegal. The appellate Court, however, granted liberty to the respondent to continue with the Departmental Inquiry after providing the appellant a Defence Assistant of his choice from the stage at which his earlier Defence Assistant had ceased to act as Defence Assistant and to proceed therefrom. The respondent filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, while the appellant filed cross-objections. On 21st March, 1997, the second appeal, filed by the respondent, was allowed. The learned single Judge of the High Court referred to Rule 24 of the C.C.S. (C.C. and A) Rules, 1965 and opined that in view of those provisions, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court had been taken away. The learned single Judge went on to hold that where recourse is had to Departmental proceedings, the order of the appellate authority, against an adverse order of the Disciplinary Authority, could only be subject-matter of challenge in a writ petition and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the matter of this type through a civil suit stood ousted.”

“11.

In view of the law laid down by Apex Court the opportunity that needs to be granted to a delinquent is not merely a formality but has to be reasonable and adequate. In view of the fact that during all the time the petitioner was being proceded against departmentally, she was in judicial custody. Her handicap to respond to the show cause notice / inquiry proceedings cannot be denied by the State.

12.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the State-the-employer of the petitioner ought to have been more considerate and pragmatic and ought to have waited at least till the petitioner was bailed out from the judicial custody.”

“(24.) THEREFORE, the principles of natural justice has to be observed at both stages. If natural justice is violated in the first stage, observance of natural justice in the appellate stage would not cure the said initial defect. Violation of natural justice in the first stage, render order void and non est. The order which is void non est cannot be made valid by offering ample opportunities or by following the principles of natural justice at the appellate stage. If the Appellate Authority were to consider the entire matter de novo and pass a considered order, it is all the more necessary that the authority which pass the impugned order should also follow the said minimum requirement. Otherwise, it would be a case of unfair trial followed by a fair trial. The principles of natural justice do not countenance such procedure. Failure of natural justice in the trial truly cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in appeal. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the aforesaid contention also.

“Article-1

That the said Shri Mukut Singh while working as Sub Postmaster Jewar SO during the period from 1.4.08 to 1.5.08 mad the fraudulent payment of lost/stolen KVPS. worth Rs 22.27.107/-(Rs twenty two Lak, twenty seven thousand, one hundred, & seven only) by not verifying the genuineness of these KVPs from office of issue, not verifying the local address of holders, & not consulting the negative list of lost/stolen KVPs circulated from time to time. Therefore by acting in aforesaid manner Shri Mukut Singh infringed the provisions of Rule 2, 11, & 37 of PO SB Manual Volume-II & thereby violated the provisions of Rule 3 (1) (i) & (ii) of CCS (CCA) Rules 1964

Article-2

That the said Shri Mukut Singh while working as Sub Postmaster Jewar SO during the period from 3.4.08 10 10.4.08 made the fraudulent payment of lost/stolen NSCs worth Rs 4,65,306/-(Rs four Lakhs, sixty five thousand, three hundred, & six only) by not verifying the genuineness of these NSCs from office of issue, not verifying the local address of holders, & not consulting the negative list of lost/stolen NSCs circulated from time to time. Therefore by acting in aforesaid manner Shri Mukut Singh infringed the provisions of Rule 2, 11 & 37 of PO SB Manual Volume-II & thereby violated the provisions of Rule 3 (1) (i) & (ii) of CCS (CCA) Rules 1964”