AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
The present Appeal, under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short "the Act"), against the order of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Telangana at Hyderabad (for short "the State Commission"), dated 02.04.2018 in Complaint No.39 of 2015.
Along with the Appeal, an Application for condonation of delay has also been filed. Although, in the said Application, the delay period is not shown but learned Counsel has submitted that the delay of 215 days has occurred. It is further argued that the name of the Appellant had changed during the proceedings before the State Commission but the Complainant did not bring that fact on record and therefore, they received the copy of the order only on 23.05.2018; since the staff was new, they did not bring it to the notice of the Management, and it was only when a notice in Execution Application EA No.25 of 2018 was received by the Appellant, the Appellant came to know of the impugned order. Appellant thereafter, filed Writ Petition No.32889 of 2018 on 10.09.2018 seeking issuance of a Writ of Certiorari and for quashing of the proceedings before the State Commission. The said Writ Petition, however, was withdrawn on 14.09.2018 with permission to approach this Forum. It is submitted that the delay is bonafide and the same be condoned.
I have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments of the learned Counsel and the contentions raised in the Application.
The first argument is that the name of the Appellant had changed during the pendency of proceedings before the State Commission and the Complainant did not bring this fact to their notice and did not get the title of the case changed which prevented their staff to know that the copy of the order received in the office relates to the Appellant. This argument certainly has no merits. First of all, if the Appellant had changed its name during the pendency of the proceedings before the State Commission, it was their solemn duty to bring that fact to the notice of the Forum by moving appropriate Application, which they did not do. Unless so informed, the Complainant certainly would not have come to know of such change. The responsibility, therefore, cannot be shifted to the shoulders of the Complainant. More over there is no contention that while their name had changed, their address had also changed. No document has been placed on record to show that the impugned order was received by the Appellant on 23.05.2018. Even if it is presumed that it was so received by them on 23.05.2018, still the period of limitation for filing the Appeal, which is 30 days, had expired on 22.06.2018. The administrative reason to the effect that the employees did not bring the order to the notice of the Management is of no consequence, particularly, in view of the fact that the Appellant had all along been participating in the proceedings before the State Commission and was aware of the fact that the order was passed in the matter. It was certainly their duty to find out what had happened in that case and then take necessary steps. Even if, I deduct the time spent by the Appellant in the wrong Forum, i.e., before the High Court, still there is a considerable delay in filing the present Appeal. Except that the employees did not bring to their notice the impugned order, no other explanation has been given for condonation of delay which is more than 215 days as per the contention of the learned Counsel herself.
What is sufficient cause has been set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Basavraj & Anr. V. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510". In para (9), (12) and (15), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v.Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150; and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629: (2012 AIR SCW 2412)
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
The contention raised by the Appellant does not, at all, shows that the Appellant had been acting diligently and was bonafidely. In the case of "Ram Lal and Ors. vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361", the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the Appellant has to show that they are entitled for such condonation of delay by showing sufficient cause. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."
The test to be applied is to see whether there is reasonable diligence or not, which is so held in a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)". The court has held as under:
"We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of "Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578," that the special nature of the Act, especially of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 wherein special period of limitation has been provided, shall also be kept in mind while dealing with the Application for condonation of delay. The Court has held as under:
"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora."
Judging the explanation given by the Appellant in the Application and the arguments on this, I am satisfied that the Appellant has failed to show that they had been acting with due diligence. No reasonable grounds for condonation of delay exist. The Application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the Appeal is also dismissed.