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Judgment
C. Viswanath, Presiding Member
The present Appeals are filed by the Appellant under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against Order passed by the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula (hereinafter referred to as the "State Commission") in Complaint No. 382/2016 dated 20.08.2019 and Complaint No.199/2017 dated 30.11.2018.
Alongwith Appeal No.2172/2019, IA/17831/2019 and alongwith Appeal No.2173/2019, IA/17834/2019 Applications for condonation of delay have been filed by the Appellant for condoning the delay of 421 days and 350 days (319 days according to the Registry) respectively.
We have heard the Learned Counsel for the Appellant and also carefully perused the record.
The Learned Counsel for the Appellants argued that they have not received copy of the impugned order. The Appellant became aware of the impugned order when they received the notice in the execution proceedings. After receiving the notice, the Appellant immediately contacted its counsel who appeared before the State Commission. Thereafter, the Appellant obtained the file from the local counsel and sent a scanned copy of the same to the Counsel in Delhi who drafted the Appeal and filed the same before this Commission. Thus, the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate.
The Learned Counsel argued that they did not receive copy of the impugned order passed by the State Commission. It is important to note that the impugned order was passed in the presence of the Counsel for the Appellant. They cannot be permitted to take the plea that they had no knowledge of the order passed by the State Commission. There is only a bald averment on behalf of the Appellant that they did not receive copy of the impugned order. Appellant is a limited company and it is a common knowledge that companies maintain a despatch register for every communication sent/received. The Appellant has not produced any documentary evidence to substantiate its plea that they had not received copy of the impugned order.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that party who has not acted diligently or remain inactive is not entitled for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)" has also described the test for determining whether the petitioner has acted with due diligence or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."
Condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the applicant has to set out the case showing sufficient reasons which prevented them to come to the Court/Commission within the stipulated period of limitation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 has held as under:
"It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."
The burden is on the applicant to show that there was sufficient cause for the delay. The expression 'sufficient cause' has been discussed and defined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj&Anr. Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510, as under:
"Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever he court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bonafide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. V. Bhootnath Banerjee &Ors, AIR 1964 SC 1336; LalaMatadin V. A.Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal V. Veena alias Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150 L2011 AIR SEW 1233); and ManibenDevraj Shah V. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629: (2012 AIR SCW 2412).
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It is a settle legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lexsedlex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
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The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature".
Also in the case of "Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (2011) 14 SCC 578, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has warned the Commissions to keep in mind while dealing with such applications the special nature of the Consumer Protection Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras."
In a recent judgment the Hon'ble Supreme court observed that condonation of delay would depend on the background of each and every case; and routine explanation would not be enough. It is observed that a different yardstick cannot be applied to public sector insurance company. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in University of Delhi vs. Union of India & Ors. in Civil Appeal Nos.9488¬9489 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.5581¬5582 of 2019) decided on 17.12.2019 has held as under: -
"The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even¬ handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation Page 24 of 34would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating "sufficient cause" to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact situation
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That apart when there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal."
(emphasis supplied)
No sufficient cause has been shown to condone the inordinate delay of 421 days and 350 days in filing the present Appeals and the Appellant has given only routine explanation. Appellant has failed to show adequate and enough reason which prevented it to approach this Commission within limitation. The applications for condonation of delay are therefore dismissed. As a consequence, Appeals are also dismissed in limine being barred by limitation.