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Judgment
The present appeal has been filed against the order dated 28.6.2017 in complaint case No.269 of 2015 of State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Uttar Pradesh. Alongwith this appeal, an application for condonation of delay has been filed. It is noteworthy that in the application the applicant has not mentioned the number of days which needs to be condoned. Learned counsel, however, has argued that though they had the notice of the complaint and their authorized representative Mr. Vaibhav Kumar attended the proceedings on 5.8.2016 and also filed the written version but thereafter he did not inform the appellant about the proceedings before the State Commission. On enquiry, he informed that he had engaged a lawyer at Lucknow. It is submitted that it was on receiving the notice of execution petition on 9.2.2018 that the appellant learned of the ex-parte order. Thereafter, an advocate was engaged and an offer to settle the matter was made to the respondent. Execution proceedings were attended on 19th March, 2018. The settlement proposal was not accepted by the respondent. It is further argued that the appellant did not want to file an appeal against the impugned order as they were keen to settle the dispute with the respondent. It is submitted that it was only in November, 2018 that the appellant decided to file the present appeal and accordingly filed it on 16.11.2018. It is argued that the delay is unintentional and bona-fide and be condoned.
Mr. Manoj Ranjan Sinha, Advocate is present on Caveat. The Caveat is discharged. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that no reasonable ground has been shown in the application for condonation of delay. The application is totally silent about the reasons for condoning the delay and the argument of learned counsel for the appellant is not part of the application and, thus, is not supported by the affidavit of the appellant.
We have given thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions and have perused the record. The admitted facts are that the appellant had the notice of the filing of the complaint before the State Commission and his authorized representative had also attended the proceedings before the State Commission and filed the written version as well on 5.8.2016. Thereafter, he did not appear and so the impugned ex-parte order dated 28.6.2017 was passed. It is strange that for one year the appellant did not make any effort to enquire from his authorized representative about the status of the case pending against them. It is settled proposition of law that law does not help lazy and sleeping lion. The law is well settled that for getting the delay condoned the applicant has to show sufficient cause. Expression "sufficient cause" has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basavraj & Anr. vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: -
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v.Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150; and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629.)"
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
From this finding of Hon'ble Supreme Court it is clear that the applicant has to set out the reasons which prevented them from prosecuting their case. The applicant has not given any reason in their application seeking condonation of delay, which prevented them from attending the proceedings before the State Commission. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that law helps only those who have acted diligently and did not remain inactive. A person who acts in a negligent manner, cannot be said to have sufficient grounds or reasons for condoning the delay. Not only that there is no ground for condonation of delay, the reasons given in the application for not attending the proceeding before the State Commission after 5.8.2016 clearly shows that the appellant had been negligent, careless and loath in pursuing their matter before the State Commission. It is certainly their obligation and duty to remain in contact with their authorized representative and make day-to-day enquiries about the dates fixed in the case before the State Commission. They cannot be permitted to take advantage of the fact that their employee in whom they reposed trust and faith by authorizing him to conduct the matter on their behalf before the State Commission, had failed to inform them. It is not shown as to why no enquiry was made during this period of one year from the representative.
Even otherwise, the appellant had the notice of execution petition on 9.2.2018, still the appeal is not filed within the statutory period of one month from the date of knowledge. It was filed after the delay of nine months. The grounds that they had appeared before the Executing Court with an offer of settlement, is not sufficient ground and does not show their bona-fide when on the very first date before executing Court i.e. 19th March, 2018, the respondent had rejected their offer of settlement. No explanation has come forward as to why they did not file the appeal immediately but filed the same after nine months. In the case of Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and it is mandatory on the part of the applicant to show sufficient causes. The Hon'ble Court has held as under:-
"It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant".
The test which the Commission needs to apply while judging whether there are sufficient reasons for condoning the delay has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC). The Hon'ble Court has held as under:
"We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."
In the case of Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578, Hon'ble Supreme court has cautioned the Commission to keep in mind the special nature of the period of limitation provided under C.P. Act while dealing with such applications. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that the object of Consumer Protection Act is not defeated by condoning such, unreasonable and unexplained delay. Where the appeals are filed with an application for condonation of delay with the sole object to stop the execution, such efforts should not be allowed to be succeeded. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"special period of limitation prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 also has to be kept in mind while dealing with such application and the object of the Act which is expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes shall not be allowed to be defeated. Judging from this settled proposition of law."
In the present case, it is apparent that not only the appellant has failed to give any sufficient cause for condonation of delay, his conduct also shows that it has filed the present appeal to pressurize the respondent to enter into the settlement in the execution proceedings and to defeat the execution of the impugned order. In view of the above, application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed.