Manzar Alam And Ors vs Masood Alam And Ors

Heard learned counsel for the defendants petitioners and learned counsel for the plaintiffs opposite parties.

The defendants petitioners are aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 24.2.2014, passed by the learned Addl. Munsif-II, Ranchi, in Eviction Suit No. 53 of 1989, whereby, the eviction suit, which was earlier filed for eviction of the defendants from the suit premises on the grounds of personal necessity and default in rent, was subsequently confined to the eviction only on the ground of personal necessity, under Section 11 (1) (c) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), and was decreed by the Court below on contest, directing the defendants to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs, within ninety days of the Judgment and Decree.

Sans unnecessary details, the necessary facts of this case are that the suit was brought for eviction of the defendant tenant from three rooms of the suit property, bearing part of the Holding No. 351, M.S. Plot No. 705/J, Ward No. 3, situated at Tiwari Tank Road, P.S.- Hindpiri, District- Ranchi. The suit was originally filed by the plaintiff lady and during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff as well as defendant died, and they were substituted by their heirs and legal representatives, who were contesting the suit. According to the plaint, the original defendant was inducted as tenant in the suit premises, which consisted of three rooms and one veranda in the house, on the monthly rent of Rs. 75/- payable as per the English calendar. Stating that the plaintiff had four sons and she required the suit property for bona fide personal necessity of using the rooms for her sons and also running a small business, the eviction suit was filed in the year 1989 itself. It was stated that the plaintiff had no other property in Ranchi, where she could keep her sons and accordingly, the suit was confined to the relief under Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act.

Upon notice, the suit was contested by the defendant and the defendant also denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, stating that the suit property belonged to one brother of the plaintiff, who used to live in USA, and the plaintiff and her husband used to collect the rent on behalf of the said landlord. The personal necessity of the plaintiff was also denied by the defendant, and it was also stated that the plaintiff had property at Gaya, where she used to live with her children. The suitability of the suit property for any business purpose was also challenged in the written statement filed by the defendant. It was also stated that there was other tenant on other part of the same holding, and for eviction of that tenant, one eviction suit was also filed by the plaintiff and the said suit was compromised and part of that suit property was subsequently sold to the defendant of that suit. Mainly on the basis of these statements in the written statement, the suit was contested by the defendant.

On the basis of rival contentions of the parties, the issues were framed by the Court below, including the issues whether there was any landlord and tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, whether the suit property was required for bona fide personal necessity of the plaintiff, as also, whether the partial eviction of the defendant from the suit property would serve the purpose.

All these necessary issues have been decided by the Court below against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff. On the basis of the evidence brought on record, the plaintiff was held to be the owner of the suit property and it was also found that there was relationship of tenant and landlord between the plaintiff and the defendant. The Court below has also taken into consideration the evidence on record that the plaintiff required the suit property for living in the property along with her children, which was bona fide requirement. It was also brought on record by way of evidence that the plaintiff had no property at Ranchi for accommodation of her four sons. The Court below has also given a finding that it is a fact that the adjacent property, for which there was also an eviction suit, was compromised, and part of that suit property was sold to the defendant of that suit. It may be stated that it has come in the cross-examination of the plaintiff that apart from four sons, the plaintiff had two daughters also, and it has come in the evidence of D.W. 2 examined by the defendant, who was also defendant in another eviction suit, that in that property, the plaintiff used to live with her daughters.

On the basis of the evidence on record, the Court below came to the finding that the original plaintiff had four sons and she required the suit property for the personal need of her sons. The Court below has also taken into consideration the evidence of D.W.2 on record, that the suit property is a small house like a hutment. The same evidence has been corroborated by other witness examined by the defendant, i.e., D.W.5 also, who has also stated that the suit property is a hutment like structure. In that view of the matter, the Court below has given the finding that the partial eviction from the suit property shall not serve the purposes, as the plaintiff had four sons whom she wanted to keep in that small house. The Court below has also held it is not for the defendant to dictate as to where the plaintiffs should reside, either at Gaya or at Ranchi, and this depends on the choice of the plaintiffs as to where they want to reside. The Trial Court below, accordingly, decreed the suit on contest, directing the substituted defendants to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property to the substituted plaintiffs.

Learned counsel for the defendants petitioners has submitted that the impugned Judgment passed by the Court below cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, inasmuch as, certain alien facts have also been taken into consideration in the impugned Judgment. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that in the plaint, it is no where stated that the plaintiff had two daughters also, and they were living in other adjacent property, still, the Court below has taken into consideration these facts.

The other point taken by the learned counsel for the defendants petitioners is that during the pendency of the suit, the part of the adjacent property was sold by the plaintiff, for which there was another eviction suit, which shows that the plaintiff had no personal necessity.

Lastly, learned counsel for the defendants petitioners submitted that the plaintiffs have other property at Gaya, where they could reside. Basically with these submissions, learned counsel has submitted that the impugned Judgement suffers from patent illegality, and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

Learned counsel for the plaintiffs opposite parties, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer, submitting that there is no illegality in the impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the Court below, as the findings on all the issues are based on the evidence on record, and it is not for the defendants to dictate as to where the plaintiffs should reside, either at Gaya or at Ranchi.

Having heard learned counsels for both the sides, and upon going through the record, I find that the first argument of learned counsel for the defendants petitioners that certain alien facts have also been taken into consideration by the Court below, has no legs to stand. The fact, remains that the facts that the plaintiff had two daughters and they were living in other adjacent property, have been taken in the cross-examination of the plaintiff, as also supported by the defendants' other witness, and these facts have been brought on record by the defendants themselves, and as such, it cannot be argued that these facts were alien to the suit, and could not be taken into consideration in the impugned Judgment.

The second submission of learned counsel for the defendants petitioners that during the pendency of the suit, the other adjacent property was sold by the plaintiff which showed that the plaintiff had no personal necessity, also does not inspire confidence, inasmuch as, it is the evidence of the defendants themselves, that in that property the plaintiff was living with her daughters, and she wanted to keep her four sons in the suit property for their education and also for running a small business. There is no finding on record that the said property was big enough to accommodate the four sons of the original plaintiff as well.

Even the last submission of learned counsel for the defendants petitioners that the plaintiffs have other property at Gaya, where they could reside, also is of no help to the defendants petitioners. It is a well settled principle of law that the choice is of the plaintiffs whether they wanted to live at Ranchi or at Gaya, and the plaintiffs cannot be dictated in this regard by the defendants. If they have the property at Ranchi, they are certainly entitled to live at Ranchi. I see no reason to disagree with the finding given by the Court below on this point.

Even otherwise, I find that the suit was originally filed in the year 1989 itself, for personal necessity of the plaintiff and her four sons. The plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit itself. The four sons are surviving and their families must have multiplied by now, as we are now in the year 2020. As admitted by the defendants' witness, the suit property being a only hutment like structure, must be urgently being required for accommodating the family of the substituted plaintiffs.

For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality in the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 24.2.2014, passed by the learned Addl. Munsif-II, Ranchi, in Eviction Suit No. 53 of 1989, worth any interference in the revisional jurisdiction.

There is no merit in this revision application and the same is accordingly, dismissed.