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Judgment
Learned counsel for the parties are present and heard.
The applicant has approached this Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, praying for the following reliefs:–
(i)Issue an order to set aside the order dated 31.07 1998 passed by Divisional Manager, North-Central Railway, Allahabad/respondent no. 2 granting the compassionate appointment to the respondent no.4.
(ii)Issue, an order or direction commanding the respondent authority to conduct inquiry over the matter against the respondent rio. 4 for getting the compassionate appointment on the basis of false and forged documents
(iii)Issue, an order or direction commanding the respondent authority to decide the representation of the applicant.
(iv)Issue any other suitable application, order or direction, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper to meet the ends of justice.
(v)Award cost of this application in favour of the applicant.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the present OA has been filed seeking cancellation of the impugned order dated 31.07.1998, by which the competent authority appointed respondent No. 4 on compassionate grounds. He further submits that the applicant and respondent No. 4 are real brothers and respondent No. 5 is their mother. The compassionate appointment was granted in favour of respondent No. 4 on account of the missing/death of the deceased employee, namely, late Doodhnath, who was posted as Storekeeper in the respondent department at Chunar. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the ground for cancellation of the appointment is that the panchayatnama was false and, accordingly, the death certificate issued on the basis thereof was also false. From the facts on record, there is no denial with regard to the missing/death of late Doodhnath in the office of respondent No. 3. Moreover, learned counsel for the applicant submits that respondent Nos. 4 and 5 have not paid the amount of gratuity to the applicant and their relationship is not good. Therefore, he has raised the dispute with regard to the appointment of respondent No. 4 before the competent authority. It is further submitted that the death of the deceased employee has not been declared by any competent Court. Therefore, the compassionate appointment granted in favour of respondent No. 4 is not in accordance with the rules.
Learned counsel for the respondents has objected that the present OA is barred by limitation under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. He submits that the matter pertains to the year 1995–1998, whereas the applicant moved the representation only in the year 2023 and approached this Tribunal in the year 2026. Therefore, the present OA is highly barred by limitation.
Considering the submissions and the relief claimed by the applicant, it is apparent that the applicant is seeking cancellation of the appointment issued in the year 1998 in favour of respondent No. 4, by arraying his mother as respondent No. 5. However, nothing has been pleaded against respondent No. 5 with regard to any action on her part, except the allegation that the amount of gratuity has not been paid to the applicant. Moreover, in paragraph 3 of the OA, the applicant has declared that the present OA is within the limitation prescribed under the Administrative Tribunals Act. However, Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides as under:
“21.Limitation.—(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,—
(a)in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance, unless the application is made within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;
(b)in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.
(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where—
(a)the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter; and
(b)no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1), or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.
(3)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.”
Thus, the limitation prescribed under Section 21 for challenging a final order is one year, subject to the provisions contained therein. Merely by moving a representation after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, the limitation cannot be extended. In the instant case, the appointment letter was issued in the year 1998 and the relevant documents also pertain to the said period. However, neither any representation was moved within the prescribed period of limitation nor has any explanation been furnished for the enormous delay in approaching this Tribunal. The applicant has approached this Tribunal only in the year 2026, after a lapse of more than two decades from the date of appointment of respondent No. 4. Even the conduct of the applicant also appears to indicate that the dispute has been raised on account of personal enmity with respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and, after such a prolonged delay, the present proceedings have been initiated to harass them.
Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the present OA cannot be entertained on account of delay and laches. No separate application seeking condonation of delay has also been moved by the applicant.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the present OA is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as well as on merit.
All pending M.A.s, if any, stand disposed of. No order as to costs.