Maksood Alam and Others vs Badhu Sahu and Others

Wort, Ag. C.J.

The brevity of my judgment in this case shows no disrespect to my learned brother Agarwala from whose decision the appeal is preferred. The claim by the plaintiff-respondents in the case was for damages against the defendants-appellants for setting the machinery of the law in motion by filing a complaint or information u/s 144, Criminal P.C. It would appear that the pro forma defendant had given a grant of land to the plaintiffs for the purpose of making bricks. It was alleged by the contesting defendants that the plaintiffs had in the course of their brick-making, encroached upon the land which was that of a Mahomedan graveyard.

It was in those circumstances that the proceedings to which I refer were brought into existence. There were a number of points which could rightly have been raised in the Courts below, for instance, whether reasonable and probable cause existed; there was also the question whether there was any evidence in the circumstances of the case that the action of the defendants was malicious. But these questions were not gone into before my learned brother Agarwala and therefore not open to the parties in this Court.

Two questions were however raised; one was that, as the plaintiffs had not proved the precise terms of the information given by the defendants, the action would necessarily fail. That has not been pressed before us, and I think rightly so, because there is no substance in the point. The other question raised, that is the remoteness of the damage, is a material point and raises a question which must be decided by this Court. I have the misfortune of disagreeing with my learned brother Agarwala with regard to this matter. Agarwala, J. has held that the argument, that the damage eaused in the circumstances of the case arose by vis-major and did not necessarily flow from the action of the defendants, could not be sustained. I say and repeat that I have the misfortune of disagreeing with the learned Judge on that point. I should have stated in order to make the matter clear that what happened was that as a result (so it is alleged) of the action of the defendants the Police stepped in, caused the plaintiffs'' brick-making to cease, and during the time of inactivity, there was a considerable fall of rain which damaged not only the bricks which were in the course of being made, but also the fuel which was used in burning them.

There was some argument as to when this damage was caused; whether it was caused during the pendency of the proceedings before the Magistrate and therefore was the result of the Magistrate''s order, or whether it was caused immediately after the Police came on the scene and therefore was the result of their action.

But these points are somewhat obscure, and for the reasons which I have already stated do not arise. Now, both as regards actions in contract and tort the damage which can be recovered by the plaintiffs is damage which necessarily flows from the breach in the case of a contract, or from the action of the defendants in the case of a tort.

This question is one of some difficulty in most cases, but I think it is quite clear in this case that neither could the defendants have contemplated damage by rain as the result of their action, which the plaintiffs alleged, nor could it be said that the damage by rain necessarily flowed from the action of the defendants. When put in that form, it seems to me that the point is clear and I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion although with great respect to the decision of the learned Judge, Agarwala.

The damage which I have described is the only damage claimed, and, as my view is that that damage was too remote, the action of the plaintiffs could not be sustained.

The appeal therefore would be allowed and the action dismissed with costs throughout.

Manohar Lall, J.

I agree. The argument of the plaintiffs in the present case is completely negatived by the observations of Cockburn, C.J. in Hobbs v. L. & S.W. Ry. Co. (1875) 10 Q.B. 111, where the claim of the plaintiff who sought to recover damages for a cold which his wife had caught by walking in the rain at night, due to the defendants compelling the family to get out at a wrong station was defeated on the basis of the rule of law stated in these words (Blackburn and Mellor JJ. agreeing):

You must have something immediately flow out of the breach of contract complained of, something immediately connected with it, and not merely connected with it through a series of causes intervening between the immediate consequence of the breach of contract and the damage or injury complained of.