AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Rajesh Shankar, J.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials placed on record.
The present contempt case has been filed alleging willful, deliberate and intentional violation of the order/judgment dated 22.10.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.5461 of 2024.
Brief background of the case is that the petitioner filed writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024 for issuance of direction upon the Circle Officer, Hehal Anchal, Ranchi (opposite party no.2 herein) to dispose of the petitioner's representation seeking restoration of possession over the land appertaining to R.S. Plot No.319, Khata No.179 measuring an area of 45 decimals situated at village-Madhukam, P.S.-Sukhdeo Nagar, District-Ranchi (hereinafter referred to the said land) which had been restored under Section 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 vide order dated 13th December, 1996 passed in S.A.R. Case No.169 of 1993-94 and the said order was upheld up to the High Court.
In the said writ petition, the following facts were averred by the petitioner:-
The petitioner preferred an application under Section 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 seeking restoration of the said land in his favour which was registered as S.A.R. Case No.169 of 1993-94 and the Special Officer, S.A.R. Court, Ranchi vide order dated 13.12.1996 allowed the restoration of the said land in favour of the petitioner.
Aggrieved with the said order, Shanti Devi & others preferred S.A.R. Appeal No.570 R15/1997 under the provisions of Section 48(4) of the C.N.T. Act which was dismissed vide order dated 15.07.1998 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.
Thereafter, S.A.R. Revision No.120 of 1998 was filed by Shanti Devi & others before the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi who allowed the said revision in favour of the said persons vide order dated 18.05.1999.
Aggrieved with the said order, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before this Court being C.W.J.C. No.2383 of 1999(R) which was allowed vide order dated 01.05.2009 quashing the order dated 18th May, 1999 passed by the revisional authority i.e. the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi.
Thereafter, Shanti Devi & others preferred L.P.A. No.341 of 2009 and Mohan Sao & others preferred L.P.A. No.342 of 2009. Both the said L.P.As. were dismissed for default by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 11.04.2017. Subsequently, C.M.P. No.-201 of 2017 was filed by Shanti Devi & others seeking restoration of the said L.P.As., however, the same was also dismissed for default vide order dated 5.12.2018.
The aforesaid sequence of litigation suggests that the order of restoration passed by the SAR Court, Ranchi on 13.12.1996 in SAR Case No.169 of 1993-94 has become final up to this Court. The petitioner has not yet received any notice in connection with the present case from the Supreme Court of India and as such he has the reasons to believe that the aforesaid persons i.e. Shanti Devi & others and Mohan Sao & others have not challenged the order passed by the learned Division Bench of this Court dismissing the aforesaid L.P.A.s and C.M.P. for default.
In course of argument in the said writ proceeding, the learned counsel for the State concurred the submission made on behalf of the petitioner. The Court having observed the aforesaid facts, disposed of the writ petition directing the opposite party no.2 to take up the present matter, issue notices to the concerned persons i.e. Shanti Devi & others and Mohan Sao & others who were said to be in possession of the land in question. The opposite party no.2 was further directed to verify the fact that the orders passed in C.W.J.C. No.2383 of 1999(R), L.P.A. No.341 of 2009 with L.P.A. No.342 of 2009 and C.M.P. No.201 of 2017 had not been set aside till that date and thereafter to handover the possession of the land to the petitioner in accordance with law preferably within 12 weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of the said order.
The present contempt case was earlier taken up for consideration by this Court on 22.08.2025 and on the said date, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.2 stated that an interlocutory application was filed seeking extension of time to comply the order dated 22.10.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.5461 of 2024. However, no such interlocutory application was found on record and the case was adjourned for the next week. On 16.01.2026, the opposite party no.2 by pressing I.A. No.11663 of 2025 sought more time to comply the order dated 22.10.2024 and to file compliance affidavit, which was allowed by this Court, granting four weeks’ further time.
In the meantime, I.A No. 2413 of 2026 dated 11.02.2026 was filed by 12 applicants seeking intervention in the present case stating that they were residing over R.S. Plot No.319, Khata No.179, measuring an area of 45 decimals situated at village Madhukam, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, District Ranchi, which is the subject land in the present contempt case. They also averred that altogether 11 settlement agreements were executed between them and the petitioner from 19.12.2019 to 31.12.2020 whereby they were permitted by the petitioner to remain in possession of the land in lieu of payments of about Rs.1.08 crore made by them on different dates. They further claimed that the said material facts were suppressed by the petitioner in the writ petition and thus obtained the order dated 22.10.2024 from this court by playing fraud.
This court vide order dated 13.02.2026 directed the opposite party no. 2 to file a show cause affidavit specifically stating as to whether in compliance of the order dated 22.10.2024, the applicants were issued notice(s) and if so, whether they were given opportunity to produce documents in support of the facts that they had paid considerable amount by way of settlement to the petitioner and as to whether any such order was passed by him before taking steps for evicting the applicants from the said land. By the said order, this court also directed the opposite party no.2 to stay his hands from taking any coercive steps against the applicants (intervenors) with respect to the said land.
On 08.05.2026, when the matter came up for further consideration, this court observed that the petitioner while filing W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024 and the present contempt petition did not even whisper about the fact regarding execution of 11 settlement agreements and receipt of Rs.1.08 crores by him paid at the instance of the opposite parties/intervenors. Under the said circumstance, this court was of the prima facie view that the petitioner had suppressed the material facts and had tried to mislead the Court amounting to perjury.
Having observed so, this court directed for issuance of show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon him as to why an appropriate order under suitable provisions of law be not passed against him.
Pursuant to the directions issued by this court on 08.05.2026, the petitioner filed show cause affidavit dated 17.06.2026 stating that the subject matter of controversy between the parties started in the year 1993 and attained finality in the year 2018 through adjudication at different forums up to the Division Bench of this Court. The writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024 was filed for the sole and limited purpose of securing compliance of the order dated 13.12.1996 passed in SAR Case No.169 of 1993-94 by the opposite party no.2, as the said order was upheld up to the High Court. The Petitioner genuinely believed that the private agreements, being matters of a disputed and collateral nature, had no bearing on an innocuous prayer made in the writ petition and such facts were not required to be pleaded. As per his understanding, only those facts having a direct bearing on the writ petition were required to be incorporated and the agreements were not among those.
It is further stated that documents relied upon by the opposite party nos.3 to 14 are the Agreements to Sale which do not transfer any title or possession in law. Moreover, the Agreements to Sale contained a specific condition that in the event of dishonour of cheques issued by them, the agreements would stand terminated. Some of the cheques issued by the opposite party nos.3 to 14 were in fact dishonoured, and consequently the Agreements to Sale could not have been given effect to. The Petitioner therefore did not consider these incomplete and terminated agreements with material breach to be germane to, or having a bearing upon, the prayer for restoration of land made in the writ petition as well as the contempt proceeding.
It is further stated that the land of the petitioner is governed by the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and the Agreements to Sale were executed in direct contravention of Sections 46 and 48 of the CNT Act, 1908 read with Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which prohibit transfer of Scheduled Tribe land without the required statutory sanction. A contract made in contravention of a statutory prohibition was otherwise void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. The petitioner being a member of scheduled tribes was aware of the fact that no private agreement could lawfully override the statutory protection provided to his land, and that any agreement to the contrary was a nullity. He therefore did not consider it necessary or meaningful to disclose about execution of the agreements which were void ab initio and could not have conferred any right upon the opposite party nos.3 to 14 as a matter of law.
It is also averred that the petitioner had been engaged in prolonged litigation since the year 1993 and trying hard to get the said land restored in his favour, however, in that process, he was facing great difficulty. In this state of helplessness and vulnerability, he was coerced and pressurized by the intervenors/opposite party nos.3 to 14 to execute agreements to sale at half of the market rate, payable in three annual installments. In fact, the petitioner did not sign those agreements with free will or with a full and informed appreciation regarding their legal consequences. Even otherwise, an agreement executed under coercion is voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
It is also pleaded in the show cause affidavit that the present contempt case was filed against the State of Jharkhand and the Circle Officer, Hehal, Ranchi (Opposite Party No. 2) arraying them as opposite parties alleging wilful and deliberate violation of the order dated 22.10.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.5461 of 2024 by not delivering possession of the said land to the Petitioner. The Petitioner's dispute with the opposite party nos.3 to 14 regarding execution of the agreements was a separate, collateral matter which had no relevance with the specific prayer for enforcement of the order passed in the aforesaid writ petition.
It is further stated that the petitioner filed the instant contempt case anticipating that in compliance of the order dated 22.10.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024, the opposite party no.2 would issue notices to the intervenors (i.e. opposite party nos.3 to 14), who would then have a full and fair opportunity to appear, place all the documents including the agreements in question before the opposite party no.2 and raise their contentions in defence. As such, the petitioner did not consider it necessary to disclose the fact regarding execution of said agreements in the contempt case. Though the opposite party nos.3 to 14 accepted the notices issued by the opposite party no.2, but failed to place the said agreements before him. They also did not furnish any satisfactory explanation regarding their continued possession over the said land. It was a serious omission on the part of opposite party nos.3 to 14 in not raising the issue of execution of the agreements in question before the opposite party no.2 despite having received the notices and the opportunity provided for that purpose. Thus, the petitioner cannot be penalised for such failure of the said opposite parties.
It is also stated that after the opposite party nos.3 to 14 filed I.A. No. 2413 of 2026 on 11.02.2026 raising the issue pertaining to existence of the agreements, the petitioner did not deny the said fact, rather in his rejoinder affidavit dated 05.05.2026, he acknowledged the execution of the agreements and explained the entire surrounding circumstances before this Court, including the fact of coercion, dishonoured cheques etc. of the opposite party nos.3 to 14 and the invalidity of the agreements. These facts clearly suggest bonafide of the petitioner.
The petitioner has further stated in the show cause affidavit that the charge of perjury is not attracted in the present case. Under section 227 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, perjury is the offence of deliberately making false statement or producing false evidence on oath or affirmation about which the maker either knows to be false at the time of making/producing it or does not believe it to be true. The petitioner had not made any false statement on affidavit and the allegation against him is solely premised on his omission of not having explicitly disclosed the fact of execution of the settlement agreements. An omission, however, cannot be treated as perjury.
The learned counsel for the petitioner by putting reliance to the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the cases of M/s S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Others, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 166; Arunima Baruah Vs. Union of India & Others, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 120; and Government of NCT of Delhi & Another Vs. BSK Realtors LLP & Another, reported in (2024) 7 SCC 370; submits that there are three essential requirements for denying relief to the petitioner on the ground of suppression of facts; (i) the facts must be material, (ii) withholding of the same must be deliberate and (iii) even if the court finds some element of suppression or non-disclosure of facts, it must ask itself whether the relief would still be denied.
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties 3 to 14 submits that altogether 11 settlement agreements were executed between the petitioner and the opposite parties 3 to 14 whereby they were allowed to remain in possession of the said land and in lieu thereof a payment of about Rs. 1.08 Crores was made to the petitioner by way of cheques. It is further submitted that the said material fact was not averred in the writ petition and as such the petitioner obtained the order dated 22.10.2024 by playing fraud on the Court. Moreover, though few cheques given to the petitioner got dishonoured, however, the opposite party nos.3 to 14 handed over other cheques in lieu thereof to the petitioner which were duly honoured by the Bank and the amount was also transferred to his bank account.
In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel for opposite parties 3 to 14 puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Another, reported in (2011)7 SCC 639.
It appears from the materials placed on record by the opposite party nos.3 to 14 that after dismissal of C.M.P. No. 201 of 2017, the petitioner entered into settlement agreements with the opposite party nos. 3 to 14 and conveyed right, title, interest and possession of the land occupied by them. As per the terms and conditions of the said settlement agreements, the petitioner received consideration of the said transaction by way of different cheques.
The facts regarding execution of the said settlement agreements and receipt of cheques from the opposite party nos. 3 to 14 has not been denied by the petitioner, though he has claimed that the said agreements had no bearing with the subject matter of the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024 and as such the fact of execution of the settlement agreements with the opposite party nos.3 to 14 was not disclosed in the writ petition.
I do not find any substance in the said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024 was filed by the petitioner seeking restoration of possession of the land in question in terms with the order dated 13.12.1996 passed in S.A.R Case No. 169 of 1993-94 under section 71-A of the Act, 1908, which was upheld up to the High Court. However, even prior to filing of the said writ petition, the petitioner by way of settlement agreements, had himself conveyed possession of the said land to the opposite parties and had also received consideration for the same. Hence, the factum of execution of settlement agreements was certainly a material fact and the same was required to be disclosed by the petitioner in the said writ petition. The petitioner has claimed that some of the cheques given by the opposite party nos.3 to 14 have been dishonoured and as such the said agreements have rendered null and void. Though the opposite party nos.3 to 14 have explained this fact as mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, yet even if the said claim of the petitioner is treated to be true, then also, the petitioner was required to disclose the said fact in the writ petition, which he did not do. The petitioner had also not arrayed the opposite party nos.3 to 14 as respondents in W.P.(C) No.5461 of 2024 and obtained the order dated 22.10.2024 from this court by suppressing the material facts.
In the case of Moti Lal Songara Vs. Prem Prakash @ Pappu and Another, reported in (2013)9 SCC 199, the respondents had obtained the order of discharge from the High Court by concealing the fact of framing of charge by the trial court. It was thus held that anyone who takes recourse to the method of suppression in a court of law, is, in actuality, playing fraud with the court and the maxim supressio veri, expressio falsi, i.e., suppression of the truth is equivalent to the expression of falsehood, gets attracted. It was further held that as the order had been obtained by practising fraud and suppressing material fact before a court of law to gain advantage, the said order cannot be allowed to stand.
In the case of Vishnu Vardhan alias Vishnu Pradhan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1501, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression of even a single material fact can be fatal before writ courts. In this context, one may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar where the law has succinctly been stated as follows:
13.As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken …
(emphasis ours)”
In Vishnu Vardhan (Supra.) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has cited various earlier judicial pronouncements and held that the Courts have consistently nullified orders obtained through fraudulent means. Key excerpts from some of these decisions read thus:-
“a. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others, reported in (2000)3 SCC 581, this Court reiterated that fraud unravels everything:
3.“Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. Lord Denning observed in a language without equivocation that “no judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for, fraud unravels everything” (Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, [[1956] 1 Q.B. 702 : [1956] 1 All ER 341 : [1956] 2 WLR 502 (CA)]).
b. In Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. Shaw Bros., reported in (1992)1 SCC 534, it was held:
20.Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton's sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his ability to, ‘wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into snares’. It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary fraud in equity has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In Black's Legal Dictionary, fraud is defined as an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal right; a false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury……..
c. In A.V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Govt. of A.P. and others, reported in (2007)4 SCC 221, this Court held:
21.Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:
“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.”
22.It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order—by the first court or by the final court—has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.
23.***
24.In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court was “mistaken”, it might be shown that it was “misled”. There is an essential distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.
25.It has been said: fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
d. The judgment by Denning, L.J. in Lazarus Estates Ltd. (supra), which has since been quoted with approval by this Court in a catena of decisions including Nidhi Kaim (supra), asserted intolerance for fraud in legal proceedings in the following words:
No court … will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. […] Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved, it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever….”
In the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan (Supra.), as has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite parties 3 to 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that whenever the court comes to a conclusion that the process of the court is being abused, the court would be justified in refusing to proceed further with the matter. This rule has evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of the court by deceiving it. However, the concealed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed, it would have an effect on the merit of the case/order. It has further been held that a person who suppresses the material facts from the court is guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi i.e. suppression or failure to disclose what a party is bound to disclose, which may amount to fraud.
Thus, it is no more res-integra that suppression of even a single material fact can be fatal before the Courts muchless the writ Courts and the same would amount to fraud on the Courts. A judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgment, decree or order has to be treated as nullity by every court. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.
In the case in hand, the petitioner neither arrayed the opposite party nos.3 to 14 as respondents before the writ Court nor disclosed the material fact about execution of the settlement agreements and receipt of consideration by him paid at the instance of the opposite party nos. 3 to 14 to settle the dispute. Undoubtedly, the said suppression of fact was deliberate. Thus, this Court is of the view that the petitioner had obtained the order dated 22.10.2024 by playing fraud on this court and as such the said order is a nullity in the eye of law and has no legal effect.
The other limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the settlement agreements were executed by the petitioner under pressure and coercion and as such the same are nonest having no legal force. The said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is nothing but a face saving device and far from the truth. Curiously enough, the petitioner neither initiated any legal proceeding against the opposite party nos.3 to 14 in that regard nor the said fact was even averred in the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024.
Since the order dated 22.10.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024 has itself been declared as nullity in the eye of law, there is no question of proceeding further with the present contempt case filed by the petitioner alleging wilful disobedience of the order dated 22.10.2014. The principle "when infrastructure collapses, superstructure is bound to collapse" is also applicable in the present case. It is well settled that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief.
It needs to be mentioned here that the petitioner has played fraud with the Court by suppressing the material facts which were vital for the adjudication of the writ petition as those facts were the development subsequent to passing of the order of restoration of land in S.A.R Case No. 169 of 1993-94. Had those facts been disclosed in the writ petition, this Court might not have passed the order dated 22.10.2024 in absence of the opposite party nos. 3 to 14. The suppression of the said material facts has certainly caused great prejudice to the opposite party nos. 3 to 14.
This Court also takes note of a dangerous trend of few unscrupulous litigants misrepresenting the Courts by suppressing the material facts just to obtain favourable orders from the Courts.
In the case of Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 421, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that anyone who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt with, not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice.
In the case of Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has aptly observed that the truth constituted an integral part of the justice- delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell the truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.
In the present case, by filing show cause affidavit dated 17.06.2026, the petitioner, on the one hand seeks apology from this court for inconvenience caused to it due to non-disclosure of the fact regarding execution of the settlement agreements between him and the opposite party nos. 3 to 14, however on the other hand, he tries to justify his conduct by stating that the said fact was not a material one for disposal of the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5461 of 2024. Thus, the said show cause affidavit also suffers from lack of bonafide.
So far as the conduct of the opposite party no.2 is concerned, this court is of the view that in purported compliance of the order of this court dated 22.10.2024, he exceeded his jurisdiction by taking steps to demolish the structures standing over the said land. This court had not directed the opposite party no.2 to demolish the structures, he was rather directed to issue notices to the opposite party nos. 3 to 14 and to hand over possession of the said land to the petitioner, if the orders of different forums/Courts were found intact. If the opposite party no.2 had found that certain structures were erected over the land in question, he was required to seek appropriate clarification of the order of this court before taking such a drastic step of demolishing the same. Unfortunately, the opposite party no.2 proceeded to demolish the structure standing over the said land. The said approach and conduct of the opposite party no.2 deserve to be highly deprecated by this court. He is thus warned to be careful in future while executing any order of the court of law.
Considering the conduct of the petitioner, as discussed hereinabove, he deserves to be imposed an exemplary cost. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to pay cost of Rs.1,00,000/-(rupees one lakh) to each of the opposite party nos.3 to 14 i.e. Rs.12.00 Lakh (rupees twelve lakh) in total within four weeks from the date of this order. Both the parties are, however, at liberty to take appropriate recourse as available under law with respect to right, title and interest over the said land.
The contempt petition is disposed of in above terms.
All pending I.As, if any, are also disposed of.
