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Judgment
The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNSS') seeking quashing of FIR No.342 dated 21.12.2025, registered under Sections 115, 3(5), 329(4) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNS') at Police Station Model Town, District Panipat along with all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom qua the petitioners.
Brief facts of the case relevant for the purpose of disposal of this petition are that the aforementioned FIR was registered on the basis of a written complaint moved by respondent No. 2/ Panipat Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd., Kabri Road Branch, Panipat through its Manager Vijay Kumar alleging therein that the petitioners had availed a loan of Rs.14,00,000/- from the complainant/bank. It was further alleged that pursuant to an order dated 01.07.2025 passed in CRM No.68 of 2025, possession of the property was taken with police assistance by Court Receiver Ravi Kumar on 04.08.2025. However, on 04.08.2025, the accused broke open the seal and lock of the property and illegally entered therein, regarding which FIR No.225 dated 06.08.2025 had already been registered under Sections 3(5) and 329(4) of the BNS at Police Station Model Town, which was stated to be pending trial. It was further alleged that on 16.12.2025, pursuant to the orders passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panipat, as well as by this Court in CWP No.36652 of 2025, the property was again taken into possession with locks and seal by the Court Receiver with police assistance. Thereafter, on 20.12.2025 at about 8:00 p.m., the accused came to the property, broke open the locks and seal and entered therein. It was further alleged that they manhandled the Bank's guards, namely, Satpal and Mehboob Ali, and threatened to kill them by stating that they should not show their faces there again. The complainant accordingly sought registration of a case, legal action against the accused, restoration of possession of the property to the Bank and protection of its employees. After registration of the FIR, investigation proceedings were initiated. Subsequently, the petitioners were granted concession of bail. The investigation is still pending and challan has not been filed.
It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that they have been falsely implicated in this case. The dispute between the parties originated from a loan transaction and proceedings initiated by the respondent-Bank under the SARFAESI Act. It is submitted that the petitioners had re-entered the residential property in emotional turmoil and that, thereafter, the entire outstanding loan amount was repaid to respondent No.2-Bank on 16.01.2026. Learned counsel submits that the Bank thereafter issued a No Dues Certificate, thereby closing the loan account and releasing its security interest over the property. It is further submitted that, in view of the settlement of the underlying financial dispute, continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Hence, it is urged that the petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned FIR along with all the subsequent proceedings are liable to be quashed.
Notice of motion to respondent No. 1 only.
Learned State counsel has advance notice of the petition and is ready to argue the matter. Learned State counsel, while opposing the petition, submits that the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of cognizable offences by the petitioners. The FIR specifically attributes allegations of breaking open the seal and locks of the property, forcibly entering therein, manhandling the Bank guards and extending threats to their lives. The petition is, even otherwise, premature as the investigation is still pending. The allegations contained in the FIR cannot be adjudicated upon or disputed in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS at this stage. Hence, it is urged that the petition is liable to be dismissed.
This Court has heard the rival submissions.
At the outset, it will be profitable to look into the scope and ambit of the Court's power under Section 528 of BNSS (which is pari materia with Section 482 of BNSS) as spelt out in several judicial pronouncements of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as different High Courts. The well settled proposition of law is that in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court is not expected to analyze all the facts, which are to be placed before the High Court. The power conferred under this section is very specific. To secure the ends of justice, to prevent the abuse of process of Court or to make any such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, such power can be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has drawn up some guidelines in some categories of cases by way of illustration to circumscribe the exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process of any Court or to secure the ends of the justice or to give effect to an order of the Court. A celebrated pronouncement on this point is the case cited as State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal : 1992 SUPP (1) SCC 335, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court had discussed different categories of cases wherein the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised either to prevent abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, while observing that it might not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined, sufficiently channelized, inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list or myriad kind of cases where such powers should be exercised. The following principles have been culled out:-
"102 (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;
(2)Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;
(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;
(4)Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code;
(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
The principles of law as laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) have been followed in a catena of judgments. In Paramjeet Batra vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, it was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice, yet, the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings, where essential ingredients of the offence are not made out. In Mahendra K.C. vs. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial. In Priyanka Jaiswal vs. State of Jharkhand, 2024 SCC Online SC 685, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot conduct a mini trial or enter into appreciation of evidence of a particular case. The following observations were made:
"13.We say so for reasons more than one. This Court in catena of Judgments has consistently held that at the time of examining the prayer for quashing of the criminal proceedings, the court exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction can neither undertake to conduct a mini trial nor enter into appreciation of evidence of a particular case. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint cannot be examined on the touchstone of the probable defence that the accused may raise to stave off the prosecution and any such misadventure by the Courts resulting in proceedings being quashed would be set aside. This Court in the case of Akhil Sharda held to the following effect:
"28.Having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court by which the High Court has set aside the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it appears that the High Court has virtually conducted a mini trial, which as such is not permissible at this stage and while deciding the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions no mini trial can be conducted by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. jurisdiction and at the stage of deciding the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court cannot get into appreciation of evidence of the particular case being considered."
Similar view was taken in Minakshi Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC Online 643, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability and genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
Reference can further be made to Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal complaint or an FIR, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accordance with the guidelines engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
In Neeharika Infrastructure vs. State of Maharashtra : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Apex Court observed that the Courts ought to be cautious in exercising powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. They do have power to quash. The test is whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence? The merits of the allegations are not to be entered into nor the power of the investigating agency to investigate into allegations involving the commission of a cognizable offence is to be trenched upon.
Similar position of law was reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Malik vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed as follows:
"8.It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9.It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)."
On applying the parameters as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in aforecited judgments to the peculiar facts of this case, it is revealed that the allegations contained in the impugned FIR, if taken at their face value, prima facie disclose commission of cognizable offences by the petitioners. The petitioners are specifically alleged to have broken open the locks and seal of the property, entered therein despite the property having been taken into possession by the Court Receiver pursuant to judicial orders, manhandled the Bank guards and extended threats to their lives. Thus, the case does not fall within any of the categories warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing of the FIR. The subsequent repayment of the outstanding loan amount and issuance of a No Dues Certificate by respondent No.2-Bank cannot by itself obliterate the allegations of the criminal acts allegedly committed by the petitioners, particularly when the investigation is still pending and the challan has not yet been presented. Whether the allegations are true and what was the actual role played by each of the petitioners are matters which require investigation and cannot be examined by this Court by conducting a mini trial in exercise of powers under Section 528 of the BNSS. The plea that the dispute has its genesis in a loan transaction and has subsequently been settled, therefore, does not furnish sufficient ground for quashing the FIR in the peculiar facts of the present case. The allegations relate not merely to the financial dispute but also to alleged trespass after the property had been taken into possession pursuant to judicial orders, assault/manhandling of the guards and criminal intimidation. At this stage, this Court cannot enter into the correctness or otherwise of such allegations.
Accordingly, no case for exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS is made out. The present petition is, consequently, dismissed. Needless to observe, nothing stated herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
Miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.