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Judgment
SURYA PARTAP SINGH, J.
By this petition, the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court by virtue of Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, hereinafter being referred to as ‘BNSS’, has been invoked.
Vide this petition, the petitioners are seeking the quashing of FIR No.240 dated 21.08.2025, Police Station Civil Lines, District Sonipat. The abovementioned FIR has been lodged for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 61, 351(3), 308(5), 140(2), 115 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, hereinafter being referred to as ‘BNS’ and Sections 25 & 27 of Arms Act.
Heard.
It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that purely on false, baseless and non-existent grounds, the FIR in question has been lodged, and that there is no iota of truth in the allegations contained in the FIR. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, the FIR has been lodged at the instance of ‘Manish Kumar’, hereinafter being referred to as ‘complainant’ only, and that the bare reading of the story, set-out by the complainant, in itself makes it apparent that it is unnatural and unbelievable. The learned counsel for the petitioners has further contended that in order to settle their score with the petitioners, and to pressurize them not to pursue the case filed against the close associates of the complainant, i.e. the case vide FIR No.100 dated 13.12.2024, Police Station Kasauli, District Solan, the present FIR has been lodged against the petitioners.
The learned counsel for the petitioners has further contended that the falsity of the allegations contained in the FIR have already been observed by this Court while passing the order on the application for anticipatory bail of the petitioner No.1. As per learned counsel for the petitioners, this Court while according the benefit of anticipatory bail to the petitioner No.1 has specifically observed that the story, projected by the complainant with regard to his abduction, fails to convince a prudent mind.
It has also been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that in fact, against political stalwart of the ruling party of the State, namely ‘Mohan Lal Badoli’ and ‘Jai Bhagwan Mittal @Rocky Mittal’, the FIR No.100 dated 13.12.2024 was lodged in Police Station Kasauli District Solan, for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 376(D) and 506 of IPC. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners are known to the victims (in the abovementioned FIR), and that there has been a continuous pressure upon the petitioners to enter into compromise with regard to FIR No.100 dated 13.12.2024. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, not only the threats were given to the petitioners to settle the abovementioned dispute, but also they were pressurized for the same purpose, with the same object during the course of custody in District Jail Sonipat. It has also been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the sole purpose of lodging the FIR against the petitioners is to pressurize them and force them not to pursue the case lodged against the above-named political leaders, i.e. case vide FIR No.100 dated 13.12.2024, Police Station Kasauli District Solan.
In addition to above, it has also been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the story set-out by the complainant is not only unnatural, but also there is delay of more than eight months in reporting the matter to the police. As per learned counsel for the petitioners, the lodging of FIR after eight months of incident in itself is sufficient and grave enough to impeach the credibility of allegations contained in that FIR.
While referring to the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of ‘Mahmood Ali & Ors. Vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.’ (2023) 15 SCC 488 and ‘State of Haryana & Ors. V/s Bhajan Lal & Ors.’ 1992 SCC (Cri) 426, it has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the purpose of Section 528 of BNSS is to stop the miscarriage of justice, and that in the present case, on the face of it, it is apparent that lodging of FIR at the instance of complainant is nothing, but an abuse of process of law. In view of above, the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that instant case is a case, wherein to avoid miscarriage of justice, the extraordinary jurisdiction should be exercised by this Court, and that by exercising the abovesaid jurisdiction, the FIR in question be quashed.
The learned State Counsel has controverted the abovementioned arguments. It has been contended by learned State Counsel that the FIR against the petitioners has been lodged on the basis of statement of complainant-Manish Kumar, and that in the abovementioned complaint, there are very specific and categorical allegations against the petitioners, and their co-accused, with regard to their involvement in the commission of offence punishable under Sections 61, 351(3), 308(5), 140(2), 115 of BNS and Sections 25 & 27 of Arms Act. According to learned State Counsel, since on the basis of allegations contained in the complaint, a cognizable offence was made out, the FIR in this case was lodged and during the course of investigation, when the process for verification of fact was undertaken, it was found that allegations contained in the complaint were true. As per learned State Counsel, in such circumstances, final report implicating the petitioner has already been filed before the Court.
In addition to above, the learned State Counsel has also contended that the law with regard to quashing of FIR, while invoking extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the Court by virtue of Section 528 of BNSS, is quite settled. According to learned State Counsel, once on the basis of allegations contained in the FIR, the essential ingredients meant for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 61, 351(3), 308(5), 140(2), 115 of BNS and Sections 25 & 27 of Arms Act, are made out, any finding with regard to credibility of allegations cannot be recorded by this Court until the trial is complete. According to learned State Counsel, such finding can be recorded by the learned trial Court only, and that, too, on appreciation of evidence of both the parties.
As per learned State Counsel, in the present case there is sufficient prima facie evidence against the petitioner with regard to their involvement in the commission of crime, and that the present petition itself shows that there are certain intricate questions of facts, which need to be determined to arrive at a conclusion, as to whether petitioners are innocent or not. According to learned State Counsel, for the adjudication of abovementioned points, the only course available under the law is to conduct the trial, record the evidence of both the parties and then take a decision.
While referring to the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the cases of ‘Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra and Others’ 2021 SCC OnlineSC 315, ‘State of Haryana Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal’, 1991(1) RCR 383, ‘Sadiq B. Hanchinmani Vs. State of Karnataka’, Criminal Appeal No.4728 of 2025, ‘M/s Balaji Traders Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr.’ 2025(3) RCR (Criminal) 175, and ‘Muskan Vs. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya)’, Criminal Appeal No.4752 of 2025, it has been contended by learned State Counsel that any ground for quashing of FIR is not made out in the present case.
The record has been perused carefully.
In the present case, it is relevant to mention here that the FIR of this case came into being at the instance of ‘Manish Kumar’, the complainant. It was stated by the complainant that he was serving in Income-tax Department at Mumbai, and that on 03.03.2025, he had visited his relative, namely ‘Mai Ram’ in the presence of ‘Amit’, resident of Bahadurgarh. According to complainant, in his presence ‘Mai Ram’ received a WhatsApp call from ‘Babla’, the petitioner No.2, who told ‘Mai Ram’ that ‘Amit Bindal’, petitioner No.1, wanted to meet him with regard to a case of gang-rape registered against their relative ‘Mohan Lal Badoli’ at Kasauli. As per complainant, although they were shocked, but agreed to meet, and thereafter ‘Babla’, ‘Amit Bindal’, and driver of Amit Bindal, namely Renu, the petitioner No.3, met them.
It was further stated by the complainant that all the above-named three persons came there to meet them and in the above mentioned meeting it was stated by the petitioner No.1 that the victim girls were demanding ₹20,00,00,000/- for settling the dispute. According to complainant, the petitioner No.1 also raised a demand to get him appointed as Chairman in Haryana. It was also stated by the complainant that he had recorded the entire conversation, and that in his presence, ₹2,00,000/- in cash was given to the petitioner No.2. According to complainant, thereafter he went to the house of the petitioner No.2 and handed over ₹8,00,000/- in cash to the petitioner No.3, and thereafter, both the petitioners No.2 & 3 used to talk to him and ‘Mai Lal’ through WhatsApp call.
It was also stated by the complainant that on 14.01.2025, the petitioner No.2 took the complainant to the residence of the petitioner No.1 and when they were talking to each other, he started the recording of conversation, but the above-named persons came to know about that and asked him to place the mobile phone outside the room. According to complainant, thereafter, he was kept hostage by the petitioner No.1 and his family members and they demanded money. As per complainant, he was brutally thrashed, but later on got himself released by making a promise to the above-named assailants that once he reached home he would pay the demanded money.
With regard to abovementioned allegations, it is pertinent to mention here that although there may be a question mark with regard to credibility of allegations contained in the abovementioned FIR, but there is no ambiguity, whatsoever, regarding the fact that the abovementioned allegations satisfy all the essential ingredients meant for offence punishable under Sections 61, 351(3), 308(5), 140(2), 115 of BNS and Sections 25 & 27 of Arms Act. Once on the basis of allegations contained in the FIR, it is apparent that essential ingredients meant for the commission of abovementioned offence are made out, in my opinion, at this stage, on the basis of plea taken by the petitioners that they are innocent, cannot be determined. Thus, it is hereby held that the proper forum for the determination of abovementioned issue is the learned trial Court only, where by appreciation of evidence of both the parties, the abovesaid issue can be adjudicated upon.
With regard to scope and indulgence of this Court for exercising extraordinary jurisdiction, the guiding principles, have been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of ‘Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.’ ( supra ). Those guidelines prescribe that:
“a)Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;
b)Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
c)It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
d)The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).
e)While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
f)Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
g)Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;
h)Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;
i)The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
j)Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
k)Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
l)The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
m)The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;
n)However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal, has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
o)When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;
p)The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India;
q)Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.
r)Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.
In addition to above, in the case of ‘Ch. Bhajan Lal’ ( supra ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India after reviewing large number of cases on the question of quashing of FIR has laid down that the FIR can be quashed in the following circumstances:-
Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
Similarly in the case of ‘Sadiq B. Hanchinmani’ ( supra ) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has ruled that police investigation should be allowed to proceed unless exceptional circumstances warrant intervention. According to Hon’ble Supreme Court of India the High Court should not interfere with the investigation when allegations in FIR disclose cognizable offences.
In the case of ‘M/s Balaji Traders’ ( supra ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has ruled that jurisdiction of quashing of FIR should be exercised sparingly in the ‘rarest of rare cases’. As per Hon’ble Supreme Court of India allegations in FIR or complaint must be taken at face value and accepted in their entirety to assess whether they disclose a cognizable offence.
In the case of ‘Muskan’ ( supra ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that the Court should not conduct a mini-trial at the stage of quashing and that quashing of FIR should be an exception and exercised sparingly in rarest of rare cases. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has further held that Courts cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
In the present case, the learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of ‘Mahmood Ali’ ( supra ). However, a bare perusal of abovementioned judgment shows that in the case of ‘Mahmood Ali’ ( supra ), requisite ingredients for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 342, 386, 504, 506 of IPC, were missing. However, the situation in hand is altogether different and therefore, it is hereby observed that the principles of law laid down in the abovementioned case are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
If the factual matrix of the present case is analyzed, in the light of abovementioned principles of law, it transpires that:-
on the basis of allegations contained in the FIR, all the essential ingredients meant for the offence punishable under Sections 61, 351(3), 308(5), 140(2), 115 of BNS and Sections 25 & 27 of Arms Act, are made out;
since evidence of parties is yet to be recorded by the learned trial Court, at this stage any observation with regard to the plea that the petitioners are innocent, can’t be recorded; and
the scope for quashing of FIR is very limited and in the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioners have been successful in qualifying the abovementioned parameters.
Taking into consideration the cumulative effect of all the abovementioned factors, in my considered opinion, in view of principles of law, enumerated above, the facts and circumstances of the present case fail to qualify the standard meant for quashing of FIR. Thus, it is hereby observed that at this stage, no ground for quashing of abovementioned FIR is made out.
As a sequel to abovementioned observation, it is hereby observed that the petitioners have failed to establish any ground for quashing of present FIR. Thus, it is hereby held that the present petition is devoid of merit and deserves dismissal. The same is hereby dismissed, accordingly.
Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of, accordingly.