M/s Shakuntalam Investment And Leasing Limited vs ACIT, Central Circle-1

Ground 1 That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law the Ld. CIT(A)-23, New Delhi, has grossly erred in partly upholding the assessment order dated 27.12.2019 passed u/s 143(3) of the Act, which is bad in law, void ab initio, and unsustainable, having been passed without granting adequate and meaningful opportunity of hearing and in violation of the principles of natural justice.

Ground 2 That the assessment order passed u/s 143(3) of the Act is void ab initio as the said assessment order has been passed based on the combined/consolidated approval issued u/s 153D of the Act by the Jt. CIT, Central Range-I, Delhi, dated 26.12.2019, in the mechanical manner, therefore, the impugned assessment order and the order of the Commissioner are liable t to be quashed.

Ground 3 That the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in sustaining a disallowance of Rs. 27,000/- out of Miscellaneous Expenditure, even though the Assessing Officer had disallowed Rs. 1,08,000/-, which was subsequently deleted by the CIT(A). The Rs. 27,000/-debited to the profit and loss account was never doubted by the Ld. AO, and the disallowance made by the CIT(A) without issuing any notice of enhancement is beyond jurisdiction and violative of principles of natural justice.

Ground 4. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in confirming the addition of Rs. 14,25,277/- u/s 68, by treating the share application money received from Shri Naveen Kumar Sachdeva as unexplained, merely on the basis of its presentation in the financial statements, ignoring that the identity of the creditor was fully established, confirmation along with income-tax return was furnished proving his creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction stood demonstrated. The disallowance is contrary to facts and settled judicial principles and deserves to be deleted.

Ground 5. That the Ld. CIT(A) has grossly erred in sustaining the disallowance of depreciation of Rs. 8,443/-, ignoring that the assets were duly reflected in audited accounts, were used for business purposes, and that depreciation, being a statutory allowance u/s 32, cannot be denied merely for want of past invoices.

Ground 6. That the Appellant craves leave to add, alter, amend, OR withdraw any ground(s) of appeal at OR before the time of hearing.

“…….4. The ld. DR has supported the approval granted by the competent authority by submitting that this approval are merely administrative in nature. As for completeness and to be fair to effort of ld. DR, though at the cost of making the order lengthy, we reproduce below the written submissions filed by ld. DR;

“With regard to the hearing held in case of M/s Shankuntalam Investment and Leasing Limited., the assessee issues raised the issue w.r.t the approval granted u/s 153D of the Income Tax Act being mechanical and without application of mind and thus consequential assessment order are unsustainable in law. Section 153 D of the Act was inserted vide amendment in Finance Act 2007 provides for the prior approval for the assessment in cases of search or requisition. Prior to the amendment vide Finance Act 2007 the existing provisions of making assessment and reassessment in cases where search has been conducted under section 132 or requisition is made under section 132A, does not provide for any approval for such assessment. Accordingly new section 153D has been inserted to provide that no order of assessment or reassessment shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner except with the previous approval of the Joint Commissioner. Such provision has been made applicable to orders of assessment or reassessment passed under clause (b) of section 153 A in respect of each assessment year falling within six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted under section 132 or requisition is made under section 132A. The provision has also been made applicable to orders of assessment passed under clause (b) of section 153B in respect of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted under section 132 or requisitioned is made under section 132A.

Section 153D of the Act is for administrative purposes and does not require that an opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the assessee. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Narayanappa vs. CIT 63 ITR 219 (SC) as to whether such approval is merely an administrative act or whether such approval can be brought under judicial scrutiny. The apex court held that the stage of obtaining approval from higher authority was administrative in character and not a quasi-judicial act. What is to be seen is whether the Approving Authority is competent to grant approval is important and under scheme of things the JCIT is the competent authority to grant approval u/s 153D of the Act. In view of the above, it is submitted that aforementioned ground of appeal on the issue of invalid approval under section 153D of the IT Act may kindly be dismissed for the reason mentioned above, it is submitted that aforementioned ground of appeal on the issue of invalid approval under section 153D of the IT Act may kindly be dismissed for the reason mentioned above it is submitted that aforementioned ground of appeal on the issue of invalid approval under section 153D of the IT Act may kindly be dismissed for the reason mentioned above.

The Hon’ble High Court of Kamatka in Rishabhchand Bhansali vs. DCIT in 136 taxman 579 held the approval granted by the JCIT is an administrative act and does not create any right to the appellant.

The Hon’ble ITAT Mumbai in the case of Smt. Usha Satisb Salvi vs ACIT Central Circle-4(4), Mumbai in ITA Nos. 4239,4237 & 4238/Mum/2023 dated 23.01.2025 has examined all the following judgements of the Tribunal and Hon’ble High Courts [Para 6.2] and rejected the objection raised by the assessee that approval granted u/s 153D of the Act has been accorded on presumption and without application of mind rather opined that approval was granted by the Addl CIT after due application of mind.

2.

Without prejudice to above objection, It is submitted that combined reading of letter dated Joint CIT/CR-5/ 153D/2019-20/1548 dated 26.12.2019 giving approval under section 153 D of the I.T. Act and letter dated 25.12.2019 seeking approval under section 153D of the I.T, make it amply evident that in the instant case, approving authority i.e. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Range, 05, New Delhi had applied his mind independently in judicious manner while granting his approval in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

It is not a gainsaying that the Joint CIT hold the concurrent jurisdiction and that the assessment is a continuous process involving administrative as well statutory roles being domed by the Joint CIT. And it is incumbent on the approving authority to examine and monitor the assessments which can’t be denied if the same is not reduced in writing at every point of time till the finalization of the assessment. The approval of the approving authority underlines that he has examined the assessment records, relevant copies of seized documents and the relevant issues arising from the material on record judiciously in independent manner by way of due application of mind. It would not be out of place to mention here that the appellant has not come out with any case that there is case of non-application of mind. The appellant has to positively prove that there is a case of non-application of mind in light of the submission that the approval u/s 153D is an administrative approval. Here, it would not be out of place to highlight that the relevant seized documents in a case are always part of the assessment records as per practice, and requirement of the work. They are not kept separately as relevant seized material is frequently referred to by the assessing officer during the course of assessment proceedings and also made part of assessment order most of the time. In fact, as per the law, seized material is considered as part of records before Assessing Officer and all such seized records, return of income, notices etc. used during an assessment proceeding when considered collectively is known as ‘Assessment record’. Therefore, from the letter seeking approval, it is evident that the entire assessment records which included seized material was placed before the approving authority for the purpose of taking decision with regard to approval under section 153D of the Act.

In view of the same, it cannot be inferred in any manner from the letter seeking approval by the AO and the letter granting approval by the Joint CIT that approval under section 153D of the Act was granted in mechanical manner without independent application of mind by the Joint CIT.

3.

It is pertinent to submit here that, single assessee has been granted approval on single day. Thus, it cannot he considered by any stretch of imagination that the approving authority was not in a position to apply his mind to the facts of the case and issues involved while granting approval under section 153D of the Act. The approving authority had sufficient time to go through all the records and relevant material to arrive at decision granting approval Under Section 153D of the I.T Act in judicious manner in the instant case.

Further, in search cases, a Joint CIT is well aware about progress of the assessment proceedings, relevant issues of different assessee, nature and content of the seized material in light of the fact that the as per the CBDT guideline F. No. 286/161/2006-IT (Inv. II) dt. 22.12.2006, copy of appraisal report is shared by Investigation Wing with both that the assessing officer and Joint CIT. In fact, CBDT guideline dt. 22.12.2006 (Copy enclosed) on the subject of the search and Seizure Assessments clearly outlines such close coordination. Thus, as per the prevailing Practice and Guidelines, the approving authority has good idea of issues involved in particular case before hand i.e. much before the cases are sent to him for approval Under Section 153D of the Act. This guideline of CBDT is relevant piece of information, which throws light on the way search assessments are taken up by the filed officers.

Therefore, in light of such peculiar fact of instant case, it cannot be inferred that the Joint CIT was not in a position to independently apply his mind injudicial manner to the case of assessee on the same day.

4.

In this regard, it is further submitted that on perusal of case laws on the issue of requirements for proper approval under section 153D, it is found that Hon’ble jurisdictional high court has emphatically held that such an issue is essentially a question of fact and has to be decided based of factual matrix of a particular case. Further, it has been held that approval cannot be reduced to a mechanical exercise and approving authority is required to apply his/her independent mind while granting such an approval. Thus, all the cases have been decided on this point by Hon’ble Tribunal and Hon’ble High court in light of peculiar facts of those cases only. Some of such peculiar facts of such cases are outlined here in under to emphasize upon distinguishing nature of facts of instant cases from those cases. :

“5 Courts should endevour to dispose of a case on merits rather than on default. ”

“ After all, justice can be done only when the matter is fought on merits and in accordance with law rather to dispose it of on such technicalities and that too at the threshold. Both sides had tried to argue the matter on merits but we refrain ourselves from touching the merits of the matter as that can best be done by the Executing Court which had denied an opportunity to the appellant to lead evidence and to prove the issues so formulated.

In our opinion, ends of justice would be met by setting aside the impugned orders and matter is emitted to the Executing Court to consider and dispose of appellant’s objections filed under Order 21 Rule 90 of CPC on merits and in accordance with law, at an early date. It is pertinent to point out that unless malafides are writ large on the conduct of the party, generally as a normal 1 rule, delay should be condoned. In the legal arena, an attempt should always be made to allow the matter to be contested on merits rather than to throw it on such technicalities.”

"15.

A similar view was taken by this Court in the case of Anuj Bansal (supra), whereby, it was reiterated that the exercise of powers under Section 153D cannot be done mechanically. Thus, the salient aspect which emerges from the abovementioned decisions is that grant of approval under Section 153D of the Act cannot be merely a ritualistic formality or rubber stamping by the authority, rather it must reflect an appropriate application of mind."

“10.

On perusal of the last page of the assessment order of the assessees‟ before us for the year under consideration, we find that the ld Additional CIT, Central Range-4, Delhi had granted approval in terms of Section 153D of the Act for all the cases for all assessment years vide consolidated approval in Approval No. 153D/CC-09/Jagat Group/2012- 13/996 dated 28.03.2013. This fact is very much evident from the last page of the assessment order for various assessees‟ for various assessment years. Hence, it is very clear that a common approval was given by the ld Addl. CIT u/s 153D of the Act vide approval No. 996 dated 28.03.2013 for all the assessees‟ before us for various assessment years. This goes to prove that the approval u/s 153D has not been given by the ld Addl. CIT for „each assessment year‟ and for „each assessee‟ separately which is mandate of the provisions of Section 153D of the Act. This issue is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Hon‟ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of PCIT Vs. Shiv Kumar Nayyar reported in 163 taxmann.com 9 (Delhi HC); decision of Hon‟ble Allahabad High Court in the case of PCIT Vs. Subodh Agarwal reported in 149 taxmann.com 373 (All. HC); PCIT Vs. Sapna Gupta reported in 147 taxmann.com 288 (All. HC) and PCIT Vs. Sidharath Gupta reported 147 taxmann 305 (All. HC), among others.

11.

Per contra, the ld DR vehemently argued that very existence of high presumption of law which is also codified u/s 114(e) of the then Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that all official acts are regularly performed and therefore, the Tribunal had to accept that the presumption of approval are validly granted. The ld DR further stated that merely because the approvals were granted by one letter does not mean that it was not granted for each assessment year.

12.

As far as the issue of presumption u/s 114(e) of the then Indian Evidence Act is concerned, the ld AR relied on the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani alias Pappu Kalani Vs. State of Maharashtra reported (1998) 7 SCC 337, wherein, it was held that presumption can be drawn only from facts, not from other presumptions and only through a process of probable and logical reasoning.

13.

We find that if a consolidated approval given by the ld. Addl. CIT for various assessees‟ for various assessment years is to be considered as a approval given for "each assessment year", then it would render the requirement of passing an order for "each assessment year" with prior approval u/s 153D of the Act, nugatory. Therefore, the obligation on the approving authority is to verify the draft assessment order of each assessment year together with the related seized document to ascertain whether it complies with law as well as the procedure laid down. Hence it is established that the action of the ld Additional CIT in granting common approval for all the assessment years for various assessees‟ in a mechanical manner without application of mind is writ large. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of PCIT Vs. Shiv Kumar Nayyar reported in 163 taxmann.com 9 (Del HC) are as under:-

"11.

A plain reading of the aforesaid provision evinces an uncontrived position of law that the approval under Section 153D of the Act has to be granted for "each assessment year" referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 153A of the Act. It is beneficial to refer to the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the case of Pr. CIT v. Sapna Gupta [2023] 147 taxmann.com 288/[2022 SCC OnLine All 1294] which captures with precision the scope of the concerned provision and more significantly, the import of the phrase- "each assessment year" used in the language of Section 153D of the Act. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are reproduced as under:-

"13.

It was held therein that if an approval has been granted by the Approving Authority in a mechanical manner without application of mind then the very purpose of obtaining approval under Section 153D of the Act and mandate of the enactment by the legislature will be defeated. For granting approval under Section 153D of the Act, the Approving Authority shall have to apply independent mind to the material on record for "each assessment year" in respect of "each assessee" separately. The words 'each assessment year' used in Section 153D and 153A have been considered to hold that effective and proper meaning has to be given so that underlying legislative intent as per scheme of assessment of Section 153A to 153D is fulfilled. It was held that the "approval" as contemplated under 153D of the Act, requires the approving authority, i.e. Joint Commissioner to verify the issues raised by the Assessing Officer in the draft assessment order and apply his mind to ascertain as to whether the required procedure has been followed by the Assessing Officer or not in framing the assessment. The approval, thus, cannot be a mere formality and, in any case, cannot be a mechanical exercise of power.

*** 19. The careful and conjoint reading of Section 153A(1) and Section 153D leave no room for doubt that approval with respect to "each assessment year" is to be obtained by the Assessing Officer on the draft assessment order before passing the assessment order under Section 153A."

12.

It is observed that the Court in the case of Sapna Gupta (supra) refused to interdict the order of the ITAT, which had held that the approval under Section 153D of the Act therein was granted without any independent application of mind. The Court took a view that the approving authority had wielded the power to accord approval mechanically, inasmuch as, it was humanly impossible for the said authority to have perused and appraised the records of 85 cases in a single day. It was explicitly held that the authority granting approval has to apply its mind for "each assessment year" for "each assessee" separately.

13.

Reliance can also be placed upon the decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Asst. CIT v. Serajuddin & Co. [2023] 150 taxmann.com 146/292 Taxman 566/454 ITR 312/SCC OnLine Ori 992 to understand the exposition of law on the issue at hand.

Paragraph no.22 of the said decision reads as under:-

***

14.

During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the assessee apprised this Court that the Special Leave Petition preferred by the Revenue against the decision in the case of Serajuddin & Co. (supra), came to be dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 28.11.2023 in SLP (C) Diary no. 44989/2023.

15.

A similar view was taken by this Court in the case of Anuj Bansal (supra), whereby, it was reiterated that the exercise of powers under Section 153D cannot be done mechanically. Thus, the salient aspect which emerges from the abovementioned decisions is that grant of approval under Section 153D of the Act cannot be merely a ritualistic formality or rubber stamping by the authority, rather it must reflect an appropriate application of mind.

16.

In the present case, the ITAT, while specifically noting that the approval was granted on the same day when the draft assessment orders were sent, has observed as under:-

"10.

We have gone through the approval granted by the ld. Addl. CIT on 30.12.2018 u/s 153D of the Act which is enclosed at page 36 of the paper book of the assessee. The said letter clearly states that a letter dated 30.12.2018 was filed by the ld. AO before the ld. Addl. CIT seeking approval of draft assessment order u/s 153D of the Act. The ld. Addl. CIT has accorded approval for the said draft assessment orders on the very same day i.e., on 30.12.2018 for seven assessment years in the case of the assessee and for seven assessment years in the case of Smt. Neetu Nayyar. It is also pertinent in this regard to refer to pages 68 and 69 of the paper book which contains information obtained by Smt. Neetu Nayyar from Central Public Information Officer who is none other than the ld. Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Range-S, New Delhi, under Right to Information Act, wherein, it reveals that the ld. Addl. CIT had granted approval for 43 cases on 30.12.2018 itself. This fact is not in dispute before us. Of these 43 cases, as evident from page 36 of the paper book which contains the approval u/s 153D, 14 cases pertained to the assessee herein and Smt. Neetu Nayyar. The remaining cases may belong to some other assessees, which information is not available before us. In any event, whether it is humanly possible for an approving authority like ld. Addl. CIT to grant judicious approval u/s 153D of the Act for 43 cases on a single day is the subject matter of dispute before us. Further, section 153D provides that approval has to be granted for each of the assessment year whereas, in the instant case, the ld. Addl. CIT has granted a single approval for all assessment years put together."

17.

Notably, the order of approval dated 30.12.2020 which was produced before us by the learned counsel for the assessee clearly signifies that a single approval has been granted for AYs 2011-12 to 2017-18 in the case of the assessee. The said order also fails to make any mention of the fact that the draft assessment orders were perused at all, much less perusal of the same with an independent application of mind. Also, we cannot lose sight of the fact that in the instant case, the concerned authority has granted approval for 43 cases in a single day which is evident from the findings of the ITAT, succinctly encapsulated in the order extracted above.

18.

Therefore, under the facts of the present case, considering the foregoing discussion and the enunciation of law settled through judicial pronouncements discussed hereinabove, we are unable to find any substantial question of law which would merit our consideration."

14.

In view of the aforesaid observations and respectfully following the judicial precedents relied upon herein above, we have no hesitation in holding that the approval u/s 153D of the Act has not been granted for each of the assessment year which is in violation of provisions of Section 153D of the Act itself thereby making the approval being granted in a mechanical manner without due application of mind. Hence, additional ground raised by the various assessees‟ before us in this regard is hereby allowed. Consequentially the assessment framed for these assessees‟ are hereby allowed for AY 2009-10. Since, the quantum assessments are quashed, the penalty appeals would have no legs to stand. Since, the assessments are quashed based on additional ground, the other grounds raised by the assessee as well as revenue need not be gone into and they are left open.”

11.

In the light of the aforesaid discussion of facts and now settled principles of law, we hold that the approval granted u/s 153D of the Act, is vitiated and thus are inclined to sustain the additional ground in the appeals in hand. The appeals are allowed. The impugned assessments are quashed….”

6.

The aforesaid, pointed out, facts do not indicate insufficiency of reasons, but mere mechanical manner in which approval is granted. The law in this regard is settled that such mechanical exercise of powers u/s 153D of the Act, vitiates the assessment order. Reliance can be placed on decisions in Asst. CIT v. Serajuddin and Co. [2023 SCC OnLine Ori 992], PCIT v. Anuj Bansal [ITA 368/2023]. The Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal while examining the similar issue in the case of SEH Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. ACIT in ITA No. 2503/Del/2017 and connected matters for Assessment Year 2013-14 vide order dated 23/07/2024, considered all the judicial pronouncements on the issue and has held as under: -

“8.

We find as per the scheme of the Act, for framing search assessments, the Ld. AO can pass the search assessment order u/s 153A or u/s 153C of the Act only after obtaining prior approval of the draft assessment order and the conclusions reached thereon from the ld. JCIT, in terms of section 153D of the Act. This is a mandatory requirement of law. The said approval granting proceedings by the ld. JCIT is a quasi judicial proceeding requiring application of mind by the ld. JCIT judiciously. In order to ensure smooth implementation of the aforesaid provisions, in consonance with the true spirit of the scheme of the Act, it is the bounden duty of the Ld. AO to seek to place the draft assessment order together with copies of the seized documents before the ld. JCIT well in time much before the due date of completion of search assessment. The ld. JCIT is supposed to examine the seized documents, questionnaires raised by the Ld. AO on the assessee seeking explanation of contents in the seized documents, replies filed by the assessee in response to the questionnaires issued by the Ld. AO and the conclusions drawn by the Ld. AO vis- à-vis the said seized documents after considering the reply of the assessee. All these functions, as stated earlier, are to be performed by the ld. JCIT in a judicious way after due application of mind. Even though as vehemently argued by the Ld. CIT-DR, the ld. JCIT is involved with the search assessment proceedings right from the time of receipt of appraisal report from the Investigation Wing, still, the ld. JCIT, while granting the approval u/s 153D of the Act has to independently apply his mind dehors the conclusions drawn either by the Investigation Wing in the appraisal report or by the Ld. AO in the draft assessment order. The copy of the appraisal report submitted by the Investigation Wing to the Ld. AO and ld. JCIT are merely guidance to the Ld. AO and are purely internal correspondences on which the assessee does not have any access. Moreover, the Act mandates the Ld. AO to frame the assessment after getting prior approval from ld. JCIT u/s 153D of the Act. The ld. JCIT getting involved in the search assessment proceedings right from inception does not have any support from the provisions of the Act as no where the Act mandates so. The scheme of the Act mandates due application of mind by the Ld. AO to examine the seized documents independently dehors the appraisal report of the Investigation Wing and seek explanation/clarifications from the assessee on the contents of the seized documents. When the scheme of the Act provides for a leeway to both the Ld. AO as well as the ld. JCIT to even ignore the conclusions drawn in the appraisal report by the Investigation Wing and take a different stand in the assessment proceedings, the fact of ld. JCIT getting involved in the search assessment proceedings right from the receipt of copy of appraisal report, as argued by the Ld. CIT DR, has no substance. In other words, irrespective of the conclusions drawn in the appraisal report by the Investigation Wing, both the Ld. AO and the ld. JCIT are supposed to independently apply their mind in a judicious way before drawing any conclusions on the contents of the seized documents while framing the search assessments. As far as the argument of the Ld. CIT DR that the details were normally filed by the assessee at the last moment is concerned, the ld. AO has got every right to reject the said replies if not filed within the stipulated time. It is not the case of the revenue that the details were filed by the assessee in the instant case at the last moment. Even if it is so, as stated above, it is the prerogative of the ld. AO to accept the said letter containing details or reject the same as it was not filed within the stipulated time. On the contrary, if the ld. AO himself grants time to the assessee to furnish the details till the last moment, then no fault could be attributed to the assessee. In such circumstances, the only irresistible conclusion that could be drawn is that the ld. AO is not serious about the statutory deadlines provided in the Act. In our considered opinion, if the arguments of the Ld. CIT DR are to be appreciated that the ld. JCIT need not apply his mind while granting approval of the draft assessment orders u/s 153D of the Act as it is not provided in section 153D of the Act, then it would make the entire approval proceedings contemplated u/s 153D of the Act otiose. The law provides only the Ld. AO to frame the assessment, but, certain checks and balances are provided in the Act by conferring powers on the ld. JCIT to grant judicious approval u/s 153D of the Act to the draft assessment orders placed by the Ld. AO.

7.

The contention on behalf of department that Section 292BC of the Act introduced by way of amendment by Finance Act, 2026 w.e.f from 1.04.2021 would be applicable in the case of present assessee also have not substance as we find that legislature has made the amendment applicable retrospectively w.e.f 01.04.2021 in regard to approvals granted after 01.04.2021. Thus, by no stretch of imagination we can accept the contention that because the matter is being heard subsequent to the amendment it becomes applicable to also in cases where approval was granted prior to 01.04.2021.

8.

We also bring on record the fact that subsequent to the hearing a request was made on behalf of the department by ld. CIT, DR Shri Mahesh Kumar by letter dated 16.04.2026 that because a reference u/s 255 of the Act has been made to Hon’ble president on 16.04.2026 for constitution of special bench in the several cases, including the present, in regard to issue of approval u/s 153D of the Act, the case be released. We do not appreciate that after a matter has been kept heard and order reserved department can take a plea to release the matter as subsequently, reference has been made by the department for Constitution of Special Bench. We have found issue to be covered by decision of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court, thus too, we find no reason to release the matter. Thus, we allow the corresponding ground raised and allow the appeals of the assessee. The impugned assessment arising out of the vitiated approval u/s 153D of the Act stand quashed….”