High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 09 PAT CK 4866

Lalchand Mishra & Anr. vs The State Of Bihar & Ors.

Patna High Court · Decided on 25 September 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Kumar Manish, J
RESULT
Disposed Of
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1746 of 2018

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Judgment

61 paragraphs · 3,935 words
1.

Heard learned counsel for the petitioners in both the writ applications and learned counsel representing the State-respondents.

2.

Since both the writ petitions involve common questions of law regarding the regularisation of long-serving temporary employees, the counting of continuous past service for pay fixation, seniority, and pensionary benefits, and the legality of treating regularisation as a prospective "fresh appointment," they have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment.

CWJC No. 1746 of 2018 (Lalchand Mishra & Anr. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.)

3.

The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioners seeking interalia for the following reliefs:

i.

Issuance of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ to quash the resolution/order dated 25.01.2016 bearing Memo No. 506 issued by Respondent No. 2, Inspector General (Prisons), Bihar, Patna, whereby the representations of the petitioners claiming counting of their service on the post of Dresser w.e.f. 22.12.1989 and 03.06.1988 respectively till 25.06.2005 with all consequential benefits were rejected.

ii.

A direction upon the respondents to shift back their date of appointment/regularisation from 25.06.2007 to 22.12.1989 and 03.06.1988 respectively with all consequential service benefits by regularising/absorbing their services in the light of the order dated 09.02.2007 passed in M.J.C. No. 2431 of 2005.

iii.

Any other order or orders that the Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.

Facts of the Case

4.

Brief facts emerging from the pleadings submitted by the parties in the case of C.W.J.C. No. 1746 of 2018 are that the Petitioner No. 1 (Lalchand Mishra) was appointed as a Dresser in the pay scale of ₹400–540 vide Memo No. 5599 dated 22.12.1989 and posted at Sub-Jail, Patna City. Petitioner No. 2 (Shatrughan Prasad Singh) was similarly appointed as a Dresser on a temporary basis in the pay scale of ₹400–540 against a sanctioned vacant post vide Memo No.3570 dated 03.06.1988 and posted at Sub-Jail, Danapur.

5.

On 21.03.1997, the Prashasi Padvarg Samiti created 40 regular sanctioned posts of Dresser across various jail establishments in Bihar specifically for absorbing existing continuous personnel. On 18.08.2004, the Director (Administration) formally recommended the absorption of both petitioners against these vacant sanctioned posts. Pending regularisation, the services of both petitioners were abruptly terminated on 30.10.2004 vide Memo No. 5344. This Court set aside the termination order on 11.01.2005 in C.W.J.C. No. 7800 of 1999.

6.

In contempt proceedings (M.J.C. No. 2431 of 2005), this Court held on 09.02.2007 that both petitioners fell squarely within Paragraph 44 of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3). Consequently, the I.G. (Prisons) issued Memo No. 3979 dated 25.06.2007, regularising both petitioners. However, the order arbitrarily restricted their regularisation prospectively from the date of joining in July 2007.

7.

Both petitioners challenged the prospective clause in C.W.J.C. No. 10924 of 2008, which was allowed on 13.08.2015, setting aside the prospective restriction. However, upon remittance, Respondent No. 2 issued the impugned rejection order dated 25.01.2016 (Memo No. 506), refusing to count the continuous past service of both petitioners. Upon reaching superannuation, the respondents initially categorized Petitioner No. 1 under the New Pension Scheme (CPF/PRAN), treating his absorption as a post-2005 entry, while retaining other identical co-employees (including Petitioner No. 2) under the Old Pension Scheme (GPF).

CWJC No. 22086 of 2014 (Md. Shahabuddin Ansari v. The State of Bihar & Ors.)

8.

The said writ has been filed by the petitioner seeking interalia for the following reliefs:

I. Issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the impugned rejection order bearing Memo No. 2417 dated 08.05.2013, issued by Respondent No. 2, Inspector General (Prisons), Bihar, Patna, refusing to count his continuous service rendered prior to 25.06.2007.

II. A direction upon the respondents to count his past uninterrupted service from his initial date of appointment (10.03.1989) for the purpose of pay protection, seniority, continuity of service, and retiral benefits under the Old Pension Scheme (GPF).

III. Any other order or orders that the Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.

Facts of the Case

9.

Brief facts emerging from the pleadings submitted by the parties in C.W.J.C. No. 22086 of 2014 are that the petitioner, Md. Shahabuddin Ansari, was appointed on a temporary basis as a Dresser against a sanctioned vacant post in Divisional Jail Hospital, Saharsa vide order bearing Memo No. 1228 dated 23.02.1989 in the pay scale of ₹400–540. He joined on 10.03.1989. His service book was opened, and deductions towards GPF and Group Insurance were initially made. Similar to the petitioners in the case of CWJC No. 1746 of 2018, his regular pay scale was withheld in 1995 and converted to daily wages w.e.f. 21.12.1995. His name was included in the departmental recommendations dated 18.08.2004 for absorption against the 40 regular posts created by the Prashasi Padvarg Samiti. Following his termination on 28.10.2004, he approached this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 15188 of 2004 (and C.W.J.C. No. 15186 of 2004), leading to the setting aside of his termination.

10.

Following the prospective appointment order dated 25.06.2007 (Memo No. 3979), the petitioner challenged the restrictive prospective condition by filing C.W.J.C. No. 1834 of 2009. On 05.07.2011, this Court allowed C.W.J.C. No. 1834 of 2009, setting aside the prospective clause and directing the I.G. (Prisons) to reconsider his continuous past service rendered prior to 2007 in light of State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari. Despite these clear directions, Respondent No. 2 issued rejection order Memo No. 2417 dated 08.05.2013, refusing to count his past continuous service for pay protection and pensionary benefits.

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners

11.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners have worked continuously on Class-IV sanctioned vacant posts of Dresser for decades since 1988/1989. It was argued that the Prashasi Padvarg Samiti created 40 posts specifically for absorbing existing continuous staff on 21.03.1997. Learned counsel contended that this Court in M.J.C. No. 2431 of 2005 had conclusively determined that the petitioners' cases fall under Paragraph 44 of Umadevi. By granting fresh prospective appointments under Memo No. 3979 dated 25.06.2007, the respondents acted arbitrarily, placing them at basic entry scales and stripping away nearly two decades of past continuous service. It was further urged that switching the Petitioner No.1 in the case of CWJC No. 1746 of 2018 (Lalchand Mishra) to the New Pension Scheme while retaining other identical co-employees (such as Petitioner No. 2 in the case of CWJC No. 1746 of 2018 i.e. Shatrughan Prasad Singh, Ranjan Kumar Dwivedi, and the Petitioner in the case of CWJC 22086 of 2014 i.e. Md. Shahabuddin Ansari) under the Old Pension Scheme (GPF) is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Submissions on behalf of the State

12.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State-respondents submitted that the initial engagements of the petitioners were purely temporary and not in accordance with formal recruitment rules. It is contended on behalf of the State that after 1992, no formal period extension was granted, and they worked as daily wagers. The appointment order dated 25.06.2007 was a fresh appointment granted on the basis of directions of this Court and not a regular absorption. Therefore, service could only be calculated from the actual date of joining in July 2007. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondents that since the petitioners joined in July 2007 pursuant to Finance Department Memo No. 1964 dated 31.08.2005, any employee entering service on or after 01.09.2005 is strictly governed by the New Pension Scheme. Thus, the respondents maintain that the rejection of past continuous service and refusal of the Old Pension Scheme via Memo No. 506 dated 25.01.2016 are entirely justified.

13.

However, during the pendency of the present writ proceedings, a Supplementary Counter Affidavit has been brought on record by the State-respondents, wherein it has been explicitly averred in Paragraph 6 that on 15.09.2025, the competent Administrative Authority (ACS, Home) gave his formal assent to the proposal for granting the benefits of the Old Pension Scheme to Petitioner No. 1 (Lalchand Mishra). Consequently, the State-respondents have stated in the Supplementary Counter Affidavit that, in view of the aforesaid administrative decision, the grievance of the petitioner regarding his coverage under the Old Pension Scheme does not survive.

Issues involved in these Cases

14.

Since common questions of law and facts are involved and identical contentions have been raised by the learned counsel for the parties in both the writ petitions, the issues arising for determination in these cases are consolidated and formulated hereunder:

Whether the decision of Respondent No. 2 (Inspector General of Prisons, Bihar) passed vide Memo No. 506 dated 25.01.2016 & Memo No.2417 dated 08.05.2013—rejecting the petitioners' claim for counting their uninterrupted past service rendered from 22.12.1989 and 10.03.1989 respectively for regularisation, pay fixation, seniority, and pensionary benefits is legally sustainable, or whether treating their regularisation as a "fresh prospective appointment" w.e.f. 25.06.2007 to deny the Old Pension Scheme (GPF) is arbitrary, discriminatory, and contrary to the binding directions issued by this Court in M.J.C. No. 2431 of 2005, C.W.J.C. No. 1834 of 2009, and C.W.J.C. No. 10924 of 2008?

Considerations

15.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the materials available on record, this Court finds that the impugned action of the State-respondents suffers from an incurable legal flaw, arbitrary misinterpretation of judicial precedents, and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

16.

The law relating to regularisation of long-serving temporary or ad-hoc employees working against sanctioned posts is governed by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1. The Apex Court categorically distinguished between illegal appointments and irregularly appointed workers who have worked for 10 years or more on sanctioned posts without the cover of orders of courts. Paragraph 44 (Paragraph 53 of SCC) explicitly carved out a one-time measure for regularising such irregular appointments:

"44.

One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) ... of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals..."

17.

Likewise, in State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari [(2010) 9 SCC 247], the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that the objective of Paragraph 44 of Umadevi was to ensure two conditions: (i) that the employee worked for 10 years or more on a sanctioned post, and (ii) that such continuous service was not under the cover of any interim order of a court.

18.

Building upon this foundation, the rulings in Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, SLP(Civil) No. 30762 of 2024 and Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, Civil Appeal No. 8158-8179 of 2024 reinforce that public employers cannot hide behind daily-wage labels, administrative drift, or contractual disclaimers to treat long-term, continuous service on perennial functions as a de novo entry. Paragraph 13.6, 13.7 ad 14 of Bhola Nath case lays down,

“This Court has repeatedly disapproved of the practice where States engage workers under temporary, contractual, or part-time designations over prolonged periods without granting regularization. In Jaggo v. Union of India, it was emphasized that public authorities must lead by example to ensure stable employment, establishing that courts must examine whether the duties performed by such temporary workers are essential to the day-to-day operations of the institution. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, this Court cautioned against mechanically applying Umadevi to deny regularization to long-serving temporary employees where statutory rules are absent. The Court observed that Umadevi cannot serve as a shield for continuous exploitative engagements in place of regular recruitment. Furthermore, Umadevi explicitly differentiates between illegal appointments and merely irregular ones, holding that irregular appointments remain eligible for regularization upon satisfying the prescribed conditions. In light of the preceding analysis, the conclusions are summarized as follows:

I. The Respondent-State was not justified in retaining the appellants on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade under contractual designations while denying them consideration for regular status.

II. Terminating such long-standing service solely based on contractual nomenclature, without recording cogent reasons or issuing a speaking order, is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for regularization cannot override constitutional protections. Accepting contractual terms does not constitute a waiver of fundamental rights, nor do contractual clauses immunize arbitrary State action from judicial review under constitutional standards.

IV. As a model employer, the State cannot rely on contractual labels or a mechanical application of Umadevi to justify extended ad-hocism or discard long-serving employees in a manner inconsistent with fairness, dignity, and constitutional governance.

V. The Respondent-State is directed to forthwith regularize the services of all appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed, with the appellants entitled to consequential service benefits accruing from the date of the judgment.”

19.

Paragraphs 13.6, 13.7, and 14 collectively establish that the State cannot use contractual labels or mechanical reliance on Uma Devi (supra) to perpetually appoint staffs on sanctioned vacant posts with long-serving temporary workers and then abruptly deny them regularization. Paragraph 13.6 deprecates the perpetual exploitation of workers under temporary or contractual titles, mandating that the State as a model employer must evaluate, that whether the duties performed are integral to the day-to-day operations of the institution. Paragraph 13.7 cautions against treating Uma Devi as a blanket shield to justify continuous exploitative arrangements, emphasizing its core distinction between purely illegal appointments and irregular appointments that remain eligible for regularization. Finally, Paragraph 14 codifies the binding conclusions: it rules that abrupt discontinuance based solely on contractual nomenclature without a reasoned speaking order is manifestly arbitrary under Article 14, that accepting contractual disclaimers does not constitute a waiver of fundamental rights, and that long-serving employees on sanctioned posts must be regularized with full consequential service benefits.

20.

Applying these settled principles to the present cases, this Court notes that a coordinate Bench of this Court in M.J.C. No. 2431 of 2005 evaluated the exact status of these petitioners vide order dated 09.02.2007. The Court specifically held that 40 sanctioned posts of Dresser were created vide Government Order dated 21.03.1997 / 14.08.1997 specifically to absorb existing continuous hands, that the petitioners had completed over 14 to 15 years of continuous service without judicial protection preserving their status, and that their cases fell squarely within Paragraph 44 of Umadevi.

21.

When an employee is regularised under a one-time scheme mandated by Umadevi, such regularisation is a legal recognition of long-standing past continuous service rendered against sanctioned posts, rather than a de novo standard open-market initial entry. The State authorities cannot defeat the core mandate of regularisation by mischaracterising an order of regularisation as a "fresh prospective appointment" so as to wipe out 18 to 19 years of prior uninterrupted service.

22.

Furthermore, as established in Sheo Kumar Shukla v. The State of Bihar, 2014(3) PLJR 609, this Court has held that where the employer-employee relationship established in earlier years was never legally severed or terminated, the employee cannot be treated as a fresh appointee post for the purpose of pushing them into the New Pension Scheme. Regularization under a mandatory scheme is an act of recognizing past uninterrupted service and not a fresh open market appointment. In the present case, the petitioners' initial temporary services commenced in 1988, 1989, and 1990. Their termination orders passed in 2004 were quashed by this Court in CWJC No. 7800 of 1999. Under settled administrative law, when a termination order is quashed by a court, the legal fiction is that the employee was never terminated. Thus, their employment relationship remained continuous and unbroken through the 2005 cutoff date.

23.

This principle receives complete reinforcement from the Supreme Court in Jaggo v. Union of India, 2025(1) PLJR (SC) 165, which categorically prohibits public employers from hiding behind formal labels or procedural delays to misinterpret Uma Devi and penalize long-serving personnel. Jaggo case (supra) explicitly holds that procedural technicalities cannot be weaponized to treat decades of continuous essential service as a fresh entry, mandating that full continuity of service must be granted to safeguard pensionary and retiral rights. Paragraph 20 of this case establishes the same as,

“It is well established that the decision in Uma Devi (supra) does not intend to penalize employees who have rendered long years of service fulfilling ongoing and necessary functions of the State or its instrumentalities. The said judgment sought to prevent backdoor entries and illegal appointments that circumvent constitutional requirements. However, where appointments were not illegal but possibly “irregular,” and where employees had served continuously against the backdrop of sanctioned functions for a considerable period, the need for a fair and humane resolution becomes paramount. Prolonged, continuous, and unblemished service performing tasks inherently required on a regular basis can, over the time, transform what was initially ad-hoc or temporary into a scenario demanding fair regularization. In a recent judgement of this Court in Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, it was held that held that procedural formalities cannot be used to deny regularization of service to an employee whose appointment was termed “temporary” but has performed the same duties as performed by the regular employee over a considerable period in the capacity of the regular employee.”

The State's attempt to rely on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi to justify Memo No. 3979 dated 25.06.2007, thereby treating the petitioners' absorption as a prospective initial appointment and erasing nearly two decades of past service is completely misdirected. As authoritatively held by the Supreme Court in Paragraph 20 of Jaggo v. Union of India (supra), the petitioners have continuously discharged essential duties on sanctioned vacant posts of Dresser in public jail establishments since 1988, 1989, and 1990. Applying the mandate of Paragraph 20 of Jaggo v Union of India (supra), in conjunction with Sheo Kumar Shukla v. State of Bihar (supra), the executive machinery cannot misinterpret Uma Devi to penalize long-serving personnel by creating a legal fiction of a 'fresh post 2005 entry’., Consequently, their unbroken continuous service rendered prior to 25.06.2007 must be reckoned for all service benefits, pay protection, and full retention under the Old Pension Scheme (GPF).

24.

Consequently, reading these precedents in harmony, the petitioners' initial engagements of 1988, 1989, and 1990 must be integrated into their qualifying service, entitling them to pay protection, continuity, and the Old Pension Scheme (GPF).

25.

Thus, the employment continuum remained unbroken.

26.

The fundamental flaw in the department's position is further exposed when evaluated against the principle of parity under Article 14 of the Constitution. It is impermissible for the State to adopt a disparate standard among identically situated co-employees who were regularised under the very same departmental order (Memo No. 3979 dated 25.06.2007). As revealed by the record, co-petitioners and similarly situated employees namely, Shatrughan Prasad Singh (Petitioner No. 2 in C.W.J.C. No. 10924 of 2008), Ranjan Kumar Dwivedi, and Md. Shahabuddin Ansari (Petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 22086 of 2014) who were all regularised under the same process, have been extended the benefit of the Old Pension Scheme (GPF). This position now stands fully accepted by the State-respondents themselves via Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Supplementary Counter Affidavit filed in C.W.J.C. No. 1746 of 2018, confirming that on 15.09.2025, formal administrative assent (ACS, Home) was accorded to extend the benefit of the Old Pension Scheme (GPF) to Petitioner No. 1 (Lalchand Mishra) as well.

27.

The decision of Respondent No. 2 in passing the impugned order dated 25.01.2016 (Memo No. 506) completely fails to appreciate the binding judgments of this Court in M.J.C. No. 2431 of 2005, C.W.J.C. No. 1834 of 2009, and C.W.J.C. No. 10924 of 2008. The authority erroneously treated the regularisation as a fresh initial entry into service, thereby illegally depriving the petitioners of the counting of their past service for regular benefits, pay fixation, seniority, and pensionary entitlements.

28.

In view of the aforesaid findings and the formal executive concession dated 15.09.2025, both writ petitions are allowed:

I. The impugned resolution/order bearing Memo No. 506 dated 25.01.2016, passed by Respondent No. 2 (Inspector General of Prisons, Bihar, Patna) is hereby quashed and set aside.

II. The departmental order bearing Memo No. 2417 dated 08.05.2013, passed in the case of Md. Shahabuddin Ansari is likewise quashed and set aside.

III. So far as the Petitioner in the case of CWJC No. 22086 of 2014 (Md. Shahabuddin Ansari) is concerned, the State-respondents are directed to treat his appointment as regularised in service from his initial date of engagement/absorption (15.05.1990), against a sanctioned post for all consequential benefits, including pay fixation, seniority, continuity of service, and retiral benefits;

IV. So far as Petitioner No. 2 (Shatrughan Prasad Singh) in C.W.J.C. No. 1746 of 2018 is concerned—who has already been extended the benefit of regularisation under the Old Pension Scheme (GPF) —the writ petition is allowed in his favour without any remittance. The State-respondents are directed to treat his regularisation as effective from his initial date of engagement (03.06.1988) against a sanctioned post. He shall be granted full continuity of service, pay protection, annual increments, and inter se seniority in the cadre of Dressers from 03.06.1988, with all consequential monetary and pensionary revisions;

V. So far as Petitioner No. 1 (Lalchand Mishra) in C.W.J.C. No. 1746 of 2018 is concerned, in view of the explicit admission made in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Supplementary Counter Affidavit regarding the formal assent dated 15.09.2025 granted by the Administrative Authority (ACS, Home) to cover him under the Old Pension Scheme (GPF), as well as the settled legal mandate in Jaggo v. Union of India, Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, and Sheo Kumar Shukla v. State of Bihar,no remand for fresh condition is warranted. The State-respondents are directed to formally issue the final sanction order treating Petitioner No. 1 as regularised with unbroken continuity of service from his initial date of engagement (22.12.1989) against a sanctioned post, with full entitlement to pay protection, seniority, and retiral benefits under the Old Pension Scheme (GPF).

VI. Since Petitioner No. 1 (Lalchand Mishra) has already superannuated from service, the State-respondents are directed to calculate, finalize, and release all accrued pensionary and retiral benefits—including pension, GPF, gratuity, leave encashment, and consequential arrears—under the Old Pension Scheme (GPF) within a period of six (6) weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this judgment.

VII. All monetary arrears and retiral benefit revisions resulting from these directions for Petitioner No. 2 (Shatrughan Prasad Singh) and Petitioner Md. Shahabuddin Ansari shall likewise be calculated and disbursed within the same period of six (6) weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this judgment.

29.

With the above observations, directions, and liberty as granted, the present writ application stands disposed of. All pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

30.

There shall be no order as to costs.