Krishna Prasad Singh and Another vs Emperor

Wort, J.—The Rule in these five cases came before Mr. Justice Jwala Prasad in the first instance, but as it appeared to him to be a matter of importance he referred the question to this Bench.

Petitioners 1 and 2 in these five cases were proceeded against u/s 63, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, and fined a sum of Rs. 100 each in each of the cases.

The case against them appears to have been that at the time of the shradh ceremony of the grandmother of petitioner 1, petitioner 1,. through his agents, made certain illegal exactions against his tenants on his estate in Chota Nagpur. It was stated in the course of the judgment that in the result these were voluntary payments by his tenants and that there was reciprocity in the cases inasmuch as that in similar ceremonies in the families of his tenants or friends he, petitioner 1, would also pay to them similar sums as those alleged to have been exacted from the tenants in these cases, the subject-matter of this Rule.

It appears that prior to the proceedings u/s 63 of the Act an enquiry was held u/s 110, Criminal P.C., against eight servants of petitioner 1., but these proceedings were discharged on the ground that the shradh ceremony of petitioner 1''s grandmother, in connexion with which the exaction was levied was already over, and, as I have stated, then the proceedings u/s 63 of the Act wore prosecuted, the petitioners were lined and as a result the petitioners preferred an appeal against the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer, who took cognizance of the cases, to the Judicial Commissioner of Chota Nagpur. The learned Judicial Commissioner declined jurisdiction in the appeal and in consequence this application was made praying for a Rule that the Judicial Commissioner be ordered to hear and determine the appeals according to law.

The argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in these cases is based on the assumption that the proceedings u/s 63 were criminal proceedings; therefore, they were governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, as a result, the appeal from the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional Officer, who heard all these cases, was to the Judicial Commissioner of Chota Nagaur. But that argument does not exhaust the considerations in regard to these cases. It may well be that, although the proceedings might be held to be criminal proceedings, yet the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, of which Section 63 is a part, may provide a separate procedure by way of appeal and, therefore, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to appeals would not apply.

In the first instance we are referred to Section 4(o), Criminal P.C., and it is argued that this matter comes within that sub-section. The sub-section reads:

"Offence" means "any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force."

If the case rested upon that point alone, I should be inclined to hold that this was an offence within the Code of Criminal Procedure; but, as I have already stated, that does not exhaust the matter, that is to say, the Code of Criminal Procedure does not necessarily apply and that is made clear by Section 1, Sub-section (2) of the Code. Section 1 of the Code deals with the application at the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-S. (2) provides that

it extends to the whole of British India; but in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary nothing herein contained shall, affect any special or local low now in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force, or shall apply, etc.

That clearly states that there may be other procedure provided by other Acts of the legislature and that, although a matter may be a criminal matter, yet it may not be necessarily governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners has engaged in an elaborate argument to show first of all that it is a criminal matter and that the provisions relating to appeals under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act do not apply to cases u/s 63. By reason of the decision to which I have arrived, it is unnecessary to state these in detail, but to set them out briefly will be sufficient. He refers us to Ch. 13, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, Section 109, which provides for appeals under that chapter. Section 126 again provides for proceedings under Ch. 14, Section 130 Sub-S. (3) provides for appeals in proceedings under Ch. 15, and again Section 215 provides also for appeals under the Act. But there is this difference between Chs. 13 to 15 and Ch. 16 whereas the sections mentioned in Chs. 13 to 15, specifically provide for appeals in those chapters Section 215, Ch. 16 is not so prescribed, but deals with all matters under the Act.

But by reason of the argument which the learned Counsel advances we are asked to hold that, although Section 215 deals with all matters under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, it does not deal with appeals u/s 63. But, it is unnecessary to discuss his argument on that point by reason of the fact that Section 258, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, seems to me to settle all the matters in dispute in these cases so far as jurisdiction to bear appeals is concerned. Section 2 (sic)8 provides:

Save as expressly provided in this Act, no suit shall be entertained in any Court to vary, modify or set aside, either directly or indirectly any order or decree of any Deputy Commissioner or revenue officer in any suit, application or proceeding under the section,

and then there are set out the numbers of the sections including Section 63:

except on the ground of fraud or want of jurisdiction,

and then comes the most important part of the section,

and every such decision, order or decree shall have the force and effect of a decree of a civil Court in a suit between the parties and, subject to the provisions of this Act relating to appeal, shall be final.

Now the last part of this section seems to me to go to the very root of the argument which has been addressed to us. It says that an order u/s 63 shall have the force and effect of a decree of a civil Court. Whatever may be said regarding the procedure to be adopted in the hearing of an application u/s 63 it is obvious from this section that when once that order has been made it is in effect a civil Court decree, and consequently it follows that any procedure to be adopted by a party subsequent to the making of that order cannot be governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, but being, as it states, a civil Court decree it must be governed, unless there be special provisions in the Act, by the Code of Civil Procedure, However, in my judgment, this Act does lay down a special procedure relating to all proceedings under the Act; it does provide a method of appeal, and, therefore, the proceedings which are before us must be governed by the sections which make those provisions. Section 215 is the section to which I refer. It provides:

All orders passed by a Deputy Commissioner under the foregoing provisions of the Act--

then it makes exceptions--

shall be appealable to the Commissioner, or, if passed by a Deputy Collector exercising powers of a Deputy Commissioner, to the Deputy Commissioner.

Whatever else may be said of that section this much must be said that there is no restriction in the class of proceedings to which it refers. The expression used in the section is "all orders passed by" and, in my judgment, it covers the order which is mentioned in Section 63. Section 63 uses the expression

may in a summary proceeding by order impose on the landlord or on his agent.

As I have stated, it is clear that the order therein referred to comes u/s 215 and the appeal is to the officers named therein, No more need be said in regard to the matter excepting perhaps that from what one can see from the judgment of the Sub-Divisional Officer the evidence which was adduced in the enquiry u/s 110 was used in proceedings u/s 63, That seems to me to be not altogether, to say the least of it, the proper procedure to adopt, but I say no more in regard to that.

The result of my finding is that this. Rule must be discharged.

Adami, J.

I agree.