Krishna Kumar Saxena vs Union Of India & Ors.

By Justice Rajiv Joshi, Member (Judicial):

Heard Shri Santosh Kumar Kushwaha, learned counsel for the applicant and Shri Krishna Kumar Ojha, learned counsel for the respondents at the time of hearing.

The instant Original Application under Section 19 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 has been filed for the following reliefs:

The brief facts as apparent from the record of Original Application are that the applicant was initially appointed as GDS on 07.02.1979 under the respondents. He was subsequently appointed as Postman on 25.10.1991 after qualifying in the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination. Thereafter, he was appointed as Postal Assistant on 01.07.1996 after qualifying in the Lower Grade Official Examination (hereinafter referred as LGO Examination). The applicant was granted the benefits of the 2nd Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (hereinafter referred to as the “MACP Scheme”) with effect from 01.09.2008. Subsequently, he retired from service on 31.01.2017. Thereafter, he submitted a representation to the respondents seeking the benefits of the 3rd MACP, which was rejected vide order dated 10.02.2022. The said order was communicated to the applicant vide letter dated 20.09.2022. Hence, the present Original Application has been filed challenging the order dated 10.02.2022 and the consequential communication dated 20.09.2022.

On the other hand, counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents on 11.04.2025, wherein it has been stated that the applicant was initially appointed as GDS on 07.02.1979. Thereafter, he appeared in the Postman Examination and, having been declared successful, joined the post of Postman on 06.09.1991. Subsequently, he appeared in the LGO Examination and, upon being declared successful, joined the post of Postal Assistant on 01.07.1996 after completing the requisite training.

In reply, rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the applicant on 24.06.2026 wherein, reiterating the averments as made in Original Application.

Mr. Santosh Kumar Kushwaha, learned counsel for the applicant assailed the impugned order on the ground that the issue involved in this Original Application regarding Postal Assistant through the LDCE was not a promotion, but a direct entry appointment to the Postal Assistant Cadre through a competitive examination and for the purpose of MACP, the services should have been counted from the date of Postal Assistant Cadre, has already been set at rest by the Apex Court in SLP (C) No.4432/2019 in case of Union of India Vs. E Sreeramulu vide its order dated 24.02.2026. This Tribunal after considering the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court decided an identical matters vide its order dated 23.07.2026 passed in O.A. No.320/2021 and vide order dated 10.09.2026 in O.A. No.1493/2017 and as such, this case may also be disposed of in view of the observations made in O.A. No.320/2021.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant and submitted that the applicant was rightly denied the benefit of the 3rd MACP, as his appointment to the Postal Assistant cadre through the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) was treated as a promotion and not as direct recruitment. The applicant had not completed the requisite 30 years of qualifying service or 10 years of service in the same Grade Pay after the grant of the 2nd MACP before his retirement. Accordingly, the impugned order was passed in accordance with the applicable provisions of the MACP Scheme, and the present Original Application is liable to be dismissed.

We have considered the submissions so raised by the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the records.

From perusal of the records, it appears that the principal issue involved in the present Original Application is whether the applicant is entitled to the benefit of the 3rd MACP by treating his appointment to the Postal Assistant cadre through the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) as a fresh entry into the cadre rather than as a promotion, and whether the service rendered by him in the Postal Assistant cadre is liable to be counted accordingly for the purpose of determining his eligibility under the MACP Scheme.

The treatment of appointment to the Postal Assistant cadre through the LDCE has been considered by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. E. Sreeramulu, SLP (C) No. 4432/2019, vide order dated 24.02.2026. The aforesaid issue has also been considered by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 320/2021, decided on 23.07.2026, and O.A. No. 1493/2017, decided on 10.09.2026. However, the applicability and effect of the aforesaid decisions have to be examined in the context of the facts and circumstances of the present case, including the financial upgradation already granted to the applicant vide order dated 31.03.2010, which remained unchallenged, and the stage at which the applicant first raised his grievance. The relevant part of the order dated 31.03.2010 is quoted as under:-

The applicant’s claim for the 3rd MACP cannot be determined merely by examining whether his appointment to the Postal Assistant cadre through the LDCE constitutes a promotion or a fresh entry into the cadre. His entitlement must also be assessed with reference to the relevant provisions of the MACP Scheme, the financial upgradations already granted to him, and the qualifying service required for the next financial upgradation.

It is an admitted position that the applicant was initially appointed as GDS on 07.02.1979 and subsequently joined the Postman cadre in 1991. Thereafter, upon qualifying in the LGO Examination, he joined the Postal Assistant cadre on 01.07.1996. Upon implementation of the MACP Scheme, the applicant was considered for financial upgradation, and vide order dated 31.03.2010, he was granted the benefit of the 2nd MACP with effect from 01.09.2008. However, the benefit of the 1st MACP was denied by the aforesaid order dated 31.03.2010 on the ground that his appointment to the Postal Assistant cadre through the LDCE was treated as a promotion. The applicant accepted the aforesaid determination, his pay was fixed accordingly, and he did not challenge the aforesaid order dated 31.03.2010 at the relevant point of time and in this original application also. He continued in service under the said arrangement and ultimately retired on 31.01.2017.

It is further evident from the record that the applicant did not raise any grievance regarding the treatment of his appointment through the LDCE or the computation of his qualifying service for the purpose of financial upgradation during his service tenure. It was only in the year 2021-22, after his retirement, that he approached the respondents by submitting a representation seeking the benefit of the 3rd MACP. The said representation was rejected vide order dated 10.02.2022, which was communicated to him vide letter dated 20.09.2022, giving rise to the present Original Application. Admittedly, the applicant accepted the grant of the 2nd MACP and the denial of the 1st MACP under the order dated 31.03.2010, without challenging the same during his service tenure or in this original application. This is a relevant circumstance. The applicant cannot, as a matter of course, seek to reopen an earlier determination.

It is also pertinent to note that the applicant has not completed the requisite ten years of regular service from the date of grant of the 2nd MACP, which is an essential consideration for determining his eligibility for the 3rd financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme. In the absence of completion of the prescribed qualifying service, the applicant cannot claim the benefit of the 3rd MACP as a matter of right. Thus, apart from the delay in raising the grievance and the failure to challenge the earlier determination during his service tenure, the applicant has also failed to establish his entitlement to the 3rd MACP on the basis of the requisite qualifying service.

The order/decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant are distinguishable on facts and circumstances of the case.

The applicant, who is a fence-sitter, approached this Tribunal after the similarly situated persons succeed in Writ Petition/SLP. The law is well settled that those persons, who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts, who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.

This Tribunal further finds that the respondents, while passing the impugned order, have duly considered all the relevant facts, the service particulars of the applicant, the applicable provisions of the ACP/MACP Scheme, the Office Memorandum governing the Scheme, as well as the claim raised by the applicant.

In view of the foregoing discussions, no case for interference has been made out by the applicant. Hence, instant original application is liable to be dismissed and as such, same is accordingly, dismissed.

All MAs pending in this O.A. also stand disposed off.

No order as to costs.