Khaliq Lone vs Azi & Others

Instant application seeking leave of this Court for filing the writ petition without annexing/depositing the requisite court fee, in view of the grounds

urged therein, is allowed. The petitioner shall deposit the requisite court fee/affidavit/stamps with the Registry of this Court within a period of one

week from the date Registry starts functioning normally.

Application is disposed of.

A suit for declaration filed by the respondent No.1 against the petitioner and proforma respondents came to be decreed by the Court of learned

Munsiff, Awantipora, vide its judgment and decree dated 12.06.2017. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before Principal District

Judge, Pulwama, along with an application for condonation of delay. Principal District Judge, Pulwama (appellate court) did not agree with the

explanation tendered by the petitioner for delay in filing the appeal and, accordingly, dismissed the application as also the appeal along with all

connected applications vide its judgment and decree dated 2nd of December, 2020, which is impugned in this petition.

The petitioner has called in question the impugned judgment and decree of the appellate court by invoking the power of superintendence of this

Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Learned counsel for the appellant when confronted that impugned judgment and decree of the court below was appealable under Section 100 of the

Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, there was no occasion to invoke the power of superintendence of this court, submits that by virtue of

impugned order the appellate court has simply dismissed his application for condonation of delay and such order of the appellate court is neither

appealable nor revisable under the Code of Civil Procedure. He, therefore, argues that in the absence of any statutory remedy available against the

impugned order, the petitioner was left with no option but to invoke the power of superintendence of this Court vested in it by virtue of Article 227 of

the Constitution of India.

Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record, I am of the considered view that the order impugned passed by the

appellate court is a decree and appealable under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

With a view to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to set out the provisions of Section 3 and 5 of the

Limitation Act:

Dismissal of suits, etc., instituted, etc. after period of limitation. â€" Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit

instituted, appeal preferred, and application made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the First Schedule shall be dismissed, although

limitation has not been set up as a defence.

Explanation: â€" A suit is instituted, in ordinary cases, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; in the case of a pauper, when his application

for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and, in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the Court, when the claimant first

sends in his claim to the official liquidator.

Extension of period in certain cases. â€

An appeal or an application for a review of a judgment or for leave to appeal or an application to set aside an order of dismissal of a suit for

plaintiff’s default or an application to set aside a decree passed ex-parte in an original suit or appeal or an application to bring the heirs of a

deceased party on the record or an application to set aside an order of abatement of a suit or appeal or any other application to which this section may

be made applicable by or under an enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the

appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation: â€" The fact that the appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing

the prescribed period of limitation may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section

From reading of Section 3, it is clear that every suit, appeal or application instituted after the period of limitation prescribed, is to be dismissed.

Section 5, however, empowers the Court to entertain an appeal and application beyond the period prescribed under law subject to the condition that

the Court is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or application within time. Section 5 is, thus, an exception to the general

rule contained in Section 3. The moment an application moved under Section 5 is rejected, Section 3 comes into operation as a necessary

consequence.

That being the position, when an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act was rejected by the appellate court, as a necessary consequence and by operation of Section 3, the appeal filed by the petitioner

became liable to be dismissed. This is exactly what has been done by the appellate court. For facility of reference, it is appropriate to reproduce the

operative portion of the impugned order, which reads thus:

―I have gone through the ratio laid down in these authorities cited by the counsel for the parties. After going through the application, the objections

and after hearing the ld. Counsel for the parties and also considering the ratio laid down by the authorities, it is evident that the appellant has failed to

make out a case for condonation of delay. The appeal being time barred, no sufficient cause exists for condonation of delay. The application for

condonation of delay is, therefore, dismissed. The result is that the appeal along with all connected applications shall stand also dismissed.

It is thus not correct to contend that by virtue of impugned order, it is only the application for condonation of delay that has been dismissed by the

appellate court whereas the fact remains that as a result of dismissal of application for condonation of delay, the appeal of the petitioner too stood

dismissed. The order and judgment dated 2nd of December, 2020 is, therefore, a decree and the remedy available to the petitioner against such decree

is Civil Second Appeal as envisaged under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Supreme Court in the case of M/S Essar Constructions vs. N.P. Rama Krishna Reddy, (2000) 6 SCC 94 and Union of India and others vs.

Manager, M/S Jain & Associates, (2001) 3 SCC 277, has clarified the position of law and has held that consequence of dismissal of condonation

application is upholding of the judgment impugned and rejection of the belated appeal.

A bench of this Court in the case of Union of India vs. Nek Ram Sharma, 2004(1) JKJ 280, considered this issue in the light of supra judgments of

the Supreme Court and held that ―an order rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or for that matter condonation under any

other law merges with the order that may ultimately be passed in the application or the appeal. The consequence of dismissal of application of

condonation of application is rejection of an application or the appeal, as the case may be. Therefore, the outcome of such rejection is upholding an

order subject matter of appeal.ǁ

In view of the settled legal position, I have no manner of doubt that the order impugned is appealable under Section 100 of the Code of Civil

Procedure and that being so, there is hardly any case made out by the petitioner for exercise of the power of superintendence vested in this Court by

virtue of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Needless to say that the power of superintendence vested in this Court by Article 227 is to be

exercised sparingly and in the rarest of rare cases and there is no justification to the exercise of such power when a statutory remedy is available in

law.

For the foregoing reason, this petition being not maintainable is, accordingly, dismissed along with connected application(s). It shall, however,

remain open for the petitioner to work out his remedy as may be available to him in law, if so advised.