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Judgment
KIRTI SINGH, J. (Oral).
The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned award dated 30.07.2015 (Annexure P-4) passed by respondent No.1, whereby the reference petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was engaged on daily wages by respondents No.2 and 3 on 01.02.2007 and worked continuously till 31.05.2013, when his services were terminated without notice or compliance with Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is submitted that the petitioner had completed more than 240 days of service during the preceding one year. It is further submitted that the management failed to produce the attendance, wage and seniority records RITIKA despite the application submitted by the petitioner in this regard. The Labour Court erred in dismissing the claim of the petitioner instead of drawing an adverse inference against the management for failing to produce the attendance and wage records of the petitioner. The finding that the petitioner was engaged under the MGNREGA Scheme is also stated to be contrary to the evidence, particularly the admission of MW-2 that no appointment letter showing such engagement was ever issued. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned award deserves to be set-aside.
Per contra, learned State counsel for respondent No.2 and 3 submits that the petitioner was never appointed by the Forest Department and had only been engaged under the MGNREGA Scheme for seasonal work. It is submitted that the engagement of the petitioner was temporary and depended upon the availability of work and funds. The petitioner worked only for limited periods under the scheme and was paid accordingly. It is further submitted that the petitioner never completed 240 days of service in the preceding year and, therefore, Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are not attracted. Moreover, the petitioner also failed to produce any appointment letter, salary slip or other record proving regular employment with the department. The Labour Court, after considering the evidence and the available records, rightly dismissed the claim petition. Accordingly, the impugned award calls for no interference.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.
Before proceeding further, a gainful reference can be made to the proposition of law as discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.6511 of 2005 titled as Surendranagar District Panchayat Vs. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, relevant paras whereof reads thus:-
“8.As per Section 25F, no workman who is in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer unless conditions laid therein are fulfilled. The retrenchment is defined in Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act). Under the definition termination of the service of a workman by the employer by any reason whatsoever, otherwise than, as a punishment, by way of disciplinary action, would constitute retrenchment except in cases accepted in the Section itself, they are :- i) a voluntary retirement of a workman; ii) retirement of a workman on reaching the age of superannuation; iii) termination of the service of a workman as a result of nonre-newal of the contract of employment; or iv) termination of the service on the ground of continued ill-health of the workman. Unless these reasons are existed and proved, termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason, would con-stitute retrenchment. Therefore, if the employer is to retrench the workmen employed in his industry who is in continuous service has to follow the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. To attract provisions of Section 25F, the workman claiming protec-tion under it, has to prove that there exists relationship of employer and employee; that he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act; the establish-ment in which he is employed is an industry within the meaning of the Act and he must have put in not less than one year of continuous service as defined by Section 25B under the employer. These conditions are cumulative. If any of these conditions are missing the provisions of Section 25F will not attract. To get relief from the court the workman has to establish that he has right to continue in service and that his service has been terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The Section postulates three conditions to be fulfilled by an employer for getting a valid retrenchment, namely:-
i)One month's clear notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or that the workman has been paid wages for the period of notice in lieu of such no-tice;
ii) payment of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days av-erage pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof, in ex-cess of six months;
iii) a notice to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner.
9.To attract the provisions of Section 25F, one of the conditions required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. Section 25B of the Act defines continuous service for the pur-poses of Chapter V-A "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purport of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service of the establishment, includ-ing the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorised leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workman shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under Section 25B. However, the workmen must have been in service during the period, i.e., not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in sub-section (1). The workman must be in the employment of the employer concerned on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of sub-section (1) of Section 25B is that the workman should be in the employment of the employer for the continuous, uninterrupted period for one year except the period the absence is permissible as mentioned hereinabove. Sub-section (2) of Section 25B introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the work-man is not in continuous service within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 25B for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2). By the legal fiction of sub-section 2(a) (i), the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the Section postulate that if the workman has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of Section 25F.
16.In Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225, it is said by this Court that before a workman can claim retrenchment not being in consonance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, he has to show that he has been in continuous service of not less than one year with the employer who had retrenched him from service.
17.In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 - (At Page 26, Para 3), this Court held that "In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside."
19.In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve calendar months preceding the date of ter-mination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no coworker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contra-dicted. It is improbable that workman who claimed to have worked with the appel-lant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with his em-ployer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. The Courts below have wrongly drawn an ad-verse inference for non production of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only 12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the pur-pose of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never con-tended that he was regularly employed in the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25B(1) of the Act. In the fact and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the work-man-respondent is not entitled for the protection or compliance of Section 25F of the Act before his service was terminated by the employer. As regards noncompli-ance of Sections 25G and 25H suffice is to say that witness Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily wagers. In the absence of regular employment of the workman, the appel-lant was not expected to maintain seniority list of the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of the seniority list and his so called seniority no relief could be given to him for non-com-RITIKA pliance of provisions of the Act. The Courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the Court. In order to entitle the Court to draw inference un-favourable to the party, the Court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved.”
A perusal of the impugned award dated 30.07.2015 would reveal that the learned Labour Court, after considering the evidence led by both sides, recorded the finding that the petitioner had failed to establish that the petitioner had completed 240 days of continuous service preceding the alleged date of termination, and that he had also not produced any appointment letter, salary record, attendance record or any other documentary evidence in support of his claim, other than his own affidavit. On the other hand, the management produced the available work records and payment details, showing that the petitioner had worked for limited periods i.e. for 112 days in 2008, 151 days in 2009 and 34.5 days in 2010 under the MGNREGA Scheme to prove that the petitioner had not worked continuously for 240 days in the preceding year from the date of the alleged termination. Once the petitioner failed to establish continuous service of 240 days preceding the alleged termination, the necessary foundation for invoking Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not established.
The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that an adverse inference ought to have been drawn against the management for non-production of the attendance and wage records also does not merit acceptance, as the management had produced the records available with it and had also explained that certain old departmental records had been destroyed in the floods of 2010. In these circumstances, the learned Labour Court was justified in considering the evidence available on record and in holding that the petitioner had failed to discharge the initial burden of proving the requisite period of continuous service.
It is well settled that this Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India over awards of Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals, does not sit in appeal over findings of fact, nor does it re-appreciate the evidence to test whether a different view was possible; interference is warranted only where a finding is shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Learned counsel for the petitioner, despite his able assistance, has been unable to point out any such infirmity in the impugned Award. The findings recorded by the learned Tribunal are based on a fair appreciation of the evidence on record and call for no interference.
In view of the above, this Court finds no merit in the present writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed.
Civil miscellaneous application(s) pending, if any, are also disposed of.
