High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 08 P&H CK 4690

Raj Kumar vs The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court-I, Faridabad & Anr.

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 10 August 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Kirti Singh, J
CASE NUMBER
CWP-7993 of 2001 (O&M)

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Judgment

16 paragraphs · 2,233 words

KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)

1)

The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the Award dated 02.06.2000 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-I, Faridabad in Reference No. 275 of 1994, whereby the reference made at the instance of the petitioner has been answered against him.

2)

The pleaded facts of the case are that the petitioner was engaged and appointed as Clerk-cum-Typist by respondent No. 2 with effect from 26.07.1993. It is the case of the petitioner that no appointment order was issued to him at the time of his engagement, that he served continuously without any break upto 31.03.1994 and completed 240 days of continuous service, and that his services were terminated with effect from 01.04.1994 without holding any inquiry, without issuing any show cause notice and without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is further averred that no retrenchment compensation was paid to him. Aggrieved thereagainst, the petitioner served a demand notice dated 16.05.1994 under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Conciliation proceedings having failed, the appropriate Government, referred the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court, which, upon the conclusion of the proceedings before it, concluded that the workman had actually worked for 214 days during the period from 26.07.1993 to 31.03.1994, and not for 240 days as claimed by him. Holding that the mandatory period of 240 days of continuous service under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 stood unproved, the Labour Court held that no industrial dispute arose between the parties, that the termination of the petitioner was justified, and that he was not entitled to any relief.

3)

Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 has opposed the writ petition and has supported the Award dated 02.06.2000.

4)

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

5)

Before proceeding further, a gainful reference can be made to the proposition of law as discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.6511 of 2005 titled as Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, relevant paragraphs whereof read thus:-

"8.

As per Section 25F, no workman who is in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer unless conditions laid therein are fulfilled. The retrenchment is defined in Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act). Under the definition termination of the service of a workman by the employer by any reason whatsoever, otherwise than, as a punishment, by way of disciplinary action, would constitute retrenchment except in cases accepted in the Section itself, they are :- i) a voluntary retirement of a workman; ii) retirement of a workman on reaching the age of superannuation; iii) termination of the service of a workman as a result of nonrenewal of the contract of employment; or iv) termination of the service on the ground of continued ill-health of the workman. Unless these reasons are existed and proved, termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason, would constitute retrenchment. Therefore, if the employer is to retrench the workmen employed in his industry who is in continuous service has to follow the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. To attract provisions of Section 25F, the workman claiming protection under it, has to prove that there exists relationship of employer and employee; that he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act; the establishment in which he is employed is an industry within the meaning of the Act and he must have put in not less than one year of continuous service as defined by Section 25B under the employer. These conditions are cumulative. If any of these conditions are missing the provisions of Section 25F will not attract. To get relief from the court the workman has to establish that he has right to continue in service and that his service has been terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The Section postulates three conditions to be fulfilled by an employer for getting a valid retrenchment, namely:-i) One month’s clear notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or that the workman has been paid wages for the period of notice in lieu of such notice; ii) payment of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof, in excess of six months; iii) a notice to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner.

9.

To attract the provisions of Section 25F, one of the conditions required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. Section 25B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A “Lay-off and Retrenchment”. The purport of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service of the establishment, including the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorised leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workman shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under Section 25B. However, the workmen must have been in service during the period, i.e., not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in sub-section (1). The workman must be in the employment of the employer concerned on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of sub-section (1) of Section 25B is that the workman should be in the employment of the employer for the continuous, uninterrupted period for one year except the period the absence is permissible as mentioned hereinabove. Subsection (2) of Section 25B introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 25B for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2). By the legal fiction of sub-section 2(a) (i), the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the Section postulate that if the workman has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of Section 25F.

16.

In Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225, it is said by this Court that before a workman can claim retrenchment not being in consonance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, he has to show that he has been in continuous service of not less than one year with the employer SWARNJIT SINGH who had retrenched him from service.

17.

In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 - (At Page 26, Para 3), this Court held that “In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside.”

19.

In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no coworker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that workman who claimed to have worked with the appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. The Courts below have wrongly drawn an adverse inference for non production of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only 12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25B(1) of the Act. In the fact and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the workman-respondent is not entitled for the protection or compliance of Section 25F of the Act before his service was terminated by the employer. As regards noncompliance of Sections 25G and 25H suffice is to say that witness Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily wagers. In the absence of regular employment of the workman, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of the seniority list and his so called seniority no relief could be given to him for non-compliance of provisions of the Act. The Courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the Court. In order to entitle the Court to draw inference unfavourable to the party, the Court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved."

6)

It is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, while examining an award passed by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, is supervisory and not appellate in nature. This Court does not sit as a court of appeal over the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal, nor does it re-appreciate the evidence to substitute its own view for the one taken by the Tribunal. Interference is warranted only where the finding recorded is shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or arrived at by ignoring material evidence on record, and not merely because another view is possible.

7)

Tested on the aforesaid parameters, this Court is of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the Labour Court, that the petitioner did not complete 240 days of continuous service, is founded on cogent documentary evidence in the shape of the pay rolls Ex.M-1 to Ex.M-8, corroborated further by the orders dated 13.12.1993 and 10.02.1994 produced by the workman himself in additional evidence, from which it was computed that the workman had only worked for a period of 214 days in the 12 months preceding his alleged illegal termination.

8)

Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any perversity in the appreciation of evidence by the Labour Court nor has he been able to demonstrate that the said finding, which is a pure finding of fact based on documentary record, calls for interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.

9)

In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no merit in the present writ petition. The Award dated 02.06.2000 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-I, Faridabad in Reference No. 275 of 1994 does not warrant any interference.

10)

The present writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.