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Judgment
S.S. Mishra, J.
The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.07.1996 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Titilagarh in Sessions Case No.166/3 of 1995-96, arising out of G.R. Case No.258 of 1994, whereby the appellants were acquitted of the charge under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code but were convicted under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC. Upon conviction, each of the appellants was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, with a default sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months.
The order dated 22.07.2025 in the file of the present appeal indicates that Appellant Nos.1 and 2 have already expired during the pendency of the appeal, consequently, their appeal stands abated. The present appeal survives only at the instance of the appellant No. 3, Khira Sahu.
This present appeal has been pending since 1996. When the matter was called for hearing, contimiously none appeared for the appellant. Therefore, on 08.09.2026, this Court requested Mr. Pranay Kumar Maharaj, learned counsel, who was present in Court to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae. He has readily accepted the same and after obtaining entire record, assisted the Court very effectively. This Court records appreciation for the meaningful assistance rendered by Mr. Maharaj.
Heard Mr. Pranay Kumar Maharaj, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant and Ms. Sarita Moharana, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State.
The prosecution case, as revealed from the written report lodged by the father of the deceased, is that the deceased Lokesi Sahu was married to appellant No.1 Kabiraj Sahu about two to three years prior to the occurrence. It was alleged that after the marriage, the appellants repeatedly demanded a motorcycle and additional gold ornaments as dowry and subjected the deceased to physical and mental cruelty since such demands remained unfulfilled. On 25.10.1994, the deceased was found dead on a railway track after being run over by a train. Initially, an unnatural death case was registered by the Government Railway Police, but subsequently, on the complaint of her father alleging dowry-related harassment, the present criminal case was instituted. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against all three appellants.
The prosecution examined fourteen witnesses, including the father of the deceased, her relatives, villagers from both sides, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination, the police officers who investigated the case, and the businessman from whom the pledged necklace was recovered. Three defence witnesses were also examined.
The learned trial Court scrutinized the evidence relating to the allegation of abetment of suicide and noticed several infirmities. The letter relied upon by the prosecution was found to be surrounded by suspicious circumstances regarding its authorship and seizure. The trial Court further observed that the letter did not disclose circumstances having a proximate connection with the death so as to constitute a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. Consequently, the appellants were acquitted of the charge under Section 306 IPC. However, while appreciating the oral evidence of the father of the deceased, her relatives, independent villagers, and the recovery of the pledged gold ornament, the trial Court concluded that there was consistent and reliable evidence that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty on account of unlawful demands for a motorcycle and additional gold ornaments. Holding that such conduct squarely fell within the ambit of Section 498-A IPC, all three appellants were convicted thereunder. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“9.Now therefore, even though the case U/S.306 of the I.P.C. read with Sec.34 of the I.P.C. fails having not been proved by the prosecution by cogent and convincing evidence, the charge U/S.498(A) readwith Sec.34 of the I.P.C. has contained sufficient grain of truth, as I have already discussed that the broad probability of this part of the prosecution story cannot be overlooked. Merely because of the fact that the I.O.(P.W.14) in his evidence has stated that accused Kabiraj Sahu had purchased a Luna-moped 3 years prior to the occurrence, we cannot conclude that there was no dowry demand by the accused persons. When the witnesses have categorically stated on this aspect regarding dowry demand by the accused persons and for its non-fulfillment, the poor lady Lokesi was subjected to harassment and torture, the evidence of the I.O. that in this case there was no dowry demand since accused Kabiraj Sahu had already purchased a motor cycle by itself would not throw away the case of the prosecution to a melting point. It is true as reveals from the evidence on record that the accused Kabiraj Sahu purchased a Luna moped but he purchased the same by pledging the gold ornaments of Lokesi and therefore there was no occasion on the part of the I.O. to speak to the Court that there was no dowry demand.”
Having carefully examined the impugned judgment and the materials placed on record, this Court finds that the learned trial Court drew a conscious distinction between the allegation of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC and the offence of cruelty under Section 498-A IPC. The trial Court noticed several infirmities regarding the prosecution's attempt to establish a proximate nexus between the alleged acts of cruelty and the commission of suicide, particularly with respect to the letter relied upon by the prosecution and the surrounding circumstances, and consequently acquitted all the accused of the charge under Section 306 IPC. At the same time, upon appreciation of the oral evidence of the father of the deceased, her relatives, independent villagers and the recovery of the pledged gold ornament, the trial Court recorded a finding that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty on account of unlawful demands for a motorcycle and additional gold ornaments. This Court does not find any perversity or manifest illegality in such appreciation of evidence so far as the conviction under Section 498-A IPC is concerned.
The question that remains is whether the sentence imposed upon the surviving appellant calls for modification. The occurrence is of the year 1994. More than three decades have elapsed since the occurrence. Appellant No.3 is the mother-in-law of the deceased and is now more than seventy-five years old. There is nothing on record to indicate that she has any criminal antecedent or has been involved in any subsequent criminal activity during the long pendency of the proceedings. Significantly, the prosecution has failed to establish the graver charge under Section 306 IPC, and the conviction that survives is confined to the offence of cruelty under Section 498-A IPC.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chellammal and Another v. State represented by the Inspector of Police1, has held that it is the statutory obligation of the sentencing Court to consider the applicability of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act and that any refusal to extend such benefit must be supported by reasons.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chellammal (supra) has elaborately explained the scope, object and significance of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 while considering the question of extending the benefit of probation to a convict. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has underscored that the legislative intent behind the enactment of the Probation of Offenders Act is essentially reformative in nature, aiming to provide an opportunity to first-time or less serious offenders to reform themselves rather than subjecting them to incarceration. It has been emphasized that the provisions of the Act are intended to prevent the deleterious effects of imprisonment on individuals who can otherwise be rehabilitated as responsible members of society. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
“26.On consideration of the precedents and based on a comparative study of Section 360, Cr. PC and sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act, what is revealed is that the latter is wider and expansive in its coverage than the former. Inter alia, while Section 360 permits release of an offender, more twenty-one years old, on probation when he is sentenced to imprisonment for less than seven years or fine, Section 4 of the Probation Act enables a court to exercise its discretion in any case where the offender is found to have committed an offence such that he is punishable with any sentence other than death or life imprisonment. Additionally, the non-obstante clause in sub-section gives overriding effect to sub-section (1) of Section 4 over any other law for the time being in force. Also, it is noteworthy that Section 361, Cr. PC itself, being a subsequent legislation, engrafts a provision that in any case where the court could have dealt with an accused under the provisions of the Probation Act but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special reasons therefor.
27.What logically follows from a conjoint reading of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act and Section 361, Cr. PC is that if Section 360, Cr. PC were not applicable in a particular case, there is no reason why Section 4 of the Probation Act would not be attracted.
28.Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record the reasons therefor.”
Considering the nature of the offence, the prolonged lapse of time since the occurrence, the age and circumstances of the surviving appellant, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant deserves to be extended the benefit contemplated under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, instead of directing the appellant to undergo the remaining part of the sentence. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is inclined to extend the appellant the benefit contemplated under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act.
Hence, the present Criminal Appeal in so far as the conviction is concerned is turned down. But instead of sentencing the appellant to suffer imprisonment, this Court directs the appellant No.3 to be released under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act for a period of one year on her executing bond of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) within one month with one surety for the like amount to appear and receive the sentence when called upon during such period and in the meantime, the appellant shall keep peace and good behavior and she shall remain under the supervision of the concerned Probation Officer during the aforementioned period of one year.
Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is partly allowed.
This Court acknowledges the effective and meaningful assistance rendered by Mr. Pranay Kumar Maharaj, learned Amicus Curiae in this case. Learned Amicus Curiae is entitled to an honorarium of Rs.7,500/-(Rupees seven thousand five hundred) to be paid as a token of appreciation.
Footnotes
- 1.2025 INSC 540