Narendra Maharana & Ors. vs State of Odisha

S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal is arising out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.10.2004 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Puri in S.T. Case No.209 of 2002, arising out of G.R. Case No.180 of 2001. By the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court acquitted the appellants of the charges under Sections 302/34 and 304-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code, but convicted them for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 306, 201 and 176 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The learned trial Court sentenced each of the appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years with fine of Rs.500/- in default to undergo further R.I. for 3 months for the offence under Section 306/34 IPC, R.I. for one year with fine of Rs.500/- in default to undergo further R.I. for 3 months for the offence under Section 498-A/34 IPC, R.I. for 3 months for the offence under Section 201/34 IPC, S.I. for one month for the offence under Section 176/34 IPC and S.I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- in default to undergo further S.I. for one month u/s 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, directing all the sentences to run concurrently.

The present appeal has been pending since 2004. When the matter was called for hearing, consistently none appeared for the appellants. Therefore, on 28.07.2026, this Court requested Mr. Samvit Mohanty, learned counsel, who was present in Court to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae. He has readily accepted the same and after obtaining entire record, assisted the Court very effectively. This Court records appreciation for the meaningful assistance rendered by Mr. Mohanty.

Heard Mr. Samvit Mohanty, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellants and Mrs. Sarita Maharana, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the State-respondent. Mr. Mohanty also filed exhaustive and detailed written notes of submission along with relied upon judgments.

The prosecution case, in brief, is that the deceased Priyatama Moharana was married to appellant No.1-Narendra Kumar Moharana and was residing in her matrimonial home. It was alleged that at the time of marriage cash of Rs.20,000/- along with certain articles was given and that subsequently there was a further demand for a welding machine. According to the prosecution, on account of non-fulfilment of the said demand, the deceased was subjected to assault, cruelty and harassment by her husband and other members of the matrimonial family. It was further alleged that the deceased had written certain letters, marked as Exts.2 to 5, narrating her alleged suffering and apprehension. On 08.03.2001, she consumed poison and was taken for medical treatment, whereafter she died.

The prosecution examined thirteen witnesses. The principal witnesses relied upon by the prosecution were P.Ws.1, 2, 3, 4 and 7, who were closely related to the deceased. The prosecution also relied heavily upon Exts.2 to 5, said to be letters written by the deceased. The defence examined two witnesses in its support.

The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, acquitted the appellants of the charges under Sections 302/34 and 304-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court found that although the prosecution had alleged homicidal death, the materials on record did not establish the same and, therefore, the appellants could not be held guilty under Section 302 IPC. The Court held that the essential requirement of Section 304-B IPC, namely, that the death of the deceased must have occurred within seven years of her marriage, was not satisfied and consequently acquitted the appellants of the said charge. However, with regard to Section 498-A IPC, the learned trial Court relied upon the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 and 7 as well as Exts.2 to 5, holding that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused persons in connection with the demand for a welding machine. The Court further held that the said cruelty and harassment had ultimately led the deceased to commit suicide and, on that basis, concluded that the appellants had abetted the commission of suicide within the meaning of Section 306 IPC. The trial Court also accepted the prosecution case regarding the alleged dowry demand and held the appellants guilty under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Ultimately, the trial Court convicted all the appellants under Sections 498-A/306/201/176/34 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced accordingly. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein for ready reference:-

Mr. Mohanty learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellants, while assailing the judgment of conviction, submitted that the conviction under Section 306 IPC is wholly unsustainable in law and on facts. It was contended that the prosecution had principally proceeded on the allegation of homicidal death and had charged the appellants under Section 302 IPC, whereas the learned trial Court, having disbelieved the said allegation and held that the deceased had committed suicide by consuming poison, could not, without there being a specific and properly established evidentiary foundation, travel to a finding of abetment of suicide. He argued that the essential ingredients of Section 107 read with Section 306 IPC, namely, instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, were not established. He placed reliance upon Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in MANU/SC/1103/2025, Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, reported in MANU/SC/1308/2024, and Manoranjan Tarei v. State of Odisha & Ors., reported in MANU/OR/0267/2025, to contend that mere cruelty, harassment or matrimonial discord cannot, in the absence of a positive, proximate and intentional act constituting instigation, sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC. Learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that Exts.2 to 5, upon which the trial Court substantially relied, were specifically disputed as to their authorship and genuineness. Though the Investigating Officer had sent the documents for handwriting examination, no admitted handwriting specimen of the deceased was furnished and no expert opinion was obtained. He therefore contended that the contents of the disputed letters could not have been treated as substantive evidence of cruelty or abetment so as to found a conviction under Section 306 IPC.

Mr. Mohanty further challenged the conviction under Section 498-A IPC by submitting that, apart from the statements of the closely related witnesses, there was no independent or cogent evidence establishing specific acts of cruelty attributable to each of the appellants. It was contended that the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 and 7 was essentially repetitive and consisted of allegations of harassment allegedly disclosed by the deceased to her parental relatives, without any independent witness from the matrimonial village being examined. He emphasized that the mere fact that the witnesses were relatives of the deceased could not make their evidence inadmissible, but where the conviction of several accused persons was sought to be sustained on allegations of omnibus nature, the prosecution was required to establish the individual role and participation of each accused. As regards Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, learned Amicus Curiae submitted that the alleged demand of cash at the time of marriage in the year 1992 was hopelessly barred by limitation, the alleged demand having been fulfilled at that time and there being no evidence of any continuing demand. He further argued that the alleged subsequent demand for a welding machine, said to have been made nearly two years after the marriage, could not ipso facto constitute “dowry” within the meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in the absence of proof of a direct and live nexus with the marriage. He placed reliance upon Damodar Moharana v. State of Orissa, reported in MANU/OR/0219/2026, in support of the aforesaid proposition.

Mr. Mohanty also assailed the conviction under Sections 176 and 201 IPC. With regard to Section 176 IPC, it was submitted that the alleged omission to furnish information regarding the death could not, in any event, sustain a conviction in the absence of compliance with the mandatory requirement under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C., namely, a complaint in writing by the concerned public servant. He placed reliance upon Devendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1753, to contend that cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 176 IPC cannot validly be taken merely on the basis of a police report in the absence of the statutorily prescribed complaint. As regards Section 201 IPC, he argued that the prosecution had produced no independent evidence to establish that the accused persons had caused disappearance of evidence with the requisite knowledge and intention of screening themselves from legal punishment. The mere fact that the dead body was cremated could not, by itself, establish the ingredients of Section 201 IPC. He relied upon Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal Nos.265-266 of 2018, to contend that the requisite mens rea and intention to screen the offender must be established by the prosecution. He also submitted that the trial Court had failed to properly appreciate the defence evidence and the circumstance that the deceased had been promptly taken for medical treatment by the appellants. On these grounds, he urged that the findings under Sections 498-A, 306, 201 and 176 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act be set aside.

Per contra, Mrs. Moharana learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the State, supported the judgment of conviction and submitted that the learned trial Court had carefully examined the evidence and had rightly distinguished the individual ingredients of the offences. P.Ws.1, 2, 4 and 7 consistently deposed regarding the demand of cash at the time of marriage, the subsequent demand for a welding machine and the cruelty and harassment meted out to the deceased when the demands were not fulfilled. The oral evidence was submitted to have been materially corroborated by Exts.2 to 5, which, according to the learned counsel, reflected the mental condition, matrimonial suffering and apprehension of the deceased. She relied upon Kaliya perumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2003) 9 SCC 157, for the proposition that the offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC have distinct and independent ingredients and that failure to establish dowry death does not, by itself, wipe out an independently established offence of cruelty. She also placed reliance upon Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 281, with regard to the legislative object and scope of Section 498-A IPC. She accordingly contended that the acquittal under Section 304-B IPC, on account of failure to establish the seven-year requirement, could not automatically result in acquittal under Section 498-A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Mrs. Moharana further submitted that the conviction under Section 306 IPC was based not upon a mere allegation of matrimonial discord but upon the cumulative circumstances appearing from the record, including persistent demand of dowry, the subsequent demand for a welding machine, physical and mental cruelty, the communications attributed to the deceased, her apprehension regarding her safety and the circumstances immediately preceding her consumption of poison. She argued that the question whether particular conduct amounted to “instigation” within the meaning of Section 107 IPC had to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. She placed reliance upon Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2001) 9 SCC 618, for the exposition of the concept of instigation. She also relied upon Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 200, and Kamalakar v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2023) 15 SCC 544, submitting that these decisions do not lay down that matrimonial cruelty can never constitute abetment, but only require a positive and proximate nexus between the accused's conduct and the suicide. The present case satisfied that requirement when the oral evidence was read cumulatively with Exts.2 to 5 and the circumstances immediately preceding the death. As regards the demand for dowry, learned State Counsel relied upon Gati Behera & Anr. v. State of Orissa, reported in 1997 (II) OLR 62, to submit that the different statutory offences must be independently examined on their respective ingredients and that interference with a conviction under Section 304-B does not necessarily invalidate convictions under Sections 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. She therefore urged that the findings of the learned trial Court were based upon a reasonable appreciation of the evidence and did not warrant interference in appeal.

Having considered the rival submissions and the evidence on record, the first and foremost question which arises for consideration is whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 306/34 of the Indian Penal Code can be sustained. The learned trial Court, having disbelieved the prosecution case of homicidal death and having concluded that the deceased had committed suicide by consuming poison, was undoubtedly entitled to examine whether the circumstances established by the prosecution nevertheless constituted abetment of suicide. However, such examination had necessarily to be undertaken independently with reference to the ingredients of Section 107 IPC. The mere fact that the deceased was a married woman and had unfortunately committed suicide, even coupled with a finding that she had been subjected to cruelty, could not by itself furnish the foundation for a conviction under Section 306 IPC. Abetment requires proof of instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, and there must be a legally sustainable nexus between the conduct attributed to the accused and the commission of suicide. The finding of cruelty, therefore, could not automatically be converted into a finding of abetment unless the prosecution established the additional and distinct ingredients of Section 107 IPC.

In the present case, the reasoning adopted by the learned trial Court does not satisfactorily establish such a nexus. The learned trial Court proceeded principally on the allegation that there had been a demand for a welding machine, that the deceased had been subjected to torture and harassment when the demand was not fulfilled and that the letters marked Exts.2 to 5 disclosed her mental suffering. On that basis, the learned trial Court observed that there had been a “last straw on the camel's back” and concluded that the conduct of the accused persons amounted to abetment of suicide. Such reasoning, in my considered view, does not identify the particular act which constituted the alleged “last straw”. The judgment does not specify which accused committed that act, when it was committed, what exactly was said or done, or how such conduct had a proximate and live connection with the deceased consuming poison. The prosecution was required to establish an identifiable positive act, omission or course of conduct attributable to the appellants which was closely linked to and directly caused the suicide. In the absence of such a finding, the conclusion that the conduct “tantamounted to abetment” amounts essentially to an inference drawn from the fact of cruelty and the subsequent suicide, which is legally insufficient.

The Honourable Supreme Court in Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2025) 2 SCC 116, held that mere harassment, in the absence of a positive or proximate act of incitement, cannot sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC. The prosecution must establish instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid and that there must be the requisite proximate link between the conduct of the accused and the suicide. It was held thus:-

Tested on these principles, the evidence in the present case does not disclose any specific act of the appellants which can reasonably be characterised as instigation or intentional aid. The circumstance that the deceased was allegedly subjected to matrimonial cruelty may create a suspicion as to the circumstances in which she took the extreme step, but suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof of the statutory ingredients of Section 306 IPC.

The evidentiary foundation of the finding under Section 306 IPC is further weakened by the manner in which Exts.2 to 5 have been relied upon. The defence had specifically disputed the genuineness, authorship and evidentiary value of the said letters. The Investigating Officer admittedly stated that the disputed documents had been forwarded for handwriting examination; however, no admitted specimen handwriting of the deceased was furnished and consequently no expert opinion could be obtained. The learned trial Court nevertheless compared the disputed letters with other letters and itself concluded that they were in the handwriting of the deceased. The failure to obtain the handwriting opinion, despite having forwarded the documents for such examination, assumes significance when there is otherwise no independent documentary evidence of the alleged acts of instigation.

The same evidentiary infirmity substantially affects the conviction under Section 498-A/34 IPC. The prosecution witnesses relied upon by the learned trial Court are admittedly members of the parental family of the deceased. Their evidence cannot be discarded merely because they are related witnesses, particularly in a case concerning matrimonial cruelty; nevertheless, their testimony must still disclose specific and reliable facts constituting cruelty as defined in Section 498-A IPC. In the present case, there is no satisfactory evidence identifying the specific act of cruelty committed by each accused, the date or occasion on which such act occurred, or the particular manner in which each appellant participated in the alleged harassment. Moreover, once Exts.2 to 5 are found incapable of providing reliable corroboration, the remaining oral evidence must be independently sufficient to establish the statutory ingredients of Section 498-A. In the present case, the evidence falls short of that standard. The acquittal under Section 304-B IPC does not, as a matter of law, automatically require acquittal under Section 498-A, as rightly contended by the State and recognized in Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2003) 9 SCC 157. However, the converse is equally important: the independent nature of Section 498-A does not dispense with the prosecution's obligation to prove cruelty beyond reasonable doubt. On the evidence available, that burden has not been discharged.

The conviction under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act also requires independent consideration. The prosecution alleges a demand of cash at the time of marriage and a subsequent demand for a welding machine approximately two years thereafter. As regards the alleged demand at the time of marriage, the defence has specifically contended that the marriage took place in 1992 and that the demand was then fulfilled. Such a demand, having been completed several years before institution of the present criminal proceeding, raises the question of limitation. There is no satisfactory material before this Court establishing that the alleged demand constituted a continuing or recurring offence so as to overcome the statutory limitation. As regards the subsequent demand for a welding machine, even if the oral evidence is accepted, the prosecution must establish that the demand answers the statutory definition of “dowry” under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, namely, that the property or valuable security was demanded in connection with the marriage. A demand made during the subsistence of a marriage does not automatically become a dowry demand merely because it is made by the husband or his relatives, as held by this Court in Damodar Moharana v. State of Orissa, reported in MANU/OR/0219/2026. It was held thus:-

Subsequent demand, in the absence of the requisite nexus with the marriage, cannot automatically be brought within Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The prosecution has not established any agreement, understanding or nexus connecting the alleged welding machine with the marriage. In these circumstances, the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.

Upon an overall consideration of the evidence, therefore, this Court finds that the learned trial Court has proceeded from the established fact of an unnatural death and the alleged existence of matrimonial cruelty to conclusions of abetment and dowry demand without sufficiently establishing the intervening statutory ingredients. The acquittal under Sections 302/34 and 304-B/34 IPC is itself significant: the learned trial Court found that homicidal death was not proved and that the statutory requirement of death within seven years of marriage was not established. While the acquittal under Section 304-B IPC does not, by itself, determine the fate of the remaining charges, the evidence relied upon for those charges has nevertheless to satisfy the independent requirements of each offence. In the present case, the same disputed letters and substantially the same oral allegations form the principal foundation for the findings under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The prosecution has failed to establish a specific proximate act of instigation for Section 306, specific and reliable acts of cruelty attributable to the individual appellants for Section 498-A, or the requisite statutory nexus and legally sustainable demand for Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The findings, therefore, cannot be sustained merely on the basis of cumulative suspicion arising from the unfortunate death of the deceased.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Sections 306/34 IPC, 498-A/34 IPC, 201/176 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Puri in S.T. Case No.209 of 2002, insofar as it relates to Sections 306/34 IPC, 498-A/34 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, is liable to be set aside. The appellants shall consequently stand acquitted of the said offences.

For the reasons aforesaid, the Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed.

This Court acknowledges the effective and meaningful assistance rendered by Mr. Samvit Mohanty, learned Amicus Curiae in this case. Learned Amicus Curiae is entitled to an honorarium of Rs.7,500/- (Rupees seven thousand five hundred) to be paid as a token of appreciation.