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Judgment
This MA has been filed by the applicant to condone the delay of 2782 days in filing the Original Application.
The applicant is aggrieved by the alternative appointment as Junior Clerk carrying Pay Matrix Level 4 on bottom seniority on medical decategorization while he was working holding the post of Station Superintendent, by the impugned order, dated 08.06.2017 According to him, he ought to have been appointed as Chief Office Superintendent carrying the Pay Matrix Level 7 with full protection of seniority in Level 7. Hence, he prayed for the following relief:
“ to call for records related to the impugned order M/P9C&P)268/MU/15, dated 08.06.2017, made by the respondent and to quash the same and to revise the alternative appointment in the Pay Matrix Level 7 with protection of the seniority with all the attendant service and pecuniary benefits and to pass such other order/orders as this Tribunal may deem fit and proper and thus to render justice. “
The facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows: The applicant joined the Railway Service in the year 1989 and while he was working as Station Superintendent carrying the Level 7 Pay Matrix with Grade Pay Rs.4600/- was medically incapacitated and thereby offered and posted in Level 2 after screening committee evaluations, vide order dated 08.06.2017 which is impugned in this OA. Since the disputed posting is in gross violation of Section 20 of the Disability Act and Chapter 3 & 13 of the Establishment Manual, the applicant preferred the present OA fort the aforementioend relief.
In the affidavit filed in support of the MA for condonation of delay, the applicant submits that under normal circumstances, the OA should have been preferred in a year by 08.06.2018. Since the respondent, representing the Railways which constitute the state as per ART 12 of the Indian Constitution, has not followed the statutory instructions and discriminated him wich tantamount to a misconudct within the meaning of Rule 3(1) (a) of the Railway (Conduct) Rules, 1966, and as the applicant was looking for requisite legal assitance and weak pecuniary position, the OA/MA was preferred on 08.11.2025/18.01.2026 with an inadvertent delay of 2732 days. Hence he prayed to condone the non-coignizant delay of 2732 days and thus render justice.
Upon notice, the respondents filed a reply statement in the MA contending that the applicant following medica-decategorisation, was absorbed as Junior Clerk with full pay protecton, in terms of the recommendatikons of the Screening Committee, and subsequently benefited from career progression, including promotions to the posts of Senior Clerk and Office Superintendent. By faithfully discharging his duties and accepting these promotions for over eight year without demur, the applicant has unequivocally acquiesced in the absorption order dated 08.06.2017. It is also stated that challenge is a belated afterthought and is squarely barred by the doctrne of laches. It is also stated in the reply that the applicant is not a person with disbility to be eligible for consideration under The Rights of Persons and Disabilities Act, 2016. Sec.2 (s) of the Act defines Person with Disability as a person with long terms physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with barrieers, hunders his full and effective participation in society equally with others. The applicant does not suffer any of these disabilities. Hence, he cannot claim any right under Sec.20 of the Act.
With regard to the question of limitation, the respondents contend that the accompanying Miscellaneous Application lacks bona fides and that the reasons assigned by the applicant do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of the inordinate delay. Placing reliance upon the decision dated, 19.08.2025 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.10898 of 2925 (arising out of SLP (C) No.13637 of 2025) in the case of State of Kerala & Oters Vs. Krishnan wherein it has been clearly held 'that claims made after anb inordinate delay are barred by the principles of laches and acquiescence. It was also emphasized that employees must assert their rights within a reasonable period of time, and that prologned delay and inaction amount to acquiescence. Consequently, Court do not entertain such stale claims.' Hence, according to the respondents, the appllicant's claim to condone the delay of 2782 days far exceeds the statutory limitation period of one year under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The applicant has not furnished any sufficient or plausible reason that would justify such an unexplained and excessive delay. Hence the respondents prayed for dismissal of the MA.
We have heard the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side, perused the pleadings and materials avilable on record.
While delay and laches may not, in every case, be fatal to a claim, an extraordinary and unexplained delay strikes at the very root of the maintainability of proceedings. The doctrine of limitation is founded on the principle that legal remedies must be pursued diligently and within a reasonable time. Courts and Tribunals have consistently held that stale claims ought not to be entertained. In this regard, we may refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar reported in 2009 INSC 1288, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court had an occasion to observe on the concepts of “stale” and “dead” issues in paragraphs 15 and 16, which reads as under:
“15.When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court’s direction. Neither a court’s direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.
16.A court or tribunal, before directing “consideration” of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a “live” issue or whether it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue. If it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue or dispute, the court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or tribunal deciding to direct “consideration” without itself examining the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in the recent judgment, dated 24.04.2025 about the limitation point and on delayed representations in the case of The Chief Executive Officer & Others Vs S. Lalitha & others in Civil Appeal No.____/2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.6289/2019, reported in 2025 INSC 565. The relevant part of the judgement is extracted below:
“34.To summarise the legal position, what assumes criticality in cases, such as these, is whether the representation that has been made and rejected, whereafter the jurisdiction of the CAT is invoked, is statutorily provided in the service rules governing the applicant-public servant. Bare reading of the opening words of Section 20 of the 1985 Act with sub-section (1), which requires exhaustion of other available remedies as a general precondition for entertaining original applications under Section 19, refers to remedies that are available under therelevant service rules as to redressal of grievances against final orders. If the relevant service rules do not provide for making of a representation against final orders, by reason of absence of such a provision, the remedy of the aggrieved applicant-public servant would lie directly before the CAT in challenging the order/action of the authorities adverse or prejudicial to his interest; and, in such a case, anoriginal application ought not to be rejected mechanically on the ground that all “remedies” have not been exhausted. However, it cannot be gainsaid that if the relevant service rules do provide for making of a representation, the remedy made available has to be exhausted unless an exceptional case is set up. Provision made in the service rules, if at all, for making of a statutory representation, timing of such representation and whether the representation raises a “stale” or “dead” claim – all these are relevant for deciding the question of limitation under the 1985 Act. The opening words of Section 20 read with sub-section (2) thereof would, however, call for a nuanced approach. As observed earlier, a representation though not provided in the relevant rules governing service could yet be necessary and imperative when a legitimate service benefit is not conferred on the aggrieved applicant-public servant by the employer on his own either due to inaction or otherwise. In such a case, the representation inviting attention to what the aggrieved applicant-public servant perceives is deprivation of a legitimate benefit has to be made expeditiously and before accrual of third- party rights, if any. Such a representation could be made even after accrual of third-party rights, but within a reasonable time of the same coming to the notice of the aggrieved applicant-public servant. What would constitute reasonable time would necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case and decided accordingly.”
It is well settled that delay and laches may not, in every case, be fatal to a claim. However, where there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching the Court or Tribunal, such delay assumes significance and may disentitle a litigant from obtaining equitable relief. The settled principle of law is that vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt—the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. A litigant cannot be permitted to keep a cause of action alive indefinitely by approaching the Court after an unreasonable lapse of time without offering a satisfactory explanation.
In the present case, the Original Application is barred by gross and unexplained delay and laches. The Applicant seeks to challenge matters after an inordinate lapse of more than two decades, with a delay of 2782 days in filing the OA, far exceeding the statutory limitation period of one year prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. No sufficient, plausible, or legally sustainable explanation has been furnished for such delay, nor has the Applicant demonstrated any exceptional circumstance warranting condonation. Having remained inactive and slept over his alleged rights for an inordinate period, the Applicant cannot seek to reopen settled service matters at this belated stage. Entertaining such a stale claim would seriously prejudice the administration and unsettle matters relating to seniority, promotion and consequential service benefits, which have long since attained finality. Accordingly, the Original Application cannot revive a stale cause of action and is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, without entering into the merits of the claim. Consequently, the Miscellaneous Application seeking condonation of 2782 days’ delay also does not merit consideration and is liable to be dismissed.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the Applicant has failed to make out any sufficient cause for condoning the inordinate delay of 2782 in filing the Original Application to seek redressal of his grievances. In the result, the MA No.52 of 2026 filed by the applicant for condoning the said inordinate delay is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the unnumbered OA also stands dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Registry to number the OA for record purpose and shown it as dismissed. No order as to costs.