AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Date : 27-08-2026 Heard the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for the State and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.11.
The present writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:-
“i)For issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the order dated 23.08.2022 passed by the State Appellate Authority, Patna, Bihar in Appeal No. 86 of 2020 whereby the appeal filed by the appellant has been allowed without considering the materials available on record and also the order passed by the District Appellate Authority, Jamui in the case of the petitioner.
ii) For holding that the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Shiksha Mitra is valid and legal and with the direction to the respondent authorities to allow the petitioner to continue working on the post of Panchayat Teacher with all consequential benefits.
iii) For holding that the appointment of the private respondent is illegal and unsustainable in view of the fact that the said appointment has been made on the basis of the forged resignation letter of the petitioner.
(iv)For a direction to the respondent authorities to allow the petitioner to work as Panchayat Teacher with payment of arrears of salary.”
The brief facts, which are necessary for adjudication off the present writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra in the Primary School, Katiyama in the district of Jamui on 01.07.2005, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. He gave his joining on 02.07.2005 and started discharging his duties. In terms of a decision of the State Government in 2006 to appoint Panchayat Shikshak in different primary schools, the petitioner, being the Panchayat Shiksha Mitra, was appointed to the post of Panchayak Shikshak in the primary school, Katiyama. The petitioner has regularly and diligently discharged his duty to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned and absentee report, duly singed by the competent authority was also prepared. The petitioner regularly participated in the C.R.C. meetings and the B.R.C. meetings, which is held every month. He also appeared in the Elementary Teachers Evaluation Examination, 2010 conducted by the Human Resource Development, Bihar, Patna on 20.02.2010 and obtained 80 marks. During his tenure as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra, he was appointed as Polling Officer by the District Election Officer-cum-District Magistrate, Jamui for the Assembly Election, 2010. He was appointed as Polling Officer for the Panchayat Election, 2011.
It is the case of the petitioner that he was never paid any remuneration for the period of his appointment, despite the fact that he continued to discharge his duties. The petitioner approached the Panchayat Secretary and raised his grievance with regard to non-payment of his salary several times. When no salary was paid to the petitioner, the petitioner approached the District Education Officer, Jamui, the Block Development Officer, Chakai and the Block Education Extension Officer, Chakai by submitting his application on 06.02.2008 with regard to non-payment of salary. The petitioner subsequently came to know that the respondent no.11 has arbitrarily and illegally been appointed in his place, without removing him in accordance with law and on learning the said illegal appointment of the respondent no.11, he submitted a representation before the Human Resources Development Department and vide letter no. 162 dated 23.02.2010, the Department directed the District Teacher Appointment Appellate Tribunal, Jamui to enquire into the whole issue. A case bearing Case No. 04 of 2010 was registered by the Tribunal and an enquiry was initiated. The Tribunal vide its order dated 25.06.2010 affirmed the appointment of the petitioner and proceeded to cancel the appointment of the private respondent no.11. Being aggrieved, the private respondent no.11 filed C.W.J.C. No. 11596 of 2010 before this Hon’ble Court, against the order dated 25.06.2010 passed in Case No. 04 of 2009 by the District Teachers Appointment Appellate Tribunal, Jamui. The Block Education Extension Officer sent a list of teachers of the school concerning the Gram Panchayat, including the school of the petitioner, namely U.M.S., Katiyama, to the District Education Officer on 15.03.2007. From the said document, it would transpire that the petitioner was working as a Teacher in the school. The writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 11596 of 2010, filed by the respondent no. 11 herein was allowed vide order dated 20.05.2015, whereby the order passed by the Tribunal dated 25.06.2010 was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the Tribunal to decide all the questions of dispute raised in the writ petition and a direction was issued to pass fresh order, after taking note of all the disputed questions of fact. Pursuant to the order dated 20.05.2015 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 11596 of 2010, the petitioner filed Case No. 13 of 2015 before the District Appellate Authority, Jamui. The case filed by the petitioner bearing Case No. 13 of 2015 was finally heard and allowed vide order dated 25.01.2017. In terms of the orders given by the Tribunal on 25.01.2017, the Block Education Officer, Chakai vide his letter dated 115 dated 11.02.2017 directed the office to accept the joining of the petitioner in Upgraded Middle School, Katiyama. The petitioner submitted his joining on 13.02.2017. Being aggrieved with the order passed by the District Teachers Appellate Authority dated 25.01.2017, the private respondent no.11 preferred an appeal before the State Appellate Authority. The appeal preferred by the respondent no.2 was numbered as Appeal No. 36 of 2017. The State Appellate Authority vide his order dated 09.03.2018 set aside the order passed by the District Teachers Appellate Authority on 25.01.2017. The matter was remitted back to the District Teachers Appellate Authority to get the resignation letter of the petitioner examined by a handwriting expert and some other directions were also given. In terms of the directions given by the State Appellate Authority vide its order dated 09.03.2018, the petitioner again moved before the District Appellate Authority, Jamui. The District Appellate Authority at Jamui, after recording its finding, proceeded to pass an order dated 07.03.2020, whereby the appeal was allowed in favour of the petitioner and the appointment of the private respondent no.11 was cancelled. Being aggrieved with the order dated 07.03.2020 passed by the District Teachers Appellate Authority, Jamui, the respondent no.11 preferred an appeal before the State Appellate Authority. The appeal filed by the respondent no.11 was numbered as Appeal No. 86 of 2020. The State Appellate Authority vide its order dated 23.08.2022, proceeded to set aside the order passed by the District Teachers Appellate Authority at Jamui dated 07.03.2020. Being aggrieved with the orders passed by the State Appellate Authority in Appeal Case No. 86 of 2020, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition.
The learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the State Appellate Authority erred in not considering the fact that the petitioner was continuously working as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra/Panchayat Teacher (PSM/PT), as is evident from the attendance register, and the register related to his attending the meetings of the CRC and BRC. The State Appellate Authority also failed to consider the documents related to the petitioner being deputed for election related duties. He submits that the petitioner preferred the complaint/appeal before the District Teachers Appellate Authority, as soon as he came to know about the appointment of the respondent no.11 in his place. The State Appellate Authority did not consider the documents, which were available on record i.e. the absentee report of the petitioner, the document related to his approaching the concerned authorities for payment of his honorarium.
The learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that the State Appellate Authority failed to consider the fact that this Hon’ble Court, although remitted back the matter to the Appellate Authority to decide the disputed question of facts and the District Teachers Appellate Authority at Jamui decided the same in favour of the petitioner, however the State Appellate Authority without even disputing the same, proceeded to allow the appeal filed by the respondent no.11. He submits that the matter was remitted back by this Hon’ble Court for deciding the disputed question of fact, including the letter of resignation of the petitioner, however the respondent no.11 failed to prove that the letter of resignation of the petitioner was submitted by him. The original document of the resignation letter submitted by the petitioner was never produced by any of the authorities, including the respondent no.11 and in absence thereof, the State Appellate Authority proceeded to hold that the appointment of the petitioner cannot be sustained in view of his resignation. He submits that the appointment of the respondent no.11 itself is illegal, since in terms of the 2006 Rules i.e. Rule 5, any appointment can only made after 15 days of the termination/removal of the concerned Panchayat Shiksha Mitra/Panchayat Teacher, however in the present case, although, the alleged letter of resignation of the petitioner was dated 20.07.2005, however the respondent no.11 was appointed on 01.08.2005. He submits that the appointment of the respondent no.11 was made without any advertisement. Further the relevant documents produced by the petitioner before the State Appellate Authority were not considered by the authority and the State Appellate Authority proceeded to allow the appeal filed by the respondent no.11 on erroneous grounds.
The learned senior counsel for the petitioner to support the contention refers to and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in 2026 SCC Online (SC) 169 (Tharammel Peethambaran and Another Versus T. Ushakrishnan and Another), wherein in paragraph no.20, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as follows:-
“20.The broad parameters summarising the procedure to be followed for introducing secondary evidence are reiterated and read thus:
20.1The fundamental principle of the Indian Evidence Act is that facts have to be established by primary evidence.9 Section 64 mandates that documents must be proved by primary evidence, which is considered the “best evidence”. Primary evidence is the rule, while secondary evidence is an exception admissible only in the absence of primary evidence. A party is generally required to produce the best evidence available; so long as the superior evidence (the original) is within a party's possession or reach, they cannot introduce inferior proof (secondary evidence).10
20.2Before secondary evidence can be admitted, the party relying on it must lay a factual foundation. This involves two steps: First, the party must prove that the original document actually existed and was executed. Secondly, the party must establish valid reasons as to why the original cannot be furnished.11
20.3Secondary evidence is inadmissible until the non-production of the original is accounted for in a manner that brings the case within the specific exceptions provided in Section 65.12 If the original itself is found to be inadmissible through failure of the party who files it to prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to introduce secondary evidence of its contents.13
20.4Section 65 of the Evidence Act is exhaustive and states the specific circumstances under which secondary evidence is permissible. To introduce secondary evidence, a party must satisfy the conditions of one of the clauses (a) through (g) of Section 65.14
20.5Further, admitting a document as secondary evidence does not automatically prove its contents. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence showing that the alleged copy is, in fact, a true copy of the original. For instance, if a party wishes to introduce a photostat copy, they must explain the circumstances under which the copy was prepared and who possessed the original at the time the photograph was taken.15
20.6Mere admission of a document or making it an exhibit does not dispense with the requirement of proving it in accordance with the law. The court has an obligation to examine the probative value of the document and decide the question of admissibility before making an endorsement on the secondary evidence. If the foundational facts, such as the loss of the original or the explanation for its non-production, are not established, the court cannot legally allow the party to adduce secondary evidence.16
20.7There is no requirement that an application must be filed to lead secondary evidence. While a party may choose to file such an application, secondary evidence cannot be ousted solely because no application was filed. It is sufficient if the party lays the necessary factual foundation for leading secondary evidence either in the pleadings or during the course of evidence.17”
The learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that the appointment of the respondent no.11 itself is illegal, since when the petitioner did not resign from the post and the original document related to his resignation was never brought on record by any of the authorities, including the respondent no. 11, therefore, there is no question of appointment of the respondent no.11. He further submits that no afresh advertisement was ever issued, therefore, the appointment of the respondent no.11 is fit to be set aside on the ground that he was appointed without any advertisement.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent no.11 would submit that the respondent no.11 was appointed in place of the petitioner on 01.08.2005, however the petitioner slept over his rights and all of a sudden filed an appeal before the District Teachers Appellate Authority in 2010. He submits that even though the petitioner was not getting any remuneration, he never approached before any of the authorities, who were competent to decide the claim of the petitioner and this goes to show that he was not working on the cut off date of 01.07.2006, w.e.f. which the Panchayat Shiksha Mitra were treated to be Panchayat Teachers.
The learned counsel for the respondent no.11 further submits that no complaint was pending before any of the authorities after coming into force of 2006 Rules, since by virtue of coming into force of the said Rules, any complaint, which was pending before any of the authorities, was to be transferred before the Tribunal. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner for the first time approached before the Tribunal in 2010.
The learned counsel for the respondent no.11 further submits that there was no question of any fresh advertisement for appointment of the respondent no.11 in 2005, since the respondent no.11 was at serial no. 2 of the merit list, which was published and through which, the petitioner was appointed being at serial no.1 of the merit list. Since the petitioner gave his joining on 01.07.2005 and submitted his resignation on 20.07.2005 itself, the panel/merit list, which was published, was still in existence and therefore, being no.2 in the merit list, the respondent no.11 was appointed, without any advertisement.
The learned counsel for the respondent no.11 to support his contention refers to and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court reported in 2014 2 PLJR 665 (Kalpana Rani versus the State of Bihar & Ors.), wherein in paragraph no.22, the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court has held as follows:-
“22.The aforesaid Scheme came to an end with enactment of the 2006 Rules which came into operation on 1st July 2006. The scope and ambit of the Rules of 2006, particularly Rule 20 thereof have been discussed in the above referred matter of Smt. Renu Kumari Pandey. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced for convenience:
16.Clause (iii) of Rule 20 of the Rules reflects the policy decision of the State Government. We are of the considered opinion that no legal provision can be held to be arbitrary or discriminatory or ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution on hypothetical set of facts. We, therefore, hold that Clause (iii) of Rule 20 of the said Rules is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
17.Coming to the second issue, we are of the opinion that the Rules are statutory in nature and have to be implemented in letter and spirit. Under Clause (i) of Rule 20 of the Rules all earlier resolutions, orders, directions issued in respect of employment of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra are repealed. Consequently, the posts of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra stood abolished. Thereafter, no person can be employed as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra; nor can there be a deemed employment as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra; nor can there be a deemed absorption in the service as Panchayat Shikshak by operation of Rule 20(iii) of the Rules. In our opinion, even in a case where a person has a legitimate grievance in respect of his or her non-selection as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra at the relevant time or non-continuance as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra, such person cannot be deemed to have been appointed as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra; nor can he/she be deemed to have been employed as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra as on 1st July 2006; nor can such person be deemed to have been absorbed in service as Panchayat Shikshak under the Rules.”
23.Having considered the scope and ambit of the Scheme for appointment of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra and the Rules of 2006, the Bench held:-
“21.All these petitions arise from the claim made by the respective writ petitioners for employment as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra under the then prevalent scheme for selection and employment of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra under the Gram Panchayats. None of them was employed as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra as on 1st July 2006. As we have held that from the date of the Rules (1st July 2006) such persons have no right to claim employment or deemed employment as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra or a right to be absorbed as Panchayat Shikshak by operation of Rule 20(iii) of the Rules, the reliefs prayed for by the writ petitioners cannot be granted.””
The learned counsel for the respondent no.11 further submits that the District Teachers Appellate Authority, Jamui went on to record that if there is a dispute with regard to appointment of a person and the person concerned, who raises objection with regard to his appointment fails to substantiate his case beyond all reasonable doubt, then the appointment of the concerned person cannot be said to be invalid only on that ground. He submits that in a criminal case, the evidence has to be appreciated beyond all reasonable doubt, however in case of departmental enquiry/departmental proceeding the same is to be on the basis of preponderance of probability. In the present case, no such effort has been made by the District Teachers Appellate Authority at Jamui and he on his own, recorded a finding that the signature of the person, who has signed on the resignation letter of the petitioner as well as of the Mukhiya, appears to be same.
The learned counsel for the State submits that the petitioner submitted his resignation on 20.07.2005 and although he was not being paid any remuneration, despite his contention that he was continuously discharging his duties, however he for the first time, approached the Tribunal for his grievance in 2010. The petitioner was never paid any remuneration from the date of his appointment till he claims to be working on his post, since admittedly respondent no. 11 was appointed on 01.07.2006. In terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court reported in 2014 2 PLJR 665 (Kalpana Rani versus the State of Bihar & Ors.), on the date of 01.07.2006, the petitioner was not working and therefore, there is no question of the petitioner being treated to be Panchayat Teacher. He submits that by virtue of 2006 Rules, the person, who was working on the post on 01.07.2006 was to be treated to be Panchayat Teacher and in the present case, since the respondent no.11 was working on the post on 01.07.2006, he has rightly been treated to be a Panchayat Teacher.
In reply to the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent no.11 and the State, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the case reported in 2014 (2) PLJR 665 (Kalpana Rani versus the State of Bihar & Ors.), is not applicable in the case of the petitioner, since the petitioner was working as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra on 01.07.2006 and the documents available on record would suggest that he was working as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra, although remuneration was not being paid to him.
CONSIDERATION
Having considered the rival submissions and after going through the records, it appears that the case has a chequered history. From 2010, the petitioner and respondent no.5 are assailing order in favour of the another. The matter travelled to this Hon’ble Court and this Hon’ble Court vide its order dated 20.05.2015 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 11596 of 2020, proceeded to remit back the matter to the Teachers Appointment Appellate Authority by setting aside the order dated 25.06.2017 passed in Case No. 04 of 2009. This Hon’ble Court directed that sitting under Article 226, the disputed question of facts cannot be adjudicated by this Court and therefore, it was directed that the Appellate Authority will decide all the questions of dispute raised in the writ petition and pass afresh order, dealing with disputed questions of fact, which also related to the verification of the so called resignation letter submitted by the petitioner. The District Teachers Appellate Authority on remand, proceeded to allow the case of the petitioner. On the matter being taken before the State Appellate Authority by the respondent no.11, the State Appellate Authority again remitted back the matter to the District Teachers Appellate Tribunal with a direction to the authority to consider the matter afresh in view of the enquiry report submitted by a Team of Officer constituted by the District Magistrate, Jamui and after getting the handwriting in the alleged resignation letter examined by the handwriting expert of the Forensic Science Laboratory of the State Government. It was directed that after getting the report of the handwriting expert and hearing the parties, the District Appellate Authority will pass the appropriate order. Pursuant to the remand order dated 09.03.2018 passed by the State Appellate Authority, the District Appellate Authority, Jamui tried to get the so called resignation letter of the petitioner verified from the Criminal Investigation Bureau, Patna, however the same could not be verified, since the original letter of the resignation was not sent before the Criminal Investigation Bureau and in absence thereof, despite the best effort made by the District Appellate Authority, the original letter of the resignation of the petitioner was not verified from any of the authorities i.e. the Criminal Investigation Bureau or through a handwriting expert or through the Forensic Science Laboratory. The District Appellate Authority, in absence of any report of any competent authority/forum, proceeded on his own to verify the signature of the petitioner, with the signature present on the resignation letter and went on to record that the signature of the petitioner is different from the signature, which was present on the resignation letter and proceeded to allow the case of the petitioner. Being aggrieved with the order of the District Appellate Authority, the respondent no.11 filed an appeal before the State Appellate Authority. The State Appellate Authority after considering the entire aspect of the matter and by going through the 2006 Rules, came to the conclusion that it is an admitted position that on 01.07.2006, the respondent no.11 was working and therefore, by virtue of the Rules, he was absorbed as Panchayat Teacher. The State Appellate Authority further went on to record that no grievance was ever raised by the petitioner against the appointment of the respondent no.11 till 2009-10. From the records, it also transpired that respondent no.11 was working as a Panchayat Shiksha Mitra on 01.07.2006, and therefore, proceeded to allow the appeal filed by the respondent no.11, by setting aside the order passed by the District Appellate Authority.
Having gone through the orders passed by the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Hon’ble Court in case of Kalpana Rani (supra), this Court finds that in paragraph no.113 and 114 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court has recorded as under:-
“113.Thus, when the appellant on her own showing till coming of 2006 Rules came into force did not even question the appointment of the writ petitioner on the post of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra, she had no right accrued under the repealed circular of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra much less right to get herself appointed in place of the writ petitioner. It is well settled that the power to take advantage of an enactment may without impropriety be termed a “right”, but the question is whether it is a “right accrued”. Lord Herschell said in Abbott v. Minister of Lands reported in 1895 A.C. 425 had said that mere right (assuming it to be properly so called) existing in the members of the community or any class of them to take advantage of an enactment, without any act done by an individual towards availing himself of that right, cannot properly be deemed a “right accrued.” This view has also been received approval in India in the jugment of the Apex Court in the case of Lalji Raja & Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram reported in (1971) S.C. 924, in the case of Hingerfold Investment Trust Ltd. v. Haridas Mundra reported in 1972 S.C. 1826 and in the case of Zobrali v. Arjuna reported in 1980 S.C. 101.
114.In view of the settled law as discussed above, I will have no difficulty in coming to a conclusion that the appellant, on the basis of her so-called empanelment on the post of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra in the year 2003 (after repeal of the entire scheme of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra with effect from 1.7.2006), could have either brought a dispute by filing her complaint in Janta Darbar on 14.9.2006 or could have sought any direction for her appointment on the post of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra. That was infact simply impermissible in view of Rule 20(i) of the 2006 Rules.”
After considering the said aspect, the Hon’ble Full Bench in paragraph no.118 of the above judgment has recorded as under:-
“118.Having thus given my anxious consideration, I am of the view that after 1.7.2006, no person, who was earlier an aspirant for the post of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra, can be appointed only because his or her name figured in the panel of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra. The post of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra has been abolished with effect from 1.7.2006 and after abolition of the post, no one can be appointed on the post of Panchayat Teacher on the basis of his mere empanelment of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra. The view taken in the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Renu Kumari Pandey (supra) is a good law. I will have no hesitation in holding that the earlier Division Bench judgment in the case of Kishori Prasad (supra), for the reasons indicated above, has not correctly decided the law and is, accordingly, overruled.”
Having considered the entire aspect of the matter and after going through the judgment of the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kalpana Rani (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the respondent no.11 was working as a Panchayat Shiksha Mitra on 01.07.2006 and there is no denial in the entire writ petition that the respondent no.11 was not working as a Panchayat Shiksha Mitra on 01.07.2006 and by virtue of coming into force of 2006 Rules as well as by virtue of the judicial pronouncements in the case of Kalpana rani (supra), this Court holds that the appointment of the respondent no.11 on the post of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra w.e.f 01.07.2005 and after coming into force of 2006 Rules is not required to be interefered with. There is no infirmity in the orders passed by the State Appellate Authority dated 23.08.2008.
Accordingly, since this Court has already held that appointment of the respondent no.11 is not in dispute, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is fit to be rejected and is accordingly dismissed.
Pending application, if any, shall also stands disposed of.