Jagat Ram Aryan vs Jammu and Kashmir State and others

Anant Singh, J.—This is an appeal from the Judgment of a Single Judge of this court, dated November 29, 1969, refusing permission to the appellant to sue in Forma Pauperis on the ground that the cause of action is barred by limitation.

The application was filed by the appellant on 12-2-1969 for permission to sue in Forma Pauperis for recovery of sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-

(Rupees one crore) as "special damages" from the respondents. It is alleged that the appellant was appointed as a Special Officer for Harijans on 16-4-1948 in the grade of Rs. 200-30-300, but the respondents 2 and 4, who are the Ex Prime Ministers of this State, and respondent No. 3, who is the Ex Revenue Minister of the State hatched a conspiracy in 1950 against the appellant for ousting him from service, because, he did not fall in line with them to act against the interest of India and carve out an independent State of Jammu and Kashmir outside the Indian Territory. It is alleged that as a result of the same conspiracy they suspended him from service without any written order or charge. A series of malicious prosecutions were taken against him, and he was convicted and driven from one Jail to another. It is also alleged that his property was confiscated.

The process of his prosecution continued from 1950 right upto September, 1963 when he was acquitted in the last criminal case. After his acquittal in the last case, he applied to the present Chief Minister for his re-instatement with all his past salary with increments and benefits of pension. He was, however, informed on 3-7-1967, by the Deputy Secretary to Government, General Department that the Government had no reasons to open his case. He, thereafter, approached the Chief Minister, but with no result. On 3-7-1967 he served the respondents, including respondent No. 1, the Chief Secretary to Government with a notice u/s 80, Civil P.C. claiming the damages of one crore of rupees as special damages, describing the respondents as joint tort-feasors. The special damages have been claimed for loss of salary, pension, and mental, physical, and nervous break down of the appellant's health amongst others. It was further alleged that the appellant has no sufficient means to pay the necessary court fees on the amount claimed.

The application was resisted by respondents 1, 2 and 3 on the ground that the appellant has sufficient means to pay the court-fees, and that the plaint does not disclose any prima facie cause of action, and in any event, the claim is barred by limitation. It was further averred on behalf of the Chief Secretary Respondent No. 1, that the appellant, when he was appointed in 1948 was appointed only temporarily, having had no lien on the post, and that he was removed from service by the then Revenue Minister Respondent No. 3, as is the appellant's own version. The plea of malicious prosecution is denied.

The appellant examined some witnesses in support of his means to prove his incapacity to pay the necessary court-fees, and this plea was conceded by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1. The learned single Judge has, however, held that the appellant's claim for arrears of salary, even if it were to be assumed that he was appointed to a permanent post, and was only suspended, and not removed from service in 1950, is barred by limitation within the meaning of Article 73 of the State Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of three years limitation for a suit for wages, not expressly provided for, and that the term, 'wages' includes salary. He has. further held that the appellant, if he had continued in service would complete the age of his retirement at 55 years in 1962, and that his claim for salary, if any, is hopelessly time barred, for this application was filed beyond several years after three years, when his salary became due.

The appellant, who argued his appeal in person before us could not show anything how, otherwise, his claim for salary is not barred by time.

As to the appellant's claim for damages against the respondents jointly, and severally for his malicious prosecutions as a result of the alleged conspiracy, it has also been held to be barred by limitation under Articles 22 and 23 of the Limitation Act, which prescribe only a period of one year for a suit from the date of the injury or injuries. In so holding, the learned Judge has relied on my decision given in the case of Bakshi Ghulam

Mohd. v. G.M. Sadiq, AIR 1968 J&K. 98.

A prior conspiracy to commit tort to another person, per se is not actionable, unless some wrong is done in pursuance to the conspiracy, for the conspiracy merges into the tort after it has been committed. The suitor in tort cannot be allowed to have an added advantage by charging conspiracy, because, it adds nothing after the wrong has been done. A tort does not become different when it is committed by several persons acting in concert from the one committed by a single individual. Thus even when tort is committed by more persons, acting in conspiracy than one individual, the charge of any prior conspiracy to commit the same tort merges into the tortious act. In such a case, the charge of conspiracy without any particular damage resulting from the conspiracy itself than from the tortious act following from the conspiracy, has to be ignored as an independent cause of action from the tort. The limitation will run from the date or dates of the tort or torts, and not from the date of conspiracy charged. The period of limitation for such a tort is one year as provided in Articles 22 and 23 of the Limitation Act. The decision in Ward v. Lewis.

1955 l All ER 55 and in D. Western v. Peary Mohan Dass, AIR 1914 Cal 396 (SB) are the authorities for the view I have; taken in the above case, referred to, by the learned single Judge. I adhere to the same view.

In Ward's case, 1955 1 All ER 55 it was observed:

It is sometimes sought, by charging conspiracy to get an added advantage, for instance in proceedings for discovery or by getting in evidence which would not be admissible in a straight action in tort, or to overcome substantive rules of law, such as here, the rules concerning republication of slanders. When the Court sees attempts of that kind being made, it will discourage them by striking out the allegations of conspiracy on the simple ground that the conspiracy adds nothing, when the tort has in fact been committed.

The appellant, however, contended before us that in my above decision, there was no question of any "Special Damage" whereas in the present action, the appellant has claimed "special damages" of rupees one crore. My observation in the above case in para 55 is to the following effect:

A conspiracy without any special damage resulting from the conspiracy charged cannot by itself be an independent cause of action, when torts have been committed even by the reason of the conspiracy.

In the present case also, although, the words "special damage" have been used, the claim is not as such resulting from the conspiracy itself, but it is for malicious persecutions and prosecutions launched in consequence of the conspiracy between the respondents. The terms ""special damages was used by me in the sense of a particular and definite injury caused by the conspiracy itself as different from damages for torts.

The Calcutta High Court supra has used the expression "special damages" in the same sense.

No special damage in the sense of a particular injury having been claimed resulting from the conspiracy charged itself, the period of limitation of one year would run from the date of the tortuous acts complained of. The last criminal case against the appellant ended in September, 1963. This application was filed in February, 1969; it is much beyond the period of one year limitation.

The appellant before the learned single Judge had, however, contended that the limitation of one year should run from February 28, 1908, when he had received the communication from the Chief Minister disallowing his claim. This contention of the appellant was overruled, and I think rightly. This question was not reiterated before us.

The appeal has no merit. It is dismissed but without costs since the appellant appears to have been misguided in launching this litigation.

S.M.F. Ali, C.J.

I agree.