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Judgment
Dr. Inder Jit Singh, Presiding Member
The present Revision Petitions (RPs) have been filed by the Petitioner against Respondents as detailed above, under section 21 (b) of Consumer Protection Act 1986, against the order dated 25.11.2016 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chhattisgarh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘State Commission’), in Appeal No. 414 to 426 of 2016, whereby the said Appeals have been dismissed by the State Commission on ground of limitation. The said appeals were filed after a delay of 296 days.
As common issues are involved in all the 13 cases, they are taken up together. However, RP No. 340 of 2017 is taken as lead case for presenting facts.
Petitioner has challenged the said Order dated 25.11.2016 of the State Commission mainly on following grounds:
a. No reasonable opportunity of being heard was given by the State Commission.
b. Complaint filed by the Respondent ( s) was not entertainable by the District Forum and Complainant is not a consumer.
c. Director of Petitioner No.2 /Appellant no.2 is in judicial custody till date and, therefore, Petitioner No.1 / Appellant No.1 was not in position to deposit the security amount for filing the Appeal but State Commission did not consider the above explanation of the Petitioners.
d. The circumstances were not within the control of the Petitioners / Appellants and thus delay caused which was bonafide. Filing of appeal requires various permission at different levels and therefore, delay occurred.
As condonation of delay application filed by the Petitioners before the State Commission was not on record, on 01.09.2023, after hearing the parties and while reserving the judgment, the Petitioner(s) were instructed to file copy of condonation of delay application filed by them before the State Commission. However, till the date of pronouncement of this judgment, Petitioners have not filed copy of this application. Accordingly, the case is being decided based on available records.
The appellants (OPs) have preferred the appeals against the order dated 28.08.2015, passed by the District Forum and have filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing appeals. The appeals were filed after a delay of 296 days.
The reasons for delay in filing appeals before the State Commission, as contained in the order of the State Commission are reproduced below:
Shri Tularam Patel, learned counsel appearing for the appellants (OPs) has argued that the impugned order has been passed by the District Forum on 28.08.2015 and the appellants (OPs) received the copy of the impugned order after three months from the date of the impugned order. The appellant No.1 (O.P. No.1) presumed that the appellant No.2 (O.P.No.2) is liable for the act and the appellant No.1 (O.P.No.1) requested the appellant No.2 (O.P. No.2) for filing appeal against the impugned order. The appellant No.2 (O.P.No.2) deposited the statutory amount on behalf of the appellants (OPs) before the District Forum on 16.12.2015. The appellant No.2 (O.P.No.2) is a Private Limited Company and the appeal on its behalf is required to be filed by an authorised person. Due to delay occurred in following the above procedure, the entire documents in this regard have been provided to the counsel. The instant appeal is being filed before this Commission within three months from the date of appointment of the advocate for filing appeal. The Head Office of the appellant No.2 (O.P.No.2) is situated at Vijaywada (Andhra Pradesh) and the concerned person, was required to come to Bilaspur (CG) for obtaining documents and information, therefore delay was caused. The appellant No.2 (O.P.No.2) is also liable for the compliance of the direction given in the impugned order to the appellant No.1 (O.P.No.1), therefore, the statutory amount for filing appeal i.e. Rs.25,000/- has been deposited by the appellant No.2 (O.P.No.2). The appellants (OPs) appointed advocate for filing instant appeal on 25.03.2016 and thereafter the advocate was required to go to Vijaywada two- three times for preparing appeal memo and the appellant No.2 (O.P.No.2) was also required to come to Bilaspur (C.G.) from Vijaywada (Andhra Pradesh) three- four times. Thus the appeal memo was finally prepared on 18.05.2016, which is also a reason for delay occurred in filing appeal. During filing of appeal, there was summer vacation for a period of one month. Thus, delay of 31 days from 18.05.2016 to 18.07.2016 (excluding days of summer vacation) has been occurred. The delay occurred in filing appeal is bonafide, therefore, the same is liable to be condoned.
State Commission in its order has stated that reasons assigned by the appellants is not satisfactory. The relevant para is reproduced below:
“6. In the order sheet dated 28.08.2015, in the remarks column where the signature of parties or pleaders where necessary, the counsel for the appellants (OPs) has specifically mentioned that “आदेश की प्रति प्राप्त अनावेदकगण द्वारा.” It appears that copy of the impugned order had been received by the counsel for the appellants ( OPs) on the same day. It means that the counsel for the appellants (OPs) was having knowledge regarding the impugned order on the same day i.e. 28.08.2015, therefore, the limitation had started from 29.08.2015, whereas the instant appeal has been filed on 19.07.2016 i.e. after near about 296 days. The reason assigned by the appellants ( OPs) is not satisfactory and explanation given by the appellants ( OPs), is not acceptable.”
State Commission has relied upon the following judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court / Delhi High Court / National Commission
i. Basavraj & Anr. Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer 2013 AIR SCW 6510.
ii. Ludhiana Improvement Trust Vs. Harpreet Kaur 2013 (4) CPR 848 ( NC)
iii. N Manohar Reddy Vs. Happy Farm and Resorts I (2014) CPJ 149 ( NC)
iv. New Bank of India Vs. M/s Marvels ( India ) 93 ( 2001) DLT 558
v. Ram Lal and Ors. V s. Rewa Colfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361
vi. Cicily Kallarackal Vs. Vehicle Factory IV ( 2012) CPJ 1 ( SC)
vii. Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority IV ( 2011) CPJ 63 ( SC)
vii Cordon Builders Pvt. Lt. & Anr. Vs. Valerian Anthony Diago & Anr. 2015 (2) CPR 517 ( NC)
viii. Lachoo @ Laxminarayan Vs. Proprietory : Verma Watch House Shyam Talkies, 2015 (4) CPR 337 ( NC).
ix. M/s Samia International Builders ( P) Ltd. Vs. Neeta Rani, 2016 (1) CPR 19 ( NC)
x. Rituraj Construction Vs. Prakash Ramchandra Kale I ( 2016) CPJ 272 ( NC)
xi. Sr. Superintendent of Post Officers and Anr. Vs. Modi ( HUF), 2016 ( 2) CPR 577 ( NC)
xi. Standard Chartered Bank Limited Vs. Neeta Chauhan IV ( 2016) CPJ 436.
State Commission further observed in its order as follows:
“17. It must be borne in mind that Consumer Protection Act, 1986 lays down its own period of limitation. In the instant case, looking to the application filed by the appellants ( OPs) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and affidavit of appellant No.1 ( OP No.1) Himanshu Tiwari, Proprietor, C.G. Beej Bhandar, Sakti, District Janjgir – Champa ( C.G.) filed in support of the said application, it appears that the reasons assigned by the appellants ( OPs) in the said application regarding delay in filing the appeal, are not satisfactory and delay has not been explained properly, therefore, the appeal is barred by limitation by 296 days, which cannot be condoned.”
In its written arguments, Petitioner has stated as follows :
“6. However, as there was an unintentional delay of 296 days, the said First Appeals were filed along with Applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the Appeals. It was described in the said Applications for condonation of delay that, during the pendency of the Complaints before the Ld. District Forum itself, there was some criminal case initiated by the Crime Investigation Department of the Govt. of Andhra Pradesh against the sister concern of the Petitioner No.2 Company M/s. Agri Gold Farms & Estates India Pvt. Ltd. and its common Directors, under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act; pursuant to which, all the Directors were arrested and vide attachment orders dated 20.02.2015 and 05.06.2015 (Annex.P/3 (colly)} all the movable and immovable properties of the Company as well as of the Directors were confiscated. Because of such turmoil in the Company, the statutory First Appeals could not be filed within the period of limitation and there was a delay in filing the Appeals before the Hon'ble State Commission; which was neither deliberate nor intentional. However, unfortunately the Counsel dealing with the First Appeals did not bring all these facts to the notice of the Hon'ble State Commission and instead, shown some procedural aspects for the cause of delay.”
In support of their contentions, the Petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India Vs. Jagbir Singh 2015 AIR ( SC) 2070.
Respondent, on the other hand contended that no valid reasons are given by the Petitioner in the affidavit filed before the State Commission and now in the RP, many reasons / grounds for condonation are being mentioned, which were not part of the condonation of delay application.
In order to condone the delay of 296 days, the Petitioner had to satisfy the State Commission that there were sufficient cause for preferring the Appeals after the stipulated limitation period. The term ‘sufficient cause’ has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj and Another. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81. Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case observed as follows :
Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.
In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.
The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale……..
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.
The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649], while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, after taking note of various authorities/earlier judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, culled out broad principles for considering the condonation of delay applications and also added few more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. Relevant paras of these are reproduced below:-
“15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
x x x x
ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
x x x x
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
x x x x
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
x x x x
c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”
In Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 321], Hon’ble Supreme Court observed :
Much later, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy this court referred to a large number of previous judgments, and observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. Other decisions have highlighted that there cannot be a universal formula to judge whether sufficient cause has, or has not been shown and the exercise is necessarily fact specific; in Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh, the court held:
“16. While considering [an] application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not.”
The court also emphasized that each case has to be balanced on the basis of its facts and the surrounding circumstances in which the parties act and behave.”
Keeping in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case, rival contentions of the parties and judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited above, we do not find any reason to intervene with the order of the State Commission for not condoning the delay of 296 days in filing the appeals. State Commission has given a well reasoned order. There is no illegality or material irregularity or jurisdictional error in the order of the State Commission. Hence, the order of the State Commission is upheld. Accordingly, the Revision Petitions are dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.
The pending IAs in the cases, if any, also stand disposed off.