Harbansh Singh vs Sanatan Chaurasia

Heard learned counsel for the defendant petitioner and the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent.

This revision is directed against the order dated 17.4.2017, passed by the learned Sub Judge-I, Pakur, in Title (Eviction) Suit No. 9 of 2014, whereby, the leave application filed by the defendant petitioner seeking leave to defend the suit under Section 14(4) of the Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), was dismissed by the Trial Court, holding that the defendant tenant had not made any such statement in his petition on affidavit, so as to make out a ground on which, he could disentitle the plaintiff landlord from obtaining an order of eviction, thus, entitling the defendant tenant to leave to contest the suit. Thus, rejecting the leave application of the defendant petitioner, the Court directed the petitioner to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiff.

Aggrieved by that order, the defendant petitioner has preferred this revision, and by Order dated 01st February 2018, it was directed that no coercive step shall be taken against the petitioner in connection with the Execution Case No. 09 of 2017, filed for execution of the said order.

According to the plaintiff's case, the suit property was purchased by the plaintiff and the defendant was inducted as tenant in the suit property by the erstwhile owner of the property. After purchasing the suit property, the plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of the defendant under Section 11(1)(c) of the Act. Though the plaint revealed that there was also dispute for rent between the parties, but the plaintiff confined his suit on the ground of personal necessity, stating that being a joint family, having many members, they all were facing difficulty in accommodation of the growing family of the plaintiff and accordingly, the suit was filed for bona fide personal requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff. It was also stated that some remodeling etc. was also required to be done in the house after evicting the tenant.

Upon notice, the defendant appeared and filed the application under Section 14(4) of the said Act, seeking leave to contest the suit. In the said application, it was stated inter alia by the defendant, that the plaintiff had got his own double storied building, having several rooms and sufficient space in it. Thus, the defendant objected the very ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff. The defendant had also objected the ground about the remodeling etc. in the house.

The Trial Court below, upon consideration of the application filed by the defendant, dismissed the application, stating that without any supportive document, no weightage could be given to the plea of the defendant that the plaintiff had got his own double storied building, having several rooms and sufficient space in it. The Trial Court below also rejected the ground taken by the defendant that that there was no provision under the Act to evict the defendant on the ground of remodeling etc., as renovation, remodeling or reconstruction of the suit premises by the plaintiff was only incidental to the prime object of making the house more suitable for his big joint family. Thus, holding that the defendant tenant had not made any such statement in his petition on affidavit, so as to make out a ground on which, he could disentitle the plaintiff landlord from obtaining an order of eviction, the application for leave to contest the suit, filed by the defendant petitioner was dismissed by the Court below.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order passed by the Court below is absolutely illegal and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, inasmuch as, the ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff was fully answered by the defendant, stating that the plaintiff had sufficient space in his own double storied building, having several rooms and as such, a clear case was made out for granting leave to contest the suit. Learned counsel submitted that at this stage, the Court was not expected to examine any evidence, or the merits and demerits of the ground taken by the defendant, and in the facts of this case, the defendant was entitled to the leave for contesting the suit, as only after getting the leave to contest the suit, the defendant could file his written statement to contest the suit. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Ahluwalia & Ors. Vs. Bishan Chand Maheshwari &Anr., reported in (2017) 3 SCC 189, laying down the law as follows :-

"18. It is a settled principle of law that while considering the grant of leave to contest the eviction proceedings under the Rent Laws, the Authority / Court is not expected to examine the merits and demerits of the grounds raised in the application for grant of leave to contest and if the Authority / Court finds that the grounds raised prima facie disclose a defence which, if ac­ cepted, may result in non-suiting the landlord from claiming eviction, the tenant is entitled to obtain leave to contest the eviction proceedings on merits . In this case, we find that the ap­ pellant tenants have made out such grounds and are, therefore, entitled for grant of leave to contest the eviction proceedings filed by Respondent 1 against them on merits."

(Emphasis supplied).

Placing reliance on this decision, learned counsel submitted that the impugned order passed by the Trial Court below, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer, submitting that in the facts of this case, the Trial Court below has rightly held that no ground was made out by the defendant disentitling the plaintiff landlord from obtaining the order of eviction, and when there is no such ground, the leave for contesting the suit was rightly refused to the defendant by the Trial Court below. Learned counsel has also pointed out from the impugned order that the application of the defendant was rejected by the Trial Court below, holding that the renovation, remodeling or reconstruction of the suit premises by the plaintiff by evicting the defendant was incidental to the prime object of making the house more suitable for the plaintiff's big joint family, which fact was not disputed by the defendant, but it was only stated by the defendant that that there was no provision under the Act to evict the defendant on the ground of remodeling etc. Learned counsel, accordingly, submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order passed by the Trial Court below.

Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record, I find that by stating in his application on affidavit, that the plaintiff had got his own double storied building, having sufficient rooms and sufficient space to cater the needs of the family of the plaintiff, the defendant had made out a prima facie case for non-suiting the landlord from claiming eviction, thus, disentitling the plaintiff to get a decree in his favour. At this stage only, the prima facie defence had to be seen, and that was not the stage for looking into any evidence, or for giving a finding after detailed adjudication of the matter. If the defendant had made out the prima facie case to show that the plaintiff had sufficient space in his double storied house to cater the needs of his growing family, I am of the considered view that the prima facie ground had been made out by the defendant that in case, he is able to prove this fact in trial, the plaintiff may not be entitled to the decree as prayed for. At this stage it was not open for the Trial Court to have disbelieved his statement stating that without any supportive document, no weightage could be given to the plea of the defendant.

I am of the considered view that in the facts of this case, the prayer, seeking leave to contest the suit, has been wrongly rejected by the Trial Court below and as such, the impugned order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated 17.04.2017, passed by the learned Sub Judge-I, Pakur, in Title Eviction Suit No.09 of 2014, rejecting the application filed under Section 14(4) of the Act, by the defendant, is hereby, set aside.

The Court below is directed to pass the order afresh on the basis of the statements made by the defendant in his petition filed under Section 14(4) of the Act on affidavit, in accordance with law.

This revision application is accordingly, allowed, with the direction as above. Consequently, the aforesaid Interlocutory Application also stands disposed of.