Gulzaar Ahmed Wani vs UT Of Jammu And Kashmir & Ors.

Per: - Ram Mohan Johri, Administrative Member

The applicant has filed the present Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 seeking the following reliefs: -

The facts of the case as averred by the applicant in his pleadings, are as follows: -

The respondents have filed their written statement wherein they have averred as follows: -

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings made by them.

The principal question which arises for consideration is whether, in the facts of the present case, the impugned termination is liable to be interfered with merely because no regular departmental enquiry was conducted before the services of the applicant were terminated.

Ordinarily, there can be no quarrel with the proposition that where a regular Government employee is visited with a major penalty on the basis of allegations of misconduct, the procedure prescribed under the applicable service rules and the requirements of natural justice are required to be observed. However, the matter does not rest merely on the general proposition. The nature of the allegation, the material on which the action is founded and, above all, whether any real prejudice has resulted from absence of an enquiry have to be examined in the facts of each case.

In the present case, the action against the applicant is not founded merely upon suspicion or upon an internal assessment made by the Department. The Department sought verification of the educational document from IGNOU itself. The University informed the authorities that although the applicant was enrolled under Enrollment No. 000652982 in the Bachelor Degree Programme, he had not completed the programme and that the Statement of Marks forwarded for verification had not been issued by the University. Thus, the material relied upon by the respondents emanates from the very institution which was stated to have issued the educational document.

At this stage, reference needs to be made to the recent judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in UT of J&K & Ors. v. Roshan Din, WP(C) No.1644/2025, decided on 18.09.2025. The said judgment assumes considerable significance as it arose from a substantially similar controversy concerning termination of an ReT/General Line Teacher consequent upon verification of the educational certificate relied upon for obtaining appointment.

In Roshan Din (supra), the employee had challenged his termination primarily on the ground that no enquiry had been conducted and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him. The Tribunal accepted the plea and set aside the termination. The Hon’ble High Court, however, reversed the decision of the Tribunal. It noticed that the educational document relied upon by the employee had been found to be false on verification and that the factual position emerging from the record was such that holding a disciplinary enquiry would not have altered the ultimate result.

The Hon’ble High Court further held that a disciplinary enquiry would be necessary where the facts constituting the alleged misconduct are genuinely in dispute. Where the material position is admitted or indisputable and affording another opportunity would not produce a different result, insistence upon such an exercise would amount only to an empty formality. While arriving at the said conclusion, the Hon’ble High Court relied upon the principle considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237, concerning the application of the “useless formality” theory in cases where the relevant facts are admitted or otherwise beyond dispute.

It is true that there is a factual distinction between Roshan Din and the present case. In Roshan Din, the conduct of the employee in subsequently appearing in the qualifying examination was also taken into consideration by the Hon’ble High Court. In the present case, the applicant has denied having submitted a fake certificate. This distinction, however, by itself does not carry the applicant’s case any further. A bare denial cannot displace an official verification received from the very University from which the qualification was claimed.

What is material is that the respondents did not undertake an independent exercise to pronounce upon the genuineness of a document beyond their competence. They referred the matter to IGNOU. The University, being the custodian of its own academic records, reported that the applicant had not completed the Bachelor Degree Programme and, more significantly, that the Statement of Marks sent for verification had not been issued by the University. No material has been brought on record by the applicant from IGNOU showing that the said verification was erroneous or that the disputed Statement of Marks had, in fact, been issued by the University.

Once the issuing University itself disowns the document attributed to it, the issue cannot be reduced to a mere departmental allegation requiring the Department to independently establish the academic record of the applicant. If the applicant disputed the verification, the most material evidence available to rebut it would necessarily have been an authentic confirmation from IGNOU. Nothing of that nature has been placed before us.

The contention that the applicant had served the Department for a long period and had already been regularized also cannot improve his case. Mere passage of time cannot validate an appointment or consequential benefit obtained on the basis of a document which, upon verification from the issuing institution, is found not to have been issued by it. Continuance in service for a number of years cannot create an indefeasible right where the foundation upon which the benefit of appointment was obtained itself fails.

The principles of natural justice are undoubtedly meant to secure fairness in administrative action. At the same time, they cannot be applied mechanically, divorced from the facts of a case. The Court or Tribunal is required to see whether the alleged procedural deficiency has caused real prejudice and whether observance of the omitted procedure could reasonably have resulted in a different conclusion. The principle considered in M.C. Mehta and applied by the jurisdictional High Court in Roshan Din is relevant precisely in this context.

Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, we are unable to persuade ourselves to set aside the impugned order merely for the purpose of directing the respondents to hold a formal enquiry when the essential documentary fact comes directly from IGNOU and there is no contrary verification from the University on record. Such a course would only prolong the matter without altering the substance of the position emerging from the record.

We are also mindful that an allegation concerning use of a false educational document is not a minor irregularity which can be overlooked on equitable considerations. Educational qualification goes to the root of eligibility for public employment. A person seeking appointment in public service is expected to place genuine documents before the employer. Where the document relied upon is disowned by the purported issuing authority itself, continuation of the consequential service benefit cannot be claimed merely on the strength of length of service.

The judgment in Roshan Din has an additional significance in the present matter. It concerns the same School Education Department, termination consequent upon verification of educational documents, and a challenge substantially founded upon absence of a departmental enquiry and opportunity of hearing. The Division Bench ultimately set aside the order of the Tribunal granting reinstatement and dismissed the Original Application. The principle laid down therein is, therefore, directly attracted to the extent discussed above.

In view of the above discussion, we find no sufficient ground to interfere with order No. CEOK/5347-51 dated 29.10.2021. Once the challenge to the termination fails, the consequential reliefs of reinstatement, continuity of service and consequential benefits also do not survive.

As regards the separate claim of the applicant for salary stated to be unpaid from May, 2019 till the date of termination, no independent material sufficient to adjudicate the precise amount or period of salary lawfully earned but unpaid has been placed before us. The dismissal of the challenge to termination shall, however, not authorize withholding of any salary which had already accrued to the applicant for a period during which he had actually discharged duties prior to termination, if otherwise admissible under the applicable rules. The respondents shall deal with any such subsisting claim strictly in accordance with the service record and applicable rules.

For the foregoing reasons, the Original Application is found to be devoid of merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. The impugned order No. CEOK/5347-51 dated 29.10.2021 is upheld. Pending M.A(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

No order as to costs.