Gonour Singh vs Emperor

James, J.—On 26th September 1929, Gonour Singh lodged an information at the Paroo police station to the effect that some money and documents had been stolen from a box in his house. The Sub-Inspector after investigating the matter found the information to be false; and he complained to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that Gonour Singh had committed an offence punishable u/s 182, I.P.C.

The Magistrate issued prosess u/s 182; and on the date fixed Gonour Singh filed a petition stating that the information which he had given was true and that he could prove it to be true. The trial proceeded, with the result that Gonour Singh was convicted of the offence charged and sentenced to one month's rigorous imprisonment. I am asked to revise this order on two grounds.

The first ground taken is that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ought to have treated Gonour Singh's petition of 9th November as a complaint, and that the prosecution could not proceed until that complaint had been formally disposed of. The learned advocate for the petitioner cites the decision in the case of Bamdhari Gope v. Emperor [1928] 110 I.C. 212, but in that case the. person who. was accused of an offence u/s 211, I.P.C., preferred his petition of protest before the date fixed for his appearance to answer the charge before the Magistrate; and the petition of protest actually was a formal complaint, since he definitely prayed that the case against the accused person whom he charged might proceed. Reference is made to an obiter dictum of this Court in the case of Maguni Padhan Vs. Emperor, wherein it was remarked that a Court is bound to treat the informant's petition as a complaint, when being dissatisfied with the police investigation he comes to the Court and asks that the case may be re-investigated or makes allegation against the police.

Mr. B.P. Jamuar on behalf of the Crown points out that even where the petition would be ordinarily treated as a petition of complaint it should be made before a Magistrate has. actually taken cognizance of an offence u/s 182 on the complaint of a police officer. I agree with the view expressed by Macpherson, J., in Ghhakari Chamar v. Emperor Cr. Revn. No. 692 of 1929. and in the case of Parmanand Brahmachari v. Emperor AIR 1930 Pat. 30, that when a Magistrate has once properly taken cognizance of an offence, anything that may happen subsequently cannot bring into operation Section 195(1)(b), Criminal P.C. so as to deprive him of jurisdiction to dispose of the matter in accordance with law.

Moreover I do not consider that in the present case the petition which was filed on 9th November could in any circumstance be properly treated as a complaint. Gonour Singh was summoned u/s 182, I.P.C. to appear on 9th November. On that date if he did not plead guilty to the charge it was necessary for him to show cause why he should not be convicted. He showed cause by his petition; and after he had filed this petition it would have been superfluous for the Magistrate to examine him again u/s 342, Criminal P.C. But the petition did not (any more than the original information had done) name any person as guilty of the offence charged. It merely said that Gonour Singh was not guilty of the offence u/s 182. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate properly treated this as a petition showing cause against conviction; and he proceeded to summon the witnesses for the prosecution who were named in the Sub-Inspector's complaint.

It is argued in the second place that the Courts below have erred in treating as substantive evidence the resitals in a document (Ex. 2) which showed that two mukarrari pattas said by Gonour Singh to have been stolen from him had been made over to one Debi Prasad at the time when a certain zarpeshgi deed was executed. The learned trying Magistrate points out that the witness Jagarnath Prasad stated that the two pattas were made over to Debi Prasad in his presence; while a pleader said that it was settled in his presence that these pattas-should be made over to Debi Prasad by way of security. The deed itself recited that these pattas had been made over to Debi Prasad, a fact which does not of course in itself prove that the pattas were made over, but which is not irrelevant, since it is at least not inconsistent with the story told by the prosecution witnesses. The learned Deputy Magistrate who heard the appeal says that apart from the oral evidence the zarpeshgi deed proved that these documents were made over to Debi Prasad as security in 1917. If the learned Deputy Magistrate had said no more than this, his decision might well have been criticized on the ground that the zarpeshgi deed to which Gonour Singh was not a party cannot in itself be held to prove the truth of any recital contained in it. But the learned Deputy Magistrate has not relied exclusively on this zarpeshgi deed. He remarks that there is overwhelming evidence which cannot for a moment be distrusted that the two mukarrari deeds had been in possession of Debi Prasad Singh for a long time and that they could not possibly have been in possession of Gonour Singh.

I am satisfied that the learned Deputy Magistrate gave proper weight to the evidence on this point; and if he attached too much importance to the corroboration of that evidence which is afforded by the fact that the recitals in the deed Ex. 2 are not inconsistent with it, I do not consider that his decision can be regarded as vitiated on that ground. I accordingly maintain the finding and order of the lower Court and dismiss this application.