Tribunals and CommissionsDivision Bench(2026) 09 CAT CK 4740

Girish Chand Gautam vs Union Of India & Ors.

Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi · Decided on 22 September 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
R. N. Singh, Member (J) · Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
RESULT
Disposed Of
CASE NUMBER
O.A. No. 3349/2023

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

115 paragraphs · 9,112 words

O R D E R

Hon’ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):-

By filing the present O.A. under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs: -

“i.

quash and set aside the Impugned Orders dated 23.01.2017, 19.06.2017 and 26.09.2023;

ii.

respondents may kindly be directed to reinstate the applicant with all consequential benefits i.e. back wages, seniority etc.

iii.

pass such other and further orders which this Hon’ble Tribunal deem appropriate and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

FACTS OF THE CASE

2.

As stated by the applicant, he joined the Department of Posts as a Postal Assistant in the year 1992 and, at the relevant time, was working as Postal Assistant. He had rendered approximately 25 years of service when the penalty of removal from service was imposed upon him.

2.1

While the applicant was posted as Sub Post Master, Sarai Khwaja (Single Hand), Agra, a Memorandum dated 31.03.2015 was issued to him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, initiating disciplinary proceedings for imposition of a major penalty. The sole Article of Charge against the applicant was that, on 15.06.2013, he did not deposit the entire amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- and deposited only Rs. 3,00,000/-. The remaining amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was subsequently deposited on 19.06.2013. It was alleged that, on account of non-deposit of the said amount during the intervening period, the Government suffered a loss of Rs. 1,00,000/-.

2.2

The applicant, vide his reply dated 18.04.2015, denied the charge and contended that the non-deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- was an omission and was not intentional. Thereafter, an Inquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer were appointed to conduct the disciplinary proceedings. Upon completion of the inquiry, the applicant submitted his defence brief dated 07.10.2016, reiterating his stand that the non-deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- was inadvertent and not intentional. The Inquiry Officer, vide report dated 23.11.2016, held the sole Article of Charge against the applicant to be proved. The applicant submitted his representation dated 22.12.2016 against the inquiry report, reiterating his earlier defence. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority, namely, the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Agra Division, passed order dated 23.01.2017, imposing upon the applicant the penalty of removal from service.

2.3

Aggrieved by the said penalty, the applicant preferred a departmental appeal dated 04.03.2017 (Annexure-A/8) before the Appellate Authority, i.e. the Director, Postal Services. The appeal was rejected vide order dated 19.06.2017, thereby upholding the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. Thereafter, the applicant preferred a Review Petition dated 10.06.2018 under Rule 29-A of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 before the President of India, challenging the penalty imposed upon him.

2.4

As the Review Petition remained pending, the applicant approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 1464/2023, inter alia, seeking quashing of the penalty of removal from service. The said Original Application was disposed of by this Tribunal vide order dated 26.04.2023, granting liberty to the applicant to submit a supplementary representation in support of his pending Review Petition. The competent authority was directed to consider the Review Petition along with the supplementary representation and pass a reasoned and speaking order expeditiously.

2.5

Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the applicant submitted a supplementary representation dated 10.05.2023 in support of his pending Review Petition. The respondents thereafter, vide order dated 26.09.2023, rejected both the Review Petition dated 10.06.2018 and the supplementary representation dated 10.05.2023.

2.6

Aggrieved by the penalty of removal from service and the rejection of his statutory remedies, the applicant has filed the present O.A. The principal grievance of the applicant is that the omission to deposit the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was neither intentional nor attributable to any dishonest conduct and, in any event, the penalty of removal from service is grossly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct.

2.7

The applicant has also contended that, having rendered approximately 25 years of service, the extreme penalty of removal from service is disproportionate to the charge proved against him, particularly when the entire amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was subsequently deposited. On this basis, the applicant seeks interference with the penalty on the ground of proportionality of punishment.

3.

Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have filed reply opposing the claim of the applicant. The applicant has also filed rejoinder refuting the contents of the reply filed by the respondents.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT

4.

Mr. Ashish Nischal, learned counsel appearing for the applicant, argued that the respondents have failed to appreciate a vital fact that the present impugned penalty of removal from service would not commensurate with the allegation of conduct by the applicant. The present impugned penalty of removal is not only disproportionate to the conduct, but also at the same time would shock the consciousness of the Courts. The applicant was having, to his credit, a service career of about 25 years and further, as on date, more six years to go, before superannuation;

4.1

Learned counsel submitted that the issue in hand is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. Vs. J. Ahmed, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1022, and the relevant para of the said judgment reads under:-

“It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness or malevolence.”

4.2

Learned counsel further submitted that the order of the co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in G. P. Sewalia Vs. Union of India & Anr., reported in 2009 (2) SLJ 360 (CAT). This Order has been affirmed by the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi, against which no SLP was preferred. Relevant para of the Order in G. P. Sewali (supra) reads under:-

“Having given our anxious thoughts, we have come to a firm conclusion that there is distinction between misconduct and not performing the duties as efficiently as another person similarly situated may be able to perform. Misconduct has to have some element of delinquency, may be, even gross negligence. It is only when the allegations subject matter of charge may tantamount to misconduct that a person can be proceeded for inflicting any of the punishments prescribed in the rules. Non-performance of duties, which may have no element of unlawful behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior, misdemeanor, misdeed, impropriety or a forbidden act, may sometime amount to not carrying out the duties efficiently, but the same cannot be construed to be misconduct. If decisions that may ultimately prove to be less beneficial to an organisation for which a person is working are to be termed as misconduct liable for punishment under rules, no person discharging his duties would be able to take any major decision. The administrative work, if may not come to a grinding halt, would, in any case, slow down so much that it may cause more harm and loss to the concerned institution. From our experience from several hundred cases that we have dealt, we find that a negative and indecisive attitude is developing amongst the government officers, primarily for the reason that any decision taken which may be even in good faith, or favourably interpreting rules benefiting even a deserving government employee, may not become subject matter of disciplinary action against them. Surely, if government servants are to be tried departmentally for bona fide actions taken by them in discharge of their official duties, which may have absolutely no undertones or overtones of delinquency, the situation as prevails today is bound to aggravate.”

4.3

Learned counsel further places reliance on the judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the judgment of B. C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Anr., reported in AIR 1996 SC 484, has held as under:-

“18.

A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”

4.4

Learned counsel submitted that the respondents have failed to appreciate the distinction between misconduct and not performing the duties as efficiently as another person similarly situated may be able to perform. Misconduct has to have some element of delinquency, may be, even gross negligence. It is only when the allegations subject matter of charge may tantamount to misconduct that a person can be proceeded for inflicting any of the punishments prescribed in the rules. Non-performance of duties, which may have no element of unlawful behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior, misdemeanor, misdeed, impropriety or a forbidden act, may sometime amount to not carrying out the duties efficiently, but the same cannot be construed to be misconduct.

4.5

Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents have failed to appreciate that the core issue while filing the Review Petition and the Supplementary Representation, was the proportionality of penalty and no misconduct, which were neither appreciated nor taken into consideration either by the Disciplinary, Appellate or the Reviewing Authorities, in as much as, there was no misconduct by the applicant and the impugned penalty of removal from service is disproportionate to the alleged conduct of the applicant, when the applicant had admitted the allegation leveled under the charge. The present impugned penalty of removal from service does not commensurate with the allegations levelled against the applicant and the same is not only disproportionate to the conduct, but also, at the same time, would shock the consciousness of the Court/Tribunal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

5.

Mr. B. L. Wanchoo, learned counsel, by referring to the contents of the counter reply filed on 27.04.2024 on behalf of respondents, submitted that the Applicant while working as SPM (Sub Post Master) in Post Office Sarai Khawja, Agra during the period from 14.06.2013 to 15.06.2013. The applicant committed a grave misconduct inasmuch as he failed to remit cash to Head Post office Agra on 15.06.2013 to tune of Rs. 4,00,000/- through various mode of conveyance as per rules and shown cash remittance of Rs. 4,00,000/- to Head Post office Agra in his record (Sub Post office Daily accounts) dated 15.06.2013 but he actually handed over/deposited an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- in place of Rs. 4,00,000/- to Assistant Treasurer Head Post office Agra for which he received a token of receipt of Rs. 3,00,000/- from the Assistant Treasurer of the Head Office, Agra. But applicant also failed to keep the concerned receipt in Post office record. Thus, the applicant retained unauthorizedly an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only). On receipt of the information regarding short deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/-by the applicant an Inquiry was conducted by Sub Divisional Inspector (Posts), West Sub Division Aga and Sub Divisional Inspector (Posts), East Sub Division Agra. Finally, the applicant deposited a balance of Rs. 1,00,000/- on 19.06.2013 in Sanjay Place Post office Agra owning/ admitting his responsibility and mistake vide his written statement dated 19.06.2013 (Annexure R-1) under receipt No. A 3815.

5.1

It is also submitted that the applicant has also failed to keep closing cash balance within prescribed maximum cash balance limit of Rs. 20,000/- (Annexure R-2) and retained cash Rs. 5,30,117/- without mentioning any liabilities/reasons in daily account of Sarai Khwaja Sub Post office Agra dated 15.06.2013. During the inquiry, the applicant admitted his guilt by way of written statement, inquiry report was submitted on 20.06.2013 and the applicant was placed under suspension w.e.f. 21.06.2013. When the inquiry of the instant case was in progress, two other cases of fraudulent withdrawal from RD (Recurring Deposit) accounts standing at Nammer Sub Post office Agra and Nai Ki Mandi Sub Post office Agra came into light wherein an amount of Rs. 3,90,000/- and Rs. 14,18,000/- respectively defrauded by the applicant. In above mentioned both the cases, the applicant committed fraud/ embezzlement by fraudulent withdrawals on the basis of forged signature of the depositor on Recurring Deposit withdrawal forms without entry in concerned RD (Recurring Deposit) Passbooks and concerned depositors denied to make any withdrawal from their concerned RD accounts during the inquiry. In respect of aforesaid two cases FIRs have already been lodged at Police Station Sadar Bazar Agra and Police Station Nai Ki Mandi, Agra under case crime No. 593/2013 dated 05.07.2013 and case crime No. 115/2013 dated 28.07.2013 respectively [Annexure R-3 (Colly)].

5.2

Action under PAD (Public Accountant Default), Act, 1850, to recover the defrauded amount was initiated against the applicant through DM, Agra on 26.07.2013 (Annexure R-4). The applicant filed an O.A. No. 1224/2013 before the co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal at Allahabad against the recovery action dated 26.07.2013 under PAD, Act, 1850. However, the CAT, Allahabad Bench dismissed the O.A. vide its order dated 25.09.2013 (Annexure R-5) on the ground that the OA was not maintainable as per the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The said Order/Judgment of this Tribunal was challenged by the applicant before the Hon‟ble High Court of Allahabad vide W.P. No. 59042/2013, which was dismissed by the Hon‟ble High Court of Allahabad vide its order dated 03.12.2013 (Annexure R-6). Thereafter, the defrauded amount of Rs. 3,90,000/- and 14,18,000/- which was recovered from the applicant through revenue authorities and credited in UCR (Un Classified Receipt) at Agra, HO. Charge sheet for major penalty under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was issued against the applicant vide SSPOs Agra Memo No. F/Misc/Sarai Khwaja PO/13-14/GC Gautam dated 31.03.2015 (Annexure A-4 of this instant O.A.). An inquiry was conducted into the above matter of shortage of cash of Rs. 1,00,000/-by the applicant and the inquiring officer submitted his inquiry report dated 23.11.2016 wherein the inquiry officer proved all the charges leveled against the applicant. Copy of Inquiry Report was sent to the applicant for representation, if any. After seeking extension of time finally applicant submitted his representation dated 06.01.2017 to the Inquiry Report. Thereafter, consequent to due consideration, the Disciplinary Authority awarded the Penalty of “Removal from Service” to the applicant vide SSPOs Agra Memo No. F /Misc/Sarai Khwaja PO/13-14/GC Gautam dated 23.01.2017 (Annexure A-1 of instant O.A.).

5.3

Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the O.A. is not maintainable in the Principal Bench of this Tribunal, whereas it has to be adjudicated by the Allahabad Bench of this Tribunal in terms of Rule 6 (ii) of the CAT, Procedure Rules, 1987 since cause of action has arisen in Agra which is under the jurisdiction of CAT, Allahabad Bench.

5.4

It is further submitted that the contention of the applicant is not tenable because the applicant was awarded penalty of stoppage of next one increment for the period of one year without future effect on the charges mentioned in punishment order issued vide SSPOs Agra Memo No. SB/Misc/lradat Nagar/08-09 dated 28.05.2010 (Annexure R-8). It is further submitted that charge sheets under Rule-14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1980 have also been issued on 28.10.15 and 29.10.15/04.11.15 in respect of Namner Fraud case and Nai ki Mandi Fraud case respectively, which clearly shows that the applicant has been a habitual offender in his service.

5.4

Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that besides other grounds, the applicant also failed to fill up the Sarai Khwaja SO (Sub Office) daily account dated 14.06.2013 and 15.06.2013 and to verify the cash balance in hand physically and to keep correct amount of closing cash balance in hand in security bag of Sarai Khwaja, PO, Agra on 15.06.2013. It is further submitted that the applicant also failed to keep closing cash balance within prescribed maximum cash balance limit (Annexure R-2) of Rs. 20000/ - and retained cash Rs. 5,30,117/-as shown in daily account) beyond the prescribed maximum cash limit without mentioning any liabilities/reasons in daily account dated 15.06.2013. It is contended that the applicant has stated/accepted in his Written Statement dated 19.06.2013 (Annexure R-1) that an amount to the tune of Rs. 3,00,000/- was handed over to treasurer on 15.06.2013 and Rs. 1,00,000/- was left by mistake in drawer of Sarai Khwaja, P.O., Agra and after searching almirah and record of Sarai Khwaja, P.O. on 18.06.2013 and 19.06.2013, he found Rs. 1,00,000/- in drawer of counter of Sarai Khwaja, P.O., and deposited the same in UCR on 19.06.2013 in Sanjay Place PO Agra under receipt no. 3815. On the other hand, Sh. Mahendra Singh, MTS, Sarai Khwaja, P.O. Agra vide his W/s dtd. 20.06.2013 and Sh. Sobran Singh Meena, SPM Sarai Khwaja, P.O., Agra vide his W/s dated 20.06.2013 have clearly stated that in their statements that the applicant did not appear/attend in Sarai Khwaja, P.O. till 20.06.2013, hence receipt of Rs. 1,00,000/- in drawer of Sarai Khwaja, P.O., Agra does not arise and thus, the statement of said applicant that he found Rs. 1,00,000/- in drawer of Sarai Khwaja, P.O., Agra stands totally false (Annexure R-9). In view of above submission, it is crystal clear that the applicant owning to his responsibility of loss, has deposited the misappropriated amount in UCR on 19.06.2013 to save his Skin. Hence, the version of the applicant that non deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- was an omission and not intentional is not correct, hence not acceptable.

5.5

Learned counsel further contended that for preferring the Review Petition, the proper Authority is Secretary, Department of Posts, Ministry of Communications Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi instead the applicant had sent the Review Petition to Secretary, Department of Telecommunications, Ministry of Communications, Sanchar Bhawan, Ashok Road, New Delhi. He also submitted that the respondents have already complied with the directions of this Tribunal contained in order dated 26.04.2023 in O.A. No. 1464/2023 by way of considering and passing the speaking order dated 26.09.2023 to the review petition dated 10.06.2018 and supplementary representation dated 10.05.2023. It is also submitted that the act of the applicant was willful and with an ill motive to utilize the public money by him for which the applicant being custodian of public money in no way could utilize for his own benefits for intervening period. The act of the applicant very well comes under the definition of grave misconduct being a wrongful intention on the part of the applicant. The applicant has himself admitted his misconduct. Under the definition of misconduct in P. Ramanatha Aiyar‟s Law Lexicon 3rd Edition at page 3027:-

“the term misconduct implied a wrongful intention and no involving error of judgment.”

5.6

Learned counsel for the respondents the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court referred by the applicant are not applicable in the instant case because the act of the applicant was neither lack of efficiency not negligence but a predetermined motive on the part of the applicant to utilize the public money for his personal use. Moreover, the applicant has himself admitted his guilt vide his written statement dated 19.06.2023 during the inquiry. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli Vs. H. P. Vora, reported in (1993) Supp 1 SCC 551, it was held that “Administrative Tribunal was not an Appellate Authority and it could not substitute the role of authorities to clear the efficiency of a public servant.”

5.7

Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the Disciplinary Authority after having duly considered the material placed before him e.g. Inquiry Report and representation of the applicant and only thereafter, have passed a speaking and reasoned order in respect of the applicant. The Penalty awarded to the applicant is also fully commensurate with the gravity of the grave misconduct committed by the applicant. Not only that even in the past also the applicant has been consistently indulging in the fraudulent activities of defrauding and misappropriated the precious saving amount of the poor account holders in the Post Office.

5.7

While replying to the contentions raised by the applicant, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the penalty awarded to the applicant is very much proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed by the applicant by way of misappropriating the public money.

5.8

The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. Samrendra Kishore Endaw & Anr., reported in (1994) 1 SCC 217, has held as under:-

“a Bench of this court to which two of (B. P. Jeevan Reddy & B. L. Hansaria JJ) were members, considered the order of the Tribunal which quashed the charges as based on no evidence, went in detail into the question as to whether Tribunal has power to appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion to that of the Disciplinary Authority ……” The Hon‟ble Apex Court in B. C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1995 SCC (6) 749, has held as under:-

“It may, however, be stated that this power of moulding relief in cases of the present nature can be invoked by a High Court, only when the punishment/Penalty shocks the judicial conscience.” The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Thiru K. V. Persumal & Ors., reported in (1996) 5 SCC in Civil Appeal No. 9229/1996 decided on 16.07.1996, has laid down the law as under:-

“Departmental Enquiry-Judicial review- Scope- The question as to whether the charges were established on the material available, held, beyond the scope of judicial review as the Administrative Tribunal is not an Appellate Authority over the Departmental Authorities.”

REBUTTAL TO THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

6.

In response to the counter reply filed by the respondents, the applicant filed a rejoinder on 01.05.2024 and submitted that the part cause of action has arisen at Delhi, as the one of the Impugned Orders i.e. 26.09.2023, of the Reviewing Authority, has been issued from Delhi. Hence, this Principal Bench of this Tribunal would be having the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present O.A. Therefore, the provisions of Rule 6 (ii) of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 are not attracted.

ANALYSIS

7.

We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the pleadings on record.

8.

As stated by the applicant, he joined the Department of Posts as a Postal Assistant in 1992 and had rendered about 25 years of service. While working as Sub Post Master, Sarai Khwaja (Single Hand), Agra, disciplinary proceedings under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 were initiated against him vide Memorandum dated 31.03.2015 on the allegation that, on 15.06.2013, he deposited only Rs. 3,00,000/- out of Rs. 4,00,000/-, and the balance amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was deposited on 19.06.2013. The Inquiry Officer, vide report dated 23.11.2016, held the charge proved. The Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 23.01.2017, imposed the penalty of removal from service, which was upheld in appeal vide order dated 19.06.2017 passed by the Appellate Authority. The applicant thereafter preferred a Review Petition dated 10.06.2018. Pursuant to the order dated 26.04.2023 passed by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 1464/2023, the applicant submitted a supplementary representation dated 10.05.2023. The Review Petition and supplementary representation were rejected by the respondents vide order dated 26.09.2023. Aggrieved thereby, the applicant has filed the present O.A., contending that the non-deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- was inadvertent and not intentional and that, in view of his long service and subsequent deposit of the entire amount, the penalty of removal from service is grossly disproportionate to the misconduct.

9.

At the outset, it is required to be noted that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is well settled. The Tribunal does not ordinarily sit as an appellate authority over the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority, etc. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence is not ordinarily a matter for re-appreciation by the Tribunal, provided the findings are based on some legally admissible and relevant material and the disciplinary proceedings have otherwise been conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, the question whether the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the proved misconduct and thereby shocks the conscience of the Tribunal is within the limited scope of judicial review.

10.

Since this matter pertains to departmental proceedings, we deem it apt to observe that it is settled principle of law that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority, normally the Court/Tribunal may not interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court/Tribunal, since the High Court/Tribunal does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review. The Tribunal cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities.

10.1

In this regard, it is profitable to mention that by referring catena of judgments on the point of scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunals, the Three Judges Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of B. C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749,wherein it has been held as under:

“13.

The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” (emphasis supplied)

10.2

In another case in the matter of Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that while re-appreciating evidence, the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings as under:-

“13.

Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i)

reappreciate the evidence;

(ii)

interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii)

go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv)

go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v)

interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi)

correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii)

go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” (emphasis supplied)

10.3

In another judgment rendered by the Three Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI Vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612,by referring the law laid down in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) and catena of other judgments, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held as under:-

“22.

The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority…………”

23.

It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India [Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 103] .

24.

It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.

25.

When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:

(i)

whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;

(ii)

whether rules of natural justice are complied with;

(iii)

whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. (emphasis supplied)

26.

It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.

27.

It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings.

28.

The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” (emphasis supplied)

10.5

Further, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the State of Karnataka & Anr. Vs. Umesh reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563, emphasised about the scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunal in the matter of disciplinary/departmental inquiry and held that: -

"22.

In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct."

10.6

In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that recording of reasons is a facet of natural justice and ensures transparency and accountability in administrative action. The relevant paras of the same are reproduced below:-

"12.

The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognised a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150] . xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

14.

The expression “speaking order” was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of the writ of certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See pp. 1878-97, Vol. 4, Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the Report).

15.

This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the “inscrutable face of a sphinx”.

10.7

In A. Masilamani Vs. LIC, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held:

“16.

It is a settled legal proposition, that once the court sets aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same.”

The decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tiwari, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 308 also throws light on the approach to be adopted but in a more nuanced manner than what was held in A. Masilamani (supra). Paragraph 8 of said decision reads as follows:

“8.

There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient, either procedurally or otherwise, the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the authority concerned to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the disciplinary authority or to the enquiry officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time-lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case at hand.” (emphasis supplied)

10.8

Further in Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, in para 23, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as under:-

"23.

Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal court on the basis of self same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." (emphasis supplied)

10.9

The sum and substance of above guiding observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court‟s judgment is that recording of reasons is part of natural justice. Reasons ensure transparency and fairness. Absence of reasons renders the order arbitrary and vulnerable to judicial review. Thus, every quasi-judicial authority affecting rights of parties must pass a speaking order.

11.

In the present case, the applicant was proceeded against under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The charge against him essentially related to the non-deposit of an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/-out of the total amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- which, according to the departmental case, was required to be remitted to the Head Post Office on 15.06.2013. It is not in dispute that an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- was deposited on the said date and the balance amount of Rs. 1,00,000/-was deposited by the applicant on 19.06.2013. Article of charge reads as under:-

“Article-I

That the said Shri Girish Chand Gautam, while functioning as SPM Sarai Khwaja PO (Single Hand), Agra, on deputation during the period 14.06.2013 to 15.06.13, committed a grave misconduct inasmuch as he failed to remit cash (in loose) to Agra HO on 15.06.13 within prescribed limit for remittance of cash by various mode of conveyance as per rules and procedure and shown cash remittance of Rs. 400000/- to Agra HO in Sarai Khwaja SO daily account dated 15.06.13 but he actually handed over/deposited an amount of Rs. 300000/- to Smt. Vishveshwari Virandani ATR Agra HO for which a receipt of sum of Rs. 300000/- on slip was granted by the concerned ATR. But the said Shri Girish Chand Gautam also failed to keep the concerned receipt in Post Office record. Besides Said Shri Girish Chand Gautam failed to fill up the Sarai Khwaja SO account dated 14.06.13 and 15.06.13. Said Shri Girish Chand Gautam also failed to verify the cash balance in hand physically and to keep correct account of closing cash balance in hand in security bag of Sarai Khwaja PO Agra, on 15.06.13. The said Shri Girish Chand Gautam also failed to keep closing cash balance within prescribed maximum cash balance limit of Rs. 20000/- and retained cash (5,30117/- as shown in daily account) beyond prescribed maximum cash limit without mentioning any liabilities/reasons in daily account dated 15.06.13. Said Shri Girish Chand Gautam owning/admitting his responsibility & mistake for short hand over cash Rs. 100000/- in Agra HO treasury on 15.06.13 deposited the amount of Rs. 100000/- in UCR on 19.06.15 in Sanjay Place PO, Agra under receipt No. A 3815. Thus the said Shri Girish chand Gautam failed to perform the duty assigned to him. The Govt. had sustained a loss of Rs. 100000/- from 15.06.13 to 18.06.13 due to the above-mentioned act, gross negligence and non-observance of rules by said Shri Girish Chand Gautam.

By acting in aforesaid manner in aforesaid period, the said Shri Girish Chand Gautam is alleged to have violated the provision contained in Rule 9, 29, 84, 85, 98, 99 & 102 of postal manual volume VI Pt-III & Rule 4,64 and 103 of FHB Vol. I and thereby he also failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in such a manner which is unbecoming of a Govt. servant as required under Rule 3 (1) (i), 3(1) (ii), 3 (1) (iii) of CCS Conduct Rule, 1964”.

12.

The Inquiry Officer, after conducting the disciplinary proceedings, held the charge proved. The applicant was afforded an opportunity to submit his representation against the Inquiry Report and thereafter the Disciplinary Authority, upon consideration of the material available on record, imposed the penalty of removal from service vide order dated 23.01.2017. The departmental appeal was dismissed on 19.06.2017. Subsequently, the applicant preferred a Review Petition, which was ultimately considered and rejected by the competent authority vide order dated 26.09.2023 pursuant to the directions issued by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 1464/2023.

13.

Thus, insofar as the regularity of the disciplinary proceedings and the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer are concerned, we do not find sufficient justification to interfere. The applicant participated in the inquiry, submitted his defence and also made representation against the Inquiry Report. The finding of the Inquiry Officer is based upon the documentary and oral material considered during the inquiry. We, therefore, do not propose to re-appreciate the evidence or substitute our own view for that of the disciplinary authorities on the question of proof of the charge.

14.

The principal question which, therefore, arises for our consideration is whether, assuming the charge to have been proved, the extreme penalty of removal from service imposed upon the applicant is commensurate with the proved misconduct.

15.

The applicant has relied upon the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 1022. The said judgment, in our considered view, does not assist the applicant to the extent of completely exonerating him from the charge. The applicant was holding the post of Sub Post Master and was entrusted with the custody and remittance of public money. Failure to remit the entire amount entrusted to him cannot be treated as a mere deficiency in efficiency in the discharge of official duties. The nature of the post and the responsibility attached thereto are relevant considerations. Consequently, the finding of misconduct cannot be interfered with merely on the ground that the applicant describes the omission as inadvertent.

16.

At the same time, the question of proportionality of punishment stands on a somewhat different footing. The disciplinary authority is undoubtedly entitled to maintain discipline and impose an appropriate penalty having regard to the nature and gravity of misconduct. However, the punishment must bear a reasonable relationship with the misconduct actually established in the disciplinary proceedings.

17.

In B. C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 484, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that normally the Court or Tribunal would not substitute its own conclusion on the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority. However, where the punishment imposed shocks the conscience of the Court or Tribunal, appropriate relief can be moulded, including directing reconsideration of the punishment or, in an appropriate and exceptional case, imposing an appropriate punishment.

18.

Similarly, the principle governing judicial review of punishment is that the Court is not concerned with whether another punishment could have been imposed, but whether the punishment actually imposed is so disproportionate to the misconduct proved that it warrants judicial interference.

19.

In the present case, certain circumstances assume considerable significance while examining the proportionality of the penalty. First, the disciplinary charge which culminated in the impugned penalty essentially related to non-deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- on 15.06.2013. Secondly, the amount was subsequently deposited on 19.06.2013. Thirdly, there is no finding in the disciplinary proceedings that the applicant permanently misappropriated the amount or that the Government ultimately suffered an irrecoverable financial loss of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Fourthly, the applicant had rendered approximately 25 years of service by the time the penalty was imposed.

20.

We are conscious of the fact that the respondents have alleged that the applicant retained the amount unauthorizedly, failed to maintain the prescribed cash balance and made incorrect entries in the daily account. These circumstances undoubtedly constitute matters of serious concern, particularly because the applicant was entrusted with public money. A person holding such a post is expected to maintain a very high degree of financial integrity and accountability. Therefore, the misconduct cannot be brushed aside as an ordinary or trivial lapse.

21.

However, while determining the appropriate penalty, it is necessary to confine the consideration primarily to the misconduct which stood established in the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the impugned order. The respondents have also referred to alleged fraudulent withdrawals from RD accounts at Namner and Nai Ki Mandi Post Offices and to the FIRs registered in respect thereof. They have further referred to an earlier penalty imposed upon the applicant in the year 2010. So far as the two alleged fraud cases are concerned, the material placed before us indicates that separate disciplinary proceedings were initiated in respect thereof and criminal cases were also registered. Those allegations, therefore, cannot by themselves be treated as established misconduct for the purpose of determining the proportionality of the punishment in the present disciplinary proceedings, unless they had been duly proved and lawfully taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority in accordance with the applicable rules. Mere registration of an FIR or pendency of separate disciplinary proceedings cannot be equated with proof of misconduct.

22.

Likewise, the previous penalty imposed in the year 2010 may be a relevant circumstance, if permissible under the applicable rules and if duly considered by the competent authority, but it cannot automatically convert the misconduct proved in the present proceedings into a case warranting the extreme penalty of removal from service. Each disciplinary matter has to be examined having regard to the misconduct proved therein and the circumstances surrounding it.

23.

We also find considerable force in the contention of the applicant that the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was ultimately deposited on 19.06.2013. The fact of subsequent deposit does not wipe out the misconduct, nor does it constitute an automatic defence to the charge. Nevertheless, it is certainly a relevant mitigating circumstance while determining the appropriate penalty.

24.

The respondents have argued that the applicant, being the custodian of public money, was not entitled to retain even a single rupee beyond the prescribed limit and that his conduct demonstrated an intention to utilize public money for his personal benefit. We are unable to accept the latter conclusion in its absolute form merely on the basis of the facts of the present charge. The respondents have not demonstrated before us any finding in the disciplinary proceedings conclusively establishing that the applicant actually utilized the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- for his personal benefit. The departmental finding, as it emerges from the pleadings, is essentially that the amount was not deposited on the due date and was subsequently deposited by the applicant.

25.

The distinction is important. A serious lapse in the handling of Government money can undoubtedly amount to misconduct and may justify a major penalty. But the question whether such misconduct necessarily warrants removal from service must depend upon the totality of circumstances, including the amount involved, the duration for which the amount remained undeposited, whether the amount was ultimately recovered, whether there was personal gain, whether there was actual financial loss to the Government, the employee‟s past service record and other mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

26.

In the present case, the amount involved was Rs. 1,00,000/-, which was deposited within four days. The applicant had approximately 25 years of service at the relevant time. There is no material before us demonstrating that, in the disciplinary proceedings relating to the present charge, the applicant had permanently misappropriated the amount or derived any established personal benefit therefrom. The subsequent allegations relating to other cases cannot be treated as proved misconduct for the present purpose merely because separate proceedings/FIRs were initiated.

27.

The principle enunciated in G. P. Sewalia Vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in 2009 (2) SLJ 360 (CAT), also requires consideration to the extent that every lapse in the performance of official duties does not necessarily carry the same degree of culpability. However, we reiterate that the facts before us are distinguishable from a case of a mere error of judgment or ordinary inefficiency. The applicant was responsible for public money and his failure to deposit the entire amount constituted misconduct. The question is only whether the extreme penalty imposed is excessive.

28.

Having regard to the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the considered view that the punishment of removal from service is grossly disproportionate to the misconduct proved in the present disciplinary proceedings. The penalty has the effect of bringing to an end approximately 25 years of service for a lapse involving Rs. 1,00,000/-, which amount was subsequently deposited within four days. While the misconduct deserves a major penalty, the extreme consequence of removal from service, in the peculiar facts of the present case, does not appear to be commensurate with the proved misconduct.

29.

We are conscious that the power to interfere with the punishment is to be exercised sparingly and only where the punishment shocks the judicial conscience. The present case, in our considered view, falls within that limited category. Our conclusion is not based upon substitution of our subjective opinion as to what punishment ought to have been imposed, but upon the cumulative effect of the relevant mitigating circumstances and the nature of the charge actually established.

30.

The respondents have also raised an objection regarding territorial jurisdiction, contending that the cause of action arose at Agra and, therefore, the matter ought to have been instituted before the Allahabad Bench of this Tribunal. The applicant, on the other hand, has submitted that the Review Order dated 26.09.2023 (Annexure A-3) was issued from Delhi and, therefore, part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Bench. We find no merit in the objection at this stage. The Review Petition was considered and decided by the competent authority at Delhi and the impugned order dated 26.09.2023 (Annexure A-3) forms one of the orders specifically challenged in the present O.A. A part of the cause of action, therefore, arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Bench. Further, the applicant had earlier approached this Tribunal in O.A. No. 1464/2023, which was disposed of by order dated 26.04.2023 granting liberty to him to pursue his statutory review remedy. The respondents thereafter considered the Review Petition and supplementary representation and passed the order dated 26.09.2023 (Annexure A-3). In these circumstances, we are not inclined to non-suit the applicant on the ground of territorial jurisdiction.

31.

The contention of the respondents that the Review Petition had initially been addressed to the Secretary, Department of Telecommunications, instead of the competent authority in the Department of Posts, also does not advance their case. The Review Petition was ultimately considered by the competent authority and a reasoned order dated 26.09.2023 (Annexure A-3) was passed pursuant to the directions of this Tribunal. The applicant‟s grievance regarding non-consideration of his statutory remedy, therefore, does not survive.

32.

We also find that the order dated 26.09.2023 (Annexure A-3) does not provide sufficient consideration to the issue of proportionality in the context of the particular circumstances highlighted by the applicant, namely, his long length of service, subsequent deposit of the amount and the distinction between the charge actually proved in the present proceedings and the other allegations referred to by the respondents. The mere reiteration of the seriousness of handling public money cannot, by itself, answer the question whether removal from service was the only proportionate penalty available in the facts of the case.

33.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the finding of misconduct recorded against the applicant in the disciplinary proceedings does not warrant interference by this Tribunal; the respondents were justified in treating the applicant's failure to deposit the entire amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- on 15.06.2013 as misconduct, particularly having regard to his responsibility as Sub Post Master and custodian of public money; however, the penalty of removal from service, having regard to the nature of the charge proved, subsequent deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/-, absence of established permanent loss in the present charge, and the applicant's approximately 25 years of service, is disproportionate and shocks the conscience of the Tribunal; and the allegations relating to separate fraud cases/FIRs cannot, in the absence of their being established in accordance with law and properly forming part of the disciplinary consideration in the present proceedings, be treated as proved misconduct for the purpose of sustaining the extreme penalty imposed in the present case.

34.

Consequently, the O.A. is partly allowed. The impugned orders dated 23.01.2017 (Annexure A-1) and 19.06.2017 (Annexure A-2), to the extent they impose and uphold the penalty of removal from service, and the consequential Review Order dated 26.09.2023 (Annexure A-3), are quashed and set aside to that limited extent.

35.

The matter is remitted to the Disciplinary Authority to reconsider the question of penalty alone, keeping in view the observations made hereinabove, particularly the nature of the charge proved, the subsequent deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/-, the length of service of 25 years of the applicant and the distinction between proved misconduct and allegations pending in separate proceedings. The Disciplinary Authority shall pass an appropriate reasoned and speaking order regarding the penalty, in accordance with law, within a period of 06 (six) weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

36.

It is clarified that we have not interfered with the finding of misconduct recorded in the disciplinary proceedings and the remand is confined strictly to the question of proportionality of punishment.

37.

Pending M.A., if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.

37.

There shall be no order as to costs.