Gajraj Singh & Ors. vs Union Of India & Ors.

O R D E R

“8.

(a) The applicant no.1 Gajraj Singh is liable to be regularized on 11.07.1983 in instead of 01.08.1987 from initial date of appointment of 11.07.1983.

(b)

The applicant no.2 Ajab Singh is liable to be regularized on 09.02.1983 in instead of 31.07.1987 from initial date of appointment of 09.02.1983.

(c)

The applicant no.3 Shiv Charan, is liable to be regularized on 09.12.1983 in instead of 07.03.1987 from initial date of appointment of 09.12.1983.

(d)

The applicant no.4 Dori Lal, is liable to be regularized on 24.09.1983 in instead 17.10.1987 from initial date of appointment of 24.09.1983.

(e)

The applicant no.4 Anil Garg, is liable to be regularized on 10.07.1987 from initial date of appointment 11.07.1983 in instead of 11.07.1983.

(f)

The applicant no.6 Vishan Swaroop, is liable to be regularized on 24.09.1983 in instead of 01.08.1987 from initial date appointment of 24.09.1983.

(g)

The applicant no.7 Bishambher Singh, is liable to be regularized on 09.12.1983 in instead of 20.10.1987 from initial date of appointment of 09.12.1983.

b- to issue order/direction/ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to consider and decide the representation of the applicants s, contained in Annexure No. 8, in accordance with law by passing a reasoned and speaking order within a time bound manner to be fixed by this Hon'ble Tribunal.

c- Any other relief which the Hon'ble Tribunal may consider appropriate may be granted in favour of the applicants.

d- Cost of the application be awarded to the applicants.”

“Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and latches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years‟ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others‟ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with „Kumbhakarna‟ or for that matter „Rip Van Winkle‟. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.”

26.

On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

(i)

Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii)

A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii)

The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

(iv)

In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

(v)

Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

(vi)

Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii)

Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii)

Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.

Diary No.3579/2024