Firm Shiv Ram Sat Lal vs Narain Singh, Dial Singh

This is an interesting case of an application for execution transferred to a Court of the State in execution of a decree passed by the British Indian

Court of Amritsar. Section 44 of the Civil Procedure Code of the State is to the effect that ""His Highness may by notification in the State Gazette,

declare that the decrees of any Civil or Revenue Courts situate in British India may be executed in the State as if they had been passed by the

Courts of the State and in the manner herein provided"". This section corresponds to section 44 of the British Indian Civil Procedure Code. The

Civil Court of Amritsar has by notification been included among the Courts of which a decree may be executed in our State. As the provisions of

this section are similar, these provisions shall be viewed herein the same manner as they are in British India. We have also the authority of a

judgment of a Bench of this Court in conformity with the opinion held by Courts in British India. Since 1890 when the Bombay High Court ruling in

the case of Haji Musi Haji Ahmad v. Parmanand Nursey (15 Bombay 216) was passed the Courts in British India have consistently held that the

decrees may be objected to on the grounds given in section 13 of the Code referring to a decree to be obtained on the basis of a foreign judgment.

The most recent ruling to which reference was given by the learned Counsel for the appellant is a single Judge ruling of the Madras High Court in

the case of Krishnaswami Chatty v. Madhappa Chettira (A.I.R. 1925 Madras page 788). It has gone into the question in great detail and

considered objections to a decree such as are raised in the present case. The Bench judgment of this Court to which reference is made is a

judgment to which one of us was a party (civil revision 36 of 1986 Charanjit Lal v Firm of S. S. Nanda, decided on 11th Katik 198). The Trial

Court was therefore, correct in enquiring into the objections of the appellant to the decree though in a portion of the judgment it has relied on a

single Judge decision of this Court and expressed the view that no argument against the British Indian Court decree may be raised in a Court of this

State.

As regards the merits of the objection raised the learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that on four grounds the judgment of the Court in

Amritsar fell within the exception, enumerated in section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code and that therefore, the decree of that Court should not be

executed. The grounds are (1) that the Court at Amritsar had no jurisdiction; (2) that the decree was obtained by fraud; (3) that the decision had

not been given on the merits of the case and (4) that the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained were opposed to natural justice.

We shall take up these objections one by one. We have considered the facts of the case and have no doubt that the Court at Amritsar had

jurisdiction under section 20 of he Code because part of the cause of action arose in Amritsar. It is admitted that the order was placed by the

appellant firm with the respondent firm by post communications which reached the respondent firm at Amritsar. The contract was, therefore, made

at Amritsar and the part of the cause of action arose there. It was argued that the cause of action arose in Srinagar because arrangement between

the parties was that payment of the price of the consignment was to be made to the branch office of the Amritsar firm at Srinagar. A cause of

action, however, is not one and single. It may consist of several parts and that is why in section 20 (c) the words used are ""that the jurisdiction may

arise, wherever the cause of action, wholly or in part arises."" It is quite true that the suit could have been instituted in Srinagar but that is not

argument to avoid the jurisdiction of the Court at Amritsar.

No specific allegation of fraud has been made. It was vaguely stated that only half of the consignment ordered had been dispatched from Amritsar

while the suit was instituted for the recovery of the price of the entire consignment. There is no evidence led on the subject. The statement of the

Manager of the appellant's firm goes to the entire extreme of denying the receipt of dispatch of any goods, whatsoever. It cannot, therefore, be

believed that only half the goods were consigned from Amritsar and note entire amount of goods. To raise an argument of fraud, a specific

statement should be substantiated by evidence. The present statement was not made in the trial Court and there is an entire absence of evidence to

prove the allegation of fraud.

As regards merits we may with advantage quote the words of the learned Judge of the Madras High Court whose ruling we have already quoted.

He observed : ""Unless the judgment was given, merely on default and in any case in which, inspite of the default any evidence is taken for the

plaintiff and judgment is given thereon, it may be difficult to say that it was not a decision on the merits.

With all respect we express our agreement with the statement of law. It is clear from the copy of the judgment of the Amritsar Court that evidence

was recorded on behalf of the plaintiff by that Court and it was open to the Court to believe that evidence and arrive at is judgment on the merits in

favour of the plaintiff of that suit.

There is nothing in the proceedings of the Amritsar Court in conflict with natural justice. It is true that the suit was instituted by the respondent

within 10 days of the contract. Circumstances, however, of the appellant firm at the time must be remembered. It appears that after the

respondents firm made the consignment, it became aware of the financial difficulties of the appellant firm and wisely took the precaution of

instituting a suit immediately. When the circumstances were such as would induce a wise man to resort to a Court of Law as quickly as possible it

cannot be said that the early institution of the suit was contrary to natural justice.

In the result we dismiss this appeal with costs.