Dr P. Sakuntala vs The State Of Telangana & Ors.

JUDGMENT: (over the Hon'ble Sri Justice P. Sam Koshy)

Heard Mr. P. V. Krishnaiah, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. S. Satyanarayana, learned Government Pleader for Services-I, and Mr. S. Suman, learned Government Pleader for Services-III, appearing for the respondents. Perused the record.

The instant writ appeal has been filed by the writ petitioner, being aggrieved by the docket order dated 13.07.2026 passed in W.P. No. 22096 of 2026.

The Registry of the High Court has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ appeal.

For ready reference, it would be appropriate to refer to the impugned docket order, which reads as follows:

According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Single Judge, without considering I.A. No. 1 of 2026, filed seeking interim relief, neither granted nor rejected the relief sought therein. This, according to him, has resulted in a situation where both I.A. No. 1 of 2026 and W.P. No. 22096 of 2026 would become infructuous.

It is in this context that the present writ appeal has been filed seeking an appropriate direction for consideration of I.A. No. 1 of 2026 and for grant of interim protection.

The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the writ petition has been filed challenging the order of transfer of the petitioner from Government Medical College, Nagarkurnool, to Government Medical College, Mahbubnagar.

According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the said order of transfer has been challenged on various grounds, including illegality and violation of the applicable transfer guidelines.

In the aforesaid factual backdrop, it is contended that interim protection against the impugned order of transfer was necessary, failing which the order of transfer would be implemented and the very purpose of filing the writ petition would be defeated. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that, whenever such an application seeking interim relief is filed, it is incumbent upon the Court to consider the same and either allow or reject the application on its own merits.

The learned counsel for the appellant has also referred to Rule 8-A of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, which, according to him, enables the Court hearing the writ petition to issue rule nisi or notice to the respondents and to pass such interim order as it may deem necessary or to reject the application. Accordingly, it is contended that the learned Single Judge ought to have taken up I.A. No. 1 of 2026 and decided the same.

According to the learned counsel for the appellant, even if the application for interim relief had been rejected, the appellant would have had an opportunity to seek appropriate interim relief before the writ appellate Court. Highlighting these aspects, he submits that the mere adjournment of I.A. No. 1 of 2026 should be construed as amounting to rejection of the interim relief and, therefore, the writ appeal is maintainable. He accordingly seeks a direction to the Registry to register the writ appeal.

Per contra, the learned State Counsel, opposing the writ appeal and supporting the objection raised by the Registry, contended that the writ appeal is otherwise also not maintainable for the reason that the impugned order was passed on 13.07.2026 and the next date of hearing was fixed as 27.07.2026. However, the writ appeal was filed only on 06.08.2026, i.e., after the date to which the matter had been adjourned by the learned Single Judge. Meanwhile, the matter was listed on 27.07.2026, and the proceedings dated 27.07.2026, as well as any subsequent proceedings, have not been challenged. Therefore, the order dated 13.07.2026 has already exhausted its effect and, consequently, the writ appeal is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone.

Even otherwise, according to the learned State Counsel, when the matter came up for hearing on 13.07.2026, the learned State Counsel had entered appearance and sought a short adjournment to obtain instructions from the department. It was in that backdrop that the learned Single Judge posted the matter after two weeks without granting any interim order. Therefore, the order dated 13.07.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be perverse or illegal in any manner warranting interference by the writ appellate Court.

Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having perused the record, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge so as to warrant exercise of the writ appellate jurisdiction of this Court under the Letters Patent. As contended by the learned State Counsel, the order dated 13.07.2026 has already exhausted its effect, as the subsequent date of hearing fixed by the learned Single Judge had already passed before the writ appeal was filed. The proceedings drawn on the subsequent date of hearing have not been questioned in the present writ appeal. Moreover, considering the urgency pleaded by the appellant, it was incumbent upon the writ petitioner to seek consideration of I.A. No. 1 of 2026 and obtain a decision thereon, so as to avail the remedy of an appeal, if the said application were to be dismissed.

Even otherwise, merely because the learned Single Judge did not decide I.A. No. 1 of 2026 and posted the matter after two weeks to enable the learned State Counsel to obtain instructions, the said order cannot, by itself, be characterised as perverse or illegal so as to warrant interference by the writ appellate Court. It is pertinent to mention that the Division Bench does not exercise any supervisory jurisdiction over the learned Single Judge; as such, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present writ appeal on this ground also.

We do not find any strong or compelling ground made out by the appellant warranting interference with the impugned order. The objection raised by the Registry is, accordingly, sustained. The writ appeal is dismissed as not maintainable against the order impugned. There shall be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.