Dr. K. Sasidhar and Others vs The District Collector and Others

P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.—In all these writ petitions, a draft notification published in the Official Gazette on November 10,1992 u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act seeking to acquire an extent of Ac. 25-22- cents of Vedantapuram village which is needed for a public purpose viz., for sites and services programme by Tirupati Urban Development Authority, Tirupati is challenged. The petitioners in all these writ petitions are small farmers having small extents of land and they will be deprived of their livelihood viz., agriculture, if these lands are acquired. A counter-affidavit has been filed stating that Tirupati Urban Development Authority which was constituted under the provisions of A.P. Urban Area (Development) Act, 1975 has been empowered to draw a master and zonal development plan; and Section 18 of the said Act enables the Government to acquire any land for the purpose of developmental activities undertaken by the authority. Accordingly, the notification was issued for acquisition of this land u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.

Sri P.S. Narayana, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the draft notification published u/s 4(1), of the Land Acquision Act does not specify any public purpose, and therefore, the same is invalid. It is also contended that the purpose for which the land is acquired is mentioned as "sites and service programme" which is very vague and that there are large extents of Government poramboke land available in the vicinity. Therefore, acquisition of this land, depriving small extents from small farmers under this notification, is illegal. The learned Counsel finally contended that this acquisition is being resorted to on account of political considerations in order to harass the petitioners who belong to a particular political party.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners streneously contended that the respondents cannot acquire the land in question unless it is for a public purpose which should be specified in the notification. Relying upon a decision reported in Smt. Somavanti and Others Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, , it is contended that public purpose is a purpose in which the general interest of the community as against the particular interest of an individual or individuals is involved. The learned Counsel also cited number of decisions across the bar to show that what is a public purpose and what is not. In Musamiyan Imam Haidarbux Razvi and Others Vs. The State of Gujarat and Others, , acquisition of land for members of a Co-operative Society was held not a public purpose. The same view is reiterated in S.C.H.B. Society v. M. Gurumurthy Sresty, 1987 (1) ALT 481. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in R. Umraomal and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, . held that providing shoping facilities to the defaulting tenants against whom decrees for eviction were passed cannot be a public purpose. These decisions in my view are not applicable to the acquisition in question.

Public purpose is defined u/s 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act. (f) the expression ''public purpose'' includes-

(i) .................

(ii) ................

(iii) ...............

(iv) ................

(v) ................

(vi) ................

(vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority;

(viii) ................

The land required under any scheme of development by any local authority with the approval of the appropriate Government is also a public purpose. In '' this context it is relevant to notice Section 18 of the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas (Development) Act, 1975 which reads as follows:-

18 (1) If, in the opinion of the Government, any land is required for the purpose of development, or for any other purpose under this Act, the Government may acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894;

(2) Where any land has been acquired by the Government, they may, after they have taken possession of the land, transfer the land to the Authority or any local authority for the purpose for which the land has been acquired on payment by the Authority or the local authority of the compensation awarded under that Act and of the charges incurred by the Government in connection with the acquisition."

Under this Act, it is open to the Government to acquire any land required for purpose of development or for any other purpose under this Act and the Government can acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This is exactly what is done in this case.

Sri P.S. Narayana, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contend s that the expression that "the Government may acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" should be construed that the land can be acquired only under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which in turn means that the land can be acquired only for public purpose. The definition of public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, as seen above would show that acquiring any land under any scheme of development sponsored by the Government, or with the prior approval of the appropriate Government by a local authority also would be a public purpose. In the light of this defintion, it is abundantly clear that the land acquired for any scheme of development under certain circumstances would also be for a public purpose. Therefore, even accepting the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the expression "Government may acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" occurring in the section means that the acquisition is permissible under the Land Acquisition Act only, still the acquisition will have to be regarded as a public purpose. Although Mr. P.M. Gopal Rao, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2 contended that this expression appearing u/s 18 (1) of the Act would merely mean that when|he land is acquired by the Government under the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas (Development) Act, 1975 the procedure prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act alone should be followed and nothing more. I need not go that far in view of the inclusive expression ''public purpose'' as defined in 3 (f) of the Land Acquisition Act.

Sri P.M. Gopal Rao, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2 also further contends relying on a decision reported in H.D. Vora Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, ., that public purpose need not be spelt out.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners articulated his argument in a slightly different angle by contending that the expression "sites and services programme" is as vague as anything and the persons interested cannot understand the purpose for which it is sought to be acquired. The Tirupati Urban Development Authority has an aim at deriving profit by dividing the land into sites and distributing the same to the public at higher cost and the same cannot be for a public purpose as it would amount to a commercial purpose is the contention of the learned Counsel. I cannot accept this contention. The expression ''sites and service programme'' is clear enough to indicate division of land into sites and service by sale. I am of the view that it is not fatal on the authoriy of the Supreme Court cited in H.D. Vora Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, . wherein it is held as follows:-

"It is not necessary that the order of requisition must explicitly set out the public purpose for which it is made. The only requirement of the la w is that the requisitioning must be made for a public purpose and so long as there is a public purpose for which an order of requisition is made, it would be valid, irrespective of whether such public purpose is recited in the order of requisition or not."

Even assuming that there is some element of profit, it cannot be a ground to quash the notification as observed by the Supreme Court in Bharat Singh and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, ., and also in V. Pakeera Reddy v. District Collector, 1989 (3) ALT 23. Therefore, this contention also has no force.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners next contended that since the petitioners are small farmers, their lands cannot be acquired. This argument also lacks force in view of G.O.Ms.No. 25 Municipal Administration & Urban Development (El) Department dated January 21,1989. This Government Order further contemplates that the concerned Urban Development Authority may exercise the powers u/s 19(2) of the act and allot some developed plots to the landowners on no profit and no loss basis and compensate the loss or disadvantage that may be suffered by such small farmers.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners made a feeble attempt to substantiate his contention that there are large extents of Government poramboke land available in the vicinity, and therefore, the respondents should not have acquired the land in question. In the counter-affidavit, it is stated that several applications are pending with the Government from various institutions like Andhra Pradesh Housing Board, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam, A.P. Dairy Development Federation for allotment of land including the request from Tirupati Urban Development Authority for allotment of land. According to Tirupati Urban Development Authority the land in question is also needed in addition to alternate land of Ac. 200-00 in Rajiv Nagar as and when it is made available to this authority. In view of this clarification, it is not open for me to hold that there is the availability of alternate land and therefore, this land cannot be acquired.

Finally, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that this acquisition is resorted to cause loss to the petitioners as they belong to a rival political party. This allegation was not made in the original affidavit filed along with the main Writ Petition, but made in the reply affidavit. That apart, the names of person or persons who are interested in causing loss or damage to the petitioners are neither mentioned in the writ petition nor made Parties to it. Under these circumstances, I cannot countenance this argument.

For all the above reasons, the writ petitions fail and they are accordingly, dismissed. No costs. However, it is made clear that the claims of the petitioners for allotment of developed plots in terms of G.O.Ms.No. 25 dated January 21, 1989 shall be considered as and when applications are made by them.