Deepak vs Union Of India & Ors.

Per Harvinder Kaur Oberoi, Member (J):

The Applicant appeared in the Combined Higher Secondary Level Examination, 2020 conducted by the Staff Selection Commission (SSC) and successfully qualified all stages of the selection process, namely Tier-I, Tier-II, Skill Test and Document Verification. He was provisionally shortlisted on merit for appointment to the post of Junior Secretariat Assistant in the AFHQ Clerical Service, Ministry of Defence. However, despite his merit-based selection, the offer of appointment was withheld along with similarly placed candidates in connection with an internal exercise undertaken by the SSC regarding alleged impersonation/malpractice in CHSL-2020. Aggrieved thereby, the Applicant approached this Tribunal in O.A. No. 1588/2024. The said OA was disposed of in terms of the directions issued in O.A. No. 3726/2023, Vikas Kumar Sain v. Staff Selection Commission & Ors., vide order dated 22.04.2024, whereby the Respondents were directed to issue provisional offers of appointment within 30 days, subject to the outcome of the enquiry, and it was further directed that, in the event of any adverse finding, appropriate departmental/administrative action could be taken only after issuance of a show cause notice, with consequential benefits to follow on a notional basis in the event of a favourable outcome. Pursuant thereto, the Applicant was issued a provisional offer of appointment dated 13.08.2024 and joined service on 21.08.2024 after completing the requisite medical, character and antecedent verification and other pre-appointment formalities. He was placed on probation for two years and, during his service, maintained an unblemished record of conduct and satisfactory performance.

Subsequently, the Applicant was served with a Show Cause Notice dated 14.10.2025 proposing termination of his temporary service under Rule 5(1)(a) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The notice referred to an internal investigation conducted by the SSC, pursuant to which the Applicant's candidature was stated to be "highly doubtful", and also referred to FIR No. 0174/2024 registered by the Crime Branch, Delhi, concerning alleged irregularities in the CHSL-2020 examination. The Applicant submits that the FIR is omnibus in nature and does not disclose any specific act of impersonation, malpractice or other misconduct attributable to him. Though he was subsequently served a notice under Section 41A Cr.P.C. and cooperated fully with the investigation, he was neither arrested nor chargesheeted. No specific adverse material, forensic report, inquiry report or other document relied upon by the Respondents was supplied to him. The Applicant therefore contends that the expression "highly doubtful candidature" is stigmatic and conclusory and that the proposed termination is founded upon an allegation touching upon his integrity and conduct rather than upon any simpliciter discharge from temporary service.

Learned counsel for the Applicant submits that the impugned Show Cause Notice and the consequential termination are contrary to the specific directions issued by this Tribunal in the earlier proceedings. It is argued that where the foundation of the proposed termination is an allegation of misconduct, doubtful integrity or malpractice, the Respondents cannot circumvent the safeguards of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 by resorting to Rule 5(1)(a) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. Reliance is placed upon the settled principle that the form of the order is not decisive and that, where the real foundation of termination is misconduct or a finding casting stigma upon the employee, a regular departmental enquiry is required. Learned counsel further submits that the notice was unsupported by the primary material forming its foundation, including the alleged forensic report of Ernst & Young LLP and the specific findings of the SSC investigation, thereby depriving the Applicant of a meaningful opportunity to defend himself. The use of the expression "highly doubtful candidature", it is contended, casts a direct stigma upon the Applicant's integrity and therefore renders the proposed action punitive in substance.

Learned counsel for the Applicant further relies upon the interim order dated 18.09.2024 passed by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 3648/2024, Shalini Devi v. Union of India, wherein, in a case involving a stigmatic show cause notice and a proposed adverse action under the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, the Respondents were directed not to pass any adverse order or take coercive action pursuant to the notice till the next date of hearing. Reliance is also placed upon the order dated 07.11.2025 passed in O.A. No. 4179/2025, Sonia v. Union of India, whereby the Applicant therein was granted liberty to submit a reply to the show cause notice and the Respondents were directed to consider and dispose of the same in accordance with law, while restraining the operation of any adverse order for ten days after its service. It is submitted that, despite the Applicant's detailed representation pursuant to the said proceedings, the Respondents passed the impugned order dated 09.01.2026 cancelling the provisional offer of appointment and terminating his temporary services, with effect from ten days after service. According to learned counsel, the Respondents merely reiterated that the action was in compliance with the order dated 22.04.2024 and Rule 5(1)(a), without dealing with the Applicant's specific objections regarding the stigmatic nature of the action, absence of supporting material and the necessity of a regular enquiry.

Learned counsel for the Applicant consequently submits that the impugned termination order is punitive and stigmatic in substance, notwithstanding its purported invocation of Rule 5(1)(a), and therefore cannot be sustained without compliance with Article 311(2) and the principles of natural justice. It is further contended that reliance upon a pending and general FIR, without any chargesheet, finding of guilt or individualized material against the Applicant, cannot constitute a lawful basis for terminating his services, particularly when he had completed nearly fourteen months of satisfactory and unblemished service. The Respondents, it is urged, failed to disclose the material relied upon against the Applicant and thereby deprived him of a fair and effective opportunity of defence. The action is alleged to be arbitrary, disproportionate and a colourable exercise of power, besides being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. On these grounds, learned counsel for the Applicant seeks quashing of the impugned termination order dated 09.01.2026 and the Show Cause Notice dated 14.10.2025, together with appropriate consequential reliefs and protection against any coercive action pursuant thereto

Learned counsel for the Respondents submits that the impugned order is an order of termination simpliciter and is neither punitive nor stigmatic, and therefore no question of violation of the principles of natural justice arises. It is submitted that the Applicant was a probationer and had been appointed only on a provisional basis pursuant to the directions of this Tribunal dated 22.04.2024, with a specific stipulation that the appointment would remain subject to the outcome of the enquiry and any further decision of the competent authority. The SSC, Respondent No.3, had initially withheld the results of 95 candidates of CHSL-2020 for further scrutiny and, pursuant to suspected malpractice detected in the examination, conducted an internal investigation through Ernst & Young LLP based upon log analysis. The investigation resulted in the candidature of 53 candidates, including the Applicant, being found highly doubtful, whereupon the SSC requested the Crime Branch, Delhi Police to register an FIR against the said candidates and other functionaries allegedly involved in the examination irregularities.

It is submitted that the action of the Respondents is fully in conformity with the orders passed by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 3726/2023 and connected matters. By order dated 22.04.2024, the Tribunal directed that provisional offers of appointment be issued to the candidates, subject to the outcome of any enquiry, and specifically permitted the Respondents to take administrative/departmental action on the basis of an adverse enquiry report after issuance of a show cause notice. Pursuant thereto, the Applicant's dossier was forwarded by the SSC to the concerned Department, pre-recruitment formalities were completed, and a provisional offer of appointment was issued subject to the outcome of the enquiry and further directions of the competent authority. The Applicant joined the AFHQ Clerical Service and was placed on probation for two years. Upon completion of the SSC's internal investigation and receipt of information confirming that the Applicant's candidature was among those found highly doubtful, the Department initiated administrative action in accordance with the aforesaid directions of the Tribunal.

Learned counsel further submits that the Applicant, being a temporary/probationary employee whose services had not been confirmed, was governed by the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, and Rule 5(1)(a) thereof expressly permits termination of the services of a temporary Government servant by notice in writing. It is contended that the Respondents issued a Show Cause Notice dated 14.10.2025 before taking action, thereby fully complying with the requirement stipulated by this Tribunal in its order dated 22.04.2024. The Applicant, instead of initially responding to the notice, approached this Tribunal, whereupon, vide order dated 07.11.2025, liberty was granted to him to submit his reply and the Respondents were permitted to consider and decide the matter in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions. The Applicant thereafter submitted his reply, principally challenging the legality of the Show Cause Notice and applicability of Rule 5(1)(a). The Respondents considered the reply and concluded that the notice and subsequent action were in strict compliance with the orders of this Tribunal and the applicable statutory rules.

It is therefore submitted that the cancellation of the provisional offer of appointment and termination of the Applicant's temporary services were neither arbitrary nor irrational but were necessitated by the finding of the recruiting agency that the Applicant's candidature in the very examination through which he became eligible for appointment was highly doubtful. The Respondents contend that once the foundation of the Applicant's selection itself stood seriously questioned on the basis of the SSC's internal investigation, the competent authority could not be faulted for taking consequential administrative action. The Respondents further rely upon the principle embodied in the maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus, namely, that when the foundation is removed, the superstructure cannot survive. Since the Applicant was still under probation and had not acquired any right to confirmation, the provisions of Rule 5(1)(a) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 were applicable and the termination, having been effected in accordance with the said Rule and the directions of this Tribunal, calls for no interference.

We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings and the material available on record.

The Applicant appeared in the Combined Higher Secondary Level Examination, 2020 conducted by the Staff Selection Commission (SSC) and was provisionally shortlisted on merit for appointment to the post of Junior Secretariat Assistant in the AFHQ Clerical Service, Ministry of Defence. His appointment was, however, withheld along with similarly placed candidates in view of the enquiry/investigation undertaken by the Staff Selection Commission in respect of alleged impersonation/malpractice in the said examination. The Applicant had earlier approached this Tribunal in O.A. No. 1588/2024, which came to be disposed of in terms of the directions issued by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 3726/2023, Vikas Kumar Sain v. Staff Selection Commission & Ors., vide order dated 22.04.2024.

Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the Applicant was issued a provisional offer of appointment dated 13.08.2024 and joined service on 21.08.2024. He was placed on probation for a period of two years. Subsequently, a Show Cause Notice dated 14.10.2025 was issued to him proposing action under Rule 5(1)(a) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The said notice referred, inter alia, to the internal investigation conducted by the Staff Selection Commission and the finding that the Applicant's candidature was "highly doubtful", as well as to the FIR registered by the Crime Branch, Delhi Police.

The Applicant submitted his response to the said notice and challenged the proposed action, inter alia, on the ground that the alleged internal investigation had been conducted behind his back, that no specific material or finding establishing impersonation or malpractice on his part had been supplied to him and that the proposed termination was founded upon a stigmatic allegation. Thereafter, the Respondents passed the impugned order dated 09.01.2026 cancelling the Applicant's provisional offer of appointment and terminating his temporary services.

The principal contention of the Applicant is that the impugned action is not a termination simpliciter but is founded upon the adverse material allegedly emerging from an internal investigation concerning his conduct and integrity. It is accordingly submitted that the Respondents could not have terminated his services merely by invoking Rule 5(1)(a) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, particularly when no positive finding of impersonation or malpractice had been recorded against him.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondents submits that the Applicant was appointed only provisionally and was continuing on probation; that his appointment was expressly subject to the outcome of the enquiry; and that the Staff Selection Commission, being the recruiting agency, had found his candidature to be "highly doubtful". It is submitted that the Respondents acted in terms of the liberty granted by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 3726/2023 and connected matters and that the Applicant was afforded an opportunity to submit his explanation before the impugned order was passed.

The controversy involved in the present Original Application is no longer res integra. The issue arising in the present case has already been considered by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 3130/2025 with connected O.A. Nos. 3132/2025 and 3133/2025 vide judgment dated 11.03.2026. The said judgment was challenged before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No. 10759/2026 and connected writ petitions, which came to be decided vide judgment dated 03.08.2026.

The facts considered by the Hon'ble High Court in the aforesaid writ petitions are materially similar to those obtaining in the present case. The candidates had appeared in CHSL Examination, 2020; their appointments were initially withheld; pursuant to the order dated 22.04.2024 passed by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 3726/2023, provisional appointments were granted subject to the outcome of the enquiry; an investigation by Ernst & Young was thereafter undertaken; the candidature of the concerned candidates was described as "highly doubtful"; show cause notices were issued; and their provisional appointments were subsequently cancelled.

While considering the challenge to the judgment of this Tribunal dated 11.03.2026, the Hon'ble High Court, vide its judgment dated 03.08.2026, specifically examined the effect of the earlier order dated 22.04.2024 passed in O.A. No. 3726/2023. In paragraph 18 of its judgment, the Hon'ble High Court noted that there was, till the passing of the cancellation orders, no positive finding that the concerned candidates had impersonated themselves or that they had not actually undertaken the examination, and that the report of Ernst & Young merely stated that their candidature was "highly doubtful".

The Hon'ble High Court further held in paragraphs 19 to 22 that the earlier order dated 22.04.2024 permitted cancellation where there was a positive finding regarding impersonation or that the concerned candidate was not the person who had undertaken the examination. The Hon'ble High Court categorically observed that such a finding was lacking and that the doubt expressed in the enquiry report and incorporated in the show cause notice remained a doubt even at the stage of cancellation. The Hon'ble High Court accordingly held that the candidature could not be cancelled on a mere doubt and that the doubt had to "metamorphose into a positive finding" before it could be acted upon.

Significantly, the Hon'ble High Court also considered the contention regarding the nature of the enquiry and the requirement of a full-fledged departmental enquiry. In paragraph 27, the Hon'ble High Court held that the respondents could not seek, in the second round of litigation, anything more than what had been granted by the Tribunal in the earlier round. It therefore declined to hold that a full-fledged departmental enquiry was necessarily required before any adverse decision could be taken.

At the same time, in paragraph 28, the Hon'ble High Court reiterated the liberty granted by this Tribunal to the respondents to proceed afresh in terms of the order dated 22.04.2024. The Hon'ble High Court directed that, if the respondents decided to proceed afresh, the concerned candidates should, before any adverse conclusion is arrived at, be extended an opportunity of personal hearing on a date and time to be fixed by the respondents.

The Hon'ble High Court further clarified in paragraph 29 that it had not expressed any final opinion on the allegation that the concerned candidates were not the persons who had undertaken the examination or on the correctness of the Ernst & Young report. It was left open to the respondents to take a view in that regard in compliance with the directions contained in the judgment.

Of particular relevance to the present case is paragraph 30 of the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court, wherein it was expressly directed that, in the event the respondents intended to proceed against the candidates in de novo proceedings, the material which may be against them should be disclosed to them.

The aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble High Court squarely governs the controversy before us. The Applicant's case arises out of the very same CHSL-2020 examination, the same nature of internal investigation by the Staff Selection Commission, the same expression "highly doubtful" used in relation to the candidature, and the same order dated 22.04.2024 passed by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 3726/2023 and connected matters.

In the present case also, the material placed before us does not disclose any positive finding that the Applicant had impersonated any person, or that he was not the candidate who had actually undertaken the CHSL-2020 examination. The Respondents have primarily relied upon the internal investigation of the Staff Selection Commission and the conclusion that the Applicant's candidature was "highly doubtful". The registration of an FIR by itself also does not amount to a finding of guilt or establish the allegation of impersonation against the Applicant.

It is important to note that the Hon'ble High Court, while dealing with materially identical facts, has expressly held that a mere doubt regarding candidature cannot constitute the basis for cancellation of appointment. The relevant requirement flowing from the order dated 22.04.2024 is that there must be an adverse outcome of the enquiry in the sense explained by the Hon'ble High Court, namely, a positive finding regarding impersonation or that the concerned candidate was not the person who had undertaken the examination.

In the present case, the impugned Show Cause Notice as well as the consequential order dated 09.01.2026 proceed substantially on the basis that the Applicant's candidature was "highly doubtful". There is no material placed before us demonstrating that, before cancellation of the Applicant's provisional appointment and termination of his services, the Respondents arrived at any positive finding of impersonation or of the Applicant not having undertaken the examination.

The mere fact that the Applicant was a probationer or that his appointment was provisional does not dispense with the requirement of complying with the specific conditions governing the provisional appointment as laid down in the order dated 22.04.2024 and subsequently explained by the Hon'ble High Court in its judgment dated 03.08.2026. The provisional nature of the appointment cannot be treated as conferring an unrestricted power upon the Respondents to act merely on the basis of an unresolved doubt.

We are, however, conscious of the fact that the Hon'ble High Court has not finally adjudicated upon the correctness of the Ernst & Young report or the allegation regarding impersonation. On the contrary, the Hon'ble High Court has expressly preserved the liberty of the Respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with the order dated 22.04.2024 and the directions contained in its judgment dated 03.08.2026.

Consequently, the appropriate course in the present case would be to set aside the impugned action while preserving the liberty of the Respondents to proceed afresh, if so advised, strictly in accordance with law and the directions of the Hon'ble High Court.

We may also clarify that any such de novo exercise shall not be a mere reiteration of the earlier conclusion that the Applicant's candidature is "highly doubtful". In case the Respondents decide to proceed afresh, the material proposed to be relied upon against the Applicant shall be disclosed to him. The Applicant shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit his response and, before arriving at any adverse conclusion, shall also be afforded an opportunity of personal hearing in terms of paragraph 28 of the judgment dated 03.08.2026 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.

It is further clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the allegations against the Applicant, the correctness of the report of Ernst & Young, or the merits of the FIR registered by the Crime Branch, Delhi Police. All such issues are left open to be considered by the competent authority in accordance with law, should the Respondents decide to initiate de novo proceedings.

In view of the foregoing discussion, and particularly in view of the judgment dated 03.08.2026 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No. 10759/2026 and connected matters, the present Original Application deserves to be allowed.

Accordingly, the present Original Application is allowed with the following directions:

We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations against the Applicant, the correctness of the Ernst & Young report, or the FIR registered by the Crime Branch, Delhi Police. All such issues are left open for consideration by the competent authority in accordance with law.

The Respondents shall comply with the aforesaid directions expeditiously and, preferably, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Pending MA(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.