Deebal Mahton vs Moti Mahton and Others

Agarwala, J.—On 18th January 1930, the plaintiffs instituted a suit out of which this appeal has arisen to declare that two sale deeds executed by their maternal grand, mother, defendant 2, in 1913 and in 1928 respectively, will not be binding on the plaintiffs after her death. Defendant 2 is the widow of one Hari Mahton who died leaving a daughter, Mt. Lutni, the mother of the plaintiffs, and a son Kalpu Mahton. After the death of Kalpu Mahton Mt. Lalo, defendant 2, obtained a cousin''s estate in the property to which her son had succeed, ed on the death of his father. Since the Act of 1929 Kalpu''s sister, Mt. Lutni, and her sons are also heirs to his property. The suit has been decreed in the Courts below on the ground that no legal necessity for either of the sale deeds has been established.

In second appeal the learned advocate for the appellant takes the point that on its face the suit, so far as the deed of 1913 is concerned, is barred by limitation.

On the other hand, the learned advocate for the respondents contends that the suit is governed by Article 120, Limitation Act, and that as the plaintiff had no right to sue until 1929 when by reason of the Act of the Legislature they became interested in their uncle''s estate, limitation runs ''only from that date.

Since the decision of the Privy Council in Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal A.I.R.1915. P.C. 124 that there is only one cause of action for the whole body of reversioners in respect of their right to challenge an alienation by a limited female owner, the view taken by the High Court has been that only one suit to challenge an alienation is maintainable and that such a suit is in the interest of all the reversioners and if it is not brought within the period of limitation prescribed by Article 120 or Article 125, as the case may be, the whole body of the reversioners, whether remote or newly born, are debarred from suing.

In Varamma v. Gopaladasayya A.I.R.1919. Mad. 911 it was held that when the remedy of the presumptive reversioner has become barred by limitation, reversioners subsequently born could not maintain a suit for a declaration that the alienation was not binding on them. The same principle will be applicable to the present plaintiffs in regard to their contention that no suit was maintainable by them until the legislation of 1929. Prior to that event the right of the presumptive reversioner to maintain a suit challenging the alienation of 1913 had become time barred and, as has been pointed out in the case already referred to, no suit by any other reverisioner was maintainable for a declaration in (respect of that alienation. The plaintiffs'' isuit therefore is time barred in so far as the sale deed of 1913 is concerned.

The result is that the decree of the Courts below must be modified to this extent, that the plaintiffs will have a declaration that the sale deed of 1928 is not binding on them, but there will be no Such declaration in respect of the sale deed of 1913. There will be no order for the costs of this appeal. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is refused.