Chandra Madhav Singh vs The State Of Bihar

The Centralized Selection and Appointment Committee-cum-District and Sessions Judge, Patna (hereinafter referred to as “the Committee”) issued Employment Notice No. 01/2016 dated 07-02-2016 inviting applications for appointment to the post of Clerk in the Civil Courts of Bihar.

The preliminary test was conducted on 17-07-2016 and its result was declared on 29-04-2017. The appellant was declared successful in the preliminary test.

The main (written) examination was held on 15-10-2017 and the result thereof was published on 16-12-2017. The appellant was among the 4914 candidates who qualified in the main examination and was thereafter called for interview.

After the interview, a consolidated merit list was prepared. The appellant was placed at Serial No. 951 in the Unreserved category and was kept in the waiting list. It is not in dispute that the appellant and one Prince (Serial No. 960) had secured identical marks of 74; the appellant was ranked higher solely on account of being older in age (date of birth 01-01-1986 as against 23-03-1989 of Prince). Another candidate, Nikhil Vinay (Serial No. 1044), had secured 73.66 marks.

Out of the finally selected candidates, 273 persons did not join the service. The appellant asserts that in terms of Rules 7(12), 7(13) and 7(14) of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III and Class-IV) Rules, 2009, the vacancies arising on account of non-joining were required to be filled from the waiting list, which, according to him, remained valid for a period of two years.

Certain wait-listed candidates, feeling aggrieved by the non-consideration of their claims, filed writ petitions which were dismissed by the learned Single Judge. They thereafter preferred L.P.A. Nos. 650 of 2022, 657 of 2022 and 661 of 2022. A Division Bench of this Court, by a common judgment dated 19-04-2023, allowed the said appeals and directed the respondents to consider the cases of the appellants therein for appointment against the unfilled and anticipated vacancies during the relevant period of two years in accordance with the statutory rules.

The appellant, who was not a party to the earlier LPAs, served a legal notice dated 19-10-2023 upon the Convenor of the Committee demanding consideration of his claim. The Committee replied vide Memo No. 483 dated 25-11-2023 stating that the appointments had been made strictly in compliance with the directions issued in L.P.A. Nos. 650 of 2022 and analogous cases.

Aggrieved by the non-consideration of his claim and by the appointment of candidates ranked lower than him, the appellant filed Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1063 of 2024. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment and order dated 22-02-2024, dismissed the writ petition primarily on the grounds of delay and laches and on the premise that the benefit of the earlier Division Bench judgment could not be extended to a person who was not a party thereto and who had approached the Court belatedly.

It is against the said judgment and order that the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred.

The cause of action, if any, accrued to the appellant much earlier when the waiting list was prepared and when the vacancies arising out of non-joining of selected candidates remained unfilled. The appellant remained silent for a considerable period and approached this Court only after certain other candidates, who had litigated, succeeded in obtaining relief from the Division Bench.

The directions issued by the Division Bench in its judgment dated 19-04-2023 in L.P.A. Nos. 650 of 2022, 657 of 2022 and 661 of 2022 were confined to the petitioners of those appeals. The said judgment did not create a general or automatic right in favour of every candidate placed in the waiting list, irrespective of whether such candidate had approached the Court or not.

The appellant was not a party to the earlier proceedings. He woke up from his slumber only after appointments were made on 25-09-2023 in compliance with the Division Bench directions. Such conduct amounts to that of a fence-sitter. Delay and laches, coupled with acquiescence, disentitled the appellant to any discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The learned Single Judge further observed that the writ petition suffered from unexplained delay and that the selective appointment of a limited number of candidates pursuant to a specific court order could not be characterised as arbitrary or violative of Articles 14 and 16 so as to warrant interference at the instance of a person who had remained inactive for years.

On the aforesaid grounds, the writ petition was dismissed.

The principal contention is that the judgment dated 19-04-2023 passed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. Nos. 650 of 2022, 657 of 2022 and 661 of 2022 is a judgment in rem and not merely in personam. The Division Bench interpreted Rules 7(12), 7(13) and 7(14) of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III and Class-IV) Rules, 2009 and held that the waiting list remained valid for a period of two years for existing as well as anticipated vacancies. Once the Court has declared the correct legal position, the declaration operates for the entire class of wait-listed candidates. The respondents could not, therefore, confine the benefit only to the petitioners of those appeals and appoint candidates ranked lower than the appellant while ignoring higher-ranked candidates.

It is next submitted that the action of the respondents in appointing Prince (Serial No. 960) and Nikhil Vinay (Serial No. 1044), both ranked lower than the appellant (Serial No. 951), amounts to a direct violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Selection to public employment must be strictly on the basis of merit. Appointment of persons with equal or lesser marks while ignoring a candidate higher in the waiting list is arbitrary and discriminatory.

Learned counsel further contends that the learned Single Judge erred in non-suiting the appellant on the ground of delay and laches. The cause of action arose only when candidates junior to the appellant were appointed on 25-09-2023. Immediately thereafter the appellant served a legal notice (19-10-2023) and, upon receiving the reply dated 25-11-2023, filed the writ petition. There was, therefore, no unexplained delay.

It is also urged that candidates included in the waiting list constitute a homogeneous class. The respondents cannot pick and choose from the list on the plea that only those who approached the Court are entitled to the benefit of the earlier judgment. Such selective implementation itself violates the principle of equality.

The learned Single Judge, according to the appellant, failed to appreciate that when the Division Bench has already interpreted the statutory rules, the authorities were duty-bound to implement the waiting list in its entirety rather than limit the relief to the parties of the earlier LPAs. Once the law has been settled, the right course for the respondents was to fill the vacancies from the waiting list according to merit.

In support of the above submissions, reliance has been placed on:

State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347. Learned counsel submits that the Supreme Court has laid down that the normal rule is to extend the benefit of a judgment to all identically situated persons. The exception of delay, laches or fence-sitting does not apply when the earlier judgment is in rem and is intended to benefit the entire class. In the present case, the Division Bench having authoritatively interpreted Rules 7(12), 7(13) and 7(14), the declaration of law must enure to the benefit of every wait-listed candidate, including the appellant.

K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721. It is contended that once the legal position has been settled by a competent Court, the benefit thereof ought to be extended even to those who approach the Court subsequently. The delay, if any, is liable to be condoned. The appellant, therefore, cannot be denied the same relief that was granted to the petitioners of the earlier LPAs merely because he approached later.

Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 588. Learned counsel relies on this judgment to submit that once a candidate acquires a right or legitimate expectation flowing from a selection process and the statutory rules, the authorities cannot act arbitrarily to his prejudice. Ignoring a higher-ranked wait-listed candidate while appointing lower-ranked ones amounts to such arbitrary action.

State of Jharkhand v. Balkishun Ram, Civil Appeal No. 6436 of 2023 (order dated 03-10-2023). It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised that relief flowing from the interpretation of recruitment rules and selection processes can be moulded and extended to similarly situated persons. The same principle should apply here so that the benefit of the Division Bench’s interpretation of the Bihar Civil Court Staff Rules is not confined only to the original litigants.

The judgment dated 19-04-2023 passed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. Nos. 650 of 2022, 657 of 2022 and 661 of 2022 is clearly in personam. The operative directions issued therein were expressly limited to the petitioners of those appeals. The Division Bench neither directed the respondents to implement the entire waiting list nor declared that every wait-listed candidate, irrespective of whether he had approached the Court, would be entitled to appointment. The respondents have strictly complied with the limited directions of the Division Bench by issuing appointment letters to the 20 candidates who were parties to those proceedings. No fault can be found with such compliance.

The appellant was not a party to the earlier round of litigation. He remained completely silent for several years after the preparation of the waiting list and after the non-joining of selected candidates. He woke up only after the appointments were made on 25-09-2023 pursuant to the Division Bench judgment. Such conduct squarely falls within the category of a “fence-sitter”. It is well settled that equity aids the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. The claim is, therefore, barred by delay, laches and acquiescence.

Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Chairman & Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ram Gopal, (2021) 13 SCC 225, wherein it has been held that a person who remains inactive for a long period and approaches the Court only after others have succeeded cannot claim the same benefit. The principle of extending the benefit of an earlier judgment to similarly situated persons is subject to the well-recognised exceptions of delay, laches and acquiescence.

Learned counsel further submits that a waiting list or select list has a limited statutory life. Once the period prescribed under the relevant rules expires, no mandamus can be issued for appointment from that list. In this regard, strong reliance is placed on State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309.

Particular emphasis has been laid on the recent decision of a coordinate Division Bench of this Court in Patna High Court v. Chandan Kumar, L.P.A. No. 891 of 2025 (decided on 24-03-2026). In that case, arising out of virtually identical facts concerning the same selection process and the same judgment dated 19-04-2023, the Division Bench has held that later applicants who seek parity after the success of earlier litigants are fence-sitters; that the earlier judgment did not create a general right in favour of the entire waiting list; and that delay and laches operate as a complete bar. The learned Single Judge’s order granting relief was set aside. The said decision, being of a coordinate Bench on identical issues, is binding and fully covers the present case.

As regards the alleged violation of Articles 14 and 16, it is submitted that appointments made strictly in obedience to a specific judicial direction cannot be characterised as arbitrary or discriminatory. The respondents did not pick and choose candidates of their own volition; they merely implemented the limited order of the Division Bench. There is, therefore, no infraction of the equality clause.

The controversy, stripped of all embellishments, turns on a narrow question: whether a wait-listed candidate who was not a party to the earlier litigation, and who approached this Court only after appointments were made in compliance with the limited directions issued on 19-04-2023, can claim appointment on the dual plea that the earlier judgment is in rem and that appointment of lower-ranked candidates violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

At the outset, it is necessary to examine the true nature and scope of the judgment dated 19-04-2023. A plain reading of the said judgment shows that while the Division Bench examined the statutory provisions contained in Rules 7(12), 7(13) and 7(14) of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III and Class-IV) Rules, 2009 and made certain observations regarding the validity of the waiting list for a period of two years, the Court did not lay down any binding ratio decidendi of general application. A proper observation of our rules very accurately shows important nuances governing hierarchy. The observations were made in the specific context of the cases of the petitioners before it and are reproduced hereinbelow:

The principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, that the benefit of a judgment should ordinarily be extended to all identically situated persons, is not absolute. The Hon’ble Supreme Court itself recognised well-settled exceptions of delay, laches and acquiescence. Persons who remain silent, allow the cause of action to become stale, and wake up only after others have succeeded by pursuing their remedies, are treated as fence-sitters and are not entitled to the same relief. This position has been reiterated in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464. The present case falls squarely within that exception. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced below:

As regards the plea of violation of Articles 14 and 16, we are unable to accept the submission. The respondents did not, of their own volition, pick and choose candidates from the waiting list. They merely implemented the limited directions issued by the Division Bench in favour of the parties to those appeals. Appointments made in obedience to a specific judicial order cannot be branded as arbitrary or discriminatory so as to attract the equality clause at the instance of a person who himself remained inactive for years.

Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on Behram Khurshid Pesikaka (supra) and Nar Singh Pal (supra). Both decisions are clearly distinguishable and do not advance the appellant’s case. Pesikaka deals with the legal effect of a declaration of unconstitutionality made by the Supreme Court under Articles 13 and 141 of the Constitution. The observations therein regarding the binding nature of such a declaration and the rejection of the American doctrine have no application to observations made by a High Court Division Bench while interpreting statutory service rules in the context of a limited in personam direction. Similarly, Nar Singh Pal concerned the termination of a casual labourer who had acquired temporary status and was, therefore, entitled to the protection of Article 311. The ratio of that decision, which turns on the requirement of a regular departmental enquiry before punitive termination, has no bearing on the claim of a wait-listed candidate who was never appointed and who remained inactive for years. Neither authority supports the proposition that a non-party to earlier proceedings can claim automatic appointment merely because the Court made certain observations while granting relief to the actual litigants.

The additional grounds urged in the Memo of Appeal; namely, that wait-listed candidates form a homogeneous class, that the respondents were obliged to implement the entire list once the rules were interpreted, and that the appellant cannot be non-suited as a fence-sitter, do not, in the facts of the present case, advance the appellant’s claim beyond what has already been considered above.

The judgment and order, dated 22.02.2024, passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1063 of 2024, is, accordingly, affirmed.