High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 08 J&K CK 0795

Chaggar Singh and others vs UT of J&K and others

Jammu And Kashmir High Court, Jammu Bench · Decided on 29 August 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rajnesh Oswal, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
WP(C) No. 1494/2025 c/w CCP(S) No. 366/2025, WP(C) No. 3238/2025

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Judgment

32 paragraphs · 3,862 words
1.

Initially, the petitioners filed WP(C) No.1494/2025 for commanding the respondents to regularize their possession over the land measuring 11 Kanals-08 Marlas comprising Khasra No. 584 and 19 Kanals-14 Marlas comprising Khasra No.628 situated at Village Logate, Tehsil and District Kathua in terms of Govt. Order No. Reh-371 of 1971 dated 09.09.1971, along with a further direction to the respondents not to disturb their possession over the land mentioned above.

2.

It needs to be noted that after the filing of the above mentioned writ petition, M/s Man Stainless Steel Tubes Ltd., was arrayed as respondent No.5.

3.

To substantiate the prayer aforesaid, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that they have remained in continuous and lawful possession of the subject land since the year 1965. To seek regularization of their possession and grant of proprietary rights over the land mentioned above, the petitioners claim to have submitted a representation dated 19.05.2025 with the official respondents. However, owing to the complete inaction on the part of the respondents in deciding the said representation till date, the petitioners were compelled to institute the instant writ petition.

4.

The respondent No. 3, in its response, has stated that the land comprising khsara Nos. 584 and 628, situated at Village Logate, Tehsil and District Kathua, is an evacuee land duly vested in the Custodian under Section 5 of the Evacuee Property Act, consequent upon the migration of its original owners to Pakistan during partition. It is contended that the said land constitutes Custodian property of the State, held in trust for displaced persons, and cannot be alienated or regularized without the specific sanction of the competent authority in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules of 2008. It is further stated that the Government Order dated 09.09.1971, relied upon by the petitioners, does not confer any automatic right of ownership upon them, but merely provides for conditional regularization of possession in respect of certain categories of displaced persons or locals, subject to verification of their status, fulfillment of the prescribed eligibility criteria and approval by the competent authority. According to respondent No. 3, the petitioners do not fulfill the criteria prescribed under the said Government Order.

5.

It has also been contended that the petitioners' claim of being in possession of the subject land since the year 1965 is unsubstantiated, self-serving and disputed. The alleged Khasra Girdawari entries, it is urged, do not establish any lawful or sanctioned occupation and cannot override the statutory vesting of the property under Section 6 of the Act. It is further stated that the petitioners have neither produced any verification certificate nor approached the Custodian in the prescribed manner for consideration of their claim. The respondent No. 3 has further urged that the Government Order dated 09.09.1971 is subject to the provisions of the Evacuee Property Act, which has an overriding effect by virtue of Section 25 thereof. It is contended that no transfer, alienation or conferment of ownership rights in respect of evacuee property can be recognized as valid without the prior written sanction of the Custodian or the Custodian General. It is also stated that the aforesaid Government Order contemplates verification of the displacement status, eligibility and possession of the claimant by a committee constituted for the said purpose, which exercise, according to respondent No. 3, has not been undertaken in the present case.

6.

Respondent No.5 also filed response to the writ petition, objecting the claim of the petitioners and asserting that it has obtained the subject land pursuant to duly conducted auction proceedings. They have also stated that an amount of Rs. 9.90 lacs was paid to the petitioners after deduction of applicable taxes on 09.12.2024.

7.

The petitioners, after filing WP(C) No. 1494/2025, filed another writ petition bearing WP(C) No. 3238/2025 seeking the quashing of Auction Order No. 78 of 2025 dated 03.03.2025 issued by respondent No. 2 and the consequent lease deed dated 04.03.2025 in respect of land measuring 11 Kanals and 08 Marlas comprising Khasra No. 584 and land measuring 19 Kanals and 14 Marlas comprising Khasra No. 628, situated at Village Lagote, Tehsil and District Kathua. The challenge is primarily founded on the ground that, in terms of order dated 06.06.2025, the parties were directed to maintain status quo on spot with respect to the possession of the subject matter and the said order was duly served upon the respondents. It is alleged that, despite having received and accepted the said order, the official respondents concealed the factum of grant of leasehold rights in favour of M/s Man Stainless Steel Tubes Limited, notwithstanding the fact that the cultivating possession of the subject land continued to remain with the petitioners. It is further stated that even the latest Khasra Girdawari for the year 2024-2025 records the name of the father of the petitioners in the cultivation column in respect of land comprising Khasra Nos. 584 and 628 situated at Village Lagote, District Kathua. It is alleged that, notwithstanding the subsisting status quo order, the respondent-company, on 25.08.2025, ran its vehicles over the crops raised by the petitioners. The petitioners, thereafter, approached the respondent-Tehsildar, Kathua, by filing an application seeking appropriate legal action against the executives of the respondent-company, who were allegedly destroying the crops of the petitioners. It is further alleged that, in the first week of September, 2025, the petitioners came to know about the lease deed executed between respondent No. 3 and the respondent-company, which, according to them, had been executed without following due process of law, as no notice was served upon the petitioners despite their possession over the subject land. The petitioners approached Police Station, Kathua, seeking registration of an FIR against the representatives of the respondent-company; however, no action was allegedly taken on their complaint. Subsequently, one Ujjwal Dande, stated to be a representative of the respondent-company, lodged a complaint before the same Police Station, pursuant to which FIR No. 0439/2025 came to be registered against the petitioners for committing the offence of trespassing.

8.

The petitioners have impugned the auction order and the consequential lease deed, also on the grounds that they were and continue to be in possession of the subject land; that no notice of eviction was ever served upon them; and that they have a legitimate claim over the subject land under various Government orders issued from time to time. It is also urged that, in terms of the applicable statutory provisions, agricultural land cannot be put to non-agricultural use without the prior permission of the District Collector, and that, in the present case, no such permission has been obtained before permitting the use of the subject land for non-agricultural purposes. It is also contended by the petitioners that they are entitled to ownership of land in terms of various government orders such as LB.6-C of 1958, LB.7-C of 1958 and the Government Order dated 09.09.1971. It is also urged that they are entitled to protection of their possession in terms of the provisions contained under Agrarian Reforms Act.

9.

Respondent Nos.2 and 3, in their reply while reiterating their earlier stand, have submitted that Government order of 1971 was meant for making up deficiency in the land of displaced persons of 1947 and does not apply to the petitioners. It is stated that the subject land came to be retrieved from the petitioners and on 08.11.2024, the office of Custodian, Evacuee Property Department issued auction notice for the subject land for industrial use. Respondent No.6 emerged as highest bidder and pursuant to auction, the Custodian General issued order dated 03.03.2025, thereby according the approval for lease in favour of respondent No.6. Agreement was also executed pursuant thereto between respondent No.3 and respondent No.6. Respondent No. 2 and 3 have denied the applicability of Big Landed Estate Abolition Act and have further stated that the provisions of Agrarian Reforms Act read with Cabinet Order 578-C, apply only to displaced persons from POK and not to local residents.

10.

Respondent No. 6 has also filed its objections, stating therein that the petitioners have suppressed the material facts and are seeking to approbate and reprobate; therefore, they are not entitled to any relief in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. It is stated that the petitioners have no enforceable legal, statutory or proprietary right over the subject land, which is admittedly an evacuee property vested in the Custodian by operation of Section 5 of the J&K State Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 2006. In terms of Section 6(2) of the said Act, any person found in possession of evacuee property is deemed to be holding the same on behalf of the Custodian and is liable to surrender possession thereof on demand. According to respondent No. 6, the official record clearly reflects the petitioners as “gair-maroosi/unauthorized occupants”.

11.

It is further stated that Government Order dated 09.09.1971 is, in substance, an executive rehabilitation scheme and cannot override the statutory framework governing evacuee property under the J&K State Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 2006. It is further stated that the respondent-company participated in the auction proceedings pursuant to Auction Notice No. 763-66/AP/78-Kathua dated 08.11.2024 and was declared the highest successful bidder on 26.11.2024. Consequent thereto, the Government issued Government Order No. 78 of 2025 dated 03.03.2025, whereby evacuee land measuring 72 Kanals and 17 Marlas, comprising Khasra Nos. 628, 584, 580, 585, 586, 587, 588 and 630, situated at Village Logate, Tehsil and District Kathua, was ordered to be leased out in favour of the respondent-company. Pursuant thereto, a lease deed dated 04.03.2025 was duly executed by the Deputy Custodian in favour of the respondent-company. It is further stated that the lease deed dated 04.03.2025 specifically records that the subject property is in possession of the respondent-company and that this position is further corroborated by the revenue records, including the khasra girdawari and Jamabandi entries as on 11.03.2025, which, according to respondent No. 6, unequivocally reflect the possession of the respondent-company over the subject land. It is also contended that the status quo order was obtained by the petitioners by projecting incorrect facts before the Court, whereas, in fact, the property was in the occupation of the respondent-company, as duly substantiated by the demarcation report submitted by the Tehsildar. It is further contended by the respondent-company that each of the petitioners i.e. petitioner No. 1 &2 had already accepted monetary consideration of Rs.9,90,000/- from the respondent-company on 09.12.2024 in full and final settlement of their alleged claim, if any, over the subject land. It is, therefore, urged that, having accepted the said monetary consideration and permitted the auction proceedings to culminate in the issuance of Government Order dated 03.03.2025 and the consequential execution of the lease deed dated 04.03.2025, the petitioners are estopped in law from challenging the very transaction which, according to the respondent-company, they had facilitated and acquiesced in.

12.

It is also stated that the report of the Tehsildar dated 06.12.2023 categorically records the petitioners as “gair-maroosi”/unauthorized occupants and recommends appropriate action against them. It is, therefore, contended that the petitioners have no right, title or interest in respect of the aforesaid land.

13.

Mr. Ankur Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that the petitioners have been in cultivating possession of the subject land since the year 1965 and that the entire auction process, as well as the consequential execution of the lease deed, was managed by the respondent-company in connivance with the official respondents. He, therefore, submits that the entire auction process and the consequential lease deed are liable to be quashed. Learned counsel has further vehemently argued that the revenue entries reflect the petitioners to be in possession of the subject land and that, by virtue of Government Order dated 09.09.1971, the petitioners have acquired a vested right to seek regularization of the land which is the subject matter of the present writ petition.

14.

Per contra, Mr. Sunil Sethi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-company, has argued that the petitioners have concealed material facts, particularly with regard to the receipt of Rs.9,90,000/- each from the respondent-company. He submits that the petitioners had received the said amount from the respondent-company, which is duly evidenced by the relevant bank transaction statements. He has further argued that the respondent-company acquired the subject land pursuant to a duly conducted auction process and that the land continues to remain in its possession. Therefore, according to learned Senior Counsel, the petitioners have no right, title or interest whatsoever in the subject land and the present petition has been filed merely with a view to extract further money from the respondent-company. Learned Senior Counsel has further drawn the attention of the Court to the statements of Krishan Singh, Dalbir Singh and Balbir Singh, wherein they have stated that they have no objection to the entire custodian land under their possession being allotted and transferred in favour of the respondent-company. He has also drawn the attention of the Court to the affidavits sworn by Narotam Singh, Chaggar Singh and Sahil Singh to contend that the petitioners have themselves acknowledged that their tenancy in respect of the aforesaid land had already been terminated.

15.

Mr. Vishal Bharti, learned counsel, has reiterated the submissions made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the other respondents.

16.

Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record.

17.

The first contention raised by the respondent-company is that the petitioners have concealed material facts from this Court and, as such, are not entitled to any relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In the objections filed by the respondent-company, it has been stated that Narotam Singh and Chaggar Singh had received an amount of Rs.9,90,000/- each on 09.12.2024. It is further stated that all the three petitioners had sworn affidavits wherein they acknowledged that they were “gair-maroosi” (unprotected tenants) in respect of the total land measuring 27 Kanals and 02 Marlas, comprising Khasra No. 628, 15 Kanals and 14 Marlas and Khasra No. 584 measuring 11 Kanals and 08 Marlas, situated at Village Logate, Tehsil and District Kathua. It is further stated that, in the said affidavits, the petitioners affirmed that they had no objection in the event their tenancy rights in respect of the aforesaid land were terminated and, further, that they had already surrendered their tenancy rights in favour of M/s Kashmir Wool and Silk Textile Pvt. Ltd., Village Logate, Kathua.

18.

The respondent-company has also placed on record the statements of Krishan Singh, Dalbir Singh and Balbir Singh, as well as of the petitioners Chaggar Singh and Narotam Singh, wherein they have stated that they have no objection to the entire Custodian land under their possession being allotted or transferred in favour of the respondent-company. The respondent-company has further placed on record the relevant bank transaction statements demonstrating that an amount of Rs.9,90,000/- each was transferred to the bank accounts of petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 2.

19.

The petitioners have not denied receipt of the amount of Rs.9,90,000/- specifically pleaded by the respondent-company. They have neither controverted the said assertion nor filed any supplementary affidavit specifically denying receipt of the aforesaid amount. Their failure to specifically deny the said assertion, therefore, amounts to an admission on their part that they had received the said amount from the respondent-company.

20.

The petitioners have also not denied the affidavits sworn by them on 17.05.2023, wherein they had acknowledged the termination of their tenancy and the handing over of possession of the subject land to M/s Kashmir Wool and Silk Textile Park Pvt. Ltd. They have also not denied the receipt of amount from he respondent-company. It appears that earlier one M/s Kashmir Wool and Silk Textile Park Pvt. Ltd. was interested in getting the land from the custodian department and that's why the petitioners swore the affidavits, but later the auction was conducted wherein the respondent-company emerged as highest bidder. Thus, from the material placed on record, it is evident that the petitioners have suppressed material facts from this Court. It is a cardinal principle of equity jurisprudence that he who seeks equitable relief must come with clean hands. A litigant who suppresses material facts or attempts to mislead the Court forfeits the right to invoke its equitable and discretionary jurisdiction, thereby rendering the petition liable to be dismissed at the threshold, without granting any relief, whether interim or final.

21.

It is a settled principle of law that a person invoking the extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction of the Writ Court is required to approach the Court with clean hands and make a full and candid disclosure of all material facts. In “K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors.”, (2008) 12 SCC 481, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

“34.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.

36.

A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, “We will not listen to your application because of what you have done.” The rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it.

38.

The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play “hide and seek” or to “pick and choose” the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because “the court knows law but not facts”.

39.

If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and “clean breast” cannot hold a writ of the court with “soiled hands”. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court.”

22.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Dalip Singh v. State of U.P.”, (2010) 2 SCC 114, Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under:

“1.

For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. “satya” (truth) and “ahimsa” (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.

2.

In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.”

23.

In the present case, the receipt of Rs.9,90,000/- each by the petitioners and the affidavits acknowledging termination/surrender of their tenancy rights are not peripheral or insignificant facts; rather, they have a direct bearing upon the petitioners’ claim of continuing tenancy, possession and entitlement to challenge the auction and the consequential lease deed. The deliberate non-disclosure of such facts assumes significance, particularly when the petitioners have invoked the equitable and discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Consequently, the petitioners, having failed to make a full and candid disclosure of material facts, cannot be permitted to seek any relief from this Court.

24.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioners have suppressed material facts from the Court and, having already surrendered whatever rights they may have had in respect of the subject land and having accepted the monetary consideration, are not entitled to any relief in the present proceedings. Accordingly, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. However, this Court finds that no permission appears to have been obtained by the respondent-company for putting the subject agricultural land to non-agricultural use. Accordingly, it is directed that the respondent-company shall not use the subject agricultural land for any non-agricultural purpose unless and until the requisite permission is obtained from the competent authority in accordance with law.

CCP(S) No.366/2025

25.

In this contempt petition, no notice has yet been issued to the alleged contemnor(s). In view of the disposal of the main petition, nothing further survives for consideration in the present contempt petition. The same is, accordingly, disposed of.