Bushra Shakil vs Union Territory Of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors.

JUSTICE RITU TAGORE, MEMBER [JUDL.]

The applicant has filed the present Original Application assailing Government Order No. 548-RA of 2026 dated 16.05.2026, whereby her engagement as Senior Resident in the Department of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Government Medical College, Srinagar, on Academic Arrangement Basis, has been cancelled ab-initio. She has also sought release of the salary/remuneration allegedly withheld for the period during which she actually discharged her duties.

Before adverting to the challenge raised in the present Original Application, it would be apposite to take note of Central Administrative Tribunal^{certain admitted facts. The material on record discloses} that the respondents issued Advertisement Notice No. 12-RA of 2025 dated 13.09.2025 inviting applications for engagement of Senior Residents in various disciplines. The applicant applied for engagement as Senior Resident in the discipline of Obstetrics & Gynaecology and was selected pursuant to Notification No. 44-EC of 2025 dated 06.11.2025. She figured at Serial No. 6 in the general selection list and at Serial No. 3 in the selected candidates in the concerned discipline.

Pursuant thereto, the respondents issued Engagement Order No. 1302-RA of 2025 dated 14.11.2025, whereby the applicant was provisionally engaged as Senior Resident in the Department of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Government Medical College, Srinagar, on Academic Arrangement Basis, initially for a period of one year. The order records that the applicant had already completed two years of Senior Residency in the same discipline/department from Government Medical College, Central Administrative Tribunal^{Anantnag. The engagement was under S.O. 364 of 2020} dated 27.11.2020 and the Government orders governing such academic arrangement.

The nature and extent of the applicant’s engagement are, therefore, required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid governing terms and conditions. It would accordingly be appropriate to notice the material conditions contained in the engagement order. The engagement was expressly provisional and temporary in nature and was made in anticipation of receipt of the Character and Antecedents Verification Report from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), J&K. The order further stipulated that in case of an adverse report with regard to the character and antecedents of the candidate, or in the circumstances specified therein, the candidate would not have any claim flowing from such engagement. The aforesaid condition assumes significance in view of the Government instructions governing verification of character and antecedents. Government Order No. 1328-Central Administrative Tribunal^{GAD of 2016 dated 07.12.2016 amended the Jammu and} Kashmir Civil Services (Verification of Character and Antecedents) Instructions, 1997 and, inter alia, provided for issuance of conditional appointment orders upon receipt of the Attestation Form and a sworn affidavit containing the prescribed undertaking, subject to satisfactory verification of the character and antecedents of the selected candidate. Subsequently, Government Order No. 528-JK(GAD) of 2021 dated 21.06.2021 substituted Instruction 2 of the aforesaid Instructions and prescribed the procedure for verification of the character and antecedents of selectees through the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), prior to issuance of formal appointment orders. The subsequent Circular No. 05-JK(GAD) of 2024 dated 18.01.2024 reiterated the procedure prescribed under Government Order No. 528-JK(GAD) of 2021 and laid down the timelines and related modalities for completion of such verification. The object of the aforesaid verification is to enable the appointing Central Administrative Tribunal^{authority to ascertain the character and antecedents of a} selected candidate before issuance of the formal appointment order. The engagement of the applicant, however, was made provisionally and subject to receipt of the Character and Antecedents Verification Report from the CID, and the effect of the report received in her case is required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid statutory instructions and the specific terms of her engagement order.

It is further not in dispute that, at the time of joining, the applicant furnished an affidavit/declaration duly attested before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class. In the said declaration, she stated, inter alia, that she was not involved in any criminal activity and that no FIR was pending or registered against her in any criminal department or police station. The declaration was furnished in pursuance of the terms and conditions governing her engagement.

Subsequently, upon verification of her character and Central Administrative Tribunal^{antecedents, the respondents received the report from the} CID. The report dated 12.05.2026 recorded that the applicant had been found involved in FIR No. 116/2023 registered at Police Station Achabal under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC and that the said case was pending before the Court of learned JMFC Shangus. The verification report further noticed that the matter had been presented before the competent Court and that the case was still sub judice.

The applicant does not dispute the existence or pendency of the aforesaid criminal proceedings. Her principal contention, however, is that the particulars of the FIR had already been disclosed by her in the online Employee Verification System (EVS) form. It is accordingly contended that there was no suppression of the criminal case on her part. It has further been urged on behalf of the applicant that the applicant was involved in a motor accident case and declaration contained in the affidavit was intended to convey that the applicant had not been Central Administrative Tribunal^{involved in a criminal case of serious nature involving} moral turpitude. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgments cited in the Original Application to contend that mere pendency of a criminal case, particularly where the allegations do not involve moral turpitude, cannot by itself furnish a valid ground for disengagement.

Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the applicant's subsequent affidavit/declaration is wholly inconsistent with the factual position. It is contended that irrespective of what was stated in the online EVS form, the applicant consciously furnished a sworn declaration stating that no FIR was pending or registered against her. According to the respondents, the verification of character and antecedents was an express condition of her provisional engagement and, upon receipt of an adverse report, the competent authority was bound to act in terms of the governing conditions.

Having considered the rival submissions and the material Central Administrative Tribunal^{available on record, the first aspect which requires} consideration is the nature of the applicant's engagement. The applicant was not appointed to a regular post in the ordinary course of service. Her engagement was expressly provisional, temporary and on Academic Arrangement Basis for a specified period, subject to the conditions contained in the engagement order and satisfactory verification of her character and antecedents.

The applicant, having accepted such engagement subject to the aforesaid conditions, cannot claim an unconditional or indefeasible right to continue in service irrespective of the result of the character and antecedents verification. The engagement order itself contemplated the consequence of an adverse verification report. The applicant was therefore aware, at the time of joining, that her continuation was subject to fulfilment of the conditions governing the engagement.

The next and more material question is whether the applicant can take advantage of the fact that she had Central Administrative Tribunal^{disclosed the FIR in the online EVS form,} notwithstanding the subsequent declaration furnished by her on oath.

The explanation offered by the applicant that the declaration contained in the affidavit was intended to convey only that she was not involved in any criminal case of a serious nature or involving moral turpitude does not find support from the language of the declaration itself. The declaration does not contain any such qualification. On the contrary, the applicant categorically declared that she was not involved in any criminal activity and that no FIR was pending or registered against her in any criminal department or police station.

The language of the declaration is clear and unqualified. There is, therefore, no scope for importing into the declaration a qualification which the applicant herself did not incorporate therein. The subsequent explanation that the declaration was intended to exclude only cases involving moral turpitude cannot be reconciled with the Central Administrative Tribunal^{plain language employed in the sworn affidavit.}

The circumstance that the applicant had disclosed the FIR in the online EVS form undoubtedly has relevance and cannot simply be ignored. However, that disclosure does not explain the subsequent categorical declaration made by her on oath. The two declarations cannot be treated as interchangeable. The question before me is not merely whether the applicant had disclosed the FIR at some stage of the verification process; it is whether, after being specifically required to furnish a declaration regarding her criminal antecedents, she made a statement which was contrary to the factual position.

The FIR in question was registered in the year 2023 and was thus not an event proximate to the execution of the affidavit so as to suggest that the applicant may reasonably have been unaware of the same. More importantly, the applicant herself asserts that she had knowledge of and had disclosed the FIR in the online EVS form. Once that position is accepted, the categorical Central Administrative Tribunal^{statement in the subsequent affidavit that no FIR was} pending or registered against her becomes difficult to reconcile with the factual position admittedly within her knowledge.

There is also nothing on record to suggest that the applicant was unable to understand the nature or consequence of the declaration furnished by her. She is a medically qualified professional and had consciously furnished the affidavit pursuant to the conditions governing her engagement. The contradiction between the disclosure made in the EVS form and the declaration made in the affidavit has not been satisfactorily explained.

The distinction between the pendency of a criminal case and the furnishing of a false declaration regarding such pendency is material. Mere pendency of a criminal proceeding does not invariably constitute a disqualification for public employment. The nature and gravity of the offence, the stage of the proceedings, the applicable rules and the circumstances in which the Central Administrative Tribunal^{information was furnished are all relevant considerations.} However, that principle cannot be extended to disregard an express and unqualified declaration made by a candidate pursuant to the conditions of engagement.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Secretary, Department of Home Secretary, A.P. v. B. Chinnam Naidu, (2005) 2 SCC 746, explained that the object of requiring disclosure of information relating to character and antecedents is to enable the employer to assess the suitability of a candidate. It was further observed that where a candidate suppresses material information or furnishes false information, he cannot claim any right to appointment or continuance in service. Likewise, in Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal, (2013) 9 SCC 363, the Hon’ble Supreme Court drew a distinction between the mere pendency of a criminal proceeding & the suppression of information relating to such proceeding, holding that suppression of such information constitutes a distinct consideration for the employer. The question, therefore, is Central Administrative Tribunal^{not merely whether the applicant is otherwise suitable for the} post. The pendency of a criminal case or proceeding is one aspect, whereas suppression of information regarding such pendency is a separate and material consideration. Where the information specifically sought by the employer is not disclosed, such non-disclosure amounts to suppression of material information and may render the appointment or continuance in service liable to be terminated, even where the criminal proceedings have not culminated in conviction or the person concerned has subsequently been acquitted or discharged. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that where an appointment is obtained by misrepresentation of facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such appointment cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The Court has consistently reiterated that fraud vitiates every solemn act and that no person can be permitted to retain any advantage obtained by practicing fraud or misrepresentation. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Central Administrative Tribunal^{Court reiterated the principle that “fraud avoids all judicial} acts, ecclesiastical or temporal”. Referring to the decision in Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, [(1956) 1 QB 702], the Court further observed that no judgment of a court or order of a competent authority can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything. Thus, a person who secures an appointment by fraud or misrepresentation cannot be permitted to retain the benefit flowing from such appointment.

The principle was reiterated and further explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited v. Anil Kanwaria, (2021) 10 SCC 136. In that case, the Court considered an employee who had suppressed his criminal antecedents and had furnished a false declaration during the process of appointment. The Court held that the issue was not merely the nature of the criminal case but also the credibility and trustworthiness of the employee who had furnished the declaration at the initial stage of employment. The Court emphasized that where the employer, on account of such conduct, does not find it appropriate to continue the employee, the employee cannot claim continuation as a matter of right.

The observations in Anil Kanwaria (supra) are particularly relevant to the present case. At paragraph 8.1 thereof, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the purpose of obtaining such declarations, namely, verification of character and antecedents for assessing suitability. At paragraph 8.2, while considering case of Devendra Kumar, (supra) the Court reiterated that the pendency of a criminal proceeding and suppression of information concerning its pendency constitute distinct considerations. The principles summarized at paragraph 8.3 further recognize that a candidate who suppresses material information or furnishes false information cannot claim a right to continue merely because the engagement has thereafter continued for some period.

The observation in paragraph 12 of Anil Kanwaria (supra) is also apposite. The Hon’ble Supreme Court Central Administrative Tribunal^{considered the matter from the employer's perspective and} held that the question in such cases concerns the “credibility and/or trustworthiness” of the employee at the initial stage of employment. The principle is not that every pending criminal case renders a person unsuitable; rather, it recognizes that a truthful declaration is itself an essential component of the relationship between the employer and the person seeking public employment.

The judgments relied upon by the applicant do not advance her case when examined in the factual setting of the present matter. The principles emerging from Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, make it clear that information concerning conviction, acquittal, arrest or pendency of a criminal case must be truthful and that the employer is required to consider the applicable rules and the circumstances of the particular case.

The applicant's reliance upon the principle that mere pendency of a criminal case cannot automatically result in termination also does not answer the basis of the Central Administrative Tribunal^{impugned action. The impugned order does not proceed} merely on the premise that an FIR was pending against the applicant. It proceeds on the receipt of an adverse character and antecedents verification report coupled with the fact that the applicant had furnished an affidavit containing a declaration inconsistent with the factual position.

The applicant's reliance upon the nature of the criminal case, namely that it arose from a motor vehicle accident and does not involve moral turpitude, may have relevance while examining the consequences of the criminal case itself. It cannot, however, by itself explain or neutralize the subsequent categorical declaration furnished by the applicant. The issue before the respondents was not to adjudicate the applicant's guilt in the criminal proceedings but to ascertain whether the conditions subject to which she was provisionally engaged had been fulfilled.

The distinction is also important because the criminal proceedings are still pending. No finding is being Central Administrative Tribunal^{recorded by this Tribunal regarding the guilt or innocence} of the applicant in the criminal case. The criminal proceedings shall naturally be decided by the competent criminal Court on their own merits and in accordance with law.

It is also necessary to notice that the applicant's case is materially distinguishable from a case where the candidate has made a truthful declaration of a criminal proceeding and the employer thereafter independently considers whether the nature of the case affects suitability. Here, the applicant furnished a categorical sworn declaration that no FIR was pending or registered against her, while the record establishes that an FIR was in fact pending. The action of the respondents is consequently founded upon the contradiction in the declaration and not merely upon the existence of the FIR.

The fact that the applicant had actually rendered service for some period does not alter the nature of the original engagement. The engagement remained provisional and Central Administrative Tribunal^{conditional. The applicant accepted the engagement with} full knowledge of the conditions attached thereto. Mere continuation for a period of several months cannot convert a provisional academic arrangement into an unconditional or regular appointment.

The applicant has also questioned the impugned action on the ground that no prior notice or opportunity of hearing was afforded to her. In the facts of the present case, however, the engagement was expressly provisional and conditional upon character and antecedents verification. The material relied upon by the respondents consisted of the applicant's own affidavit and the subsequent CID verification report. The factual foundation for the action was therefore not dependent upon an enquiry into disputed allegations.

The respondents were not imposing a disciplinary punishment upon the applicant for misconduct committed during service. They were acting upon the failure of a condition subject to which the provisional engagement Central Administrative Tribunal^{had been made. The action, therefore, cannot be equated} with punitive termination requiring a regular departmental enquiry.

This aspect also finds support from the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in Dr. Sajad Ahmad Bhat v. UT of J&K &Ors., WP(C) No. 2769/2025, decided on 21.04.2026. In that case, the petitioner had been engaged as Senior Resident on Academic Arrangement Basis under S.O. 364 of 2020, subject to CID verification, and his engagement was cancelled ab-initio after receipt of an adverse report. The Hon’ble High Court held that, having accepted the provisional conditions of engagement, the petitioner could not subsequently contend that a regular enquiry was necessary before cancellation in accordance with those conditions.

The ratio of the aforesaid judgment is applicable to the present case insofar as the nature of the engagement and the consequence of the CID verification are concerned. Central Administrative Tribunal^{The applicant had accepted the provisional engagement} subject to verification of her character and antecedents. Once the competent authority received the adverse verification report and found that the applicant had furnished an incorrect declaration, the respondents acted within the framework of the conditions governing her engagement.

Consequently, I am of the considered view that the respondents cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily or outside the terms and conditions governing the applicant's provisional engagement in cancelling the same. The challenge to the impugned order, insofar as it seeks restoration or continuation of the applicant's engagement, therefore, cannot be accepted.

I, now turn to the applicant's claim for release of salary/remuneration for the period during which she actually discharged her duties.

The engagement order and the undertaking furnished by the applicant contain a stipulation that, in the event of an adverse report regarding character and antecedents, the Central Administrative Tribunal^{candidate shall have no claim to salary/remuneration or} other benefits flowing from the engagement. The respondents seek to rely upon this condition for withholding the remuneration claimed by the applicant.

In my considered view, the aforesaid stipulation cannot be enforced so as to deprive the applicant of remuneration for services which she actually rendered.

The right to continue in an academic arrangement and the right to receive remuneration for work already performed are two distinct matters. The adverse character and antecedents report may validly furnish a basis for bringing the provisional engagement to an end in accordance with the conditions governing such engagement. It cannot, however, authorize the respondents to retain the benefit of services actually rendered without payment of the corresponding remuneration.

The very issue came up for consideration before the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in case of Dr. Sajad Ahmad Bhat (supra). In that case also, the respondents relied upon the condition that an appointee would have no claim to wages/salary in the event of an adverse CID report. The Hon’ble High Court nevertheless held that salary/wages for the period during which the petitioner had actually worked could not be denied and directed release of the legitimately earned wages.

I respectfully agree with the aforesaid principle. A condition in an engagement order which seeks to deny remuneration for services actually rendered cannot be construed as authorizing the respondents to retain the benefit of such services without corresponding payment. The applicant may have no right to continuation of the engagement after receipt of the adverse verification report, but that is entirely different from denying payment for work which she had already performed.

The undertaking furnished by the applicant is, therefore, required to be read down to the limited extent necessary to preserve its lawful operation. The stipulation may operate to disentitle the applicant from claiming continuation of Central Administrative Tribunal^{the academic arrangement, experience or other future} benefits flowing from such engagement on the basis of the adverse verification report. It cannot, however, be extended to forfeit remuneration legitimately earned for the period during which the applicant actually discharged her duties.

Accordingly, while the applicant is not entitled to reinstatement or continuation as Senior Resident pursuant to the impugned engagement order, she is entitled to receive the salary/remuneration legitimately earned for the period during which she actually discharged her duties, subject to verification of the period of actual service and the applicable rate of remuneration, after adjustment of any amount, if already paid.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the Original Application is partly allowed to the aforesaid limited extent.

The challenge to Government Order No. 548-RA of 2026 dated 16.05.2026, whereby the applicant's provisional Central Administrative Tribunal^{engagement as Senior Resident in the Department of} Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Government Medical College, Srinagar, has been cancelled, is rejected. The applicant shall have no right to reinstatement or continuation in the said engagement on the basis of the impugned order.

However, the respondents are directed to release to the applicant the salary/remuneration, if any, legitimately due to her for the period during which she actually discharged her duties pursuant to the engagement order dated 14.11.2025, subject to verification of the period of actual service and applicable rate of remuneration and after adjustment of any amount already paid.

The aforesaid exercise shall be completed and the admissible amount released to the applicant within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

Accordingly, the Original Application stands disposed of in the above terms. Pending MAs, if any, shall also stand Central Administrative Tribunal^{disposed of.}

The Registry shall return the records to the concerned department after due completion of all formalities and consign the file of OA after due compliance.