Binshad vs State Of Kerala & Ors.

Anil K. Narendran, J.

The petitioner has filed this W.P.(Crl), invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking an order to grant temporary release to the petitioner for 15 days from 22.06.2026, to attend the ceremonies and functions relating to his brother’s marriage.

On 23.06.2026, when this writ petition came up for admission, the learned Government Pleader was directed to file a counter affidavit on behalf of the 1^st respondent State, within a week.

Along with a memo dated 29.06.2026, filed by the learned Senior Government Pleader, a statement dated 27.06.2026 of the 4^th respondent District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural, which is one filed on behalf of all the respondents, is placed on record.

On 02.07.2026, when this writ petition came up for consideration, this Court passed the following order;

Heard arguments of Adv. Rebin Vincent Gralan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Senior Government Pleader for the respondents.

It is averred in the first paragraph of the statement of facts of this writ petition that the petitioner is aggrieved by Ext.P1 detention order, issued against him under Sections 3(1), 13(2)(i) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act], by the 3^rd respondent District Collector and District Magistrate, Thrissur, whereby he is under preventive detention. However, the document marked as Ext.P1 in this writ petition is a copy of the memo for executing the order of detention, bearing No:DCTSR 9503/2025-C4 dated 08.08.2025 issued by the 3^rd respondent.

From the statement dated 27.06.2026 filed by the 4^th respondent District Police Chief, Thrissur, we notice that, in the year 2022, as per order No.C1-6247/2022 dated 29.08.2022 of the 3^rd respondent District Magistrate, issued under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act, the petitioner was placed under preventive detention for a period of six months. He was also remanded to judicial custody, in connection with Crime No.312/2022 of Kattoor Police Station, registered under Sections 341, 323, 324, 392, 294(b), 506, 307 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After completing the period of preventive detention under KAA(P) Act and following his acquittal in Crime No.312/2022 on 03.03.2025, he was released from prison.

In the statement dated 27.06.2026 filed by the 4^th respondent, it is stated that, after release from prison, the petitioner continued to be actively involved in anti-social activities. As per order No.DCTSR-9503/2025-C4 dated 08.08.2025, the petitioner is again under preventive detention, with effect from 13.08.2025. The order of detention under Section 3(1) of KAA(P) Act was subsequently confirmed by the 1^st respondent State, vide G.O.(Rt)No.3494/2025/HOME dated 14.10.2025. Accordingly, the petitioner has been kept under preventive detention for a period of 1 year, from 13.08.2025 to 12.08.2026. The details of cases registered against the petitioner, as furnished in page No.3 of the statement filed by the 4^th respondent, are as follows;

In the statement filed by the 4^th respondent, it is stated that, on the request made by the petitioner in Ext.P4 for granting temporary release, for a period of 15 days from 22.06.2026, an enquiry was conducted. The enquiry revealed that petitioner’s parents currently reside at the family home. His brothers are employed abroad. His married sisters are residing in their matrimonial homes. Neither the father nor any other family member has taken steps to secure parole for the petitioner. It was reported that they have no interest in the petitioner attending the wedding. Various other aspects have also been pointed out in the statement filed by the 4^th respondent, opposing the petitioner’s request for grant of temporary release. We do not propose to consider those aspects in this writ petition.

During the course of arguments, the submission made by Adv. Rebin Vincent Gralan is that Adv. Manumon A., who was instructed by the petitioner’s father to file this writ petition, filed the memo dated 01.07.2026, seeking permission to withdraw the writ petition as it has become infructuous. On the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel, we notice the declaration made in the memo of appearance dated 19.06.2026 filed by Adv. Manumon A. and Adv. V.M. Vinosh, that they have been duly authorised by the petitioner (Binshad) to file this application, appear and plead before this Court. In a separate sheet attached to the memo of appearance, which is also captioned as ‘memo of appearance’, Adv. Rebin Vincent Gralan and 22 other advocates have affixed their signature. The said sheet does not even bear a date.

As pointed out by the learned Senior Government Pleader, the petitioner was under preventive detention, as per the order dated 29.08.2022 of the 3^rd respondent District Magistrate, issued under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act, for a period of six months. Thereafter, as per order dated 08.08.2025 of the 3^rd respondent, issued under Section 3(1) of KAA(P) Act, the petitioner has been kept under preventive detention for a period of 1 year, from 13.08.2025 to 12.08.2026.

As already noticed hereinbefore, though it is averred in the first paragraph of the statement of facts of this writ petition that the petitioner is aggrieved by the detention order Ext.P1, issued under Section 3(1), 13(2)(i) of KAA(P) Act, dated 08.08.2025, by the 3^rd respondent District Collector and District Magistrate, the document marked as Ext.P1 is a copy of the memo dated 08.08.2025 issued by the 3^rd respondent for executing the order of detention. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not offer any satisfactory explanation for not producing the order of detention dated 08.08.2025 in this writ petition. The learned counsel could not also offer any satisfactory explanation for not disclosing the previous order of detention in this writ petition.

In Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana [(1995) 3 SCC 757], the Apex Court held that filing of false affidavit, or making false statement on oath in courts aims at striking a blow at the Rule of Law. No court can ignore such conduct, which tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions, because the very structure of an ordered life is put at stake. It would be a great public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned by anyone resorting to filing of false affidavits or giving of false statements and fabricating false evidence in a court of law.

In Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner of Police, Chennai v. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi [(2011) 5 SCC 496], the Apex Court expressed the view that filing of a false affidavit should be effectively curbed with a strong hand. In Sciemed Overseas Inc. v. BOC India Limited [(2016) 3 SCC 70], the Apex Court held that, though observations in Muthu Karuppan [(2011) 5 SCC 496] were made in the context of contempt of court proceedings, the view expressed must be generally endorsed to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings.

In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. [(2008) 12 SCC 481], the Apex Court held that the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Apex Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play 'hide and seek' or to 'pick and choose' the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because "the court knows law but not facts".

In K.D. Sharma [(2008) 12 SCC 481], the Apex Court held further that, if the primary object as highlighted in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486] is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and 'clean breast' cannot hold a writ of the court with 'soiled hands'. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for Contempt of Court for abusing the process of the court.

In Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik v. Pradnya Prakash Khadekar [(2017) 5 SCC 496], a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth.

In Usha Nanthini M. v Secretary, Regional Transport Authority [2018 (2) KLT 89], a judgment rendered by one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J.], while sitting single, it was held that a litigant who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must come with clean hands and clean objects. Any attempt made by a litigant to mislead this Court, either by suppressing material facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements, should be curbed with an iron hand. A litigant has every right to withdraw the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, once it is found that he has approached the Court suppressing material facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements, this Court has ample power to decline the permission sought for withdrawal of that writ petition. Dismissal of such writ petitions imposing exemplary costs is inevitable, and even necessary, to prevent abuse of the process of this Court and to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings.

The decision in Usha Nanthini M. [2018 (2) KLT 89], laying down the above legal principles, was confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court, in the judgment dated 21.02.2018 in W.A.No.455 of 2018 - Usha Nanthini M. v Secretary, Regional Transport Authority [2018:KER:8915]. The Division Bench noticed that judicial proceedings are sacrosanct, and no person would be allowed, particularly in public law remedy, to abuse the judicial process. In summary proceedings, as the writ proceedings are, the Court places implicit faith in the parties and their pleadings. The Division Bench found that the learned Single Judge rightly refused the plea of the petitioner to permit her to withdraw the writ petition. Paragraphs 4 to 10 of the judgment dated 21.02.2018 of the Division Bench read thus;

In the instant case, the petitioner has filed this writ petition, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking an order to grant temporary release for 15 days from 22.06.2026, i.e., from 22.06.2026 till 06.07.2026, to attend the ceremonies and functions relating to his brother’s marriage, which was scheduled on 28.06.2026. Ext.P4 petition filed before the 1^st respondent State, invoking the provisions under Section 14 of KAA(P) Act, seeking an order to grant temporary release for 15 days from 22.06.2026, is one dated 17.06.2026. The writ petition, which was one filed on 19.06.2026 at 18.58 hrs., was registered on 20.06.2026. On 23.06.2026, when the writ petition came up for admission, the learned Government Pleader was directed to file a counter affidavit on behalf of the 1^st respondent State, within a week.

In the writ petition, though it is averred that the petitioner is aggrieved by the Ext.P1 detention order dated 08.08.2025, issued against him under Section 3(1), 13(2)(i) of KAA(P) Act, by the 3^rd respondent District Collector and District Magistrate, the document marked as Ext.P1 is a copy of the memo dated 08.08.2025 issued by the 3^rd respondent for executing the order of detention. As already noticed hereinbefore, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not offer any satisfactory explanation for not producing the order of detention dated 08.08.2025 in this writ petition. The learned counsel could not also offer any satisfactory explanation for not disclosing the previous order of detention in this writ petition. When the concealed facts are material to the merits of the claim made by the petitioner in Ext.P4 petition for temporary release and even the entertainability of a writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the competent authority to consider the petition filed under Section 14 of the KAA(P) Act for temporary release, to attend a marriage ceremony, the petitioner who does not come with candid facts and 'clean breast' cannot hold a writ of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with 'soiled hands'.

It is well settled that suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in K.D. Sharma [(2008) 12 SCC 481], the party invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open, who must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play 'hide and seek' or to 'pick and choose' the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts.

When the petitioner has not disclosed all the material facts fairly and truly in the writ petition, but, stated them in a distorted manner to mislead the Court, this Court has inherent power to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. For such conduct, the petitioner can even be dealt with under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for abusing the process of the court.

The judicial proceedings are sacrosanct, and no person would be allowed, particularly, in a public law remedy, to abuse the judicial process. In writ proceedings, which are summary proceedings, the Court places implicit faith in the parties and their pleadings. Any attempt made by a litigant to mislead this Court, either by suppressing material facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements, should be curbed with an iron hand.

A litigant has every right to withdraw the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, as held by this Court in Usha Nanthini M. [2018 (2) KLT 89], which was confirmed by a Division Bench in Usha Nanthini M. [2018:KER:8915], once it is found that the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, suppressing material facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements, this Court has ample power to decline the permission sought for withdrawal of that writ petition. Dismissal of such a writ petition imposing exemplary costs is inevitable, and even necessary, to prevent abuse of the process of this Court and to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings.

The principles laid down by this Court in Usha Nanthini M. [2018 (2) KLT 89], which was confirmed by a Division Bench in Usha Nanthini M. [2018:KER:8915], apply with equal force in a case in which the petitioner seeks permission to dismiss the writ petition as infructuous, once it is found that he has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, suppressing material facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements. Dismissal of such a writ petition imposing exemplary costs is inevitable, and even necessary, to prevent abuse of the process of this Court and to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings.

When the concealed facts are material to the merits of the claim made by the petitioner in Ext.P4 petition for temporary release and even the entertainability of a writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the competent authority to consider the petition filed under Section 14 of the KAA(P) Act for temporary release, to attend a marriage ceremony, the dismissal of the writ petition imposing exemplary costs is inevitable, and even necessary, to prevent abuse of the process of this Court and to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings. It is also inevitable and even necessary to deal with such conduct of the petitioner, against whom multiple orders of preventive detention have already been passed, by initiating contempt proceedings under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for abusing the process of the court.

The memo of appearance filed in this W.P.(Crl.) contains the names of 19 junior lawyers, who were enrolled after 2021 [2021 - 1 lawyer; 2022 - 7 lawyers; 2023 - 1 lawyer; 2024 - 3 lawyers; 2025 - 3 lawyers; and 2026 - 4 lawyers]. In such circumstances, we refrain ourselves from imposing exemplary costs on the petitioner or initiating contempt proceedings against him; after making it clear that any such attempts in future for abusing the process of the court shall be dealt with sternly, in accordance with the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings.

In the above circumstances, this W.P.(Crl.) is dismissed imposing a cost of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only) on the petitioner, payable to the Kerala State Legal Services Authority, which is rendering free legal assistance to the poor, weak and marginalised sections of the society, within a period of three months from the date of this judgment.

In case of default, it would be open to the Member Secretary, Kerala State Legal Services Authority, to recover the said amount by initiating revenue recovery proceedings against the petitioner, in accordance with the provisions under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968, in terms of the notification, i.e., G.O.(Ms.)No.107/2011/RD dated 26.02.2011, issued under the provisions of Section 71 of the said Act.