Binod Kumar Singh vs Directorate Of Enforcement, Ranchi Zonal Office, Ranchi

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

The present criminal revision has been filed challenging the legality, propriety, and correctness of the order dated 10.06.2026 passed in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 2539/2025 (arising out of ECIR Case No. 06/2023) by learned AJC-I cum Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi, whereby and whereunder the learned trial court has rejected the application of the petitioner filed under Section 250 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023/227 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for discharge from the offences defined under Section 3 and punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Genesis of the prosecution case is like that in the course of investigation in ECIR/RNZO/18/2022, searches were conducted on 13.04.2023 at several premises, including the premises of Shri Bhanu Pratap Prasad, the then Revenue Sub-Inspector, Circle Office, Baragain, Ranchi. The searches resulted in the seizure of, inter alia, 17 original registers of the Circle Office and 11 trunks containing voluminous property documents, a large number of which were found to be forged, tampered with and falsified.

The said information was shared with Jharkhand Government under Section 66(2) Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002, consequent thereto an FIR bearing No. Sadar PS case No. 272/2023 dated 01.06.2023 was registered against one Bhanu Pratap Prasad, Revenue Sub-Inspector under Sections 465/467/468/469/476/420/ 379/474 of IPC on the written complaint of Manoj Kumar, Circle Officer, Baragai Anchal.

Since Sections 467/476 and 420 of IPC out of Sections 465/467/468/469/476/420/379/474 of IPC in the FIR No. 272/2023 dated 01.06.2023 were the scheduled offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Enforcement Directorate registered ECIR RNZO/25/2023 and conducted investigation under PMLA, 2002.

The investigation culminated in the submission of prosecution complaint under the PMLA, 2002 against the accused persons namely Bhanu Pratap Prasad, Raj Kumar Pahan, Hilariyas Kachhap, including the present petitioner Binod Singh arraigned as accused A-5, which resulted in the institution of ECIR Court Case No. 06/2023.

The background for sharing information u/s 66(2) of the PMLA, 2002 was the investigation by Enforcement Directorate in another case being ECIR RNZO/18/2022 into the matter of fraudulent acquisition of land, which was in possession of Ministry of Defence, Government of India, having area 4.45 acres at Morabadi, Ranchi. During the investigation of that case, it came to light that a group of private persons in connivance with government officials including the Ex-Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, and Bhanu Pratap Prasad (Revenue Sub-Inspector, Circle Office, Baragain, Ranchi) were part of land grabbing syndicate and were involved in corrupt practices, which included acquiring properties on the basis of false deeds, falsification of Government records, tampering with original revenue documents etc. in order to facilitate private persons to acquire landed properties in a fraudulent manner.

The investigation revealed the operation of an organised land-grabbing syndicate which acquired valuable parcels of land by fraudulent means, including by tampering with original government registers, falsifying government revenue records and manufacturing forged title documents. Among the properties so identified is a parcel admeasuring 8.86 acres situated at Shanti Nagar, Baragain, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi, in the locality commonly known and identified by witnesses as "Lalu Khatal", which has been illegally acquired and has remained in the continuous possession, control and beneficial enjoyment of the accused No. 2 since the year 2010-11.

It is stated that during searches on 13.04.2023 in connection with ECIR/RNZO/18/2022, handwritten diaries were also seized from the possession of other persons namely, Md. Saddam Hussain, Imtiaz Ahmad and others, who were associates of Bhanu Pratap Prasad. In the diaries cash payment to Bhanu Pratap Prasad was mentioned by his associates and in the cash transactions details in respect of property measuring 4.83 acres situated at Plot Nos. 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 72 and 73, Khata No. 53, Mouza Gari, Baragain Anchal, Ranchi, two false deeds- one of the year 1940 and the other of the year 1974 were found to have been prepared by the associates of Bhanu Pratap Prasad.

It has been stated that the land measuring 4.83 acres is a portion of 37.10 acres of land, which was purchased from Catholic Credit Cooperative Society by Mangal Mahto and Kaila Mahto in the year 1939 executed at the office of the District Sub-Registrar, Ranchi. It was revealed during investigation that the said properties are entered in Register-II at Page No. 53 of Volume-I of Gari Mouza.

The land belongs to the Mahtos, which could not be sold or transferred to the persons belonging to the General Category. However, Bhanu Pratap Prasad in connivance with his accomplices entered the property measuring 4.83 acres in the name of Samrendra Chandra Ghoshal at Page no. 139 of Register-II, Volume I. This page was earlier opened in the name of a raiyat, namely, Jitya Bhokta, Son of Tetar Bhokta. The name of Jitya Bhokta as well as Tetar Bhokta were encircled in red ink and the name of one Samrendra Chandra Ghoshal and Jitendra Chandra Ghoshal were written in place of Jitya Bhokta and Tetar Bhokta respectively thereby making this property as a general property which became saleable.

On being confronted with the said facts while recording statement u/s 50 PMLA, 2002, Bhanu Pratap Prasad had admitted about his involvement. The Circle Officer, Baragain was requested to provide a fresh certified copy of the concerned page but he, vide letter dated 19.03.2024, informed that the said page was torn and destroyed by someone, hence, the same could not be made available. It was therefore, implied that the records and evidence associated with the forgery committed by Bhanu Pratap Prasad and others are being destroyed and there are other persons involved, who is/are acting on behalf of Bhanu Pratap Prasad and others.

It has been alleged that in the first survey conducted u/s 16 of the PMLA, 2002 on 20.04.2023 in respect of 8.86 acres of land in presence of the Circle Officer, Circle Inspector, Circle Aamin, Baijnath Munda, Shyam Lal Pahan, Bhanu Pratap Prasad and the officials of the Directorate of Enforcement, Ranchi Zonal Office, it was seen that there was a big chunk of land bounded by stone walls with a temporary settlement in which a family consisting of five persons were residing and on inquiry about the ownership of the land, one lady residing and available there stated that the owner of the said 8.86 acres of the land was A-2.

In the course of inquiry, one Santosh Munda had stated that the land belonged to Mantri Ji. On further inquiry, Santosh Munda had stated that the land was in custody of A-2, which was noted by all persons present during the survey proceedings by putting their signatures on the paper drawn for that purpose.

In the second survey dated 10.02.2024, conducted in the presence of the officials of the Circle Office, Baragain, the Anchal Ameen, the Petitioner Binod Kumar Singh himself and Shri Bhanu Pratap Prasad, it was confirmed and recorded that the locality shown on the Banquet Hall plan retrieved from the Petitioner's mobile phone is the same locality in which the 8.86 acres of land is situated, and further that no other parcel of comparable dimension was available in that locality upon which a structure of the kind proposed could be constructed. The said survey proceedings, being records prepared and attested by competent public officials.

During investigation it is revealed that the Petitioner, Binod Kumar Singh, is a partner in M/s Grids Consultants and is a very close associate of Accused No. 2. In the course of investigation in ECIR/RNZO/07/2023, a search under Section 17 of the PMLA, 2002 was conducted on 03.01.2024 at the residential premises of the Petitioner, in the course of which his mobile phone, his laptop and unaccounted cash amounting to Rs. 23,74,000/- were seized. Scrutiny of the seized mobile phone yielded highly incriminating material, including WhatsApp communications exchanged between the Petitioner (mobile No. 983xxxxx76) and Accused No. 2 (mobile No. 94xxxxx949).

It is further revealed that the said WhatsApp communications establish that on 06.04.2021 the Petitioner shared with Accused No. 2 the plan/layout of a proposed Banquet Hall, prepared by his own firm M/s Grids Consultants, bearing the name of the said firm upon its face and describing the location of the proposed construction as "Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi". The date borne on the said site plan is 12.04.2018.

It is alleged that it has come during investigation that the said plan was under continuous amendment and active professional processing for a period of more than four years. The WhatsApp communications between the Petitioner and his own employee Shri Pranav Kumar Mandal establish that on 10.09.2022 the Petitioner shared with the said employee a file expressly titled "banquet @bariyatul.pdf", in which the name of the project was recorded as "Proposed Banquet Hall" and the address was recorded as "Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi".

It has come in the investigation that the said Pranav Kumar Mandal, in his statement recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA on 08.03.2024, has confirmed that the site plan was shared with him by the Petitioner for the purpose of carrying out edits to the parking area of the said plan, and that after making the requisite edits he reverted the same to the Petitioner. Conspicuously, the said site plan bears the name of M/s Grids Consultants but bears no client's name whatsoever.

It is alleged that when Accused No. 2 was confronted with the said WhatsApp chats in his statement dated 05.02.2024 recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, he refused to append his signature upon the chats, furnished false information in respect thereof, and declined to produce his mobile phone for cross-verification. When further confronted on 06.02.2024 with the construction plan of the proposed Banquet Hall at Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi, prepared on 12.04.2018 and shared by the Petitioner on 06.04.2021, Accused No. 2 had stated that he had no information whatsoever regarding the said property.

The investigation further revealed that after the first summons was issued to Accused No. 2, an application was immediately moved by his accomplice Shri Raj Kumar Pahan before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, registered as SAR Case No. 81/2023-24, and by order dated 29.01.2024 the SAR Court cancelled the jamabandis of the earlier occupants, thereby enabling Shri Raj Kumar Pahan to acquire the property on paper and to distance Accused No. 2 from his illegal occupation and possession.

Upon completion of investigation, the Prosecution Complaint dated 30.03.2024 was filed under Sections 44 and 45 of the PMLA, 2002 before the learned Special Court (PMLA), Ranchi, arraigning the Petitioner as Accused No. 5, and cognizance was taken vide order dated 04.04.2024. Supplementary Prosecution Complaints dated 07.06.2024 and 10.08.2024 were thereafter filed, the latter recording, inter alia, the provisional attachment of the said 8.86 acres of property at Shanti Nagar, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi.

It is alleged that the role attributed to the Petitioner in the Prosecution Complaint is specific and he is directly a party with Accused No. 2 in the concealment of proceeds of crime and he prepared a plan of a Banquet Hall proposed for construction upon the said 8.86 acres of property, the said plan having been made in the year 2018 and having remained under continuous amendment until 2022 and the name of petitioner‘s firm M/s Grids Consultants was borne upon the said plan and he transmitted the said plan to Accused No. 2 over WhatsApp as such he was accordingly well aware of the land upon which the said Banquet Hall was proposed to be constructed and despite such knowledge he gave a false statement under Section 50 of the PMLA in order to assist Accused No. 2 in concealing the proceeds of crime; and that he thereby knowingly became a party with Accused No. 2 in the concealment of the true possession and use of the said property.

It has come on record that Petitioner was not arrested during investigation, no occasion for custodial interrogation having arisen. He furnished bonds under Section 88 of the Cr.P.C. which were accepted by the learned Special Court vide order dated 08.08.2024.

Thereafter the Petitioner's application for discharge, was filed under Section 250 of the BNSS, 2023 and registered as Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 2539/2025, came to be rejected by the learned Special Judge vide the impugned order dated 10.06.2026 against which the present revision has been preferred.

While assailing the impugned order the learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the following grounds:

Per contra the learned counsel for respondent ED while defending the impugned order has taken the following ground:

This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and has also gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned order as also the counter affidavit.

It is evident that the prosecution case, as emerging from the Prosecution Complaint, originates from searches conducted by the Enforcement Directorate on 13.04.2023 during investigation of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 relating to fraudulent acquisition of government and private lands in Ranchi. During the searches at the premises of Bhanu Pratap Prasad, then Revenue Sub-Inspector, Baragain Circle Office, 17 original revenue registers and 11 trunks containing voluminous property documents were seized, many of which were found to be forged, tampered with and falsified.

On the basis of information shared under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, Sadar P.S. Case No. 272/2023 dated 01.06.2023 was registered against Bhanu Pratap Prasad under various provisions of the IPC, including Sections 467 and 420 IPC, which are scheduled offences under the PMLA. Consequently, ECIR/RNZO/25/2023 was registered and investigation under the PMLA commenced. The investigation culminated in filing of a Prosecution Complaint against Bhanu Pratap Prasad, Raj Kumar Pahan, Hilariyas Kachhap and others including the present petitioner Binod Kumar Singh (A-5), leading to institution of ECIR Case No. 06/2023.

The investigation disclosed the existence of an organised land-grabbing syndicate involving private individuals and public officials, which allegedly acquired valuable lands through forged title deeds, falsification of revenue records, tampering of government registers and illegal transfer of protected lands. Particular focus was placed on a parcel measuring 8.86 acres situated at Shanti Nagar, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi, locally known as "Lalu Khatal", which was alleged to have been fraudulently acquired and continuously possessed by accused no. 2 since 2010-11. Investigation further revealed manipulation of revenue records relating to 4.83 acres of land forming part of a larger 37.10 acres property originally belonging to members of the Mahto community.

It has been alleged that Bhanu Pratap Prasad and his associates fraudulently altered entries in Register-II by replacing the names of tribal raiyats with those of Samrendra Chandra Ghoshal and Jitendra Chandra Ghoshal, thereby converting restricted land into transferable general category land. Bhanu Pratap Prasad allegedly admitted his involvement during his statement under Section 50 of the PMLA. Subsequently, the concerned page of the revenue register was reported to have been torn and destroyed, suggesting attempts to obliterate evidence.

During surveys conducted under Section 16 of the PMLA on 20.04.2023 and 10.02.2024, statements of local occupants and officials allegedly confirmed that the aforesaid 8.86 acres land was under the possession and control of accused no. 2. The second survey, attended by the petitioner himself, Bhanu Pratap Prasad and revenue officials, allegedly established that the locality depicted in a Banquet Hall plan recovered from the petitioner's mobile phone corresponded to the same "Lalu Khatal" property and that no comparable plot existed in the vicinity.

Investigation revealed that the petitioner, a partner of M/s Grids Consultants and a close associate of accused no. 2, had shared with accused no. 2 through WhatsApp a proposed Banquet Hall plan bearing the name of his firm and showing the project location as "Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi".

The records further indicated that the project remained under active modification from 2018 to 2022. The petitioner's employee, Pranav Kumar Mandal, in his statement under Section 50 PMLA, confirmed having edited the plan on the petitioner's instructions. It was also alleged that accused no. 2, when confronted with these communications, denied knowledge of the project, refused to authenticate the chats and withheld his mobile phone from verification.

The prosecution case against the petitioner is that despite being fully aware of the identity, location and possession of the 8.86 acres property, he assisted accused no. 2 in concealing the proceeds of crime. It is alleged that the petitioner knowingly prepared and repeatedly modified the Banquet Hall project plan concerning the said land and transmitted it to accused no. 2, yet subsequently furnished a false statement under Section 50 of the PMLA with a view to conceal the true ownership, possession and intended utilisation of the property.

Upon completion of investigation, the Prosecution Complaint dated 30.03.2024 was filed under Sections 44 and 45 of the PMLA wherein present petitioner has been arraigned as accused A-5. Thereafter cognizance was taken on 04.04.2024 and supplementary complaints were thereafter filed, including one recording provisional attachment of the 8.86 acres land.

The petitioner was not arrested during investigation and was allowed to furnish bonds under Section 88 Cr.P.C. on 08.08.2024.

However, his application for discharge under Section 250 BNSS, registered as Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 2539/2025, was rejected by the learned Special Judge on 10.06.2026, giving rise to the present criminal revision.

It has come on record that during the pendency of the present Criminal Revision, charge under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the PMLA, 2002 has been framed against the Petitioner by the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi on 11.08.2026.

In the background of the factual aspect as referred hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs, the issues which require consideration are that:

Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they are taken up together.

This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties and appreciating the said issues, deems it fit and proper to discuss herein some of the provisions of law as contained under the Act, 2002 with its object and intent.

The Act 2002 was enacted to address the urgent need to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof including vesting of it in the Central Government, setting up of agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for combating money laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.

It is, thus, evident that Act 2002 was enacted in order to answer the urgent requirement to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof for combating money-laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.

It needs to refer herein the definition of ―proceeds of crime‖ as provided under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act, 2002 which reads as under:

It is evident from the aforesaid provision that ―proceeds of crime‖ means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.

In the explanation it has been referred that for removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The aforesaid explanation has been inserted in the statute book by way of Act 23 of 2019. It is, thus, evident that the reason for giving explanation under Section 2(1)(u) is by way of clarification to the effect that whether as per the substantive provision of Section 2(1)(u), the property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country but by way of explanation the proceeds of crime has been given broader implication by including property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

The ―property‖ has been defined under Section 2(1)(v) which means any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located.

The schedule has been defined under Section 2(1)(x) which means schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The ―scheduled offence‖ has been defined under Section 2(1)(y) which reads as under: ―2(y) ―scheduled offence‖ means— (i) the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or (ii) the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or (iii) the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.‖

It is evident that the ―scheduled offence‖ means the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.

The offence of money laundering has been defined under Section 3 of the Act, 2002, which reads as under:

It is evident from the aforesaid provision that ―offence of money laundering‖ means whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.

It is further evident that the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.

The punishment for money laundering has been provided under Section 4 of the Act, 2002.

The various provisions of the Act, 2002 along with interpretation of the definition of ―proceeds of crime‖ has been dealt with by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (supra) wherein the Bench comprising of three Hon‘ble Judges of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court has decided the issue by taking into consideration the object and intent of the Act, 2002.

It is evident that the purposes and objects of the 2002 Act for which it has been enacted, is not limited to punishment for offence of money laundering, but also to provide measures for prevention of money laundering. It is also to provide for attachment of proceeds of crime, which are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceeding relating to confiscation of such proceeds under the 2002 Act. This Act is also to compel the banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries to maintain records of the transactions, to furnish information of such transactions within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter IV of the 2002 Act.

The predicate offence has been considered in the aforesaid judgment wherein by taking into consideration the explanation as inserted by way of Act 23 of 2019 under the definition of the ―proceeds of crime‖ as contained under Section 2(1)(u), whereby and whereunder, it has been clarified for the purpose of removal of doubts that, the "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence, meaning thereby, the words ―any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence‖ will come under the fold of the proceeds of crime.

In the judgment rendered by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) it has been held that the Authority under the 2002 Act, is to prosecute a person for offence of money-laundering only if it has reason to believe, which is required to be recorded in writing that the person is in possession of ―proceeds of crime‖. Only if that belief is further supported by tangible and credible evidence indicative of involvement of the person concerned in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, action under the Act can be taken forward for attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated would be a standalone process.

Now, after having discussed the judgments passed by the Hon‘ble Apex Court on the issue of various provisions of the Act, 2002, this Court, is now proceeding to discuss the principle governing framing of charge.

But before discuss the principle related framing of charge it would be apt to discuss herein principle of Section 250 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‗BNSS‘ for brevity) provides for discharge in sessions cases, because framing of charge is the stage after rejection of discharge application. The Section 250 of BNSS is being quoted herein which reads as under:

Section 227 of Code of Criminal Procedure (‗CrPC‘ for brevity) contemplates discharge by the Court of Session. The trial Judge is required to discharge the accused if the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Section 250(2) BNSS corresponds to section 227 CrPC. Section 250(1) BNSS stipulates a time limit of 60 days from the date of committal of the case within which an application for discharge should be filed by the accused.

Section 239 CrPC provides for discharge of accused in warrant cases instituted upon a police report. The power under section 239 Cr.P.C. is exercisable when Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. Section 262(2) BNSS is similar to section 239 CrPC but section 262 BNSS provides an opportunity to the learned Magistrate to examine the accused either physically or through audio – video electronic means. Section 262(1) BNSS stipulates a time limit of 60 days from the date of supply of documents under section 230 BNSS within which an application should for discharge should be filed by the accused.

Section 245 Cr.P.C. deals with warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. Section 245 CrPC corresponds to section 268 of BNSS. The power under section 245 (1) Cr.P.C. is exercisable when the Magistrate considers that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction. The Magistrate has the power of discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case under section 245 (2) Cr.P.C. Sections 227 and 239 Cr.P.C. provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. But the stage of discharge under section 245 Cr.P.C., on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in section 244 is taken. Despite the difference in the language of the provisions of sections 227, 239 and 245 Cr.P.C. and whichever provision may be applicable, the Court is required to see, at the time of framing of charge, that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under sections 227 or 239 of Cr.P.C. is to assist the Court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial.

The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu, by Inspector of Police in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, wherein, at paragraphs no.29, 32.4, 33 and 34, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:—

It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191. For ready reference, paragraph no. 11 of the said judgment is being quoted hereinbelow: —

Further, it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him.

If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.

Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, in the following words: —

This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word ―presume‖ while relying upon Black's Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean ―to believe or accept upon probable evidence‖; ―to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming‖. In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence.

The Hon'ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) wherein, at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14, it has been held as under:

In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768, the above principles have been reiterated in para 17, 18, 28 to 31 and the Hon'ble supreme court has explained as to how the matters of grave suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs are being quoted as under:

It has been further held in the case of Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148, that mini trial is not expected by the trial court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record at the time of framing of charge, wherein, it has been held at paragraph no.18 of the said judgment as under: —

In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA, (supra), it has been held by the Hon‘ble Apex Court that the words ‗not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused‘ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.

Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. However, the defence of the accused cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge. The accused has no right to produce any document at that stage. The application for discharge has to be considered on the premise that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true.

Thus, at the time of considering an application for discharge, the Court is required to consider the limited extent to find out whether there is prima facie evidence against the accused to believe that he has committed any offence as alleged by the prosecution; if prima facie evidence is available against the accused, then there cannot be an order of discharge.

Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed to framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the prosecution or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused.

While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of discharge or considering the discharge application the mini trial is not permissible.

The test to determine a prima facie case against the accused would naturally depend on the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down the rule of universal application and if the material placed before the Court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in rejecting the discharge application and proceeding with the trial.

Thus, from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements it is evident that at the stage of considering discharge, trial court is not to examine and assess in detail the material placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. Marshalling of facts and appreciation of evidence at the time of considering discharge is not in the domain of the court. Discharge application can be rejected even on the basis of strong suspicion founded upon materials before the court which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused.

It needs to refer herein that ingredients of offences should be seen in the material produced before the court and duty of court at the stage of considering the discharge is to see whether the ingredients of offences are available in the material produced before the court. Contradictions in the statements of witnesses or sufficiency or truthfulness of the material placed before the court cannot be examined at the stage of consideration of discharge. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence. Court has to consider material only with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offense and not for the purpose of arriving at a definite conclusion. "Presume‟ means if on the basis of materials on record, court can come to the conclusion that commission of the offense is a probable consequence, then a case for framing of charge exists.

Thus, it is well settled that at the time of considering discharge meticulous examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out to proceed in the case. Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding that a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner.

It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of discharge the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made in the First Information Report/complaint, the statement of the witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the documents on which the prosecution relies and the report of investigation submitted by the prosecuting agency. The probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of trial and not at the stage of discharge and at the stage of considering discharge application minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be made.

Further it is settled position of law that at the stage of discharge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for rejecting the discharge and the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the stage of consideration of discharge and, therefore, at the stage of considering the discharge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material.

Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge.

At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the prosecution or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused.

While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.

Further, while considering the question of discharge, the Court has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the materials for the limited purpose for finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. In exercising the power, the Court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution.

The test to determine a prima facie case against the accused would naturally depend on the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down the rule of universal application and if the material placed before the Court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in rejecting the discharge application and proceeding with the trial.

In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Golconda Linga Swamy (2004) 6 SCC 522, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that at the stage of discharge, evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It was held that it is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence and a charge can be framed if there are materials showing possibility about commission of the offence by the accused as against certainty.

Thus, from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements it is evident that at the stage of discharge, trial court is not to examine and assess in detail the material placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. Marshalling of facts and appreciation of evidence at the time of discharge is not in the domain of the court. Discharge application can be rejected even on the basis of strong suspicion founded upon materials before the court which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused.

It needs to refer herein that duty of court at the stage of discharge is to see whether the ingredients of offences are available in the material produced before the court. Contradictions in the statements of witnesses or sufficiency or truthfulness of the material placed before the court cannot be examined at the stage of discharge. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence. Court has to consider material only with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offense and not for the purpose of arriving at a definite conclusion.

In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation and brought on record, as would be available in the impugned order, prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not?

Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the investigation has not unearthed any material indicating that the petitioner was ever in possession of the alleged proceeds of crime or had derived any pecuniary benefit therefrom. It has been contended that the sole allegation against the petitioner is that he prepared a proposed plan for a Banquet Hall and shared the same through WhatsApp. According to the petitioner, even if the said allegation is accepted in its entirety, such an act by itself does not constitute any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime so as to attract the provisions of Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. It has further been argued that there is no material on record to suggest that the petitioner was a party to any conspiracy concerning the disputed property, was involved in the preparation of any forged document, had any role in the SAR proceedings, or was aware of the alleged tainted character of the property in question. On the aforesaid premises, it is submitted that the continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

Per contra the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Enforcement Directorate submitted that the role attributed to the petitioner cannot be examined in isolation and is required to be appreciated in the backdrop of the entire prosecution case. It has been contended that the preparation and dissemination of the proposed plan was not an independent or innocuous act, but formed part of a series of activities undertaken for the development and utilization of the disputed property. Learned counsel further submitted that the cumulative material and surrounding circumstances collected during the course of investigation disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding against the petitioner in accordance with law.

In the context of the aforesaid contention of learned Counsel for the parties, it also needs to refer herein the specific role attributed against the petitioner as has been referred in the prosecution complaint. For better appreciation, the specific role of the petitioner in the commission of offence under PMLA is being reproduced as under:

Thus, from the aforesaid paragraph of the prosecution complaint, it is evident that during the course of investigation, the prosecution/Enforcement Directorate found a WhatsApp communication between accused A-2, using mobile No. 943xxxxxx9, and accused/petitioner Binod Singh, using mobile No. 983xxxxx76, wherein a proposed Banquet Hall plan was shared by Binod Singh with A-2. The said plan bore the description ―Lalu Khatal‖.

According to the respondent, witnesses examined during investigation have identified the disputed 8.86 acres of land as ―Lalu Khatal land‖ or ―Lalu Khatal property‖, and the said property is commonly known by the aforesaid name. The material collected during investigation is indicative of the fact that the accused A-2 was aware of the proposed project and, being interested in the property, was involved in planning its development and exercising beneficial control over the land. According to the prosecution, such circumstances assume significance under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, as possession, use and enjoyment of the alleged proceeds of crime constitute part of its case.

This court finds that the inference sought to be drawn by the Enforcement Directorate possesses some probative value, inasmuch as the expression ―Lalu Khatal‖ emerges from two independent sources, namely, (i) the Banquet Hall plan shared by present petitioner Binod Singh with A-2 through WhatsApp, and (ii) the statements of witnesses who have consistently referred to the disputed 8.86 acres of land as ―Lalu Khatal land‖ or ―Lalu Khatal property‖.

The Banquet Hall plan is, therefore, not being relied upon in isolation. Rather, it constitutes one link in the chain of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Enforcement Directorate to establish that A-2 was in possession of the disputed land and exercised control and supervision over the same.

At the stage of consideration of a discharge application, the Court is not required to determine whether such material conclusively establishes ownership or possession; the relevant consideration is whether the circumstance is capable of lending support to the prosecution's case.

Viewed from the aforesaid limited perspective, the sharing of the Banquet Hall plan between accused/petitioner Binod Singh and A-2, coupled with the reference to ―Lalu Khatal‖ in the plan and the identification of the disputed property by the same name in the statements of witnesses, constitutes a circumstance from which an inference may be drawn that the said plan pertained to the property under investigation.

The Banquet Hall map remains a relevant circumstance which, when read in conjunction with the other materials collected during investigation, contributes towards a prima facie inference regarding the knowledge, interest and possible beneficial enjoyment of the land by A-2. Though the plan alone may not be insufficient to sustain a prosecution, it is capable, when considered along with the other evidence relied upon by the respondent Enforcement Directorate, of contributing to a finding of grave suspicion.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has laid considerable emphasis on the fact that while the ECIR refers to Shri Bhanu Pratap Prasad "and unknown others", it does not specifically name the present petitioner. Therefore, it has been argued that the trial being conducted against the petitioner lacks legal foundation and is unsustainable in the eyes of law.

But in the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that an ECIR is an internal departmental record and is not a statutory document equivalent to an FIR, as has been authoritatively held in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (supra). Investigation under the PMLA is a progressive and dynamic exercise, and the arraignment of a person whose complicity surfaces in the course of investigation is not merely permissible but obligatory. As reaffirmed in Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement 2023 INSC 1029 a person need not be named in the predicate FIR, much less in the ECIR, to be prosecuted under Section 3 of the PMLA.

It has further been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the document recovered during the course of investigation i.e. the alleged/incriminating map, was nothing more than a ―rough conceptual sketch‖ which was never acted upon or implemented. Therefore, according to the petitioner, no inference regarding his involvement in the alleged commission of the crime can be drawn solely on the basis of the said map.

In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that from the record it appears that the document was a site plan dated 12.04.2018, bearing the imprimatur of M/s Grids Consultants, bearing the specific project name "Proposed Banquet Hall" and the specific address "Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi", transmitted to Accused No. 2 on 06.04.2021, and thereafter transmitted on 10.09.2022 to the Petitioner's own employee under the file name "banquet @ bariyatul.pdf" for the purpose of effecting edits to the parking layout edits which were in fact carried out and returned.

Thus, prima facie, it can be inferred that a drawing which is site-specific, bears the name and branding of the concerned architectural firm, and has undergone revisions over a period of more than four and a half years, cannot readily be characterized as a mere conceptual doodle or rough sketch. Be that as it may, whether the document in question constitutes only a preliminary sketch or a developed architectural layout, and whether an architect is professionally obligated to verify the title or ownership of the land concerned, are essentially questions of fact as well as matters of professional practice. Such issues can only be adjudicated upon after appreciation of evidence during trial and cannot be conclusively determined at this stage of the proceedings.

Further from record it is evident that a search under Section 17 of the PMLA was conducted on 03.01.2024 at the residential premises of the Petitioner in the course of investigation in ECIR/RNZO/07/2023, in which his mobile phone, his laptop and unaccounted cash amounting to Rs. 23,74,000/- were seized. It is from that very mobile phone that the incriminating WhatsApp communications between the Petitioner and Accused No. 2, and the Banquet Hall plan bearing the address "Lalu Khatal", were retrieved. However the Petitioner is not charged with acquiring or holding the 8.86 acres and is charged with knowingly being a party to its concealment.

Further the prosecution/ED relies upon the seized mobile device and its contents, the plan of 12.04.2018 bearing the address "Lalu Khatal, Bariyatu Road, Ranchi"; the transmission of whatsapp made by petitioner on 06.04.2021 to Accused No. 2, the transmission of 10.09.2022 to Shri Pranav Kumar Mandal under the file name "banquet @bariyatul.pdf"; the Section 50 statement of Shri Pranav Kumar Mandal dated 08.03.2024; the survey proceedings under Section 16 of the PMLA dated 20.04.2023 and 10.02.2024; the identification by witnesses of the disputed parcel as "Lalu Khatal"; the statements of the Petitioner under Section 50 of the PMLA; and the statements and refusal to co-operate of Accused No. 2 when confronted with the very same chats.

Further, it is alleged by the ED that petitioner concealed his knowledge of the Banquet Hall plan and of the property. The falsity of his statement stands demonstrated by the contents of his own seized device, by the survey proceedings, by the statement of his own employee and by the mutually corroborative statement of Accused No. 2 on the very same subject.

It is the considered view of this Court that whether the alleged falsity of the assertions or documents relied upon by the prosecution is ultimately established beyond reasonable doubt is a matter to be determined upon appreciation of evidence during trial. At this stage, it would not be proper for the Court to undertake a detailed examination of the merits of the allegations or to record findings on disputed questions of fact.

Further it is apparent from record that the Petitioner is not alleged to have projected the property as untainted in his own hands but he is alleged to have knowingly assisted accused No. 2 in concealing the true possession, control and beneficial enjoyment of the tainted property.

It needs to refer herein that Clause (i) of the Explanation to Section 3 of the Act 2002 enumerates concealment, possession, acquisition, use, projecting as untainted property and claiming as untainted property as six independent and severable processes or activities, involvement in any one of which constitutes the offence. Clause (ii) declares the offence to be a continuing one. The Explanation to Section 2(1)(u), inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019, expressly extends the definition of proceeds of crime to property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

Further, the petitioner has placed his reliance upon the case of Jafar Mohammed Hasanfatta v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2017 SCC OnLine Guj 2476. In that case the impugned conduct of the petitioners was the passive receipt of funds through regular banking channels from a relative, and there was no material of any description to impute knowledge.

In the present case the Petitioner as per allegation, has affirmatively created, branded, transmitted and, over a period of four and a half years, revised a development plan for the very parcel constituting the proceeds of crime, transmitted it directly to the person in illegal possession thereof, and thereafter denied all knowledge of it upon oath. Further, and decisively, Jafar Mohammed Hasanfatta case was decided in the year 2017 and its observations upon the reach of Sections 3 and 24 of the PMLA must now be read subject to the authoritative and binding exposition of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), decided in 2022. Accordingly, in the light of the factual matrix and circumstances obtaining in the present case, this Court finds that the ratio laid down in the judgment relied upon by the petitioner doesn‘t lends support to the petitioner's contention.

Further the reliance placed by the petitioner on the case of Shyam Radhakrishna Malpani v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2404, is also distinguishable upon its facts and affords the Petitioner no assistance. The case concerned a statutory external auditor prosecuted for a failure to detect sham transactions for an omission amounting at highest to professional negligence, in the discharge of a statutory audit function performed transparently and on the record.

The present case concerns as per the prosecution complaint, an act, performed off the record, for a client whose name does not appear anywhere upon the document, followed by an affirmative denial of that act upon oath. The distinction between a professional who fails to detect wrongdoing and a professional who conceals his own participation is fundamental. It may further be noticed that the Bombay High Court in the very passage extracted by the Petitioner reiterates that the Court must consider "the broad probabilities of the case" and "the cumulative effect of the documents produced" which is an exercise which the learned Special Judge has performed in the impugned order.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement v. Murali Krishna Chakrala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 878, wherein the judgment of the Madras High Court dated 23.11.2022 in Murali Krishna Chakrala v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, has been affirmed. In the said case Chartered Accountant was discharged upon the specific reasoning that in issuing a Form 15CB certificate he was required only to examine the nature of the remittance and was not required to go behind the genuineness of the documents furnished by his client. But in the instant case three features distinguish the present case decisively. First, the Petitioner acted for no disclosed client at all: the site plan bears the name of M/s Grids Consultants but bears no client's name whatsoever, and no engagement letter, fee note, invoice, professional register entry or any other contemporaneous professional record has been produced by the Petitioner to evidence a bona fide professional engagement. Secondly, the Chartered Accountant in Chakrala performed a statutory function transparently and never denied having performed it but herein as per allegation the Petitioner concealed the very existence of the plan and gave a false statement under Section 50 of the PMLA. Thirdly, here the Petitioner was, on his own showing, professionally engaged with a site over four and a half years, transmitted the plan directly to the person in illegal possession, and had every means of knowing. The Chakrala principle protects the professional who is transparent; it does not protect the professional who conceals. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the petitioner is not applicable in the fact and circumstances of the instant case.

Upon consideration of the rival submissions and the materials placed on record, this Court is of the view that the settled principles governing discharge favour continuation of the prosecution where the circumstances, when cumulatively assessed, give rise to a grave suspicion regarding the involvement of the accused. At this stage, the Enforcement Directorate is not required to establish actual conspiracy, actual manipulation of records, or the ultimate guilt of the accused beyond doubt. The requirement is only to demonstrate the existence of material giving rise to a reasonable prima facie inference warranting a trial.

The circumstances relied upon by the Enforcement Directorate, including the disputed property under investigation, the emergence of the SAR proceedings, the alleged unusual urgency surrounding the passing of the order contemporaneous with the investigation being conducted by the Enforcement Directorate, and the broader materials linking A-2 with possession of the property and an intention to develop and commercially exploit the same, when viewed cumulatively, appear sufficient to justify the continuation of the proceedings.

The contention of the petitioner that preparation of a plan by itself does not establish the offence alleged cannot be accepted as a ground for discharge at this stage. The issue before this court is not whether the said circumstance conclusively establishes guilt but whether it constitutes relevant material requiring examination during trial.

The prosecution seeks to rely upon said document as one link in a chain of circumstances and not as a sole incriminating material whether the proposed Banquet Hall plan actually relates to the disputed property, whether the applicant prepared the same with knowledge of the alleged of the property, and whether his acts amount to knowingly giving assistance or participating in activities connected with the proceeds of crime are all matters requiring evidence and cross-examination. These issues cannot be conclusively determined at the stage of discharge.

Further, whether the Petitioner prepared the plan with knowledge of the character of the property and whether his acts amount to knowingly giving assistance in activities connected with proceeds of crime are "all matters requiring evidence and cross-examination" which "cannot be conclusively determined at the stage of discharge".

Further, it is settled position of law that no professional enjoys a status-based immunity under the PMLA. The said protection attaches to the professional who acts transparently within the four corners of a disclosed engagement and does not conceal what he has done. But it does not attach to a professional who acts for an undisclosed client, whose drawing bears no client's name, who produces no engagement letter, fee note or invoice, who transmits his work directly and privately to a person in illegal possession of the site, and who thereafter denies the whole transaction upon oath in a proceeding deemed judicial by Section 50(4) of the PMLA. Therefore, the question whether the Petitioner falls in the former class or the latter is precisely what the trial must determine.

It is settled position which has been settled in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659, wherein it has been held that the requisite intention or knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances proved and need not be established by direct evidence at the stage of framing of charge.

The circumstances from which such knowledge is prima facie inferable herein based upon the prosecution complaint that the Petitioner is a close associate of Accused No. 2, petitioner‘s firm carried the project on its books from 2018 to 2022, the plan bore the specific locality description "Lalu Khatal‖, and witnesses identify the disputed 8.86 acres by that very name. Further the survey dated 10.02.2024, conducted in the Petitioner's own presence, confirmed the identity of the locality and the plan bore no client's name; and it is alleged that the Petitioner concealed the entire transaction and gave a false statement under Section 50 of the PMLA. Whether these aforesaid circumstances ultimately sustain a finding of knowledge beyond reasonable doubt is a question for the trial.

The petitioner is hereby charged under Section 3 of the PMLA with allegation that he is knowingly being a party to, and knowingly assisting in, a process or activity connected with proceeds of crime. Further it alleged that he assists to Accused no.2 in the concealment of the possession and beneficial enjoyment of the 8.86 acres by Accused No. 2. Thus, it is impossible at this stage to adjudicate the Petitioner's participation in that concealment without examining what was being concealed, by whom and from whom.

Having considered the prosecution complaint, witnesses statements, documentary evidence relied upon by the complainant/prosecution, digital evidence and the surrounding circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, this court is of the opinion that the material on record cannot be said to be wholly insufficient or incapable of giving rise to a prima facie inference against the petitioner. The material rather raises issues requiring adjudication upon evidence during the trial.

Furthermore, it is the settled position of law that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, interference with an order passed by a subordinate Court is permissible only if such order suffers from perversity or patent error, thereby occasioning a failure of justice.

At this juncture it needs to refer herein that the word ‗perverse‘ has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:

Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law then it will come under the purview of perverse order. Further ―perverse verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.

Thus, ―perversity‖ refers to a finding or decision so unreasonable or irrational that no reasonable person acting judicially could have reached it. It signifies a gross and unreasonable assessment of evidence or law by a court.

Further Perversity is a high threshold for intervention, distinguishing it from a mere error of fact or law. The "safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man's inference on the facts but inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 14 SCC 197.

This Court, in order to examine whether the impugned order dated 10.06.2026 suffers from perversity, has perused the same.

From the impugned order it is evident that the learned Special Judge has recorded satisfaction that there exists sufficient material to proceed against the petitioner for the offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, punishable under Section 4 thereof.

Further it is also evident from impugned order that the learned Special Judge sets out Section 250 of the BNSS and its correspondence with Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. and applies State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 and the allied line of authority. Further it is evident from the impugned order that the learned special Judge deals specifically and separately with the material available against this Petitioner and identifies the cumulative circumstances relied upon and records conclusion with reasons.

Thus, it is evident from the impugned order that the learned Special Court, PMLA, Ranchi, upon due consideration of the materials available on record, confined itself to the limited exercise of examining whether a prima facie case existed against the petitioner warranting continuation of the proceedings. Having found sufficient material for such purpose, the learned Special Court proceeded to reject the discharge application. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be said to suffer from any legal infirmity, jurisdictional error, or perversity warranting interference by this Court.

At this juncture, it needs to refer herein that the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Versus Directorate of Enforcement and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 560 has observed that as established in multiple judicial pronouncements, cases involving economic offences necessitate a thorough trial to unearth the complete chain of events, financial transactions, and culpability of the accused, therefore the material submitted by the respondent, coupled with the broad legislative framework of the PMLA, indicates the necessity of allowing the trial to proceed and not discharging the appellant at the nascent stage of charge framing and discharging the appellant at this stage would be premature and contrary to the principles governing the prosecution in money laundering cases, for ready reference the relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under:

Thus, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove, the materials available on record, including the statements of witnesses and other documents collected during investigation, and bearing in mind the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the present petitioner. The contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner essentially pertain to disputed questions of fact and matters requiring appreciation of evidence, which can be adjudicated only during trial. Therefore, the petitioner cannot seek rebuttal of the prosecution allegations at this stage of the proceedings.

Further, it needs to refer herein that the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 9 SCC 631 has observed that the revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.

Thus, it is evident that the revisional power can only be exercised to correct patent error of law or procedure which would occasion unfairness, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be compared with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.

The Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu, and Ors., (2023) 6 SCC 768 has held at paragraphs-81 to 83 as under:

Thus, the ambit and scope of exercise of power of discharge is fairly well settled which has been elaborately discussed in the preceding paragraphs and as per settled proposition of law, no comprehensive assessment of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defence need to be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden scales is to be undertaken at this stage. The only deliberation at the stage of framing of charge is “as to whether prima facie case was made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not”.

Further, it is well settled that the revisional power cannot be parallelled with appellate power. The Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as is undertaken by the Trial Court or the Appellate Court.

Further, it is evident from the impugned order that the learned Special Court, PMLA, Ranchi, correctly applied the settled principles governing consideration of a discharge application and restricted its scrutiny to ascertaining whether sufficient material existed on record to proceed against the petitioner. Upon being satisfied that a prima facie case was made out, the discharge application was rejected. In such circumstances, this Court finds no error in the approach adopted by the learned Special Court.

Hence, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove and taking into consideration the settled position of law as discussed and referred hereinabove and further taking into consideration the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Versus Directorate of Enforcement and Another (supra), this court is of the considered view that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned dated 10.06.2026 passed in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 2539/2025 (arising out of ECIR Case No. 06/2023) by learned AJC-I cum Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi, whereby and whereunder the learned trial court has rejected the application of the petitioner filed for discharge from the offences defined under Section 3 and punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Accordingly, this Court does not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 10.06.2026.

In view thereof, the instant criminal revision petition, is hereby, dismissed.

Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

It is made clear that any observations made herein are prima-facie for consideration of issue involved in the instant revision petition and view expressed herein shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the case. The learned Trial Court shall proceed with the matter uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court and shall decide the case strictly in accordance with law.