Bhupendra Kumar vs Delhi Development Authority

On 03.10.2024, the finalseniority list of Executive Engineers (Civil) was issued (Annexure A-4), wherein the applicant was placed at Seniority No. 770. His seniority and eligibility for further promotion were not in dispute thereafter.

The next promotional post from Executive Engineer (Civil) is that of Superintending Engineer (Civil). The applicant had completed the prescribed qualifying service in the feeder cadre and his case was due for consideration for promotion with effect from 01.01.2026.

On 24.12.2024, the respondent issued a circular requiring the employees to submit their Immovable Property Return (IPR) for the calendar year ending 31.12.2024 by 31.01.2025 through the online DDA portal (Annexure A-5). The said circular provided that non-filing or delay in filing of the IPR would attract denial of vigilance clearance and disciplinary action under Regulation 16 of the DDA Conduct, Disciplinary and Appeal Regulations, 1999. The said circular did not stipulate withholding of promotion as a consequence of delayed submission of the IPR.

Thereafter, vide order dated 07.01.2025 (Annexure A-6), the Vice Chairman, DDA entrusted the applicant with the additional charge of the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) under FR 49(i). The said entrustment itself shows that the respondent found the applicant fit, competent and suitable to discharge the duties of the higher post. Subsequently, by order dated 28.04.2025 (Annexure A-7), although the applicant's substantive posting was changed on account of administrative exigencies, his additional charge of the higher post continued.

On 08.07.2025, a show-cause notice was issued to the applicant alleging non-submission of the IPR for the year ending 31.12.2024 (Annexure A-8). In his reply dated 22.07.2025, the applicant explained that he was unable to submit the IPR within time as he was not receiving the login OTP on his registered mobile number (Annexure A-9). He further stated that neither he nor any member of his family had acquired any immovable property as on 31.12.2024 and that there was no change in the IPR for 2024 as compared to the preceding year, i.e., 2023. As such, the delay, if any, was due to the technical snag reported by him.

On 15.12.2025, despite the above explanation, the Commissioner (Personnel), DDA issued a warning letter concerning delay in submission of the IPR and advised the concerned employees to ensure timely filing in future (Annexure A-10). The communication was in the nature of a caution regarding timely compliance.

On 26.12.2025, the additional charge of the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) entrusted to the applicant was withdrawn for administrative reasons (Annexure A-11). According to the applicant, anyway, he was going to attain eligibility for promotion within a week.

On 29.12.2025, the applicant submitted his IPR for the year 2024 through the prescribed form upon receiving the OTP required for online submission (Annexure A-12). Thus, the IPR was available with the respondent before the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) met on 31.12.2025. The applicant also stated that there was no change in his immovable property position as compared to the previous year.

On 31.12.2025, the applicant submitted a detailed reply explaining the circumstances leading to the delayed submission of the IPR and sought condonation of the delay (Annexure A-13). On the same day, the DPC met to consider promotion from the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) to Superintending Engineer (Civil) against 12 vacancies.

The respondent did not communicate to the applicant that his IPR was unavailable to the DPC. The reason subsequently communicated to him for non-consideration for promotion was the delayed submission of the IPR.

On 02.01.2026, the applicant submitted his IPR for the year 2025. Subsequently, on 21.01.2026, he submitted a representation to the Vice Chairman, DDA seeking condonation of the delay in filing the IPR for the year 2024, referring, inter alia, to his service record and the fact that his case was due for promotion (Annexure A-14).

On 30.01.2026, the respondent issued a subsequent circular concerning submission of IPR for the calendar year ending 31.12.2025. In the said circular, apart from the consequences contained in the earlier circular, withholding of forthcoming promotions was also stipulated as a consequence of delayed filing.

On 06.02.2026, the promotion order pursuant to the DPC held on 31.12.2025 was issued for promotion from Executive Engineer (Civil) to Superintending Engineer (Civil). While certain persons junior to the applicant were promoted, the applicant was not included in the said promotion order (Annexure A-1).

Thereafter, vide communication dated 18.02.2026, the applicant was informed by the Deputy Director (CR) that he had been declared “unfit due to late submission of IPR” (Annexure A-2). This was the first communication by which the reason for denial of his regular promotion was communicated to him.

It is the applicant's case that no communication was issued to him specifically stating that his vigilance clearance had been withheld on account of delayed submission of the IPR. At the relevant time, he was neither under suspension nor facing any disciplinary proceedings or criminal prosecution.

On 19.02.2026, the applicant's request for condonation of delay in submission of the IPR for the year 2024 was rejected by the Vice Chairman, DDA (Annexure A-3).

The aapplicant has further placed on record instances where other employees of the DDA were granted promotion despite delayed submission of their IPRs. The material placed by the Applicant includes instances of promotions from Levels 6 to 7, 7 to 8, 9 to 10 and 10 to 11 despite belated filing of IPRs. Details of such employees are as under:-

The applicant, therefore, claims that he has been denied promotion despite his seniority and eligibility, while his juniors have been promoted to the post in question, and that the denial of promotion has resulted in grave prejudice to his service career. Hence, the applicant has filed this OA seeking the reliefs as quoted above.

Learned counsel contended that a subsequent executive instruction creating an adverse consequence cannot be applied retrospectively in the absence of any express provision making it applicable to earlier defaults. There is nothing in the subsequent circular to indicate that the newly introduced consequence of withholding promotion was intended to operate retrospectively.

Learned counsel also contended that the Recruitment Rules governing promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) do not prescribe delayed submission of an IPR as a disqualification for promotion. The applicant had completed the requisite qualifying service in the feeder post of Executive Engineer (Civil), his seniority stood settled, and he was otherwise eligible for promotion with effect from 01.01.2026. The finalized seniority list dated 03.10.2024 placed him at Seniority No. 770. Thus, neither his eligibility nor his seniority was in dispute.

Learned counsel submitted that there was no other impediment to the applicant’s promotion. No disciplinary proceedings or criminal case was pending against him; he had never been placed under suspension; and no adverse entry had been recorded against him. It is also not the case of the respondent that the applicant’s vigilance clearance had been withheld or denied. No communication had been issued indicating that his vigilance status was adverse on account of delayed submission of the IPR.

Learned counsel argued that the warning letter dated 15.12.2025 could not be equated with initiation of disciplinary proceedings. No charge-sheet had been issued, no disciplinary inquiry had been instituted, and no penalty or adverse entry had resulted from the said warning. Consequently, the warning could not constitute a lawful basis for treating the applicant as unfit for promotion.

Learned counsel further submitted that the conduct of the respondent demonstrated that the applicant was considered competent to discharge duties of the higher post. By order dated 07.01.2025, he was entrusted with the additional charge of Superintending Engineer (Civil) under FR 49(i), which continued even after his substantive posting was changed by order dated 28.04.2025. Having entrusted him with the responsibilities of the higher post, the respondent could not deny him regular promotion on the technical ground subsequently relied upon.

Learned counsel submitted that, in any event, the IPR for the year 2024 had been filed by the applicant on 29.12.2025, i.e. before the DPC met on 31.12.2025. Therefore, at the time of consideration by the DPC, the IPR was available and there was no question of the applicant having failed to furnish the return altogether. The respondent proceeded on the basis that the applicant did not file his IPR timely.

Learned counsel emphasized that the respondent had specifically stated in their communication dated 31.12.2025 that there was no change in the applicant’s IPR for the year 2024 as compared with the previous year. The return did not disclose any adverse material, nor was there any allegation that it was false, doubtful or indicative of misconduct. There was no allegation of concealment, acquisition of disproportionate assets or any other misconduct arising from the contents of the IPR. Hence, mere delay in filing the return, particularly when the return was available before the DPC met, could not reasonably justify denial of promotion.

Learned counsel further contended that the respondent had neither initiated any disciplinary proceedings nor issued any charge-sheet or imposed any penalty in respect of the alleged delay. The respondent could not, therefore, indirectly impose a punitive consequence upon the applicant by denying him promotion when no such consequence was contemplated under the governing instructions for the relevant year.

Learned counsel submitted that the communication dated 18.02.2026 was the first communication informing the applicant that the DPC held on 31.12.2025 had found him ‘unfit’ for regular promotion on account of late submission of the IPR. According to learned counsel, the said decision was fundamentally flawed, as the IPR had already been submitted before the DPC convened and the circular dated 24.12.2024 did not authorize withholding of promotion on that ground.

Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant’s request dated 21.01.2026 seeking condonation of the delay was rejected by the Vice Chairman, DDA, vide communication dated 19.02.2026. Learned counsel contended that the said communication was a non-speaking order, as it failed to disclose reasons for rejecting the request despite the applicant having explained the delay, having submitted the IPR before the DPC meeting, and having specifically pointed out that there was no change in the IPR as compared to the previous year. The subsequent rejection, according to learned counsel, could not cure the illegality in the original decision to deny promotion.

Learned counsel further urged that the impugned action was grossly disproportionate. Even assuming that there had been a delay in submission of the IPR, the lapse stood cured before the DPC considered the applicant; no prejudice had been caused to the respondent; the IPR contained no adverse material; and no disciplinary finding had been recorded against the applicant. Denial of promotion in such circumstances was, therefore, excessive, unreasonable and arbitrary.

Learned counsel also argued that similarly situated employees in the DDA, details of such employees are mentioned in OA in para 4.23, who had also submitted their IPRs belatedly, had not been denied promotion. The applicant had been singled out for adverse treatment without any rational basis, resulting in hostile and discriminatory treatment amounts to violation of provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Learned counsel also submitted that as a consequence of the impugned action, juniors to the applicant had been promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil), whereas the applicant had been superseded despite possessing the requisite eligibility, seniority and qualifying service. Such supersession, according to learned counsel, was arbitrary and caused serious prejudice to the applicant’s service career.

Lastly, learned counsel contended that administrative action having civil consequences must be fair, transparent, reasoned and supported by lawful authority. In the present case, the respondent had failed to identify any provision in the circular dated 24.12.2024 or in the Recruitment Rules which authorized denial of promotion merely because of delayed submission of the IPR for the year 2024. The applicant was, therefore, entitled to be considered and promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) from the due date, i.e. 01.01.2026, with all consequential benefits.

On merits, learned counsel submitted that the applicant was appointed as Junior Engineer (Civil) on 03.10.2007, promoted as Assistant Engineer (Civil) in 2014 and thereafter, as Executive Engineer (Civil) in 2021. He became eligible for consideration for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) upon completion of the prescribed qualifying service in terms of the relaxation granted by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs vide letter dated 11.12.2025. The applicant's name was accordingly included in the zone of consideration and the relevant Vigilance Report, Departmental Proceedings Report and APARs were obtained and placed before the Departmental Promotion Committee.

Learned counsel submitted that the Supplementary DPC, which met on 31.12.2025 for considering promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) for the vacancy year 2026, assessed the applicant as “UNFIT due to late submission of IPR.” Learned counsel emphasized that the applicant was required to submit his IPR for the year 2024 on or before 31.01.2025, but admittedly submitted the same only on 29.12.2025, after a delay of nearly one year.

Learned counsel also submitted that, on account of the applicant's failure to submit the IPR within the prescribed time, a Show Cause Notice dated 08.07.2025 was issued to him for violation of Regulation 16 of the DDA Conduct, Disciplinary and Appeal Regulations, 1999. Although the applicant attributed the delay to non-receipt of OTP and a technical glitch while attempting online submission, the Systems Department, upon being consulted, clarified that no technical malfunction, system error or OTP-related difficulty had been reported or existed during the relevant period from 01.01.2025 to 31.01.2025. He pointed out that the applicant had not made any contemporaneous complaint, request or intimation regarding any such technical difficulty. Learned counsel further submitted that, notwithstanding the applicant's continued failure to submit the IPR, a final opportunity was granted to him by way of warning letter dated 15.12.2025. The applicant ultimately submitted the IPR only on 29.12.2025 and furnished his explanation on 31.12.2025. By that time, the DPC had considered his case and assessed him as “UNFIT” on account of the delayed submission of the IPR. The promotion order dated 06.02.2026, according to the respondent, merely related to those officers who had been duly empanelled by the DPC. Learned counsel further submitted that the DPC had acted within its legitimate discretion in assessing the suitability of the officers. Reliance was placed upon paragraphs 4.4.1 to 4.4.3 of the DoP&T OM dated 22.07.2024, according to which the DPC is required to devise its own method and procedure for objective assessment of suitability and is vested with discretion in the matter of assessment. Learned counsel then argued that promotion is not a matter of course and that suitability has to be determined through a rigorous assessment having regard to service record, conduct and performance. Accordingly, the DPC was competent to assess the applicant as “Unfit” after considering the material placed before it.

Learned counsel also contended that the applicant's plea regarding the subsequent submission of the IPR does not cure the delay. According to learned counsel, the issue was not the non-availability of the IPR on the date of the DPC, but the applicant's failure to comply with the prescribed deadline. The fact that the IPR was eventually submitted on 29.12.2025, nearly one year after the stipulated date, did not obliterate the earlier non-compliance. The respondent therefore maintained that the applicant was rightly assessed as “Unfit” on account of the delayed submission.

Learned counsel also controverted the applicant's contention that the consequence of delayed submission of IPR could not have been applied to his case. Learned counsel submitted that the Circular relating to IPR for the year 2024 emphasized timely submission in the context of vigilance clearance and disciplinary matters, while the subsequent Circular relating to IPR for 2025 specifically clarified, pursuant to the directions of the Vice Chairman, DDA, that compliance with the IPR requirement would also be taken into account while processing promotion cases. According to the respondent, the latter circular did not dilute the earlier requirement but merely supplemented and reinforced it by extending its consideration to promotional matters.

Learned counsel argued that the Recruitment Rules constitute the governing statutory framework for promotion and that the DPC is required to examine the service record and other relevant material of eligible officers and assess their suitability in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The applicant's eligibility for consideration, according to the respondent, did not confer upon him any vested or automatic right to promotion.

Learned counsel submitted that although the applicant was included in the zone of consideration, his case was duly placed before the DPC along with the relevant Vigilance Report, Departmental Proceedings Report, APARs and other material. The DPC independently assessed the officers on the relevant parameters and found the applicant ‘unfit’ on account of late compliance with the IPR requirement. The fact that certain other officers referred to by the applicant were assessed as ‘fit’, according to the respondent, does not establish any right in favour of the applicant, as their cases were assessed by the respective DPCs on the basis of the material available in their individual cases.

With regard to the applicant's reliance upon his having been entrusted with additional charge under FR 49(i), learned counsel submitted that such additional charge is assigned on the basis of functional and administrative requirements and does not confer any automatic right to regular promotion. He argued that the principles governing additional charge under FR 49(i) are distinct from those governing regular promotion through the DPC.

Learned counsel further submitted that under Rule 18(1) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, read with Regulation 16 of the DDA Conduct, Disciplinary and Appeal Regulations, 1999, submission of the IPR is an obligatory requirement. The Circular dated 24.12.2024 specifically required all officers and officials to submit the IPR in respect of property held as on 31.12.2024 on or before 31.01.2025. The applicant admittedly failed to comply with the said requirement and submitted his IPR only on 29.12.2025.

Finally, learned counsel submitted that the Vice Chairman, DDA, being the competent authority, was duly apprised of all relevant facts and, after considering the applicant's request for condonation of delay, rejected the same. Therefore, learned counsel contended that the action of the respondent was in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions, that the DPC had acted within its discretion, and that the applicant had failed to establish any illegality, arbitrariness or procedural infirmity warranting interference by the Tribunal. On these submissions, learned counsel prayed that the Original Application be dismissed with costs.

Learned counsel would also contend that the respondent has itself disclosed the precise reason for the applicant's non-selection, namely, that he was assessed as “UNFIT due to late submission of IPR.” Significantly, the respondent has not disclosed any adverse APAR, adverse vigilance report, pending disciplinary proceeding, penalty, suspension, criminal proceeding, denial of vigilance clearance or any other legally recognised impediment against the applicant. Thus, the respondent cannot now improve upon or enlarge the reason communicated to the applicant by making a general reference to the various parameters allegedly considered by the DPC.

Learned counsel also submitted that the IPR in question was for the year ending 31.12.2024 and was governed by the Circular dated 24.12.2024. The said circular did not prescribe denial or withholding of promotion, much less declaration of an officer as “unfit”, as a consequence of delayed submission of the IPR. The subsequent circular/order dated 30.01.2026, relied upon by the respondent, relates to the subsequent IPR cycle concerning the year ending 31.12.2025. It could not have been retrospectively applied to an IPR pertaining to the preceding year so as to visit the applicant with an adverse promotional consequence.

Learned counsel would further submit that, even otherwise, the respondent's reliance upon the subsequent circular does not advance their case. The subsequent circular speaks of “withholding of forthcoming promotions” and does not authorise a DPC to declare an officer “unfit” for promotion. The two consequences are materially different. Withholding of promotion is a temporary and curable consequence, whereas a declaration of “unfit” constitutes an assessment of the candidate's suitability in the promotion process. The respondent cannot convert a limited consequence of withholding into a substantive finding of unfitness, particularly when the latter consequence is not prescribed by the applicable instructions.

Learned counsel would further submit that, in the facts of the present case, even the factual basis for withholding the applicant's promotion had ceased to exist when the DPC actually considered his case. The applicant submitted the IPR on 29.12.2025, whereas the DPC met on 31.12.2025. Thus, on the date on which the DPC considered the applicant's suitability, the said IPR was already available with the respondent and there was no pending obligation on the applicant to furnish the return. The respondent has not demonstrated any prejudice caused to the DPC on account of the delayed filing.

Learned counsel would also contend that the IPR itself disclosed no acquisition of immovable property by the applicant or his family. As such, no allegation of concealment of property, suppression of material information, adverse disclosure or any other circumstance arising from the contents of the IPR which could legitimately bear upon the applicant's suitability for promotion. The respondent has not shown how the mere fact of delayed filing, after the IPR had been submitted before the DPC, impaired the DPC's ability to assess the applicant's suitability.

Learned counsel argued that the respondent has misdirected itself regarding the role of the IPR in the promotion process. The applicant would rely upon DoP&T OM No. 104/33/2024-AVD-IA dated 09.10.2024 to submit that the IPR is relevant in the context of vigilance and disciplinary scrutiny. However, the said instructions do not transform delayed submission of an IPR into an independent ground for declaring an officer unfit for promotion. In the present case, there was no denial of vigilance clearance, no disciplinary proceeding, no penalty and no adverse material arising from the IPR.

Learned counsel would further submit that the respondent's reliance upon the DoP&T’s OM dated 22.07.2024 concerning the discretion of the DPC is misconceived. The discretion vested in a DPC is a discretion to assess suitability within the framework of law; it is not an unfettered power to create a new disqualification which is neither contained in the Recruitment Rules nor prescribed by the applicable circulars or instructions. The power to devise a method of objective assessment cannot be equated with the power to invent a substantive ground of ineligibility or unfitness.

Learned counsel also contended that the DPC could not travel beyond the recognised parameters governing promotion and substitute delayed filing of the IPR for an adverse service record or other lawful material demonstrating unsuitability. The expression “fit” or “unfit” in the context of promotion has to be understood with reference to the recognised parameters governing DPC assessment. A procedural lapse, particularly one which stood cured before the DPC considered the applicant's case and which was not accompanied by any adverse material, could not by itself be elevated into a substantive finding of unfitness.

Learned counsel would further submit that the respondent's reliance upon the warning letter dated 15.12.2025 is equally misplaced. The warning was cautionary and advisory in nature; it was not a penalty imposed after disciplinary proceedings and did not create a promotional disqualification. More importantly, the applicant complied with the final opportunity and submitted the IPR before the DPC met. The respondent could not thereafter convert the warning into a punitive or promotional consequence which was not contemplated therein.

As regards the respondent'scontention that similarly situated officers were assessed as fit by their respective DPCs, learned counsel would submit that the said response does not answer the applicant's specific grievance. If delayed submission of IPR was indeed regarded as a valid and decisive ground for denying promotion, the respondent was required to demonstrate consistent application of that principle. The fact that similarly placed employees, who had also submitted their IPRs belatedly were promoted raises a serious question as to the selective application of the alleged disqualification. Such selective treatment, it is submitted, is arbitrary and inconsistent with the requirement of fairness in public employment.

On the preliminary objection regarding non-joinder of necessary parties, learned counsel would submit that the objection is misconceived. The applicant is not seeking cancellation of the promotion of any particular officer. The challenge is directed against the decision of the respondent whereby the applicant was declared “unfit” solely on account of delayed submission of the IPR. The employer-DDA is the authority which convened the DPC, issued the impugned promotion order, communicated the reason for the applicant's non-selection and rejected his request for condonation. Consequently, it is the respondent who is required to justify the legality of the impugned action.

Learned counsel also submitted that reference to officers junior to the applicant is only for demonstrating the applicant's rightful position in the seniority and promotional hierarchy and the prejudice caused by his exclusion. The applicant does not seek any adverse order against such officers personally. His prayer is essentially for correction of the illegality committed by the respondent and restoration of the promotional position which he would have occupied but for the impugned decision.

Learned counsel would thus submit that the real issue before the Tribunal is whether the DDA could lawfully declare the applicant “unfit” on account of delayed IPR when the applicable circular did not prescribe such consequence, when the IPR had already been filed before the DPC met, when no adverse material arose from the IPR, and when similarly placed employees were promoted despite delayed filing. The objection of non-joinder, according to learned counsel, does not answer this fundamental issue.

Learned counsel would further submit that the respondent's attempt to describe the DPC assessment as an exercise of independent discretion cannot cure the underlying illegality. The question is not whether the DPC possessed discretion to assess suitability; rather, the question is whether such discretion could lawfully be exercised on a criterion which was not prescribed as a consequence of delayed IPR submission.

The respondent has stated that the DPC considered vigilance reports, departmental proceedings reports, APARs and IPR. However, no adverse material has been disclosed against the applicant under any of these heads. Indeed, the contemporaneous communication informing the applicant of the result specifically attributed his being declared “UNFIT” to late submission of IPR. The respondent cannot, after the event, improve upon that reason by making a general reference to multiple parameters without disclosing the adverse material, if any, existed against the applicant. In this regard, learned counsel would submit that the respondent ought to produce the complete DPC record, including the minutes of the DPC, assessment sheet, APAR grading, vigilance status, departmental proceedings report, IPR status of all officers considered and the material on the basis of which the applicant alone was assessed as unfit. In the absence of disclosure of any such adverse material, the respondent's attempt to justify the decision by referring generally to the DPC's consideration of various parameters cannot be accepted as a substitute for the reason actually communicated to the applicant.

Learned counsel would clarify that the applicant does not claim promotion as a matter of right merely because he was entrusted with additional charge under FR 49(i). The relevance of the additional charge is only to demonstrate that the respondent itself had considered the applicant competent and suitable to discharge higher responsibilities. The additional charge was assigned on 07.01.2025 and continued thereafter with the approval of the competent authority. While such additional charge may not confer a vested right to regular promotion, the respondent's subsequent stand that the applicant was unsuitable to be considered for promotion solely because of delayed IPR is required to be examined in that factual context.

As regards the applicant's explanation concerning non-receipt of OTP, learned counsel would submit that the respondent has proceeded on an erroneous premise. The applicant did not allege a system-wide collapse of the portal; his specific explanation was that the OTP required for completing the online filing was not received. The internal clarification obtained from the Systems Department merely states that no system-wide malfunction was recorded. It does not establish that the OTP was actually delivered to and received by the applicant. Further, if the respondent intended to reject the applicant's explanation on this ground, they ought to have placed before him the relevant OTP delivery logs, transmission records or other contemporaneous material demonstrating that the applicant had in fact been enabled to complete the filing within the prescribed period. The internal clarification, having not been supplied to the applicant or put to him before the adverse decision, could not by itself conclusively discredit his explanation.

Learned counsel would further submit that the rejection of the applicant's representation seeking condonation of delay does not independently validate the denial of promotion. The rejection was arbitrary and non-speaking inasmuch as it failed to disclose why the delay was treated as fatal despite the IPR having been filed before the DPC, despite the IPR disclosing no adverse material, despite the applicant having complied with the final opportunity and despite similarly situated employees admittedly having been promoted notwithstanding delayed filing. Further, the respondent has failed to establish the legal foundation for the impugned action. The applicant accepts that timely submission of IPR is obligatory. However, an administrative obligation cannot automatically be converted into a promotional disqualification unless the governing statutory rules or applicable instructions expressly provide for such consequence.

The applicant's case, therefore, is not that the delay ought to be ignored altogether. The case is that the respondent could take such action for the delay as was lawfully prescribed, but they could not create a new and substantive consequence, namely, declaration of the applicant as “UNFIT” for promotion without any enabling provision. Thus, the respondent has failed to demonstrate any lawful basis for treating the applicant's delayed IPR as a ground of substantive unfitness. The IPR had already been filed before the DPC met; it disclosed no adverse material; no adverse vigilance or disciplinary material has been shown; the applicable Circular dated 24.12.2024 did not prescribe denial or withholding of promotion on this ground; and the subsequent circular dated 30.01.2026 could neither operate retrospectively nor be read as authorising a declaration of “unfit”. Thus, the impugned action is arbitrary, unsupported by the governing instructions and liable to be set aside.

Learned counsel for the applicant also produced the reply dated 21.08.2026 to the applicant’s RTI application dated 21.08.2026 vide which the applicant sought information with regard to number of vacant vacancies for the post of Superintendent Engineer (Civil) as on 21.08.2026, which provides that 05 number of vacancies of the post in question are available as on 21.08.2026.

The impugned promotion order dated 06.02.2026 is set aside to the extent that the applicant has been denied consideration/promotion solely on account of delayed submission of the IPR for the year 2024;

The respondent shall undertake such reconsideration as is permissible under the applicable Recruitment Regulations, to assess the applicant's suitability for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil), treating the delayed submission of the IPR for the year 2024 as not constituting, by itself, a disqualification for such consideration without applying retrospectively the subsequent circular introducing withholding of forthcoming promotion as a consequence of delayed submission of IPR;

If, upon such reconsideration, the applicant is found fit for promotion, he shall be granted promotion from the date on which his immediate junior in the relevant seniority position was promoted, with consequential seniority and other benefits as admissible under the applicable rules; and

The above exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this Order.