Bal Dev vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.

“87. Repeal and Saving

(1)

On the commencement of these rules, every rule [including Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972], regulation or order including Office Memorandum (hereinafter referred to in this rule as the old rule) in force immediately before such commencement shall, in so far as it provides for any of the matters contained in these rules, cease to operate.”

“84. Application of other rules

(1)

…… …… …… ……

(2)

The Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981 shall apply in regard to commutation of pension authorised under these rules, payment of commuted value of pension and restoration of commuted pension on expiry of the period of commutation.”

“2. Application

These rules shall apply to Government servants appointed on or before 31st day of December 2003 who may be entitled to or have been authorised any class of pension referred to in Chapter V of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972.

3. Definitions

(1)

In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires : -

…… …… …… ……

j. "Pension" means any class of pension including compassionate allowance referred to in Chapter V of the Pension Rules but does not include extra pension and the amount, by whatever name called, granted by the Government to a pensioner as a compensation for higher cost of living ;

k. "Pension Rules" means the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 ;

CHAPTER II

General Conditions

4 …… …… …… ……

5. Limit on commutation of pension

(1)

A Government servant shall be entitled to commute for a lump sum payment of an amount not exceeding forty percent of his pension.

(2)

In an application for commutation in Form 1 or Form 1-A or Form 2, as the case may be, an applicant shall indicate the fraction of pension which he desires to commute and may either indicate the maximum limit of forty percent of pension or such lower limit as he may desire to commute. (3) If percentage of pension to be commuted results in fraction of a rupee, such fraction of a rupee shall be ignored for the purpose of commutation.

6. Commutation of pension to become absolute

(1)

The commutation of pension shall become absolute in the case of an applicant referred to

(i)

in sub-rule (1) of Rule 13, on the date on which the application in Form 1 is received by the Head of Office ;

(i-a) in sub-rule (3) of Rule 13, on the date following the date of his retirement ;

(ii)

in Chapter IV, on the date on which the medical authority signs the medical report in Part III of Form 4 ;

Provided that -

(a)

in the case of an applicant who is drawing his pension from a treasury or Accounts Officer, the reduction in the amount of pension on account of commutation shall be operative from the date of receipt of the commuted value of pension or at the end of three months after issue of authority by the Accounts Officer for the payment of commuted value of pension, whichever is earlier, and

(b)

in the case of an applicant who is drawing pension from a branch of a nationalized bank, the reduction in the amount of pension on account of commutation shall be operative from the date on which the commuted value of pension is credited by the bank to the applicant's account to which pension is being credited.

(c)

in the case of an applicant governed by sub-rule (3) of Rule 13 in whose case the commuted value of pension becomes payable on the day following the date of his retirement, the reduction in the amount of pension on account of commutation shall be operative from its inception. Where, however, payment of commuted value of pension could not be made within the first month after the date of retirement, the difference of monthly pension for the period between the day following the date of retirement and the date preceding the date on which the commuted value of pension is deemed to have been paid in terms of Rule 49 of the Central Government Accounts (Receipts and Payments) Rules, 1983, shall be authroized by the Accounts Oficer.

(2)

In the case of an applicant referred to in Rule 9 or Rule 10, the commuted value is paid in two or more stages, the reduction in the amount of pension shall be made from the respective dates of the payments as laid down in Clause (a) or Clause (b) of the proviso to sub-rule (1).

(3)

The date on which the payment of the commuted value of pension was made to the applicant or the commuted value was credited to the applicant's account shall be entered in both halves of the Pension Payment Order by the disbursing authority under intimation to the Accounts Officer who authorized the payment of commuted value of pension.

…… …… …… ……

8. Calculation of commuted value of pension

The lump sum payable to an applicant shall be calculated in accordance with the Table of the values prescribed from time to time and applicable to the applicant on the date on which the commutation becomes absolute.

…… …… …… ……

10 A. Restoration of Commuted Pension

The commuted amount of pension shall be restored on completion of fifteen years from the date the reduction of pension on account of commutation becomes operative in accordance with rule 6:

Provided that when the commutation amount was paid on more than one occasion on account of upward revision of pension, the respective commuted amount of pension shall be restored on completion of fifteen years from the respective date(s)

34. Repeal and Savings -

(1)

On the commencement of these rules, every rule, regulation or order including Office Memoranda (hereinafter referred to in this rule as the old rule) in force immediately before such commencement shall, in so far as it provides for any of the matters contained in these rules, cease to operate.

(2)

Notwithstanding such cesser of operation -

(a)

any application for commutation of pension which is pending before the commencement of these rules shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of old rules as if these rules had not been made ; and

(b)

subject to the provisions of Clause (a), anything done or any action taken under the old rules shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of these rules.

TABLE

COMMUTATION VALUES FOR A PENSION OF ₹1 PER

ANNUM

Effective from 1st January, 2006

[See Rules 3 (1) (m) 8, 26(7), 28(5), 29(1) and 29(2)]

Age Commutation Age Commutation Age Commutation

next value expressed next value expressed next value expressed

birth as number of birth as number of birth as number of

day year's purchase day year's purchase day year's purchase

20 9.188 41 9.075 62 8.093

21 9.187 42 9.059 63 7.982

22 9.186 43 9.040 64 7.862

23 9.185 44 9.019 65 7.731

24 9.184 45 8.996 66 7.591

Age Commutation Age Commutation Age Commutation

next value expressed next value expressed next value expressed

birth as number of birth as number of birth as number of

day year's purchase day year's purchase day year's purchase

25 9.183 46 8.971 67 7.431

26 9.182 47 8.943 68 7.262

27 9.180 48 8.913 69 7.083

28 9.178 49 8.881 70 6.897

29 9.176 50 8.846 71 6.703

30 9.173 51 8.808 72 6.502

31 9.169 52 8.768 73 6.296

32 9.164 53 8.724 74 6.085

33 9.159 54 8.678 75 5.872

34 9.152 55 8.627 76 5.657

35 9.145 56 8.572 77 5.443

36 9.136 57 8.512 78 5.229

37 9.126 58 8.446 79 5.018

38 9.116 59 8.371 80 4.812

39 9.103 60 8.287 81 4.611

40 9.090 61 8.194

“9.

In dealing with a matter of this nature, it is not appropriate to be guided by the example of Life Insurance; equally unjust it would be to adopt the interest basis. On the other hand, the conclusion should be evolved by relating it to the 'years of purchase' basis. An addition of two years to the period necessary for the recovery on the basis of years of purchase justifies the adoption of the 15 years rule. That is more or less the basis which appears to be equitable. It may be that this would give rise to an addi- tional burden on the exchequer but it would not be heavy and after all it would bring some relief to those who have served the cause of the Nation at great sacrifice. We are, therefore, of the view that no separate period need be fixed for the Armed Forces personnel and they should also be entitled to restoration of the commuted portion of the pension on the expiry of 15 years as is conceded in the case of civil pensioners. And for them too the effective date should be from April 1, 1985.”

“16.

Increase in life expectancy and its effect on commuted pension cannot be viewed in isolation. Several factors, figures and the entire pension provisions on the whole including cost to the exchequer have to be taken into consideration. Commutation table can take into consideration periodical increase in salary and better saving capacity during service period due to increase and enhanced pay scales. Courts would hesitate and not go by one formula and mathematical calculations on assumption and precept that the formula would be more fair, just and appropriate. There can be many formulas. Calculations are complex, convoluted and a tricky task. Fixation of payment of pension or commutation of pension, etc. are highly difficult and cumbersome exercise which the Court would not like to step into, undertake and even interfere unless there is complete arbitrariness and discrimination that is ex-facie apparent. Courts on perceived wisdom would not declare the table as flawed, acting and preforming the role of an actuarial. Every government, including the Central Government, has to take into consideration their available resources and funds, for any increase and enhancement in pension requires money which may well have to be diverted from other schemes or would result in reduction of funds available for poor, the marginalized and needy.

17.

Pension, commutation of pension, etc. are policy matters, which are examined and decided on the basis of recommendations of the Pay Commissions by the authorities. No doubt, an executive order or policy decision is not beyond the scope of judicial review but the Courts do not go into the nitty gritty of the policy to substitute the table by making various computations and calculations, which are possible by different formulas or by applying a particular formula. Broadly, policy decisions can be subjected to judicial review when they are unconstitutional being do hors the provisions of the Act and the Regulations, if the delegatee has acted beyond its power of delegation and if the executive policy is contrary to the statutory or larger policy in matters of price fixation, pay fixation, etc. Courts would not interfere unless formula or method adopted is per se and ex facie irrational, arbitrary or can be struck down on the four grounds mentioned above.”

“27.

It is a matter of record that all the petitioners before us are retired employees who have admittedly availed of the benefit of commutation of pension. Admittedly, pension of some of the employees also stands restored. All the petitioners were in service at the time of issuance of notification dated 21.07.1998. They never raised any objection to the stipulated period of 15 years for restoration of pension. Having availed of a benefit which is clearly voluntary in nature, it is not open to the petitioners to raise the grievances as noted above, at this stage, to seek a variation in the terms and conditions accepted by them with open eyes. They are not entitled to seek recovery of the amount so deposited by them in accordance with the accepted terms and conditions.

28.

In this factual matrix, the argument that it is a continuing cause of action as it pertains to pension, is clearly unacceptable. There is no question of any direction to the State to restore pension on expiry of 11.5 years or 12 years as prayed for or to refund the amount so recovered. It is necessarily for the State to take a considered decision thereon after delving into the complex questions and underlying parameters which would be involved for assessment of the issues. Admittedly, matters related to commutation of pension are complex affairs involving vexed issues traversing diverse field which calls for application of specialized expertise. It is a settled position that in such matters the Court would venture only in case of manifest and apparent arbitrariness. Learned counsel for petitioners were unable to point out any material on record to indicate that the formula adopted is per se and ex facie irrational or arbitrary which calls for interference by this Court.

29.

At this stage, we take note of the specific stand of the State as projected before us that it would be ready to examine the scheme/period of commutation while taking into consideration changes, if any, in underlying parameters and that an Expert Committee would be constituted in this respect which would be assisted by Recognized Expert Agency or Institution(s) which possess requisite knowledge and competence in assessing such matters. In this process the Committee would also invite and consider submission and representations in the matter from Associations of pensioners in the State.

30.

Keeping in view the fair stand on the part of the State, we do not find any ground for issuance of any particular direction in this regard except to observe that in terms of the stand as projected before us, it is expected that necessary steps in this regard would be taken expeditiously by the State.

31.

Keeping in view facts and circumstances as narrated and discussed in foregoing paras, all the 808 writ petitions are dismissed with no order as to cost. It is clarified that the State is entitled to effect recoveries which were stayed by way of interim orders in the writ petitions. Such recovery however be made in a staggered manner to obviate any hardship to the pensioners.”

“5.

Notwithstanding certain factual variations relating to service conditions or forum of origin and the mathematical calculation of the amount of pension commuted being recovered by the respective employer, the underlying controversy in all matters is common, namely, whether continuation of recovery of the commuted portion of pension for a fixed period of fifteen years remains legally sustainable despite successive revisions to actuarial commutation factors, which, according to the Pensioner-Petitioners, have altered the financial assumptions underlying the original restoration framework. This contention principally arises from successive revisions in commutation tables pursuant to CPCs recommendations, which, according to the Pensioner-Petitioners, altered actuarial assumptions underlying the original fifteen-year recovery period. …… ……. ……. …….

27.

A holistic reading of the CCS Commutation Rules, executive instructions, and policy materials demonstrates that the commutation scheme possesses the following essential characteristics:

i.

The scheme is conceived as a social security and welfare measure, intended to provide immediate financial liquidity at the time of retirement when employees typically face major financial obligations such as housing, medical needs, family responsibilities or debt settlement.

ii.

Participation in commutation is entirely voluntary. A retiree may elect to draw full monthly pension without any commutation whatsoever.

iii.

Only a limited fraction of pension is permitted to be commuted, ensuring continuity of assured monthly income and preserving post-retirement financial security. A retiree can opt for commutation of lower or lesser portion of their pension, i.e., any figure below 40% of the basic pension for Central Government employees and upto 50% for Judicial Officers. iv. The commuted amount is paid as a lump sum, which is treated as tax exempt, while the residual monthly pension remains taxable.

v.

Upon death of the pensioner, no recovery is effected from legal heirs, and family pension becomes payable independent of the commutation already received.

28.

The modern framework of pension commutation traces its origin to the decision of the Supreme Court in Common Cause (supra), wherein the issue of restoration of commuted pension was examined upon consideration of expert material, actuarial inputs, and governmental policy evaluation.

29.

A careful reading of the aforesaid extracts demonstrates that the Supreme Court was directly confronted with the identical contention urged before this Court, namely, that since the commuted portion of pension is ordinarily recovered within approximately twelve years, fixation of a fifteen-year restoration period was arbitrary. The Court examined the nature of commutation, the advantages accruing to the pensioner, the actuarial basis underlying the scheme and the financial implications for the State.

30.

The Supreme Court recognised two inherent advantages flowing from commutation: first, the immediate availability of a lump-sum amount which otherwise would have been received gradually over the life span of the pensioner; and second, the embedded risk factor, namely, that the State assumes the risk of premature death without recovery of the commuted amount.

31.

Rejecting the mathematical comparison suggested by the Pensioner-Petitioners, the Supreme Court evolved the restoration period on the "years-of-purchase" basis, holding that addition of two years beyond the recovery period constituted an equitable balance between pensioner welfare and fiscal responsibility. The Court thus consciously approved the fifteen-year rule as a nationally uniform standard, extending the same even to defence personnel.

32.

The "years-of-purchase" basis referred to in Common Cause (supra) is an actuarial concept. Under this methodology, restoration is not determined by simple arithmetical recovery of the lump sum but by maintaining actuarial equilibrium within the pension system. The addition of a marginal buffer period, accepted by the Supreme Court as equitable, accounts for longevity risk, financial uncertainty and systemic sustainability. The said reasoning clearly supports the stand of the Union of India that fixation of fifteen years forms part of an integrated actuarial policy rather than a recoverable loan transaction. It may also be noted that the judgment in Common Cause (supra) has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in R. Gandhi (supra). …… ……. ……. …….

35.

The judgment in FORIPSO (supra) clearly affirms the settled legal position that the commutation of pension is purely voluntary, wherein the pensioner retains absolute discretion regarding both the quantum and the timing of such commutation. It is further observed that the formulation and periodic revision of commutation tables are tasks predicated upon complex actuarial evaluations and multifaceted economic variables. Judicial intervention in such specialized fiscal domains is warranted only in exceptional circumstances where the impugned action is found to be ex facie arbitrary, discriminatory, or in manifest violation of constitutional safeguards.

36.

The Division Bench expressly relied upon the reasoning in Common Cause (supra) while rejecting the argument that recovery within twelve years invalidates the fifteen-year restoration period. It was further emphasised that pension economics involves balancing competing public interests and financial resources of the State.

37.

It is also pertinent to note that the judgment in FORIPSO (supra) was carried in challenge before the Supreme Court by way of SLP (C) No.8852/2019, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 15.04.2019, thereby lending finality to the view taken by this Court.

38.

The judgment in FORIPSO (supra) was subsequently relied upon by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shila Devi (supra) while dismissing a large batch of 808 Writ Petitions raising identical grievances regarding restoration of commuted pension.

39.

From the aforesaid extracts, it becomes evident that the Punjab and Haryana High Court noticed continued acceptance of the fifteen-year period by successive CPCs and held that pensioners who voluntarily exercised the option of commutation cannot subsequently seek alteration of accepted terms. It rejected the plea of continuing cause of action and emphasised that commutation policy involves specialised economic assessment warranting limited judicial review.

40.

At this stage, it becomes necessary to deal with the submission advanced on behalf of the Pensioner-Petitioners that the judgments in FORIPSO (supra) and Shila Devi (supra) did not constitute decisions on merits and were allegedly rendered on account of absence of complete factual material before the respective Courts.

41.

The said contention cannot be accepted. A plain reading of both judgments demonstrates that the constitutional challenge to the fifteen-year restoration period was substantively examined in light of actuarial principles, policy considerations governing pension schemes and the binding precedent of Common Cause (supra). The observations regarding availability of data or expert material were made only in the context of emphasising judicial restraint in matters involving specialised economic evaluation. The dismissal of challenges was, therefore, not procedural or technical in nature but rested upon a conscious judicial conclusion that fixation of the restoration period forms part of a policy decision grounded in actuarial assessment and does not warrant interference under Article 226 in the absence of manifest arbitrariness.

42.

Indeed, both judgments reaffirm that courts cannot substitute actuarial wisdom with isolated mathematical calculations suggested by individual pensioners. The attempt to characterise the said precedents as non-merits decisions is, therefore, misconceived.

43.

Furthermore, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Thupakula Venkateshwar Rao (supra) examined an analogous challenge to Rule 18 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Pensions (Commutation) Rules, 1944, which prescribed an identical fifteen-year period for restoration of pension. After an exhaustive survey of precedent including Common Cause (supra) and FORIPSO (supra), the Court rejected the challenge and upheld the validity of the said rule.

44.

A similar challenge was thereafter considered by the Telangana High Court in M.V.S.N. Acharyulu (supra) concerning Rule 18 of the Telangana Civil Pensions (Commutation) Rules, 1944. The Court, after detailed consideration of the nature of commutation, the fiscal implications involved and the limits of judicial review in economic policy matters, declined interference and upheld the statutory framework.

45.

Recently, the Allahabad High Court in Ashok Kumar Agarwal (supra), Dan Bahadur Yadav (supra), Kaushal Kishore Mishra (supra) and Radheshyam Shukla (supra), after considering Common Cause (supra), FORIPSO (supra) and Shila Devi (supra), has reiterated the same position and upheld the fifteen-year restoration period, holding that pension commutation rules represent an integrated economic policy and cannot be invalidated merely on the basis of alternate financial calculations suggested by pensioners.

46.

Similarly, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Trilokchand Dhaneriya (supra), while examining Rule 10(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1996 (as amended), held that determination of commutation factors, rate assumptions and the period for restoration of pension fall squarely within the policy domain of the rule-making authority. Observing that such matters involve complex fiscal considerations guided by expert bodies, the Court declined judicial interference and dismissed a batch of writ petitions.

47.

Further, the Pensioner-Petitioners have contended that successive CPCs had recommended reconsideration of the restoration period and that reduction thereof ought to have followed as a logical consequence of revision of pensionary benefits. The record, however, indicates that although the 5th CPC examined the question of restoration period, the Union of India, upon actuarial evaluation, consciously declined alteration of the existing framework. Significantly, both the 6th and 7th CPCs retained the fifteen-year restoration period. Such consistent retention across multiple expert bodies over decades evidences continuity of informed governmental policy rather than arbitrary fixation.

48.

The revised commutation tables introduced in the year 2008 formed part of a comprehensive restructuring of pay and pension pursuant to implementation of revised pay scales. The enhancement of salaries and pensions, revision of longevity assumptions, recalibration of interest benchmarks and updated actuarial parameters constituted an integrated fiscal exercise. The commutation tables, therefore, cannot be examined in isolation divorced from the broader pension reform framework. Additionally, recommendations or observations made in departmental consultations, including those of the Department of Pension & Pensioners' Welfare and the Supplemental Report (March 2021) of the Second National Judicial Pay Commission suggesting a shorter period, remain advisory in nature. In the absence of their acceptance by the competent rule-making authority, such proposals do not alter the binding statutory framework presently in force.

49.

A central misconception underlying the challenge lies in treating pension commutation as analogous to a loan repayable through instalments. The Court is unable to accept this foundational premise. The commuted value of pension is not computed as recovery of principal advanced to an individual pensioner but is determined through actuarial tables taking into account multiple macro-economic and demographic variables, including life expectancy trends, mortality distribution across pension cohorts, discount rates, opportunity cost of public funds, long-term pension liabilities of the State, and systemic risk arising from premature death of pensioners.

50.

The commutation scheme therefore does not operate as a commercial borrowing transaction or lending arrangement. Rather, it represents a statutorily structured redistribution of pension payments across time, founded upon actuarial balancing applicable to a large pension population.

51.

The aforesaid understanding of pension commutation stands authoritatively affirmed in T.R. Singla (supra), wherein the Punjab and Haryana High Court recognised that payment of the commuted portion of pension does not partake the character of a loan or recoverable advance. The commutation amount constitutes a one-time settlement based upon actuarial evaluation, under which the Government assumes substantial financial risk. In the event of death of the pensioner prior to expiry of the restoration period, no recovery is effected from dependants and family pension becomes payable notwithstanding the unrecovered commuted value. The Court expressly acknowledged that, to account for such mortality risk and systemic financial balancing, recovery during the prescribed period may exceed a simplistic mathematical equivalence with the lump-sum amount received. The judgment therefore negates the foundational premise advanced by the Pensioner-Petitioners equating commutation with repayment of a financial borrowing.

52.

The fifteen-year restoration period must therefore be understood as an actuarial equilibrium designed for the pension system as a whole rather than a mathematical recovery period relatable to each individual retiree. The contention that "recovery stands completed within twelve years" proceeds on a simplified financial comparison ignoring actuarial assumptions embedded in the statutory design and already recognised in binding precedent.

56.

It is well settled that courts exercise institutional restraint in matters involving economic or fiscal policy framed by the State, as consistently recognised in the judicial precedents noticed hereinabove.

58.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that judicial review in matters of economic policy is confined to examination of legislative competence, violation of constitutional limitations, manifest arbitrariness, or patent irrationality. Courts do not substitute judicially preferred economic models for those evolved by expert bodies possessing institutional competence and access to specialised data.

59.

Pension commutation policy, involving actuarial projections and long-term fiscal planning affecting a vast class of retirees, squarely falls within this domain of policy deference. The revised commutation tables introduced with effect from 02.09.2008 operate prospectively within statutory authority and do not create enforceable retrospective entitlements.

60.

The fifteen-year restoration rule applies uniformly to all pensioners governed by the relevant statutory framework. The Pensioner-Petitioners have not demonstrated existence of any hostile discrimination, artificial classification, or unequal treatment among similarly situated pensioners.

61.

Comparisons sought to be drawn with pension regimes adopted by certain State Governments are misconceived. Separate rule-making authorities functioning under distinct fiscal conditions are constitutionally competent to adopt different pension models. Variation between Central and State schemes does not, by itself, attract Article 14 scrutiny.

62.

There can be no dispute that pension constitutes a valuable statutory right and forms an important component of social security ensuring dignity in old age. However, regulation of pension through valid statutory rules framed under Article 309 cannot be characterised as deprivation of property.

63.

Reduction in monthly pension during the commutation period arises solely from voluntary exercise of a statutory option enabling receipt of an immediate lump-sum benefit. The temporary reduction thus operates strictly in accordance with law and cannot be equated with unconstitutional deprivation.

68.

When a retiree consciously elects to commute pension and receive a substantial tax-free lump sum under clearly prescribed statutory conditions, the legal consequences attached to that choice remain operative so long as the underlying scheme is constitutionally valid. The Pensioner-Petitioners cannot seek retention of the advantage while selectively repudiating the accompanying statutory terms.

69.

Fixation of commutation value and restoration period involves specialised economic judgment dependent upon actuarial science and macro-fiscal assessment. Courts have consistently recognised, including in FORIPSO (supra), that judicial alteration of pension policy may generate cascading fiscal consequences impacting millions of pensioners and destabilising long-term budgetary planning.

70.

The present challenge essentially invites the Court to replace actuarial policy with individual financial calculations advanced by the Pensioner-Petitioners. Such substitution lies beyond permissible judicial review in absence of demonstrated constitutional infirmity.

CONCLUSION:

75.

For the reasons recorded in the preceding discussion, this Court finds that the challenge to Rule 10-A of the CCS Commutation Rules and analogous provisions governing other pension regimes is devoid of merit. The prescription of a uniform fifteen-year period for restoration of the commuted portion of pension represents a conscious policy determination founded upon actuarial evaluation, expert recommendations and long-standing statutory practice, and does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity warranting interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.”

"30.

Keeping in view the fair stand on the part of the State, we do not find any ground for issuance of any particular direction in this regard except to observe that in terms of the stand as projected before us, it is expected that necessary steps in this regard would be taken expeditiously by the State."

“3.

The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the State was ready to examine the period of commutation of pension through an expert committee. Therefore, he submits that a simple direction be issued to the State for constituting such a committee.

4.

Issue notice to the respondents for the limited purpose to obtain instructions as to the timeframe within which the State is likely to constitute the said committee so as to examine the period of commutation of pension.”