Ashok Kumar Shah vs Union Of India & Ors.

Hon'ble Dr. Sumeet Jerath, Member (A) :

The present Original Application has been filed by the applicant under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, primarily assailing the validity of Rule 10-A of the Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981, insofar as it provides for restoration of the commuted portion of pension upon completion of fifteen years from the date on which reduction of pension on account of commutation becomes operative. The applicant has also sought consequential directions for restoration of his full pension immediately upon the alleged recovery of the commuted value together with interest and for refund of the amount, if any, recovered thereafter, along with interest. The reliefs sought by the applicant are as follows :-

The case of the applicant, as presented by the counsel is that the applicant served in the office of the Development Commissioner (Handicrafts), under the Ministry of Textiles and retired from Government service on 31.05.2011 and had commuted a portion of his pension. An amount of approximately Rs.8,130/- per month has been deducted from his pension from June, 2011 onwards. According to the applicant, the amount paid to him towards commutation, along with interest thereon, stands recovered substantially before the expiry of fifteen years and therefore, continuation of deduction for the full period of fifteen years amounts to unjust enrichment on the part of the Government. He contends that there is no rational basis for continuing reduction of pension after recovery of the commuted value and interest and that full pension ought to be restored immediately thereafter. The applicant has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common Cause vs. Union of India -(1987) 1 SCC 142, the recommendations of various Pay Commissions, the commutation tables and certain actuarial calculations to contend that the period of fifteen years prescribed for restoration has become excessive and irrational with the passage of time. It has also been pleaded that certain State Governments have adopted a shorter period for restoration and that the Government of Gujarat, in particular, reduced the period to twelve years. The applicant has accordingly questioned the continuance of the fifteen-year period in the Central Government scheme and has sought a direction for restoration of full pension immediately upon recovery of the commuted value. The applicant also submits that he preferred a representation dated 21.10.2024 to the Department of Pension and Pensioners’ Welfare requesting restoration of his full pension immediately upon recovery of the commuted value and interest wherein he stated that approximately Rs.8,130/- per month had been deducted from his pension since June, 2011 and that, according to his calculations, the commuted value together with interest stood recovered much before the completion of fifteen years. The applicant thereafter approached this Tribunal seeking the aforesaid reliefs. The record further shows that similarly placed pensioners had also made representations and that certain interim orders had earlier been passed by different Courts and Tribunals in matters concerning the recovery of commuted pension. The substantive relief sought by the applicant is, therefore, founded upon a challenge to the statutory prescription contained in Rule 10-A of the CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981. The applicant has sought striking down of the expression “fifteen years” occurring in the said Rule and a consequential direction that restoration of full pension should take place as soon as the commuted value is recovered, besides refund of alleged excess recovery with interest.

During hearing, the counsel for the applicant handed across the Bar a copy of the Writ Petition (C) No. 19729/2025 dated 24.12.2025 – Central Civil Pensioners Forum & Ors., vs. UOI & Ors. whereby recoveries made from the petitioners therein were stayed however, no stay was granted on the issue in hand.

We have heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned counsel appearing for the respondents. It is an admitted position that no counter-affidavit/reply has been filed by the respondents in the present OA. However, during the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondents has placed before us a copy of the judgment dated 29.05.2026 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No.12781/2024 in Union of India & Ors. vs. Sub Trilok Chand Retd. No. JC374073A & Anr. and connected matters wherein the Hon’ble High Court held as under :-

Learned counsel submits that the controversy raised in the present OA is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment, whereby the Hon’ble High Court has upheld the validity of the fifteen-year restoration period prescribed under Rule 10-A of the CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules and dismissed the challenges raised by the pensioners.

We have carefully considered the submissions made before us and perused the material available on record. At the outset, it may be noticed that the principal issue raised in the present OA is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, in its judgment dated 29.05.2026 in W.P.(C) No.12781/2024 and connected matters (supra), has considered in detail the challenge to the fifteen-year period prescribed for restoration of commuted pension. The batch before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi included challenges to Rule 10-A of the CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules and analogous provisions applicable to different categories of pensioners. The Hon’ble High Court considered the contention that the commuted amount is allegedly recovered within a period shorter than fifteen years and that continuation of recovery thereafter amounts to unjust enrichment. The Court also considered the actuarial, financial and policy aspects relied upon by the pensioner-petitioners. After examining the statutory framework and the principles governing judicial review of economic and fiscal policy, the Hon’ble High Court held that pension, commutation of pension and the period for restoration involve matters of policy founded upon actuarial evaluation and expert consideration. The Court observed that judicial review does not permit substitution by the Court of one policy formula for another merely because another formula may appear to be more beneficial to a particular class. The Hon’ble High Court further considered the contention regarding the alleged recovery of the commuted value within a shorter period and the argument that the fifteen-year period had become excessive. It noticed the risk factor involved in commutation, namely, that the State pays a lump-sum amount upfront and, in the event of premature death of the pensioner before completion of the restoration period, the unrecovered amount is borne by the State. The Court also took note of the advantages accruing to a pensioner on account of commutation, including immediate availability of a lump-sum amount and the associated risk factor. The Hon’ble High Court, after considering the aforesaid aspects, held that the fifteen-year period is a consistent policy followed by the Government and is based upon the statutory framework and the principles recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Common Cause case. The Court further held that the challenge based on alleged manifest arbitrariness was not made out. It was specifically observed that a statutory rule or subordinate legislation can be invalidated only when the constitutional infirmity is established in accordance with settled principles of judicial review and that the Court cannot substitute its own assessment of the desirability of a fiscal or actuarial policy for that of the competent rule-making authority. Most significantly, in paragraph 77 of the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble High Court dismissed the remaining writ petitions filed by the pensioner-petitioners challenging Rule 10-A of the CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules and analogous provisions and expressly upheld the validity of the uniform fifteen-year restoration period for commuted pension. The Court consequently held that the prescription of a uniform fifteen-year period for restoration of the commuted portion of pension represents a conscious policy determination founded upon actuarial evaluation, expert recommendations and long-standing statutory practice and does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity warranting interference in writ jurisdiction. In paragraph 71 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble High Court also dealt specifically with W.P.(C) No.12781/2024 filed by the Union of India against an interim order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal. The Court noticed that the interim protection had substantially proceeded on the basis of interim orders passed in other proceedings, including those before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and that the substantive challenges in those proceedings had subsequently been dismissed. The Hon’ble High Court consequently held that interim orders, being provisional in nature and based on prima facie consideration, could not constitute a binding precedent once the substantive challenge itself stood rejected. The interim order dated 24.07.2024 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal was accordingly set aside and W.P.(C) No.12781/2024 was allowed. The judgment of the Hon’ble High Court dated 29.05.2026 thus directly answers the principal contention raised in the present OA. The applicant seeks substantially the same relief which has been considered and rejected by the Hon’ble High Court, namely, that the statutory period of fifteen years prescribed for restoration of commuted pension should be substituted by a shorter period based upon the applicant’s calculation of the period within which the commuted amount and interest are said to have been recovered. In view of the binding declaration of law by the jurisdictional High Court, we cannot grant a relief which would have the effect of declaring the statutory prescription contained in Rule 10-A to be invalid or directing restoration of pension contrary to the said statutory provision. The fact that the respondents have not filed their counter-affidavit does not alter the legal position. The challenge in the present OA is principally directed against the validity and operation of a statutory rule. The issue is, therefore, one of law and does not depend upon any disputed factual defence which could be established only through a counter-affidavit. More importantly, the jurisdictional High Court has, subsequent to the filing of the present OA, authoritatively adjudicated upon the very issue raised before us. The absence of a written reply from the respondents cannot confer upon the applicant a right to relief contrary to the law declared by the Hon’ble High Court. We may also notice that the reliance placed by the applicant upon the earlier interim orders passed by certain High Courts and Tribunals cannot advance his case any further. Such interim orders were passed at a stage when the substantive challenge to the fifteen-year rule was pending consideration. The Hon’ble High Court, in its judgment dated 29.05.2026, has now considered the substantive issue and upheld the statutory prescription. Therefore, the earlier interim orders cannot be relied upon to claim a continuing right to suspension of recovery or restoration of pension contrary to the statutory rule. The Hon’ble High Court has itself expressly directed that interim orders, protections or directions operating in favour of pensioners in the concerned batch or connected matters shall stand vacated, subject to the limited equitable direction regarding recovery of deferred amounts in cases where interim protection had remained operative. Learned counsel for the applicant has also relied upon the contention that the Government allegedly recovers the commuted value together with interest within about ten to eleven years and that continued reduction of pension thereafter results in unjust enrichment. However, this submission was also considered by the Hon’ble High Court. The Court declined to enter into individual actuarial calculations for the purpose of replacing the statutory formula and held that such an exercise would amount to substituting judicial assessment for the policy determination of the competent authority. The said reasoning applies with full force to the challenge raised before us. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Common Cause vs. Union of India, (supra) relied upon by the applicant, also does not support the relief sought in the present OA. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the issue of restoration of commuted pension and took note of the decision of the Government to restore the commuted portion after fifteen years. The Supreme Court did not lay down that restoration must necessarily take place immediately upon the notional or actual recovery of the commuted value. The subsequent statutory prescription of fifteen years has continued to operate and its validity has now been specifically upheld by the jurisdictional High Court in its judgment dated 29.05.2026. The applicant, therefore, cannot derive a right to immediate restoration merely by relying upon his own calculation of the period of recovery.

We are conscious that the applicant has approached this Tribunal asserting that continuation of deduction from his pension after recovery of the commuted amount causes financial hardship. However, equitable considerations, howsoever sympathetic, cannot be a ground for directing restoration contrary to a statutory provision whose validity has been upheld by the jurisdictional High Court. The Tribunal is bound by the law declared by the Hon’ble High Court and cannot grant a relief inconsistent therewith.

In the aforesaid circumstances, we find that the principal relief sought by the applicant, namely, striking down or reading down the fifteen-year period prescribed under Rule 10-A of the CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981 and directing restoration of full pension immediately after recovery of the commuted value, cannot be granted. The consequential prayers for refund of alleged excess recovery and payment of interest also do not survive independently once the principal challenge to the statutory prescription fails. We accordingly find no merit in the present OA. The same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

The OA stands dismissed in the aforesaid terms. Pending MAs, if any, also stand disposed of.