High CourtsDivision Bench(1978) 05 PAT CK 0012

Baikunth Singh vs North Bihar Regional Transport Authority and Others

Patna High Court · Decided on 16 May 1978 · Citation: AIR 1979 Patna 164 : (1979) PLJR 40

HON’BLE JUDGES
K.B.N. Singh, C.J · P.S. Sahay, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Jur. Case No. 1400 of 1976

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Judgment

29 paragraphs · 2,779 words

P.S. Sahay, J.—This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is for quashing Annexures 1 and 2, the order of the North Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Muzaffarpur (respondent No. 1) dated 8-2-75 and Annexure 3, the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (respondent No. 11) dated 18-5-76. The aforesaid orders have been passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter called the Act).

2.

In order to appreciate the points raised some necessary facts have to be stated. The petitioner was granted stage carriage permit for the route Begusarai-Barauni via Eastern Tilrath Gumti, Barauni Block, Pipra Chowk and has been operating the same. Radha Krishna Singh (respondent No. 4) holds a similar permit for his route Sagi-Begusarai, which covers a distance of 29 miles. On 30-3-71 respondent No. 4 filed an application before respondent No. 1 for a further extension of his permit covering a distance of 10 miles more from Begusarai to Barauni, via Eastern Tilrath Gumti, Barauni Block, Pipra Chowk. The said application was published in the official gazette on 9-6-71 in order to invite objections u/s 57(3) of the Act, and the petitioner filed objection to the aforesaid extension on 7-7-71. Respondents 5 to 10, holders of stage carriage permits for various routes indicated below also filed applications for extension of their permits which was also published and the petitioner did not file any objection in his case:

Name Route Permit No. Date of application for extension. Extension sought for. Date of Publication. Objection by whom filed and data.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Radha Krishna Singh (R. 4) Begusarai (26 miles); 192/70 30-3-71 Begusarai Barauni (10 miles) 9-6-71 Baikunth Singh (7-7-71)

Srikanth Pd. Singh (R. 5) Do 200/73 11-4.74 do 26-6-74 No Objection

Umakanth Singh (R. 7) Bakri. Begusarai (21 mile) 1/74. 11-4-74 do do do

Amaresh Kr. Singh (R. 8) Begusarsi Sagi (26 miles) 207/73 15-2.74 do do do

Ramakant Singh (R. 6) Chatar. Begusarai (46 miles) 210/73 15.2-741 Begusaral to Barauni (10 miles) do do

Chandreshwar Singh (R. 9) Begusarai Sagi (26 miles); 208/73 do do 35-9-74 do

Ramsagar Singh (R. 10) Do 109/73 11.4-74 do 3.7.74 do

Respondent No. 1 in its meeting dated 8-2-75, after considering the reports of respondents 2 and 3 and in view of the State Government policy, granted temporary and provisional extensions to all those applicants for the routes prayed for. A copy of the resolution granting extension to respondent No. 4 is filed herewith marked Annexure 1 and of the permission granted to respondents 5 to 10 is filed herewith marked Annexure 2. The petitioner filed an application in revision before the State Transport Tribunal (respondent No. 11), which was numbered as T.R. 53 of 1975. A similar application was also filed by respondent No. 4, Radha Krishna Singh, which gave rise to T.R. No. 59 of 1975, in which the petitioner was also impleaded as opposite party, challenging the grant of temporary and provisional extension of permits and praying for permanent extension. Respondents 5 to 10 also prayed for permanent extension. All the applications were heard together by the Chairman, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Bihar, at Muzaffarpur, who by his order dated 18-5-76 dismissed the application filed by the petitioner.

The applications filed by respondent No. 4 and also respondents 5 to 10 were allowed and respondent No. 1 was directed to make a permanent extension of the permits granted to him. The Tribunal has also held that the petitioner should have filed two applications whereas he has filed only one, challenging the grant of permit to respondent No. 4 only and, therefore he could not raise any objection so far as respondents 5 to 10 are concerned. The Tribunal also rejected the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that before deciding their cases for extension there should have been an order u/s 47(3) fixing the limit of the vehicles. On merit also, the Tribunal held that on the reports of the authorities it was satisfied that the extension was justified in view of the public demand. A copy of the order of the Tribunal dated 18-5-76 has been filed along with the application marked as Annexure 3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner has moved this court for quashing.

3.

Mr. Rana Pratap Singh II appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that before granting extension to respondents 4 to 10 there should have been an order as required u/s 47(3) of the Act, and in absence of such an order the whole proceeding was without jurisdiction. Secondly, it has been contended that though the petitioner did not file any objection against the extension of the permit so far as respondents 5 to 10 are concerned, still he was entitled to challenge the same, as the order was completely without jurisdiction. Mr. Amala Kanta Choudhary appearing on behalf of respondents 5 to 10 has contended that in cases covered by Section 57(8), Section 47(3) is not attracted and even if no limit has been fixed under the aforesaid section, the order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. It has also been submitted by him that the authorities have power to attach condition u/s 48(3), which is an independent section and not controlled by Section 47(3). Counter-affidavit has also been filed on behalf of his clients supporting the order passed by respondent No. 1 extending their permits and also of the Tribunal directing the authority to grant permanent permits to them. A similar argument has also been advanced by Mr. Badri Narain Singh appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4. On his behalf also a counter-affidavit has been filed supporting the order of respondent No. 1 and also of the Tribunal.

4.

Before considering the submissions raised on behalf of the parties it will be necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Act. Application for stage carriage permit has to be filed u/s 46 of the Act which lays down various conditions that have to be satisfied before an application can be filed. Section 47 deals with the procedure to be followed by the Regional Transport Authority while considering such application, and it will be relevant to quote Section 47(3) which is in controversy in this case, in extenso:

"A Regional Transport Authority may, having regard to the matters mentioned in Sub-section (1), limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region."

Section 57 deals with the procedure in applying for and in granting of the permits, and u/s 57(3) on receipt of application the same has to be published for inviting objections within thirty days, and such objections are actually considered by the Transport Authority while granting permits. Permits are then granted u/s 48 (which is not necessary to be mentioned for the purpose of this, application), which lays down various conditions. On examination of the relevant provisions under Sections 47 and 57 before granting stage carriage permit, two independent steps have to be taken. Firstly, there should be a determination by the Transport Authority of the number of stage carriages for which permits can be granted u/s 47(3); thereafter, applications for stage carriage permits should be entertained. The Transport Authority is not competent to grant stage carriage permits for more carriages than fixed u/s 57(3). Having once fixed the limit the authority publishes u/s 57(3) the application together with a notice of the date before which representations can be submitted and the date on which the representations have to be considered.

After having done so, the next thing that the authority has to consider is whether the permit should be granted, and it has to act within that limit fixed u/s 47(3) and ultimately grant or refuse the permit u/s 48(1). Therefore, once the limit is fixed, the only question before the authority to be considered is whether the operator is a fit person to be granted a permit or not in the light of the matters set out under Sub-section (1) of Section 47. This is also clear from the opening words of Section 48(1) which empowers the Authority to grant or refuse, permit and starts with the words "subject to the provisions of Section 47". Reference in this connection may be made to R. Obliswami Naidu Vs. The Additional State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and Others, . In the case of Mohd. Ibrahim, etc. Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras, etc., , it has been held that the provisions of Section 47(3) are not an empty formality and has to be strictly complied with.

In Rattan Lal Gupta and Others Vs. Shri Suraj Bhan and Others, , on which both the parties had relied, has simply laid down that before a permit is granted, strength must be fixed in order to avoid manipulation. In a Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court reported in Ajit Kumar Singh and Others Vs. The Regional Transport Authority, Kanpur and Others, , their Lordships held that before grant of permit strength must be fixed. The Regional Transport Authority has to consider the applications on merit and has to confine within that limit, and if it transgresses the limit the action will be without jurisdiction. It has been further observed that the proceeding u/s 47(3) is administrative and no party has the right to be heard while fixing the limit, whereas the proceedings u/s 57(3) are quasi-judicial in nature and the rules of natural justice must be observed. Thus, on a careful consideration of the authorities, it is absolutely clear that before the grant of stage carriage permit the provisions of Section 47 and the procedure laid down u/s 57 have to be complied with.

5.

Now, I shall consider whether in applications for grant of extension of permits as required u/s 57(8) a limit has to be fixed or not. It will be better to quote Sub-section (8) of Section 57 which reads thus:

"An application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or, in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of services above the specified maximum, or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carrier''s permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit;

Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route or in any area to increase the frequency of the service so provided, without any increase in the number of vehicles."

Reading the above provisions it is clear that any change in the terms and conditions of the permit, including the extension of a new route, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit, the only exception being that it will not be considered as a new permit if the frequency of the permit-holder who provides the only service on any route or in any area is increased. In the instant case, according to the chart which has been given above, the original route was different and the extension sought for completely changed the nature of the original permit. The word ''route'' has been defined in Section 2(28A). ''Route'' means a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another. Therefore, in my opinion, if the original route is changed by bringing in a new route by extension, it shall be treated as an application for grant of a new permit, and all the formalities and procedures which are followed for the grant of a new permit have also to be followed in such cases. The limit has to be fixed u/s 47(3), and then it has to be published in the gazette for inviting objections u/s 57(3).

In the instant case it is clear that on the application for the extension of the permits by respondents 4 to 10 there was publication u/s 57(3), and the procedure was thus partly followed. I am supported in my view by the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sudhir Kumar Sadhu and Another Vs. Regional Transport Authority, Burdwan and Others, , where it has been held that extension of an existing permit by including new area has to be treated as an application for a new permit for which applications under Sub-sections (2) and (3) of 57 have to be made. In Kannayya Naidu Vs. The Regional Transport Authority, Chittoor and Another, it has been held that Section 57(8) is not only procedural but substantive, because by varying the terms of the permit it has to be treated as a new permit. The Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in S. M. Shinde v. S. B. Bagli (AIR 1963 Mys 261) took the view that variations of the terms and conditions of the permit u/s 58(3) can only be complied with by following the procedure laid down for the disposal of an application for a new permit.

It may also be relevant to examine Section 62 in this connection which deals with grant of temporary permits for a period of four months, and this can be done without following the procedure laid down in Section 57. This also supports my view that in all other cases, including the grant of new permit or extension of a permit the prescribed procedure has to be strictly complied with. Thus, on a careful consideration of the various provisions of the Act and the case laws which have been discussed above, it is difficult to agree with the finding of the Tribunal that in cases for extension a route as required u/s 57(8), it is not necessary to comply with the provisions laid down u/s 47(3). It is also difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Amala Kanta Choudhury that the Tribunal has attached certain conditions to the permit, a Sectioncting in exercise of the powers u/s 48(3), but such powers have to be exercised within the limits prescribed under the aforesaid clause which certainly does not include extension of a permit and could not have been so because of the proviso to Section 48 which reads as follows:

"Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the application."

These conditions, in my opinion, relate to the grant of permit at the initial stage, but if there is a prayer for the extension, as in the instant case, u/s 57(8), Section 48 will not be attracted. Reliance has also been placed on behalf of respondents 5 to 10 on the decision in the case of Arbind Kumar Singh v. Ansar Motor Service (1969 LJR 104), but, in my opinion, it is an authority only for the limited purpose that against an order passed u/s 57(8), no appeal is maintainable and only a revision can be filed. Therefore, this authority does not support the contention raised on behalf of respondents 5 to 10.

6.

On a careful consideration of the points which have been raised in this case I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Transport Authority (respondent No. 1) and also by the Tribunal (respondent No. 11) is wholly without jurisdiction because of non-compliance with the provisions laid down in Section 47(3). In view of the fact that the petitioner has succeeded on the first point, it is not necessary to consider the second point raised on his behalf in this application. No doubt, no objection regarding the grant of permit to respondents 5 to 10 was made by the petitioner, but since the entire matter has come before us and it has been found that the provisions of the Act have not been strictly complied with, it will only be just and proper for us to interfere even with the orders passed in favour of respondents 5 to 10 in the instant case.

7.

In the result, the application is allowed. Let a writ of certiorari issue quashing the order of respondent No. 1 as contained in Annexures 1 and 2 and the order of respondent No. 11 as contained in Annexure 3. In the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. K. B. N. SINGH, C. J.:-- I agree.