Aurora Educational Society vs Chief Commissioner of Income Tax

Ramesh Ranganathan, J.—The relief sought for in this writ petition is to declare the order of the first respondent dated September 24, 2009, as arbitrary and illegal, and, consequently, to direct the first respondent to grant approval in terms of section10(23C)(vi) of the income tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter called "the Act"). The objects of the petitioner, a society registered under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Areas) Public Societies Registration Act, 1350 Fasli, with Registration No. 201 of 1989 dated February 4, 1989, were as under:

(i) To start educational institutions, libraries and law colleges, etc.

(ii) To organize social services, and

(iii) To do the needful for the poor children and students on social grounds.

Subsequently, the objects are said to have been amended at the meeting held on August 13, 2009, and to have been registered with the Registrar of Societies. The objects, after amendment, are said to be as under:

(a) To start educational institutions, libraries and law colleges, etc.

(b) To organize seminars, workshops, debates, camps and forums etc., to students;

(c) To encourage educational activities among the students;

(d) To open, run and continue primary, secondary and high schools for students; and

(e) To help poor people to study.

The petitioner claims to be running various educational institutions including P. G. colleges, engineering colleges, etc., after obtaining necessary approval from the appropriate authorities. They also claim to have filed income tax returns seeking exemption under the Act contending that their existence is solely for educational purposes and not for profit.

The petitioner claims to have submitted an application on May 31, 2005, in Form 56D seeking exemption for the assessment year 2004-05, along with all necessary enclosures, before the Director of income tax (Exemption) as their gross collections were likely to exceed Rs. 1 crore. They also claim to have filed another application in Form 56D on March 26, 2007, along with all necessary enclosures, seeking exemption from the assessment year 2004-05 onwards. It is their case that, on the oral request of the Director of income tax (Exemption), they once again filed another application in Form 56D on September 24, 2008, with all necessary enclosures.

The first respondent passed order dated September 24, 2009, granting approval under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act from the assessment year 2009-10 onwards. The first respondent, by another order dated September 24, 2009, refused to entertain the application submitted by the petitioner in so far as it related to the assessment years 2004-05 to 2008-09 on the ground that it was beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the fourteenth proviso to section10(23C)(vi) of the Act. It is this order which is under challenge in this writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had submitted applications earlier on May 31, 2005, and March 26, 2007; the application dated September 24, 2008, was filed at the request of the second/third respondent as the earlier applications filed by the petitioner was misplaced; the first respondent ought to have given them an opportunity of being heard before passing the impugned order, which would have enabled them to bring to his notice that they had filed the first application as early as on May 31, 2005; the first respondent failed to notice that the amendment, prescribing limitation for submitting an application under section10(23C)(vi), came into force only from June 1, 2006, whereas the petitioner had submitted their first application even prior thereto on May 31, 2005.

In the counter-affidavit filed by the second respondent it is stated that, as per the records in their office, the petitioner did not file any application on May 31, 2005, seeking approval under section10(23C)(vi); and their claim that they did so was not evidenced by the records of their office. In so far as the petitioner''s claim to have filed another application on March 26, 2007, is concerned, the second respondent would state that the inward register, pertaining to the period April 1, 2006, to March 31, 2007, was not readily traceable and, as per their records, the petitioner did not file any application, in Form 56D, either on May 31, 2005, or March 26, 2007.

In the counter-affidavit, filed on behalf of the first respondent, it is stated that the petitioner''s application dated September 24, 2008, was rejected by an order dated September 24, 2009, on the ground that the application was submitted beyond the time limit specified in the fourteenth proviso to section10(23C); the objects of the petitioner-society, as amended on August 13, 2009, would be applicable only from the assessment year 2010-11; the petitioner did not furnish particulars of their having filed their return of income, with necessary evidence such as inward number, date of filing, etc., and, as such, their claim that they existed solely for educational purposes, from the assessment year 2004-05 onwards, was not correct.

In their rejoinder, the petitioner would submit that their primary object is to provide education without profit motive, their objects are all related to educational purposes only; they had amended their objects only at the instance of the authorities; in so far as the application dated March 26, 2007, is concerned, the second respondent was taking inconsistent stands; the petitioner had filed their application on the said date, and had obtained acknowledgment in the office copy and the second respondent had given No. 0316 to the application filed on March 26, 2007.

The scope and amplitude of section10(23C)(vi) of the income tax Act, the provisos thereunder and the rules and forms applicable thereto, which were the subject-matter of examination in New Noble Educational Society Vs. The Chief Commissioner of Income tax and Director of Income Tax (Exemption), and in R. R. M. Educational Society v. Chief CIT [2011] 339 ITR 323 (AP) can, conveniently, be summarised as under:

As section 20A of the A. P. Education Act prohibits individuals from establishing educational institutions, it is only societies/associations/ trusts which can establish educational institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh.

Section10(23C)(iiiad) of the Act, read with rule 2BC(1) of the income tax Rules stipulates that the income received by a person (i.e., the educational agency-society/trust), on behalf of an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for the purpose of profit, shall not be included in their total income if the aggregate annual receipts of such an educational institution do not exceed Rs. 1 crore.

Where the annual receipts of an educational institution exceeds Rs. 1 crore, the benefit of exclusion from the total income is available not under sub-clause (iiiad) but under sub-clause (vi) of section10(23C) whereunder approval is also required to be obtained from the prescribed authority.

Except that approval is now required to be obtained from the prescribed authority, section10(23C)(vi) is analogous to section10(23C), as it existed prior to its omission by the Finance Act, 1998, with effect from April 1, 1999. To that extent judicial pronouncements, made in the context of section10(23C), would equally apply to section10(23C)(vi) of the Act American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Others,

It would be unreal and hyper-technical to hold that an educational society, running an educational institution solely for educational purposes and not for the purpose of profit, is only a financing body and will not come within the scope of "other educational institution". If, in substance and reality, the sole purpose for which the society has come into existence is to impart education at the level of colleges and schools, it should be regarded as an "educational institution" Aditanar Educational Institution Vs. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax,

Educational institutions, which are registered as a society, would continue to retain their character as such and would be eligible to apply for exemption under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act ( Pinegrove International Charitable Trust Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (P&H)).

To be eligible for exemption, under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act, it is necessary that there must exist an educational institution. Secondly, such institution must exist solely for educational purposes and, thirdly, the institution should not exist for the purpose of profit ( Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Sorabji Nusserwanji Parekh,

The recipient of the income must have the character of an educational institution to be ascertained from its objects. If the activity has no co-relation to education, exemption has to be denied ( Aditanar Educational Institution Vs. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax,

The emphasis in section10(23C)(vi) is on the word "solely". "Solely" means exclusively and not primarily Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Gurukul Ghatkeswar Trust, ), Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Maharaja Sawai Mansinghji Museum Trust, ). In using the said expression, the Legislature intends to exempt the income of institutions established solely for educational purposes, and not for commercial activities M/s. Oxford University Press etc. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, . This requirement would militate against an institution pursuing objects other than education Vanita Vishram Trust Vs. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and Another, . Even if one of the objects enables the institution to undertake commercial activities, it would not be entitled for approval under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act ( American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Others,

It is only if the objects reveal that the very being of the assessee-society, as an educational institution, is exclusively for educational purposes and not for profit, would they be entitled for exemption under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act ( Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Gurukul Ghatkeswar Trust,

Imparting of education is regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. "Education" is not regarded as a trade or business where profit is the motive ( The State of Bombay Vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, Islamic Academy of Education and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Others,

Section 2(15) of the income tax Act defines "charitable purpose" to include "education". The sense in which the word "education" has been used in section 2(15) is the systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young in preparation for the work of life. It also connotes the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has received. The word "education", in section 2(15), has not been used in that wide and extended sense according to which every acquisition of further knowledge constitutes education. What education connotes, in that clause, is the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind and character of students by formal schooling The Sole Trustee, Lok Shikshana Trust Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore, ). This definition of "education" is wide enough to cover the case of an "educational institution" as, under section10(23C)(vi), the "educational institution" must exist "solely" for educational purposes Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Maharaja Sawai Mansinghji Museum Trust,

The element of imparting education to students, or the element of normal schooling where there are teachers and taught, must be present so as to fall within the sweep of section10(23C)(vi) of the Act. Such an institution may, incidentally, take up other activities for the benefit of students or in furtherance of their education. It may invest its funds or it may provide scholarships or other financial assistance which may be helpful to the students in pursuing their studies. Such incidental activities alone, in the absence of the actual activity of imparting education by normal schooling or normal conduct of classes, would not suffice for the purpose of qualifying the institution for the benefit of section10(23C)(vi) Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Sorabji Nusserwanji Parekh,

Section 2(15) is wider in terms than section10(23C)(vi) of the Act. If the assessee''s case does not fall within section 2(15), it is difficult to put it in section10(23C)(vi) of the Act ( Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Maharaja Sawai Mansinghji Museum Trust,

If there are several objects of a society some of which relate to "education", and others which do not, and the trustees or the managers, in their discretion, are entitled to apply the income or property to any of those objects, the institution would not be liable to be regarded as one existing solely for educational purposes, and no part of its income would be exempt from tax.

In other words, where the main objects are distributive, each and everyone of them must relate to "education" in order that the institution may be held entitled for the benefits under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act.

If the dominant purpose of an institution is "educational", another object which is merely ancillary or incidental to the dominant purpose would not disentitle the institution from the benefit.

The test which has, therefore, to be applied is whether the object, which is said to be non-educational, is the main object of the institution or it is ancillary or incidental to the dominant object which is "educational" Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, ). The test is the genuineness of the purpose tested by the obligation created to spend the money exclusively on "education". If that obligation is there, the income becomes entitled to exemption The Sole Trustee, Lok Shikshana Trust Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore,

On a conjoint reading of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 8 of the A. P. Societies Registration Act, 2001, it is only when the amendment to the objects of a society (educational agency) is intimated and the Registrar, on being satisfied that the amendment is not contrary to the provisions of the Act, registers and certifies such an alteration, would it be a valid alteration under the Act. It is only from the date the Registrar certifies the alteration that the amendment, to the objects of the society, comes into force.

In the case of a dispute, whether the claim of the assessee to be exempted from tax is admissible or not, it is necessary for the assessee to establish that it is a part of an institution which is engaged solely for educational purposes and not for the purposes of profit, and the income in respect of which exemption is claimed is a part of the income of the institution ( M/s. Oxford University Press etc. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax,

The activities of the institution, its objects, its source of income and its utilisation, must be analysed by the prescribed authority to ascertain whether it exists solely for education and not for profit, and it is his duty to ascertain whether the income is applied wholly and exclusively for the educational objects for which the applicant is established Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Others,

The test of predominant object of the activity is to be seen, whether it exists solely for education and not to earn profit Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, , American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Others, Pinegrove International Charitable Trust Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, The decisive test is whether, on an overall view of the matter, the object is to carry on educational activities or to make profit ( Aditanar Educational Institution Vs. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, .

While the object of establishing an educational institution should not be to make profit there can, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus which may be used by the educational institution for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the institution T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others,

It is not possible to carry on educational activity in such a way that the expenditure exactly balances the income, and there is no resultant profit Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, , American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Others, , Pinegrove International Charitable Trust Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

Profits/surplus, if any, can neither be diverted for any other use or purpose nor can it be used for personal gain or for any other business or enterprise Islamic Academy of Education and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Others,

Under the third proviso to section10(23C)(vi), the prescribed authority has to ascertain, while examining the genuineness of the activities of the institution, whether the applicant applies its income wholly and exclusively to the objects for which it is established. The applicant has not only to impart, but must also apply its income exclusively for the purposes of, education American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Others,

The words "not for the purposes of profit" accompanying the words "existing solely for educational purposes" has to be read and interpreted keeping in view the third proviso to section10(23C)(vi) which prescribes the methodology for utilisation and accumulation of income at the hands of the educational institution. As a result 85 per cent. of the income has to be applied by the educational society for the purpose of education. Capital expenditure, if incurred, for the attainment of such objects has to be deducted from the gross receipts/income. The word "wholly" in the third proviso refers to the quantum of expenditure and the word "exclusively" refers to the motive, object or the purpose of expenditure Pinegrove International Charitable Trust Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

The third proviso indicates that accumulation of income by an educational institution, governed by sub-clause (vi), is not a disabling factor as long as the purpose of accumulation is the application of the income wholly and exclusively for the purpose of education ( Vanita Vishram Trust Vs. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and Another, That the third proviso to section10(23C)(vi) permits investment and deposits, of its surplus, in a fund means that the institution can have deposits on which it may earn interest ( City Montessori School (Regd.) Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

The idea underlying the twelfth proviso to section10(23C) is to provide guidance to the prescribed authority as to the meaning of the words "application of income to the objects for which the institution is established" American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Others,

In view of the twelfth proviso to section10(23C) of the Act, money advanced to another educational institution cannot be treated as application of income to the objects for which the petitioner-society is established; such a transaction would only mean that the funds of the applicant-society have not been utilised solely for the purposes of education and the applicant-society would, therefore, be disentitled from being granted approval by the prescribed authority under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act.

The provisions of section 13(1)(c) would be attracted in cases where any part of the income, or the property, of a charitable institution is used, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of the person referred to in section 13(3) of the Act. u/s 13(2), the income or property of the institution shall, for the purposes of section 13(1)(a), be deemed to have been used or applied for the benefit of a person referred to in section 13(3) if any one of clauses (a) to (h) of section 13(2) are applicable. The person, referred to in section 13(3), would be benefited only if the amount paid to him constitutes a benefit to him or if clauses (a) to (h) of section 13(2) are attracted.

It is only if the rent paid to the person, referred to in section 13(3), is more than the prevailing market rates can the recipient of the rent/rental advance be said to have benefited thereby.

On a conjoint reading of section 13(1)(a) with section 13(2)(a) and 13(2)(g) of the Act, interest-free advance given to the secretary of a society running an educational institution, (a person who falls within the ambit of section 13(3)(cc) of the income tax Act), would amount to a part of the income or property of the educational institution being used for the benefit of such a person, and the provisions of section 13(1)(c) of the Act would be attracted thereby.

The fourteenth proviso to section10(23C) of the Act, in its entirety, was inserted by the Finance Act, 2006, with effect from June 1, 2006, and, prior to its amendment by the Finance Act, 2009, required an educational institution which makes an application, on or after the first day of June, 2006, for the purpose of grant of exemption or continuance thereof to make an application at any time during the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year. After its amendment by the Finance Act, 2009, with retrospective effect from April 1, 2009, the fourteenth proviso to section10(23C) stipulates that where an educational institution, referred to in the first proviso, makes an application, on or after the first day of June, 2006, for the purpose of grant of exemption or continuance thereof, such application shall be made on or before the 30th day of September of the relevant assessment year for which the exemption is sought.

The fourteenth proviso to section10(23C) has been inserted, inter alia, to provide for a period of limitation for entertaining an application, under section10(23C)(vi) for grant of exemption, on or after the 1st day of June, 2006. The Legislature has, however, not made any provision for condonation of the delay in presenting such an application.

The prescribed authority, being a creature of the statute, cannot travel beyond the statutory provisions and does not have the jurisdiction to entertain an application filed under section10(23C)(vi) beyond the statutory period of limitation or to condone the delay in presenting the said application Roland Educational and Charitable Trust Vs. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and Others,

It is evident, from the provisos to section10(23C)(vi), that there is a difference between stipulation of conditions and compliance thereof Vanita Vishram Trust Vs. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and Another, ). At the initial stage, when an application for exemption is submitted by an educational institution, the scope of inquiry is restricted only to ascertain the genuineness of the activities of such an institution. Such an inquiry may even extend to an examination of the accounts of the institution, application of its income to the object and purposes of education and other cognate aspects. Once, on the basis of the genuineness of the activities of an educational institution, approval is granted for exemption then the monitoring provisions would come into play Pinegrove International Charitable Trust Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

The applicant must also adhere to the conditions in Form 56D (rule 2CA). One of the conditions is that the assessee will have to submit its audited accounts and balance-sheets for the last three years, along with a note on the examination of accounts, on the activities as reflected in the accounts, and in the annual reports with special reference to appropriation of income in furtherance of the objects of the educational institution. From the audited accounts it can be ascertained whether the funds were utilized for the expansion of the educational institution/activity or for personal profit ( City Montessori School (Regd.) Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

In cases where approval, under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act is initially sought, the objects in the memorandum of association of a society/ trust are conclusive proof of such a trust existing solely as an educational institution entitled for the benefits, and as being eligible for approval, under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act. In addition, an application in the prescribed proforma should be submitted to the prescribed authority within the time stipulated, and the specified documents should be enclosed thereto.

In cases where an application is submitted, seeking renewal of the exemption granted earlier, the prescribed authority shall, in addition to the conditions aforementioned, also examine whether the income of the applicant-society has been applied solely for the purposes of education in terms of section10(23C)(vi) of the Act, the provisos thereunder, the income tax Rules, and the documents enclosed to the application submitted in Form 56D.

The threshold conditions are aimed at discovering the actual existence of an educational institution and approval of the prescribed authority for which an application in the standardised form, in terms of the first proviso, has to be given by every applicant. If the pre-requisite condition, of actual existence of the educational institution, is fulfilled then the question of compliance with the requirements, contemplated by various provisos, would arise. Only if the educational institution actually exists for educational purposes alone should it be permitted to operate subject to the monitoring conditions to be stipulated by the prescribed authority American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Others, Pinegrove International Charitable Trust Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

Compliance with the monitoring conditions/requirements under the third proviso, like application, accumulation, deployment of income in specified assets, whose compliance depends on events that have not taken place on the date of the application for initial approval, can be stipulated as conditions by the prescribed authority subject to which approval may be granted, provided they are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act.

While imposing such conditions the prescribed authority may insist that a certain percentage of the accounting income should be utilised/ applied for imparting education. He may grant approval on such terms and conditions as he deems fit in cases where the institution applies for initial approval for the first time.

The prescribed authority must give an opportunity to the applicant-institution to comply with the monitoring conditions which have been stipulated for the first time by the third proviso.

After grant of approval, if it is brought to the notice of the prescribed authority that the conditions, on which approval was given, are breached or that circumstances mentioned in the thirteenth proviso exists, then he can withdraw the approval earlier given by following the procedure mentioned in that proviso.

Stipulation of monitoring conditions is different from compliance with those conditions. Compliance or non-compliance can only be gauged at the assessment stage, as availability of exemption has to be evaluated every year in order to find out whether the institution existed during the relevant year solely for educational purposes, and not for profit ( American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Others, Vanita Vishram Trust Vs. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and Another,

The Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (A. P. Act 30 of 1987), is applicable to all charitable institutions regardless of religion Parsi Zoroastrian Anjuman of Secunderabad and Hyderabad and others Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, Hyd. and others,

"Charitable purpose", u/s 2(5) of A. P. Act 30 of 1987, brings within its ambit, amongst others, education also. To find out the object for which a society has been established, the provisions of section 2(5) of A. P. Act 30 of 1987, which only excludes those "exclusively of a religious nature", also has a role to play Commissioner of Endowments, Andhra Pradesh, Hyd. and Another Vs. All India Sai Seva Samaj,

The provisions of A. P. Act 30 of 1987 apply to all public charitable institutions whether registered or not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. A public charitable institution is required, in law, to manage its affairs strictly in accordance with the provisions of A. P. Act 30 of 1987. Registration under A. P. Act 30 of 1987 would also ensure that the activities of the educational agency are monitored by the State agencies. The mere fact that the authorities failed to act in the matter to get the institution registered under the provisions of the Act is of no legal consequence The Secretary to Government, Revenue (Endowments) Department and Others Vs. Sri Swamy Ayyappa Cooperative Housing Societies Limited and Others,

While failure to register themselves under A. P. Act 30 of 1987 may attract the penal provisions therein, the said Act does not prohibit public charitable institutions from carrying on their activities even though they are not registered under the Act.

As "education" falls within the scope of "charitable purpose" both u/s 2(5) of A. P. Act 30 of 1987 and section 2(15) of the income tax Act and, inasmuch as A. P. Act 30 of 1987 requires all charitable institutions in the State of A. P. to be registered, societies running educational institutions should register themselves under the provisions of A. P. Act 30 of 1987, as failure to so hold would result in one arm of the law being utilised to defeat another arm of the law which would not only be opposed to public policy but would also bring the law into ridicule Bihari Lal Jaiswal and Others Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Others,

Even in cases where a society is registered as a charitable institution under A. P. Act 30 of 1987, the prescribed authority is not absolved of his statutory duty to verify the statutorily prescribed documents, and to satisfy himself that the applicant-society is not only a charitable institution but also that its charitable objects are exclusively for educational purposes and for no other. Since the statutory provisions of the income tax Act prescribe this as a threshold examination requirement, satisfaction of which alone would require the prescribed authority to grant approval, in cases where he is satisfied, after examination of the records, that the applicant exists solely for educational purposes and not for the purposes of profit, and the application is made in the stipulated form accompanied by all the documents specified under the Act and the Rules, he would not be justified in denying approval merely on the ground that the applicants did not register themselves as a charitable institution under A. P. Act 30 of 1987.

The certificate issued by the Commissioner of Endowments, as the appropriate authority u/s 43 of A. P. Act 30 of 1987, is but one of the factors, and not conclusive proof, of an assessee under the income tax Act being a charitable institution existing solely for the purposes of education.

Even in case the assessee produces a certificate of registration u/s 43 of A. P. Act 30 of 1987, the prescribed authority has to independently examine the objects of the applicant-society, their application seeking approval under section10(23C)(vi), and the prescribed documents enclosed thereto, and satisfy himself, in the light of the provisions of section10(23C)(vi), the provisos thereto, rule 2CA of the Rules and Form 56D, that the existence of the educational institution is solely for the purposes of education and not for the purpose of profit, and only if he is so satisfied to grant approval.

Registration u/s 43 of A. P. Act 30 of 1987 is not a condition precedent for grant of approval under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act. The prescribed authority can, however, prescribe registration under A. P. Act 30 of 1987 as a condition subject to which approval is granted under section10(23C)(vi) of the Act inasmuch as registration, as a charitable institution, under A. P. Act 30 of 1987 would be one of the factors to show that the society concerned exists for the charitable purpose of carrying on educational activities.

The burden of establishing that an application in Form 56D was filed, as early as on May 31, 2005, lies heavily on the petitioner. The copy of the application placed before this court does contain the seal of the office of the Director of Exemption. However, in the light of the averment in the counter-affidavit, that receipt of the said application dated May 31, 2005, is not borne out by the records, the conduct of the petitioner must also be noted. Having filed the application on May 31, 2005, it defies reason that the petitioner would not follow up the matter with the first respondent and would wait for nearly two years to make the subsequent application dated March 26, 2007, and to again wait for more than one year thereafter before submitting the application on September 24, 2008. We are, therefore, unable to brush aside the submission of Sri J. V. Prasad, learned standing counsel, that the applications, said to have been filed on May 31, 2005, and March 26, 2007, are created only to get over the amendment to the fourteenth proviso which came into force with effect from June 1, 2006. The petitioner''s application dated September 24, 2008, can only be applicable for the assessment years 2009-10 and beyond, and not for the assessment years prior thereto.

Even otherwise the petitioner''s objects, as it originally stood, include "to organise social services" and "to do needful for the poor children on social grounds". These objects are not "solely" educational in nature. They are also not ancillary to, or integrally connected with, the sole object of providing education. While the petitioner would contend that the original objects were amended in the meeting held on August 13, 2009, and were registered with the Registrar of Societies, Hyderabad, the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition is silent as to the date on which the objects were so registered. The petitioner has chosen not even to place a copy of the certificate, if any, issued by the Registrar of Societies certifying the amendment, before this court. In view of the statutory requirement of section 8(3) and (4) of the A. P. Societies Registration Act, 2001, it is only when the Registrar certifies an alteration of the objects would it be a valid alteration of the objects under the Act, and it is only from that date would the amended objects would come into force. In the absence of details being furnished regarding the date on which the objects were registered, even if August 13, 2009 (the date of which the meeting, wherein the objects were amended, is said to have been held) is taken as the relevant date the amended objects would be applicable only for the assessment year 2010-11 or, at best, the assessment year 2009-10 and not prior thereto. As noted hereinabove, approval was granted by the first respondent for the assessment year 2009-10.

The petitioner would, however, contend that this is not the reason for the first petitioner rejecting their application. The jurisdiction exercised by this court under article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary, and a writ is not issued as a matter of course. A writ of mandamus is not a writ of course or a writ of right but is, as a rule, discretionary ( C.R. Reddy Law College Employees'' Association and Others Vs. Bar Council of India and Others, One of the limitations imposed by this court, on itself, is that it would not exercise jurisdiction unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensue. It would not allow itself to be turned into a court of appeal to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya, . Ex facie some of the objects of the petitioner-society, as it originally stood, are not solely for the purposes of education. In such circumstances we see no reason to exercise discretion to interfere, set aside the order of the first respondent, and remand the matter for his consideration afresh, only for him to reject the petitioner''s application on the ground that their objects are not solely for the purposes of education. Viewed from any angle, the relief sought for in the writ petition cannot be granted. The writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs.